I’ve been meaning to write a big and very comprehensive post on North Korea, but I’ve been putting it off. I have a rough draft, but it’s very rough and I cannot bring myself to work on it today.
The reason is fairly clear. It’s a weekend, of course, and there are some other things I’d like to do outside of blogging. But that’s not the real reason. The real reason is twofold: it’s a huge topic, and it’s an overwhelmingly depressing one. In fact, in all my years as a blogger, I can’t recall a single situation in which all alternatives seem so terrible.
I hope I’m just being pessimistic. But I don’t think so. And the piece I’m about to recommend in the present (somewhat less comprehensive) post certainly isn’t optimistic, either. It’s by Caroline Glick, and it seems to me it states the facts of what we face in stark and uncompromisingly realistic terms.
North Korea is a problem that’s been a long time coming. We’ve watched it unfold, step by step, administration by administration, with growing anxiety and frustration and anger. How can we be so impotent in the face of such a growing danger? The answer is that North Korea has, in effect, held South Korea (particularly Seoul) hostage. As Glick puts it:
Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama all sought to appease North Korea’s aggressive nuclear adventurism because they didn’t believe they had a credible military option to deal with it.
In the 1980s, North Korea developed and deployed a conventional arsenal of bombs and artillery along the demilitarized zone capable of vaporizing Seoul.
Any US military strike against North Korea’s nuclear installation it was and continues to be argued, would cause the destruction of Seoul and the murder of millions of South Koreans.
So US efforts to appease Pyongyang on behalf of Seoul emptied the US-South Korean alliance of meaning. The US can only serve as the protector of its allies, and so assert its great power status in the Pacific and worldwide, if it prevents its allies from being held hostage by its enemies.
And now, not only does the US lack a clear means of defending South Korea, and Japan, America itself is threatened by the criminal regime it demurred from effectively confronting.
The Seoul “Capitol area” (that’s not just the city, but the general metropolitan area) has a population of about 24 million people. That’s a lot of people to hold hostage. It is very close to the North Korean border. In retrospect, this seems like quite an oversight, but there’s not much to do about it now (evacuating 24 million people would be quite an undertaking). The government of South Korea doesn’t seem to know what to do about the entire situation except keep its fingers crossed and hope for the best. Nor, apparently, do we, at least so far, and the failings on that score have been bipartisan, and inextricably linked to the fact that Seoul is at grave risk no matter what we do.
So the question becomes twofold: do we have the guts/brains to figure out what is best (or least bad) to do? And what would be the cost to Seoul? In regard to that second question, here’s an attempt (I have no idea how realistic an attempt) to evaluate South Korea’s defenses:
Since the 1990s, right about the time the Clinton administration decided not to undertake military action against North Korea’s nuclear program, the general consensus has been that Pyongyang had enough artillery to turn nearby Seoul, home to approximately 25 million South Koreans, into a “sea of fire” that could see up to one million civilians killed. This apocalyptic scenario has been a trump card against strong military action against Pyongyang, with fears it could order a bombardment of the city as an act of retaliation.
A 2011 study by the Nautilus Institute throws a considerable amount of cold water on this scenario. While the sheer number of artillery tubes could theoretically kill a large number of civilians, operational issues complicate matters and push the number of civilian casualties greatly downward. Despite the thousands of artillery pieces, only 700 heavier guns and rocket launchers, plus the newer 300-millimeter MRLs, have the range to strike Seoul. Only a third would normally be fired at once, and notional rates of fire would be slowed tremendously by the need to withdraw guns into their hardened artillery sites (HARTS) to shelter them from counter battery fire.
Other factors reduce the projected loss of life in the greater Seoul metropolitan area. The city has extensive air raid shelters for civilians that will quickly reduce the exposed population density. The North will struggle to keep these heavy artillery units supplied with shells, particularly with its aging supply system. Finally, U.S. and ROK forces will quickly begin hunting down units participating in the bombardment, causing their numbers to drop almost immediately.
Finally, the North would face a strategic dilemma. Artillery used to bomb Seoul could not be used to soften up border defenses for a general invasion, and in wartime it would be critical to capture the enemy capital quickly as possible. An all-out bombardment of the South Korean capital might very well leave Pyongyang without the ability to actually capture it, while at the same time ensuring a U.S./South Korean counteroffensive that would spell the end of the regime of Kim Jong-un. Even if a million civilians were killed in Seoul it would ensure Kim’s untimely demise, and from his perspective that is still almost certainly a very bad trade.
That was written in April, and doesn’t mention nuclear weapons. It doesn’t have to; even without them the scenario is bad enough. If you look at the comments to the article, you’ll see that the consensus is that the author is painting too rosy a picture in terms of the damage that could and would be done.
Take a look at this piece, for example, and you’ll see that a lot of things have been left out of that first article, such as chemical and biological and cyber warfare, locating weapons in relatively impenetrable locations such as caves, and the number of US casualties that would be sustained in any attack on Seoul by the North, as well as the possibility of China and/or Russia becoming involved on the side of the Norks.
One could go on and on and on reading these things, careening between a more optimistic (for example, this piece on THAAD defenses) and a more pessimistic prognostication. I’ll arbitrarily stop here, for now. But first I want to reiterate a couple of things:
(1) The time to have acted was long ago, before the threat to our shores materialized—and that threat was very predictable and easy to foresee.
(2) What stopped us then is the same thing that stops us now: fear of the ensuing conflagration, which will almost undoubtedly cause a huge loss of life. Since WWII we have gotten out of the habit of accepting such a magnitude of human loss as an inevitable consequence of large-scale war. We want (and I include myself here in that “want”—although you can’t always get what you want) sanitized wars, clear targets, minimal loss of life. But this is almost certainly not going to be possible in Korea, and time is not our friend.
It is truly a horrific prospect, and we may not have the will, heart, or guts to do it, or the knowledge to know what is best to do. That is why until now we’ve hoped for a diplomatic solution, but I think it’s been clear for a long time that that’s not possible, even though I dearly hope I’m wrong about that.
