The more I think about the Iran deal announced yesterday, the stranger it gets.
One strange thing about it is that it’s not a deal at all; it’s certainly not a contract, a treaty, or an agreement. It’s an announcement of intent with some of the specifics of that intent spelled out and some akin to “a player to be named later.” Preliminary announcements like that either signify basic agreement between the parties and really pan out when the details are ironed out, or are mere hopes and wishes and have propaganda value for the moment but cover up a basic lack of agreement. So it’s odd that pundits are discussing its pros and cons as though it’s something real.
There are also large problems with the deal that make it suspect even if the parties do end up agreeing in June on what’s was announced yesterday by the Obama administration as the basics of the deal. Dennis Ross describes what he thinks is the background philosophy behind the deal:
At some point, the Obama administration changed its objective from one of transforming the Iranian nuclear program to one of ensuring that Iran could not have a breakout time of less than one year. The former was guided by our determination to press Iran to change its intent about pursuing or at least preserving the option of having a nuclear weapon. The latter clearly reflects a very different judgment: that we were not able to alter the Iranian intentions, so instead we needed to focus on constraining their capabilities.
…But if the measure of the negotiations is now about breakout time, then the administration needs to show convincingly that the verification regime will be far-reaching and capable of detecting whatever the Iranians are doing and whenever they do it. In fact, a one-year breakout time depends not just on the number and type of centrifuges, their output and the stockpile of enriched uranium””all of which can be calculated””but also on the administration’s ability to discover the moment at which the Iranians begin to sneak out, creep out or break out from the limitations placed on them.
Moreover, for those who say that one year is not enough time because even discovery of a violation does not ensure a response, the administration will need to explain why this agreement will not function like other arms control agreements, where questions related to noncompliance have historically bogged down in endless discussions…
I’d also recommend reading Duelfer on the deal, as well as the WaPo‘s editorial board, which continues to diverge from the attitude of the far more Obama-friendly NY Times. And here’s the reaction of the Times of Israel.
Obama said yesterday that the deal would “cut off Iran’s most likely paths” to the bomb. There’s a lot of technical information out there as to whether this could be true or not. But to me, as a layperson, the fact that the goal of the US, under the best of circumstances under this deal, is to limit Iran to a one-year breakout period certainly doesn’t sound to me like paths are cut off. The best you can say is that a few speed bumps have been placed in the way, and it’s not even clear that those speed bumps would be effective.
Here’s what the WaPo says:
The “key parameters” for an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program released Thursday fall well short of the goals originally set by the Obama administration. None of Iran’s nuclear facilities ”” including the Fordow center buried under a mountain ”” will be closed. Not one of the country’s 19,000 centrifuges will be dismantled. Tehran’s existing stockpile of enriched uranium will be “reduced” but not necessarily shipped out of the country. In effect, Iran’s nuclear infrastructure will remain intact, though some of it will be mothballed for 10 years. When the accord lapses, the Islamic republic will instantly become a threshold nuclear state.
That’s a long way from the standard set by President Obama in 2012 when he declared that “the deal we’ll accept” with Iran “is that they end their nuclear program” and “abide by the U.N. resolutions that have been in place.” Those resolutions call for Iran to suspend the enrichment of uranium. Instead, under the agreement announced Thursday, enrichment will continue with 5,000 centrifuges for a decade, and all restraints on it will end in 15 years…
The proposed accord will provide Iran a huge economic boost that will allow it to wage more aggressively the wars it is already fighting or sponsoring across the region. Whether that concession is worthwhile will depend in part on details that have yet to be agreed upon, or at least publicly explained. For example, the guidance released by the White House is vague in saying that U.S. and European Union sanctions “will be suspended after” international inspectors have “verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear related steps.” Exactly what steps would Iran have to complete, and what would the verification consist of?
The agreement is based on a theoretical benchmark: that Iran would need at least a year to produce fissile material sufficient for a weapon, compared with two months or less now. It remains to be seen whether the limits on enrichment and Iran’s stockpile will be judged by independent experts as sufficient to meet that standard.
The more one reads, the more it seems clear to me that the Obama administration has accepted Iran’s nuclear status and has given up deterring it and is now courting it.
Which brings us to the larger issue, which is the nature of Iran and what sort of relationship we can, or should, have with that country. That is as big an elephant in the room as is the question of Obama’s real intentions, which I’ll leave aside for now.
Analogies with the USSR during the Cold War are not very good, because although both Iran and the Cold War USSR have been our enemies (not that Obama thinks in those terms), they are enemies with very different natures. Both wage proxy wars with us all over the world, they desire domination, and they severely repress and control their populations. After that the comparisons fall down. The USSR had nuclear weapons by the time we were negotiating with them; I doubt that negotiations of any sort would have stopped them from obtaining them, even though the task of developing them was more difficult back then because the knowledge was secret rather than in the public domain (see this for a description of the Soviet efforts). The USSR was a ruthless regime, but our negotiations with the Soviets were based on their inherent rationality about survival, and the fact that both sides already had the capacity to destroy each other several times over.
Iran operates under a very different sort of philosophy, an apocalyptic religious one. Iran’s entire history with the US (and with Israel) since 1979 has been to call for the destruction of what it refers to as the Great and Little Satans. “Death to America” is a favorite chant to this day. How does one negotiate with such an adversary? The answer is “very very carefully and expertly, and from a position of great strength and pressure, and be willing to walk away if they don’t give you what you want.” Reagan’s adage “trust, but verify” has to be changed to “distrust, and verify to the nth degree, and carry a very big stick.”
Obama displays a different attitude (whatever his real attitude may be). It can be summed up as the notion that Iran wants to be a nation like any other, and if we treat them well they’ll be eager to “rejoin the international community, and we can begin to chip away at the mistrust between our two nations. This would provide Iran with a dignified path to forge a new beginning with the wider world based on mutual respect.”
This seems delusional to me (again, perhaps it’s not his real attitude, but let’s just take him at his word for the sake of this post). What indication has the post-1979 Iranian government ever given of such an interest? And what about its current aggressive behavior would lead anyone to think anything of the sort? The Iranian people are another thing; perhaps it’s what they (or at least many or some of them) want. But the people of Iran and the government of Iran are hardly the same thing.
Unfortunately, the same has become true in this country as well.
[ADDENDUM: This post hardly scratches the surface of the questions and problems raised by this deal and by the perception of Obama’s conceding to Iran. One, however, is the escalating arms race that probably will ensue in the Middle East. If this deal doesn’t reassure other nations like Saudi Arabia—and I see no reason why it should—those consequences could also be catastrophic.]