The news about Iran is worthless at this point
I haven’t written about Iran for the past few days for a very simple reason: the news is unreliable. I’m not just talking about the MSM, which is almost reflexively consistently unreliable on a host of things. I’m talking about all sources to which I have access, and that includes the blowing hot and cold messages from President Trump.
Of course, that doesn’t stop me from thinking about what’s going on there and even having opinions. But my opinions probably aren’t worth all that much, either. But here are a few anyway.
For example, I saw the reports to which commenter “Richard Aubrey” refers here:
Saw a report a day or so ago with what remains of the, more or less, civilian government saying they have no more say; the IRGC is in complete control.
Presuming this is the case, with whom do we negotiate? How much more killing does it take to convince the IRGC? Bering at least superficially military in structure, they no doubt have lines of succession well known and probably generally accepted.
As I said, I saw those reports, too. They usually include the idea that the people in control now are real “hardliners,” compared to the civilian government. The thing about that, though, is that for decades I’ve read and believed that the civilian government of Iran was mere window-dressing with little to no power, and that the hardliners (mullahs, IRGC) were really in charge anyway. So I conclude that if the pretend civilian leaders are gone now and the hardliners in control, that only changes the superficial appearance of things.
Then there’s the other problem Richard Aubrey mentions, “with whom do we negotiate? How much more killing does it take to convince the IRGC?” But that’s been the problem from the start of the negotiation phase. That’s been the problem even before the war began; you may recall that the war was preceded by fruitless and frustrating negotiations as well.
You may also recall that, at the start of the present negotiations, Trump kept saying we’re not sure if the people with whom we’re negotiating have any power over much of anything. At some point, they “proved” they did by letting some ships through the Strait or something of that sort, but that hardly proves much of anything in terms of the big picture. We know – and Trump knows, and Rubio surely knows because he’s talked about it at length – that the IRGC are fanatics who are uninclined to give up. And so we are left with the same question we’ve had from the start: what’s the point of these negotiations?
Your answer depends on your opinion of Trump, and if you think he’s a clueless idiot then that covers it. I don’t think he’s a clueless idiot – and I certainly hope I’m right about that – and I wrote recently about the possible tactical reasons for the negotiations, so I’ll just repeat here what I said then:
I strongly suspect (without actually knowing) that the reasons for the negotiations are as follows: (1) to reset the clock on the war for purposes of the need for Congress’ approval (2) intelligence gathering and planning (3) turning up the economic screws and letting the Iranian leadership fester in the problems that result (4) giving the Gulf States a needed rest; and (5) waiting to get what we want – the open Straits and the nuclear material – and then following up with more regime-weakening moves.
The IRGC could not care less about the Iranian people and their wishes. Then again, the regime never has. They have killed many many thousands for merely opposing them, and they’ve been doing that for decades. When the regime first came to power, they marked it by mass executions of their opponents and their rivals (including the leftists who had helped them). Periodically, there were incidents like this one in 1988:
Between late July and September 1988, the Iranian authorities forcibly disappeared and extrajudicially executed thousands of prisoners for their political opinions and dumped their bodies in unmarked individual and mass graves. Minimum estimates put the death toll at around 5,000.
This source says it was more than 30,000 in 1988, but who knows? The link was written in 2019, and it included the following:
Iran is among those governments that execute their opponents. 120,000 people have been executed in Iran since 1981 for their opposition to the government, at-least one-third of whom have been women. According to the international laws, pregnant women must not be executed, whereas in Iran, at least 50 pregnant women have been executed in the 1980s. …
Iran holds the world record in number of executions per capita. According to Amnesty International: “more than half (51%) of all recorded executions in 2017 were carried out in Iran.”
And those are the official executions.
So, the hardliners are in control now? They’ve been in control since 1979.

Probably good to remember Trump is no more acting alone in this matter than anyone on the Iranian side is, neither on the war nor the negotiation. It’s not about what Trump personally does or does not say or do. Quite aside from the hundreds of Americans involved, there are also allies involved, and not just Israel.
Sure, it’s hard to wait for results, or for meaningful information about progress toward results. I find it hard to wait a whole six minutes for a microwaved baked potato some days.
Marking my own bewilderment on the subject of the US position on the Strait of Hormuz I can recall its inception on the day after the announcement of “Project Freedom” [initiating a CentCom action to free by force the trapped commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf] when the “Project” was abruptly “put on hold”, military clearing operations ceased, a blockade of Iranian commercial traffic began and shortly thereafter negotiations over opening the Strait commenced. I didn’t understand the transition then and can’t say I understand it today. I simply don’t grasp what changed in those 24 hours to flip that script. But flip it did.
On the other hand, today I think I understand the current primary aim of these same negotiations referred above: number one, get the Strait open by means of an Iranian declaration that “the Strait is open without restrictions”, that Iran declares “we will not attack commercial vessels transiting, nor toll any such vessels in transit”. Or so I read Sec. Rubio’s testimony to the Senate yesterday and the House today. Why (exactly) this is so, I cannot say. But I start there.
Then there’s number two: get Iran to commit to a separate and second round of negotiations concerning their nuclear materials, their nuclear weapons aspirations and any future development thereof.
Of course this isn’t exhaustive of my own peculiar ignorance of the subject, but I’ll leave it there for now, while remaining open to instruction toward improvement.
One would have to know much more of the intelligence Trump has and what his plans are to judge what’s going on.
My guess is that Trump will continue to play hard for a deal, but he doesn’t depend on it. Maybe he knows that Iran can’t survive another two months. Maybe he really is not that worried about the midterms. (Democrats are not triangulating towards the center, or at least pretending to, as might be sensible and expected.)
Trump may be guilty of hubris, but never cluelessness.