There’s a lengthy and heated argument going on today about what caused the recession. Not surprisingly, people are inclined to see what fits in with their worldview.
Conservatives and libertarians tend to be on the “it’s the fault of too much regulation” side of the question. Liberals tend to be on the “it’s the fault of too little regulation” side.
Who cares? Well, the blame game is always fun. But the more important reason we should try to understand what happened is that, in trying to design solutions, it helps to know how we got here.
The solution, according to most conservatives? Less regulation. The solution, according to liberals? That’s easy: more, and throw in a lot more government intervention as a whole—why not?
As for me, I’m inclined to believe that in general “less is more,” because of the incomplete state of our knowledge of complex processes. In other words, “first, do no harm.”
I’m not an economist, as I never tire of claiming. But it seems to me that, historically speaking, totally unregulated capitalism is not desirable. The best and clearest example I can think of is the need for child labor laws and other legislation to prevent blatant exploitation of workers.
But most issues are far more complex than that. In the present crisis, let’s take the example of over-leveraging. In 2004 there was a change in the SEC rules that allowed five investment firms to apply leverage ratios that were far more risky than in the past. You can probably guess who these firms were: Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley.
Oh-oh.
So the liberals are right—right? Here’s a perfect example of deregulation—and maybe Bushian deregulation at that—that led us into this mess.
But, not so fast. Here’s the larger picture. It began (sacre bleu!) in Europe, of all places:
In 2004, the European Union passed a rule allowing the SEC’s European counterpart to manage the risk both of broker dealers and their investment banking holding companies. In response, the SEC instituted a similar, voluntary program for broker dealers with capital of at least $5 billion, enabling the agency to oversee both the broker dealers and the holding companies.
This alternative approach, which all five broker-dealers that qualified…voluntarily joined, altered the way the SEC measured their capital. Using computerized models, the SEC, under its new Consolidated Supervised Entities [CSE] program, allowed the broker dealers to increase their debt-to-net-capital ratios, sometimes, as in the case of Merrill Lynch, to as high as 40-to-1.
Not only did Europe lead the way, but this rule change was actually an attempt to increase regulation rather than to decrease it. Sound nuts? Well, let’s take a look [emphasis mine]:
[A]ll five of these major investment banks increased their debt-to-equity leverage ratios significantly in the period following their entry into the CSE program. That higher leverage, coupled with a high concentration of their assets in subprime mortgages and related real estate assets, left them exposed and vulnerable when market conditions soured in 2007-2008. For example, at the time of its insolvency, Bear Stearns’ gross leverage ratio had hit 33 to 1, and press reports placed Merrill Lynch’s debt/equity ratio at the time of its merger at 40 to 1.
But does the adoption of this relaxed net capital rule show that the SEC was “captured”? The problem with this simple hypothesis is that the SEC’s adoption of the CSE program in 2004 was not intended to be deregulatory. Rather, the program was intended to compensate for earlier deregulatory efforts by Congress that had left the SEC unable to monitor the overall financial position and risk management practices of the parent companies controlling these investment banks. Still, if the 2004 net capital rule changes were not intended to be deregulatory, they worked out that way in practice. The ironic bottom line is that the SEC unintentionally deregulated by introducing an alternative net capital rule that it could not effectively monitor.
So the new rule was an attempt to regulate more, not less, although it applied the wrong type of regulation. That’s a lot different than the cry of “more” or “less” regulation. But it doesn’t play as well on the news, does it?
My guess is that many of the policies being discussed as causes (or solutions) for the current recession feature similar ironies and/or complex interplays of regulation and deregulation (I may write on others at some future date). But the most dramatic force of all operating here may well be the law of unintended consequences: actions that lead to unplanned results that most people were unable to predict.
The most vital question is: how can we get smarter about all of this? And even if we were to do so, could we ever trust Congress and the SEC to apply that knowledge to benefit of us all?






