Even for those of us long inured to the multiple betrayals and lies of the Obama administration, the news yesterday was shocking: the AP story that they had seen documents attesting to an alleged “side deal” in which the UN’s IAEA will allow Iran to do its own inspections of the Parchin nuclear site. This is an agreement the US signed off on but to which it was not party:
The agreement in question diverges from normal procedures by allowing Tehran to employ its own experts and equipment in the search for evidence of activities it has consistently denied ”” trying to develop nuclear weapons.
Olli Heinonen, who was in charge of the Iran probe as deputy IAEA director general from 2005 to 2010, said he could think of no similar concession with any other country. and then report to the U.N.’s International Atomic Energy Agency.
The White House has repeatedly denied claims of a secret side deal favorable to Tehran. IAEA chief Yukiya Amano told Republican senators last week that he was obligated to keep the document confidential…
…wording suggests that ”” beyond being barred from physically visiting the site ”” the agency won’t get photo or video information from areas Iran says are off-limits because they have military significance.
But Reuters reports that the IAEA chief Amano has denied it. Or, sort of denied it. See what you think of this careful language:
“I am disturbed by statements suggesting that the IAEA has given responsibility for nuclear inspections to Iran. Such statements misrepresent the way in which we will undertake this important verification work,” IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano said in an unusually strongly worded statement on Thursday…
“I can state that the arrangements are technically sound and consistent with our long-established practices. They do not compromise our safeguards standards in any way,” Amano said.
The U.S. State Department said on Thursday the IAEA would “in no way” hand over responsibility for nuclear inspections to Iran. “That is not how the IAEA does business,” State Department spokesman John Kirby said in a statement.
“The U.S. government’s nuclear experts are confident in the Agency’s technical plans for investigating the possible military dimensions of Iran’s former program,” he said.
So, Amano is denying that the IAEA “has given responsibility” to Iran for inspections. State Department spokesman Kirby echoes that “responsibility” wording. They all say they are bound to keep the agreement confidential. And the head of the IAEA says to trust the IAEA and that everything’s great. John Kerry has already said in his testimony that he has not even seen the side agreement, which was negotiated between Iran and the IAEA. And Senators have been complaining for quite some time that they have not been given enough information on it.
One of the things that’s frustrating about all these articles is their incompleteness. For example, why should we care about inspections at Parchin in particular? Why would the arrangements there for inspections be secret and separate from the other sites? In other words, what’s Parchin about?
Business Insider reports that Aaron Stein, an expert on nuclear proliferation, has said that Parchin is an old site, a “red herring,” and “They won’t find anything there [anyway]”” it’s completely stripped of anything of value.”
In addition, ten days ago this piece appeared in the WaPo from another nuclear expert, David Albright, who said:
Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said over the weekend that my organization, the Institute for Science and International Security, was spreading lies when we published satellite imagery that showed renewed, concerning activity at the Parchin military site near Tehran…But…the Iranians chose to deny the visible evidence in commercial satellite imagery. Iran’s comments would be mirthful if the topic were not so serious.
Here’s a related report from a few days earlier, indicating the same thing. This renewed “activity” may be an effort to cover up evidence of past activity there, but the effort to sort it all out is headache-inducing. This article in Haaretz, a leftist Israeli paper, is actually quite informative, including a long quote from the Obama administration by Ned Price, National Security Council spokesperson, who points out that the inspections of Parchin deal solely with past activities. Haaretz reports on what it sees as the most troublesome aspects:
The Iranians would supply the UN inspectors with still photographs and video footage of several locations within the Parchin compound where components for the production of nuclear weapons are suspected to have been tested. The Iranians may use their own equipment, which will be examined by UN inspectors only to make sure it is in working order.
Even though Iran has been given widespread authority to inspect the site, they are still resisting an inspecting of the entire Parchin compound, terming several locations in it “out of bounds” – meaning no photographs or any other information about them would be handed over to UN inspectors.
Another troubling clause in the draft determines that even though Iranian scientists would be those who sample the soil and the air in Parchin, this activity would be limited, and UN inspectors would receive only seven soil and air samples from the building in which Iran is suspected of having tested the nuclear weapons components.
That quote goes a long way, I think, towards explaining Amano’s language re “responsibility.” As best I can piece it together, IAEA officials will have final “responsibility” but in many cases Iranians will give them the data and the evidence.
This may actually be the most informative article of all, because it describes the history of Parchin and why it matters to the Iran deal. The summary paragraph is this:
Knowing what happened at Parchin more than a decade ago remains key to ending the nuclear crisis because the accord reached last month in Vienna stipulates that sanctions can only be lifted if Tehran resolves all of the IAEA’s concerns over the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program — both past and present.
But it actually was the speech the other day by Senator Menendez (text here) that was most helpful to me in explaining the significance of Parchin. It’s a long speech, but well worth reading in its entirety. Here’s the most relevant excerpt:
The goal that we have long sought, along with the international community, is to know what Iran accomplished at Parchin — not necessarily to get Iran to declare culpability — but to determine how far along they were in their nuclear weaponization program so that we know what signatures to look for in the future…it makes a difference if you are 90 percent down the road in your weaponization efforts or only ten percent advanced. How far advanced Iran’s weaponizing abilities are has a significant impact on what Iran’s breakout time to an actual deliverable weapon will be…
With so much at stake, the IAEA — after waiting over ten years to inspect Parchin, speak to Iranian nuclear scientists, and review additional materials and documents — are now told they will not have direct access to Parchin…
For me, the administration’s willingness to forgo a critical element of Iran’s weaponization — past and present — is inexplicable.
And here’s another excellent point he makes about our own track record in monitoring nuclear development:
The U.S. track record in detecting and stopping countries from going nuclear should make Kerry more modest in his claims and assumptions. The U.S. missed the Soviet Union, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. Washington underestimated Saddam’s program in 1990. Then it overestimated his program in 2003 and went to war to stop a nonexistent WMD program.’…
It is precisely because of this track record that permitting Iran to have the size and scope of an industrialized nuclear program, permitted under the JCPOA is one of the great flaws of the agreement.
It’s also well worth reading this WSJ piece on what’s wrong with the inspections that are supposed to be so foolproof and rigorous according to the administration—the ones about future activity, not past ones at Parchin.
In summary, I’ll just add this quote from Menendez about the entire deal (not just Parchin):
The deal enshrines for Iran, and in fact commits the international community to assisting Iran in developing an industrial-scale nuclear power program, complete with industrial scale enrichment. While I understand that this program will be subject to Iran’s obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, I think it fails to appreciate Iran’s history of deception in its nuclear program and its violations of the NPT.
Its “history of deception” is exactly what the American public has been reacting to. And not just Iran’s history of deception; that of the Obama administration, too.
And then there’s the relationship between Iran and the IAEA:
Should a nuclear accord be signed this time [this was written July 1, not long before the accord was announced], it will aim to primarily constrain, not permanently roll back or “dismantle,” Tehran’s nuclear infrastructure. In that case””in which Iran is still left with significant nuclear capacity””an accurate and comprehensive Iranian declaration of all its nuclear undertakings to the IAEA is essential for reliable monitoring and verification. Absent this complete declaration, including the oft-cited “Possible Military Dimensions” (PMD), IAEA inspectors can neither assemble a clear picture of Iran’s nuclear program, nor set a reference point against which to monitor it and verify there is no violation or diversion.
Iran has a long history of failing to report critical elements of its nuclear activities.
Please read the whole thing.