Iran, Iran, and Iran–and the West

The New Neo Posted on by

It’s becoming more and more clear that Iran is the prime mover right now in the Middle East. As columnist Mark Steyn points out:

…these territories [Gaza and Lebanon] are now in effect Iran’s land borders with the Zionist Entity. They’re “occupied territories” but it’s not the Jews doing the occupying. So you’ve got a choice between talking with proxies or going to the source: Tehran. And, as the unending talks with the EU have demonstrated, the ayatollahs use negotiations with the civilized world as comedy relief…

Once upon a time, it would have been Egypt and Jordan threatening the Zionist usurpers. But these countries have been, militarily, a big flop against the Zionist Entity since King Hussein fired Sir John Glubb as head of the Arab Legion. So after ’73 they put their money on terrorism, and schoolgirl suicide bombers — the kind of “popular resistance” that buys you better publicity in the salons of the West. And one result of that has been to deliver Palestinian pseudo-“nationalism” away from Arab influence and into hard-core Iranian Islamist hands.

Omar at Iraq the Model connects the Iranian dots between what’s been going on in Iraq and the current crisis in Lebanon, as well as the ways in which the international community has been “played”–and will continue to be played–by Iran:

The key point in this strategy is to keep the half-solution alive. This method proved successful in keeping the despotic regimes in power for decades and these regimes think this strategy is still valid. What makes them this way is their interpretation of international comments which came almost exactly as they always do; calls for restraint and urging a cease-fire which they (Iran and her allies) think will mean eventually going back to negotiations which they know very well how to keep moving in an empty circle.

The common denominater here is not just Iran. It’s Iran and the cooperation of the “useful idiots” of the West–some of them well-meaning–who mysteriously fail to recognize the nature and goals of the Iranian regime.

The danger of “proportionality” in war

The New Neo Posted on by

Now, how could proportionality in war be dangerous?

First, before I attempt an answer to that question, here’s a great post by Betsy Newmark (via the Anchoress) on the widespread European international community’s condemnation of Israel’s response to the attacks from Hezbollah as “disproportionate.”

She writes:

I wish that the next time some leader comes out and starts talking about Israel’s “disproportionate response” that the journalists would ask them what their definition of a proportionate response would be if some terrorists were sending rockets into their own cities. Perhaps their own citizens might be interested in knowning how these intrepid leaders would respond if they were being attacked.

I’m not so sure many of their own citizens would even ask the question, since many may believe that their own relative chumminess with Iran and the Palestinians would guarantee them immunity. And perhaps their own knowledge that their country’s leaders might not respond in an especially muscular manner to any attack on their own soil is what leads to the tactic of appeasement in the first place.

Sort of like paying hush money to the Mafia, in hopes that it won’t target your business. I’d call it a vicious cycle of nonviolence.

But, leaving Europe aside for a moment, what is this larger idea of proportionality in war, anyway? Oh, don’t misunderstand me (although of course some of you will). I’m not one of those people who advocates a truly disproportionate response, such as Israel nuking Tehran.

But I do wonder what’s happened to the notion and definition and expectation of war. What am I talking about? It comes down–as so many things in life seem to–to the idea of responsibility, and of consequences (see here).

In the old days, the idea of fear of a nasty response from a well-armed power often acted as a deterrent (remember that word?) to attacking that country. In fact, that was one of the reasons countries had armies and weapons–not necessarily to use them, but to keep from having to use them very often; to keep themselves from being overrun and attacked, to defend its citizens. And the best way to defend them would be to not even have to defend them, but to just use the threat of a response in defense. And to be threatening, it helped if that threat was somewhat unpredictable in its force and scope.

In the olden days (which weren’t so very long ago) responses were seldom (if ever?) discussed in terms of proportionality. Perhaps the beginning of the “proportionality” argument came with the invention of nuclear weaponry. For the first time, we had the ability to mount a truly disproportionate response to provocation, one that would threaten the entire world. So it became common sense to understand that not every attack would be met with the full panoply of weapons in the arsenal. And history has played out that way: the first time atomic weapons were used, Hiroshima/Nagasaki, was the last. So far, of course.

I’m not a student of military history, but it’s not my impression that every attack was met with an all-out response even prior to nuclear weapons. But the limiting factor then was not the mouthing of platitudinous, self-serving advice from other nations; but, rather, the practical and strategic decisions of the attacked nation itself. Each nation would do what it determined necessary to end the threat–no more and no less. Sometimes it would miscalculate, of course. But the idea was that a sovereign nation had a right to defend itself to the best of its ability and its own judgment, and everyone knew that.

And that knowledge probably served to prevent many asymmetrical attacks. “The Mouse That Roared” notwithstanding, weak countries didn’t tend to attack the strong; it would be suicidal. But asymmetrical warfare is now not only chic, but it’s actively encouraged by this idea of “proportionality,” which ties the gigantic Gullivers of the world (such as that mean old, bad old US and its vile mini-me, Israel) down with many tiny ropes.

