The State Department said it was looking [at the 55 million visa holders] for indicators of ineligibility, including people staying past the authorized timeframe outlined in a visa, criminal activity, threats to public safety, engaging in any form of terrorist activity or providing support to a terrorist organization. …
The administration has steadily imposed more restrictions and requirements on visa applicants, including requiring them to submit to in-person interviews. The review of all visa holders appears to be a significant expansion of what had initially been a process focused mainly on students who have been involved in what the government perceives as pro-Palestinian or anti-Israel activity.
Officials say the reviews will include all visa holders’ social media accounts, law enforcement and immigration records in their home countries, along with any actionable violations of U.S. law committed while they were in the United States.
A visa is a privilege, and I have no problem with deporting people who violate that privilege.
When I read about these announcements the first thing that came to mind was 9/11. I distinctly recalled that many of the suicide hijackers/murderers exploited defects in the visa system, including the fact that some overstayed their visas and were not caught.
At the time, I was shocked that the visa system was so poorly administered with so many vulnerabilities, but now it doesn’t shock me; it seems par for the course. If you’re curious about the 9/11 perpetrators’ visa violations, please read this.
Some quotes:
Three [9/11] hijackers were known or knowable by intelligence authorities as al Qaeda terrorists in early 2000, but their biographical information was not fully developed and communicated to border authorities for watchlisting at U.S. consulates abroad (by the State Department) and at the border (by immigration and customs border inspectors). The travel plans of all three also were known or knowable in 2000, in part because of cooperation from Arab and Asian country intelligence services and border authorities. …
Three were carrying Saudi passports containing a possible extremist indicator present in the passports of many al Qaeda and other terrorists entering the United States as early as the first World Trade Center attack in 1993. This indicator had not been analyzed by the CIA, FBI, or our border authorities for its significance. …
Two hijackers were carrying passports that had been manipulated in a fraudulent manner. They contained fraudulent entry-exit stamps (or cachets) probably inserted by al Qaeda travel document forgers to hide travel to Afghanistan for terrorist training. …
Thirteen of the hijackers presented passports less than three weeks old when they applied for their visas, but the new passports caused no heightened scrutiny of their visa applications. Two hijackers lied on their visa applications in detectable ways, but were not further questioned about those lies. Two hijackers were interviewed for reasons unrelated to terrorism. Most simply had their applications approved and their passports stamped with a U.S. visa. Consular officers were not trained to detect terrorists in a visa interview. …
One of the two nonpilots admitted on business was granted a one-month stay; he, along with another of the nonpilot operatives, was in violation of immigration law for months before the attack. The one pilot who came in on a student visa never showed up for school, thereby violating the terms of his U.S. visa. Another of the pilots came in on a tourist visa yet began flight school immediately, also violating the terms of his U.S. visa. This pilot came in a total of seven times on a tourist visa while in school. In both cases, the pilots violated the law after their entry into the United States.
The following is especially relevant, I think:
On August 23, 2001, the CIA provided biographical identification information about two of the hijackers to border and law enforcement authorities. The CIA and FBI considered the case important, but there was no way of knowing whether either hijacker was still in the country, because a border exit system Congress authorized in 1996 was never implemented. One of the two overstayed his visa by less than six months. Without an exit system in place at the border tied to law enforcement databases, there was no way to establish with certainty that he remained in the United States. Thus, there was no risk that his immigration law violations would be visible to law enforcement, and there was no risk of immigration enforcement action of any kind.
It’s strange to look back so many years and recall how lax the system was – including the ability to walk right onto a plane without a TSA search. So many of our onerous TSA rules have been reactions to pre-9/11 errors – reactions that perhaps have thwarted or at least discouraged repeats of that terrible day, although there’s really no way to know and many people doubt it. The visa system, however, could obviously use quite a bit of tightening up, and this new directive aims to address that.
