Well worth reading, and containing some surprising and little-known facts:
Yet most of the Syrian refugees have been taken in not by Western countries but by Syria’s neighboring states: Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, whose capacity has been overwhelmed. Lebanon, with a population of around four million and a territory smaller than Maryland, is hosting over a million Syrian refugees. Young people are overrepresented in the refugee population, so that more than half of the school-aged children in Lebanon are now Syrian.
It is estimated that an extraordinary number of people have left Syria, or have been driven from their neighborhoods within Syria (this is from a year ago):
Already, more than 10 million Syrians ”” nearly half of the country’s population ”” are estimated to live as refugees, either living as internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Syria or having fled to Turkey, Lebanon or Jordan.
If you’re confused by the difference between the terms “displaced persons” (familiar from WWII) and “refugees,” you’re not alone. A great many of the Syrians we call refugees don’t actually fit the definition of “refugee” in the legal sense:
“A [refugee is a] person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country…
That fits the Christian Syrians but I don’t see how it fits the Sunni Syrians. They appear to me to be displaced persons, both internal and international. However, if this is true, it doesn’t seem to matter much to those in charge right now.
More about displaced persons of the internal variety:
A forced migrant who left his or her home because of political persecution or violence, but did not cross an international border, is commonly considered to be the less well-defined category of internally displaced person (IDP), and is subject to more tenuous international protection…A migrant who fled because of economic hardship is an economic migrant.
Back to the plan in the original article:
Some 83 percent of Jordan’s refugees live in cities””around 170,000 in Amman alone. Their situation is clearly unsustainable: without access to international or state assistance, children grow up without education and families deplete their savings. The fate of the refugees who stay in the camps is similarly unfortunate: there, displaced Syrians languish under extreme dependency…
To avoid such outcomes, donor states and international organizations such as the UN have urged the governments of Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey to permanently integrate Syrian refugees into their societies. But leaders in those countries are deeply resistant to that idea, because they perceive refugees as a threat to domestic employment and a drain on stretched budgets. Nor are Syrian refugees easily incorporated into the fragile ethnic and sectarian balances that are crucial for maintaining stability in all three countries.
Take a moment to think about it. Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, majority Muslim countries which are ethnically and culturally similar (quite a bit less so for Turkey, but still a lot more similar than Western Europe or the US) are keeping the refugees in camps because they are afraid of the consequences of integrating them into their countries. And yet we are not supposed to feel a similar reluctance? What’s more, my guess is that the given reasons for those countries’ refusal is not the entire story; they may be all too aware of the possibilities for disruption and even terrorism in their own countries.
To continue:
An effective refugee policy should improve the lives of the refugees in the short term and the prospects of the region in the long term, and it should also serve the economic and security interests of the host states.
Jordan offers one place to begin. There, a reconsidered refugee policy would integrate displaced Syrians into specially created economic zones, offering Syrian refugees employment and autonomy, incubating businesses in preparation for the eventual end of the civil war in Syria, and aiding Jordan’s aspirations for industrial development. Such an approach would align the interests of a host state with the needs of refugees and might prove broadly applicable to refugee crises elsewhere.
There’s much more. I have no idea whether this would work, but it seems a lot better than what we’re doing now—which means it’s probably never going to happen.

