[NOTE: Part I, which was posted about two weeks ago, can be found here.]
Not only has Princeton bioethics professor Peter Singer advocated infanticide for profoundly disabled infants if parents request it, he also has done a lot of writing about animal rights, which he champions. As one interviewer says, it was Singer:
…who wrote that our refusal to grant other animals moral equality is like saying that all human beings – even psychopaths and murderers – are superior to any dolphin or chimpanzee.
A startling statement, but Singer specializes in startling positions. In what way does he consider human psychopaths and murderers either no better than certain animals or perhaps even inferior to them?
Now, I certainly have not read all or in fact any of Singer’s books in their entirety. But I’ve read an enormous number of articles about him and many interviews with him, as well as some essays by him summarizing his thoughts. This sample of his writing offers the following important clues [emphasis mine]:
…Bentham points to the capacity for suffering as the vital characteristic that gives a being the right to equal consideration. The capacity for suffering – or more strictly, for suffering and/or enjoyment or happiness – is not just another characteristic like the capacity for language, or for higher mathematics. Bentham is not saying that those who try to mark “the insuperable line” that determines whether the interests of a being should be considered happen to have selected the wrong characteristic. The capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in any meaningful way. It would be nonsense to say that it was not in the interests of a stone to be kicked along the road by a schoolboy. A stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer…A mouse, on the other hand, does have an interest in not being tormented, because it will suffer if it is.
If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering – in so far as rough comparisons can be made – of any other being.
It’s hard to read that without the feeling that something is being left out of the equation. But what is that “something”? Religions have a lot to say about that “something,” and about the difference between animals and humans. But it isn’t even necessary to be a religious person to get a sense that Singer is missing an essential element in the equation he sets up.
To take an animal’s suffering [see * below] into consideration is something many religions do. For example, it is a basic principle of the Judaism which Singer has rejected (he is an atheist, and has been since childhood). But this does not mean that an animal’s suffering must be taken into equal consideration. Judaism (and many other religions, but we’ll take Judaism for the purposes of this discussion) has a great deal to say on the subject of the proper treatment of animals by humans and their place in the hierarchy of the world:
All of God’s creations are deserving of our humane consideration and can serve as pathways for sanctification. In his essay on animals and Halakhah, Rabbi Edward Friedman speaks of two opposing attitudes toward animals in the Torah: In Genesis, human beings are given mastery over the animal kingdom on the one hand, and are seen as potential partners, ”˜helpmates,’ for human beings, on the other hand. Rabbi Friedman writes: “Halakhah seeks a compromise between these two extreme positions. We are thus called on to be compassionate to other creatures, even though we are allowed to use their labors and even the bodies of these same creatures to fulfill various needs in our lives.”
So, according to Judaism and the Book of Genesis, which is also part of the foundation for Christianity, humans stand above animals in the hierarchy and can use them and even kill and eat them, but must always be cognizant of doing it in a way that does not cause unnecessary suffering. Humans and animals are not equal, but that’s not based on their capacity to suffer but on their capacity for consciousness and decision-making, and their relation to God and to each other.
But if we take religion out of the equation, we still can come up with the same conclusion. Animals themselves are morally neutral as agents. Only human beings can, and do (as Singer himself demonstrates), ponder moral and ethical issues. Even if one looks at the Garden of Eden story as a mere parable, even if you remove it from any consideration of religion, one message of the story is that animals and humans are different in their moral awareness. In fact, you could say the story is one of the dawning of moral awareness and the differentiation of humans from animals. The acts of animals stand outside of the system we might call morality; they are beyond right and wrong in terms of what they themselves do, and as such they can be neither morally superior nor inferior to humans. They do not have free will. They have not, as it were, eaten from the Tree of Knowledge, unlike Adam and Eve and all their actual or metaphoric descendants, humankind.
And so the way in which humans are “superior” to animals is that they act within a moral system: they make decisions, they are conscious of themselves, they know right from wrong (or at least they think about it and wonder about it). As human beings, they have made decisions that mean in some cases that they have done wrong (for instance, murder) and must be punished. They are punished precisely because they can make thoughtful decisions and therefore, as agents, they must be held responsible. And when humans do wrong they are punished by the justice system; animals who do wrong (bite humans, kill humans) are put down if they are deemed dangerous to others, but they are not punished.
So, to finally respond to Singer’s point, even murderers and psychopaths are human beings, and as such they have more rights than animals but they also have more responsibilities than even the highest-functioning animals that Singer mentions, such as dolphins and chimpanzees.
[* “Suffering” and “pain” are actually two separate, although related, phenomena. Animals feel pain and have physiological reactions that indicate when pain is present. But there is evidence that they feel pain to different extents depending on their complexity and development.
To what degree animals suffer is an even more hotly debated question. Although I’ve done a search to see whether Singer ever even considers the distinction between pain and suffering, I have as yet found nothing that indicates he does; he seems to treat the two words as more or less synonymous (see for example this from Singer).
If Singer ignores the distinction, he’s certainly not the only one. But the difference between the two means a great deal to me, based on my own experience with many years of chronic pain. One of the most important books I ever read on the subject was by Eric J. Cassell, entitled The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine. I recommend it highly, but the gist of it can be summarized in one sentence of Cassell’s: Bodies do not suffer, only persons suffer. Cassell is not talking about animals there, he’s talking about the fact that the amount of suffering a person undergoes is related to a host of other issues, in particular the meaning and context in which he/she interprets and explains his/her pain: does it have a purpose? Is it just or unjust? Is it random or punishment or an opportunity for heroism? Is it temporary or will it last for a long long time? Does anyone care, and can anyone help?
I suppose that’s another post for another day.]
[ADDENDUM: By the way, the status of humans as beings with free will and a moral sense, and therefore moral responsibility, does not lie in their individual personal characteristics or degree of functioning. Singer might argue that the lack of those characteristics in a very disabled infant or certain other disabled people, for example (see Part I of this series), puts them on a plane equal to that of animals, or at least puts animals on the same plane as them. But the moral status of a human being, however disabled, injured, or diseased, lies in his/her identity as a human, a group of beings with certain characteristics that are different from those of animals. A deficient or ill human is nevertheless a human, whereas no animal—however smart and/or beloved—ever possesses the characteristics of moral responsibility and free will, nor do animals possess such characteristics as a group.
Religious people, of course, tend to deal with the issue by saying that only humans have souls. But that argument will not convince an atheist like Singer.]
[Part III can be found here.]