[NOTE: The word “deal” is in scare quotes because it’s not actually a deal, it’s an announcement of a tentative deal to make a deal. But for the rest of this post I’ll leave out the quote marks for the sake of convenience.]
If you want to know what a well-meaning, relatively well-informed liberal’s take on the Iran deal is, I’m about to describe it.
You say there are no well-meaning relatively well-informed liberals? Of course there are; this is an argument we’ve had many times on this blog before, and you know my position.
After a discussion yesterday with a person I think merits the above description (your take may differ), here’s my summary: The goal of the Iran talks is not to stop Iran from getting a bomb; that horse was already out of the barn. The goal—and the person freely admitted this was a gamble—is to open Iran to more Western influence and over time to soften the theocratic regime there, much as happened in the Communist world years ago. The current government of Iran (not the mullahs, though) campaigned on a platform of doing just that, and if they fail to deliver the people will revolt. The deal is a risky move, but one well worth it, because the government isn’t crazy and won’t nuke Israel or the West. And it’s the best alternative compared to the others.
Our actual discussion was more detailed, but that was the gist of it. This particular person also knows quite a few US citizens who are of Iranian background and have relatives there, so that’s part of what he is relying on when coming to these conclusions. He said that all that jubilation in the Iranian street wasn’t just people happy that Iran has stuck it to the Big Satan (although a lot of people like that absolutely were indeed celebrating there), it was also a large subset of Iranians who are happy because they think this will lead to more human rights and less power for the mullahs.
My part in the discussion was to say things like this: how do you know the Iranian government isn’t just a front for the mullahs? What about all the recent “Death to America” chants? Why is Iran insisting on keeping ICBM’s, if not to deliver weapons long-range? Why the underground facility? Why do you think helping the current regime economically (and allowing it free rein in other countries militarily) will weaken it and make it more vulnerable to the reformers’ wishes rather than strengthening it? Don’t you think Iran would need to show some good will and good intent first by softening its rhetoric and in particular scaling back its operations to take over other countries in the Middle East?
The argument that ensued made it clear to me that, at least in this instance, our main disagreements were over the mindset of the Iranian government (as opposed to the mullahs; we agreed on their motivations), who’s actually in charge there, and where the forces of history and human nature will blow that country, as well as what the risks of this deal will be to Israel and the US. In other words: is the threatening rhetoric mostly for show, or does it represent an intent to act? And in what internal political direction is Iran likely to move if this deal comes to pass?
That’s where the “human nature” part comes on. So much of differing opinion is a different take on people themselves. Conservatives (and I include myself here) tend to take the view that threats signify intent and must always be taken seriously, and that in order to give concessions to a side that has previously been your enemy, the enemy needs to have altered something that indicates a very real change of behavior, and that if you don’t have a very reliable way to check on their compliance with an agreement, the agreement isn’t worth the piece of paper it’s printed on. I think history bears this out.
This agreement, of course, doesn’t even feature a piece of paper, or really any agreement at all. If you want a very penetrating analysis of how that fact serves Obama’s purposes in the political sense, see this. And this describes the deeper roots of the Iran-as-nuclear-power problem:
If a nuclear deal is imminent, that is largely because over the past 13 years of on-and-off negotiations, the great powers of the world have slowly but surely given in to Iran’s demands. As Iran has flouted United Nations resolutions demanding a halt to its program, those nations have steadily softened their terms. Instead of ending the threat of Iranian nuclearization, negotiators have apparently limited their ambitions to an attempt to regulate it””an idea that, given the record of Iran’s lack of even rudimentary compliance with international law, is wishful thinking.
How did we get here? In speaking with nearly 30 experts and veterans of both the Bush and Obama administrations, I’ve found one core factor at the heart of this outcome: the desire to avoid military engagement with Iran at all costs””and, particularly during the Obama administration, the fear of even threatening it. Without a credible threat to use force, the United States has relied on tools that alone could never have compelled the Islamic Republic of Iran to abandon its nuclear program.
Read the whole thing. It’s extremely interesting, and goes into the history of negotiations with Iran during the Bush years. I have long thought that the war in Iraq was deeply connected to what’s going on in Iran right now, in no small part because the Iraq War showed (temporarily) that we meant business about nuclear non-proliferation in the area, and the abandonment of the Iraq War meant that we no longer meant business. The article seems to substantiate that:
While America never seemed capable of aiming a direct threat at Iran when the nuclear program grew more substantial in the latter Bush years, the fact remains that the Iraq war itself initially aided Western efforts to halt Iran’s progress. According to several sources, U.S. intelligence indicated that in the months following the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran was riven with anxiety that it might come next. That fear probably drove the Iranians into negotiations with Europe in 2003. In those so-called E3 talks, the Iranians agreed to suspend enrichment””the only time they have done so in more than a decade of negotiations.
Michael Singh, a senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council from 2005 to 2008, claims that the E3 negotiations “were about ensuring that Iran escape the peril of an invasion unscathed.” This suggests that when the United States had a high degree of credibility as a forceful actor, Iran made some of its greatest concessions to date.
In summary, the rationale given by my liberal friend for the current approach to Iran is that, if it has become impossible to halt Iran’s nuclear program without war or a credible threat of war, then the next best thing is to make the regime into a more cooperative and tractable entity. I think that’s a highly unlikely and dangerous pipe dream. Nor do I think that war is the only alternative, but a credible threat of war seems necessary—although I understand that a threat of war could propel a country like Iran to become even more determined to get nuclear weapons.
At any rate, the current administration cannot possibly mount a credible threat of war at this point even if it wanted to (which it does not). After the loss of will in Iraq, I’m not sure any future administration can do so.
[NOTE: More about the Iraq War, WMDs, and the rewriting of history here.]