It’s in the interests of those with less power, and fewer arms, to advance the doctrine of “proportionality.” This evens the playing field, something like a handicap in golf, and makes the game better sport for those with fewer skills. The concept of proportionality comes, no doubt, at least partly from fear of a truly disproportionate response; from some sort of concern for the weak. But it also comes from a disproportionate concern that weaker, third-world countries shouldn’t be disadvantaged in any way because of their weakness, that they should be allowed to attack a stronger nation with relative impunity because, after all, they’re weaker; and, after all, they’re “brown;” and, after all, the West is imperialist and guilty; and, after all…and on and on.

But war is not a game of golf. And leveling the playing field doesn’t make for more fun. It makes for the emboldenment of tyrants in the third world. It makes for lengthy, drawn-out conflicts that never seem to end or be resolved. It buys time for countries such as Iran to gain power and become contenders by acquiring the most disproportionate weaponry of all, the nuclear variety.

And, when Iran reaches that goal, I wonder whether it will listen to Europe’s bleats about “proportionality.” Somehow, I don’t think so. After all, Iran has no western guilt to expiate.

[ADDENDUM: By the way, I’m aware that the concept of “proportionality” is traditionally part of Just War theory. Note (if you’ll follow the link) the introduction, defining when Just War theory might or might not be applicable. Also, the definition of “proportionality” in any given circumstance depends, of course, on the eye–and politics–of the beholder.]

Zeno diplomacy

The New Neo Posted on by

No, that’s not a typo above. I didn’t mean “Zero diplomacy,” I meant “Zeno diplomacy.”

What’s Zeno diplomacy? It’s described in this article by Robert Tracinski, a writer with whom I wasn’t previously familiar but who appears to be an Ayn Rand proponent (see this).

The term apparently originated with Robert Kagan, who mentions it in his recent article appearing in the Washington Post. It’s a reference to Zeno’s paradox; remember, the one that was illustrated in your textbooks by the little drawings of the turtle and Achilles, advancing the seemingly logical but obviously incorrect argument that says the turtle will win the race against the warrior?

Here’s another way to state the argument:

Suppose I wish to cross the room. First, of course, I must cover half the distance. Then, I must cover half the remaining distance. Then, I must cover half the remaining distance. Then I must cover half the remaining distance . . . and so on forever. The consequence is that I can never get to the other side of the room.

We don’t need to worry right now about the flaw in Zeno’s argument (although if you follow the link you’ll find a good explanation); what we’re dealing with today is a flaw in the argument of those who argue for diplomacy, and then some diplomacy, and then some more diplomacy, when dealing with those whose aim is not to come to a peaceful resolution, but to stall for time. Because stalling for time gives the enemy the means to choose to start a conflict at a time more favorable to him, rather than to us. And it’s Tracinski’s assertion that stalling for time with Iran (otherwise known as “diplomacy”) has only given Iran the ability to strike in a way and time of its own choosing, as we see now in the current Mideast crisis.

Those who promote nearly endless diplomacy as a solution to situations in which conflict threatens to erupt often don’t seem to see that diplomacy has its downside. After all, what could be bad about postponing a war by talking? Isn’t that always good?

It would be good, I suppose, if the negotiations led to an actual resolution or defusing of the situation, if the passage of time led to the situation somehow becoming better and not worse. And, of course, without a functioning crystal ball, none of us can foretell the future; we can only do our best to predict it based on the best evidence we have in the present. That process, of course, is deeply flawed, but it’s all we have.

One of my favorite quotations of all time is that of the New England abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison, who famously said:

With reasonable men, I will reason; with humane men I will plead; but to tyrants I will give no quarter, nor waste arguments where they will certainly be lost.

When I first heard the quote I misunderstood it for a moment, thinking Garrison was saying that tyrants always win arguments. No, what he meant by the phrase “they will certainly be lost” is “they will certainly be wasted.”

So the key to winning arguments–or to get people to do what you want them to–is to tailor the approach to the problem and to the character of the person or people with whom one is dealing. Tyrants are tyrannical, and neither reason nor pleading will suffice to convince them.

The problem, of course, is in deciding who is that sort of a tyrant, and who is not. It’s a bit like end of the first sentence of Niebuhr’s well-known serenity prayer:

God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change; courage to change the things I can; and the wisdom to know the difference.

The wisdom to know the difference–yes, indeed! To distinguish when diplomacy has a chance of working from the times when it doesn’t is not an easy task, but certainly not an impossible one. And I think it’s safe to say that in North Korea and in Iran we are dealing with the sort of tyrants on whom words will certainly be lost.

That’s not to say that some tyrants can’t be appealed to by coercion or even persuasion that focuses on their own self-interest. That may be true of Iran. But be careful. Look what happened in North Korea, during the Clinton administration. Giving negotiated concessions to a tyrant for humanitarian reasons, ones that seem to be good for the people of the country at the time, can ultimately backfire and end up with the tyrant having bought time to become more aggressive.

It’s an interesting balancing act. Tyrants desire power above all, and to get that power they need a country. However, that need for power may be the only reason they care about the welfare of their people at all–if the people disappear, the country disappears, and where would that leave the tyrant? But tyrants ordinarily consider large numbers of their people expendable, as long as enough people remain to maintain the tyrant’s country and his power. So the welfare of their people as a whole is not necessarily so much of a bargaining chip.

