I thought I’d get the first piece out today, but it may not be till next week – Monday, I hope. I was busy earlier today and got a very late start, and it’s one of the more complex issues I’ve tried to tackle. But I hope it will help readers here sort out an enormous tangle of information, and it will present some theories I’ve generated. The point is not just to evaluate what went so very wrong in the Uvalde response – and there’s plenty of that – but analyzing some of this may help somebody or other to come up with prevention and/or reaction strategies for the future.
But for today, I thought I’d just list a few somewhat random facts that McCraw mentioned in his lengthy lengthy testimony, things that have come up in discussions in the past on this blog and were considered somewhat mysterious. In no particular order:
(1) The perp had no trouble getting the money. It came from his fast-food job, and he had no rent or other expenses of the usual sort. He had stopped attending high school in his senior year and worked enough hours to save enough in a bank account (held jointly with his grandmother). He made many purchases online when he was seventeen – not of weapons but of accessories for the weapons he was planning to buy – and then after his 18th birthday he made the purchase of the items (including the firearms) that he was only able to buy after turning eighteen.
(2) He does not seem to have had any juvenile record. Apparently he kept a pretty low profile in the regard. Some acquaintances have reported animal abuse (carrying around dead cats in a bag and talking about it), but no one ever reported it to authorities. Also, despite quite a few apprehensive feelings about him on the part of online acquaintances alarmed by certain things he’d said, he was never reported to local or state or federal authorities for any of this.
(3) As I had guessed, there is no toxicology report yet on the perp because although it’s been done it takes a long time to issue results. He said the results will be made available after that.
(4) The questions of how the classroom door locks operated, whether or not the doors of those two classrooms were in fact locked, whether the officers knew whether they were or weren’t (or whether they even checked to see), and what should or could have been done by the officers to enter those classrooms, is such a big topic it will probably have its own post. But apropos of earlier discussions we had on this blog, a shotgun breach or an explosive breach of a locked door generally would never be used in a classroom situation. That wasn’t the issue here, however.
(5) Quite early on, there were at least two rifles, a Halligan, and several ballistic shields in the hallway of the school. Unfortunately – and this is one of my big criticisms of McCraw’s testimony – he doesn’t say where they were (the hallway had a bend in it), who had them exactly, to whom their presence was communicated, or whether it was in fact communicated to Arredondo or others in any possible coordinating position. McCraw did not even make it clear whether or not there was coordinated communication, and if so what its nature was (that is, how messages were conveyed), nor did he compare the communication that occurred within that hallway that day with what the officers would have been told to do in training in order to communicate under such circumstances. Perhaps there was someone else at the hearing who went into all of that; I only listened to McCraw, who spoke for about four and a half hours. If anyone has watched more of it and those things were touched on in any comprehensive way, please let me know.
(6) Police radios didn’t work in the school – not just the Uvalde police, but even the state police and the federal officers except for BorTac. And even the BorTac radios could not be reliably connected to each other while in the building, for a group call. What’s more, this is not an unusual problem in schools, and it’s somewhat expensive to solve (I’ve read that, anyway; there may be more creative cheaper solutions that haven’t been tried). McCraw also said that police radios are very chaotic in a crisis, with lots of communications coming in, and that can be a problem even if they are working. Quite a few of the officers in the hall had their radios with them, but they did not function and so were useless.
(7) Arredondo and others at the scene were in communication with headquarters by cell phone. But for some unknown reason, none of the content of the 911 calls from the classrooms where the perp was and where the massacre had occurred was ever relayed to Arredondo, so he was unaware of that or even their existence. Apparently there was only one person there (and I believe that person was outside the hallway and not in the building, although I didn’t hear McCraw directly addressing that question) who heard anything about those later 911 calls, and there is no indication that he or she ever relayed the information to anyone. My own thought is that the person may have assumed – and it would seem reasonable to have assumed – that the chief and others already had the same information and thus there was no need to try to repeat it. The lack of awareness of the 911 calls is a small but important point, and it is emblematic of the enormous and really shocking breakdown of communication that occurred on so many levels.
I’ll stop there for today. This is just the very tippy tip of the big iceberg. Unfortunately, McCraw left out a great deal of information that would be extremely pertinent – I don’t know whether he already knows the answers to those things and just isn’t saying, or whether he doesn’t know yet. I plan to get into more of those issues later. His presentation was only based on video and audio evidence, however – not on any interviews with participants or survivors or anyone else, although he said that about 700 such interviews have been conducted so far. I am assuming those will be sorted out and incorporated into a final investigative report, but that will take quite a while.
