…is that he’s a fool rather than a knave. It’s come down to that.
There are still defenders (or at least partial defenders) of Obama’s Middle East policy, and they’re not even all liberals. Ross Douthat, one of those partial defenders, is a NY Times conservative, meaning that every now and then he actually writes something conservative but often occupies some in-between wavering zone instead.
Douthat summarizes what he thinks happened during the Bush years in Iraq, a description that serves as part of the build-up for his semi-apologia for Obama:
…[I]t took all the king’s horses and all of David Petraeus’s men just to hold Iraq together; a different bad actor, Iran, ended up empowered; and the old problem of repression led to the Arab Spring and the civil wars that followed.
Sticking to the Pax Americana model after these developments would have required keeping American troops in Iraq for decades.
Douthat is ignoring the hard-fought improvements that had been made in Iraq by the time Obama took office, so dramatic that even Obama declared the state relatively stable and successful. By the time Obama pulled the troops out entirely in 2011 it would not have taken “all the king’s horses and all of David Petraeus’s men just to hold Iraq together” any more, and the “American troops in Iraq for decades” would have been a relatively small force. We’ve had troops all around the world “for decades” (many of them since World War II and the Korean War) and this would have been a particularly cost-effective deployment. There was no need to pull out entirely as Obama did (except what he saw as his own political interest), and the result has been a much greater amount of influence over Iraq for that bad actor, Iran—a bad actor Obama is now actively rather than passively encouraging and empowering.
Douthat thinks the following overarching plan is what’s behind Obama’s foreign policy decisions:
Haltingly but persistently, this administration has pursued a paradigm shift in how the United States relates to the Middle East, a shift from a Pax Americana model toward a strategy its supporters call “offshore balancing.”
In a Pax Americana system, the United States enjoys a dominant position within a network of allies and clients; actors outside that network are considered rogues and threats, to be restrained and coerced by our overwhelming military might. Ideally, over time our clients become more prosperous and more democratic, the benefits of joining the network become obvious, and the military canopy both expands and becomes less necessary.
In an offshore balancing system, our clients are fewer, and our commitments are reduced. Regional powers bear the primary responsibility for dealing with crises on the ground, our military strategy is oriented toward policing the sea lanes and the skies, and direct intervention is contemplated only when the balance of power is dramatically upset.
I fail to see any “balancing” that’s being set up by Obama. Seems to be all Iran, all the time.
Douthat realizes this, but doesn’t understand that it’s purposeful on Obama’s part:
…[O]ffshore balancing offers the most benefits when your entanglements are truly minimal, but it’s very hard for a hegemon to simply sidle offstage, shedding expectations and leaving allies in the lurch.
And letting bad guys get even more powerful.
…[O]ffshoring American power and hoping that Iran, Iran’s Sunni neighbors and Israel will find some kind of balance on their own will probably increase the risk of arms races, cross-border invasions and full-scale regional war. The conflicts we have now are ugly enough, but absent the restraint still imposed by American military dominance, it’s easy to imagine something worse.
That’s kind of a no-brainer, isn’t it? I wonder how Douthat would explain Obama’s seeming failure to see something so elementary. But he doesn’t say; he doesn’t even try. The article pretty much ends there, with just some generalities to tie it up.
That’s the problem faced by those who would be the least bit kind to Obama at this point. They end up writing things that sound at best confused. I’m picking on Douthat, but I’m not really meaning to single him out; his is just the first article I happened to encounter.
The comments to Douthat’s article are the usual NY Times reader stuff. We’re in the Middle East only for oil, it’s all Bush and Cheney’s fault, etc.
Walter Russell Mead voted for Obama in 2008, and by November 2010 still thought it to have been a good move for reasons so strange and convoluted I cannot follow them (be my guest and try to understand what he’s saying here; suffice to say he was wrong, wrong, wrong and showed a profound lack of understanding of the man whose character and plans were already crystal clear.). Today, however, Mead is singing a different tune:
…[N]obody should miss the most important point here: even the President’s ideological fellow travelers can no longer mount a cogent defense of his Middle East policy. The MSM will still do all it can to avoid connecting the dots or drawing attention to the stark isolation in which the White House now finds itself as ally after ally drops away. It still doesn’t want to admit that the “smart diplomacy” crowd has been about as effective at making a foreign policy as the famous emperor’s smooth-talking tailors were at making a new suit of clothes. But it’s getting harder and harder to find anybody willing to gush about how snazzy the President looks in the sharp foreign policy outfit that he’s sporting around town.
Mead’s a smart man; I cannot understand why he was so fooled originally. But he’s not so fooled any more:
The shocked silence of the foreign policy establishment, the absence of any statements of support from European or Asian allies about our Middle East course, the evidence that the President and the “senior officials” whom he trusts continue to be blindsided by major developments they didn’t expect and haven’t provided for: all of this tells us that our Middle East policy is indeed in free fall.
Much like Douthat, though, Mead describes the president and his advisors as being “blindsided” by “major developments they didn’t expect and haven’t provided for.” In other words, Mead comes down firmly on the “fool” side of the “knave vs. fool” question. I’m not sure why, except I think that, for those who once supported Obama as both a smart and a good man, it’s easier and less threatening for them to think they were wrong about his brainpower than about his goodness.
[NOTE: I found an unintentionally funny comment to this article:
It’s suspicious how hard Nothinyahoo and the GOP are trying to stop a peace process. They seem like this is so urgent, like their lives depend on it…]