Please watch this; the part I’ve cued up is just two minutes long:
This isn’t something I’ve researched much yet, but my sense is that it’s more complicated than that.
It’s not as though Trump was unaware of the problem. But it’s been rough going. That article I just linked is from early September, 2026:
U.S. President Donald Trump told oil producers and refiners that he wants lower gasoline prices, immediately, at a meeting at the White House this week.
As gasoline prices remain above $4 per gallon on average across the United States and drivers are heading for the most expensive Labor Day weekend gas prices on record, President Trump urged executives from Chevron, Marathon Petroleum, Valero Energy, and PBF Energy, among others, to raise refining capacity to increase fuel availability.
This topic is way outside my field of expertise, and at the moment I don’t have time to do a deep dive on it. But apparently this has been going on for a long long time:
At the White House meeting, the executives reportedly discussed efforts to boost existing capacity and, most of all, the Renewable Fuel Standard. Some refiners criticized the blending targets as unattainable, which are driving up gasoline costs, sources with knowledge of the closed-door meeting told Bloomberg.
Moreover, U.S. refiners are not even entertaining the idea of building new refineries to ease potential similar supply crunches in the long term. …
Despite the deep pockets and the blockbuster profits this year, oil companies are unwilling to sink billions of U.S. dollars into a costly new construction venture that may not even be too profitable when it starts up in about five years, as fuel demand is expected to level off and even decline.
Why is it expected to decline?
More here:
A review of EIA refinery shutdown data indicates that approximately 2.6 million barrels per day of individual U.S. refinery capacity has been shuttered since 2001. Meanwhile, surviving refineries have been expanded, debottlenecked and made substantially more productive.
In other words, America did not simply shrink its refining system. America concentrated it.
We closed numerous facilities while investing heavily in the survivors. The result is fewer physical refineries, larger individual plants and less geographic redundancy in portions of the country. EIA’s 2026 data show 128 operating refineries and two idle facilities. That distinction matters when something goes wrong.
A barrel of Gulf Coast refining capacity is not necessarily a substitute for a barrel of lost West Coast refining capacity. Pipelines, ports, product specifications, transportation costs and refinery configurations matter. …
COVID provided an extraordinary stress test.
U.S. refining capacity fell 4.5% in a single year, to approximately 18.1 million barrels per day at the beginning of 2021. Six refineries closed during 2020. EIA attributed the closures to several causes, including collapsing petroleum demand, poor refinery economics and plans that in some cases predated the pandemic. Some facilities subsequently converted to renewable-fuel production.
This is where discussions of refinery closures can become too political too quickly. Not every refinery closed because of government policy. Some were old. Some were uneconomic. Some suffered accidents. COVID destroyed demand. Some companies preferred investing their capital elsewhere. Some refineries were converted to renewable diesel. Environmental compliance requirements and changing federal and state policies also influenced capital decisions.
Regardless of the explanation, capital allocation decisions ultimately depend on expected risk-adjusted returns. Capital asks a simpler question: What return am I likely to earn if I put another billion dollars here? If the expected return is inadequate relative to the risk, the money flows somewhere else.
Much more at the link, including this: “But refining is not like turning up the thermostat. A refinery already operating near its practical limit cannot magically process another 100,000 barrels tomorrow. Nor can a gasoline-oriented configuration instantaneously maximize diesel production.”
NOTE: As I said, there’s much much more at the link. I haven’t had time to read all of it, and at the moment I have some obligations that I need to tend to – however, I plan to read it a bit later today and perhaps add something more to this post. In the meantime, I have little doubt that some of you readers are a lot more up to speed on this than I am.