And be careful even of the logical assumption that tyrants care about the existence of their country at all. Some tyrants are more or less mad–or they become so over time–and when their fortunes are on the wane they want to bring the entire country down with them, in a sort of murder-suicide impulse (Hitler, for example, wanted Germany and the Germans to perish with him when he finally realized that all was lost).

And that brings us to the Iranian mullahs. They’ve put a somewhat new twist on things, because they are the first tyrannical heads of a country (in modern times, at least) who appear far less concerned with the things of this world than with their vision of the world to come. Therefore all bets are off; their priorities may indeed be focused on the afterlife rather than on protecting their people in this one. This is what makes them especially bad candidates for negotiation, and especially good ones for the problems inherent in Zeno diplomacy.

[By the way, Pajamas Media has some very thorough roundups of breaking news and reactions in the current crisis.]

[ADDENDUM: In another case of psychoblogger unity, Dr. Sanity spotlights the same Tracinski article, although she discusses other aspects of it.]

Tehran unmasked?

The New Neo Posted on by

I’m not going to pretend to be an expert on the balance of power in the Middle East. But I do read, and I can think.

And what I read lately has convinced me that, in the current Middle East crisis–which has so far stopped short of full war but might lead to one–all roads lead to Iran, even those that seem to begin in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine.

See what Omar at Iraq the Model has to say on the matter. Not only is he convinced that Iran is a main mover and shaker behind instability in Iraq (and who isn’t convinced of this? I think it’s one of the few points on which the right and left tend to agree), but he wonders whether the recent abduction of the Israeli soldiers was planned by Iran as a tactic to distract attention from Iranian nuclear ambitions and the fallout (pun intended) from that.

Omar also writes:

Those extremists do not understand the language of compromise and they do not believe in negotiating even if they declare the opposite. They want a war and I think they’re going to get one.

And Michael Ledeen–not surprisingly, since his béªte noire has long been the Iranian government–agrees:

The important thing to keep in mind is that both the Gaza and northern Israel attacks were planned for quite a while, which means that Iran wanted this war, this way. It isn’t just a target of opportunity or a sudden impulse; it’s part of a strategic decision to expand the war.

For quite some time Ledeen’s conclusion has been that there is no way to escape a showdown with Iran, and he predicts in this article that, the longer the delay, the more likely it becomes that the confrontation will be a military one–with, as he puts it, “terrible consequences.”

Ledeen’s solution? To bring down the regimes in Iran and Syria; he sees that as the task of the United States. But missing in his article is the answer to the question, “how is that to be accomplished, without a military confrontation and its ‘terrible consequences?'”

Austin Bay sees some possible ways the Iranian mullahs could end up weakened and discredited as a result of recent events (though not without some military escalation), if the following scenario plays out:

The relative lack of western criticism of Israel is an indicator. Apparently Israel has an opportunity to hammer Iranian and Syrian proxies. Israel may also escalate by striking Syrian intelligence targets throughout the region”“sending the message that supporting proxies can cost the supporter. Israeli escalation past a certain point escalation puts Tehran in a bind: if Tehran’s mullahs fail to react militarily they begin to look impotent. Promises of future bombs won’t suffice….

In the context of an on-going war with Iranian proxies in Lebanon, if Tehran’s mullahs threaten mass annihilation one too many times the Israelis could strike several Iranian nuclear facilities. This would not be a “pre-emptive strike” but a “deep strike” on Hezbollah’s deep pockets ally and supplier.

The diplomatic component of this scenario: the Israelis make the case that in the post-Saddam, post-Beirut Spring Middle East, proxy wars are no longer tolerated. The Iranians will not be able to respond to Israeli strikes in kind. They will be exposed as weak hotheads and they will have lost at least part of their nuclear investment.

As Bay points out, it’s a risky game. Tigerhawk offers his views on just what that game might be about (read the comments section as well). His main thesis is that Iran wants to be seen as the hand behind this, wants to be seen as the locus of anti-Israel anti-Zionist power, and is gambling that Israel and the US are too weak to oppose its moves. Tigerhawk believes that Iran may have underestimated how much it has alienated Europe recently, and has miscalculated.

I’m not pleased with today’s violence, and the possibility of worse to come. But a while back I came to the sorrowful conclusion that something of the sort may just be inevitable. Those of you who know my history can guess that I used to believe that negotiation alone could work to defuse the Israel/Palestine situation. But I see today’s events as part of a long chain of failed negotiations and dashed hope; one that began with Oslo, led through the 90s to the collapse of Camp David, and then to the horrors of the Second Intifada, and ultimately to where we stand today.

Those (such as myself) who used to believe in the power of negotiations and “giving peace a chance” in the region remind me a bit of my relatives who were Soviet sympathizers back in the early days of the 20s and 30s, before all the wretched excesses of Soviet power became known, back when Communism could still be thought of as an experiment that might somehow work out, and capitalism (especially during the Depression) as the failure. It was relatively easy to believe in the promise of Communism then; much harder to believe it now, at a time when only diehards keep the faith.

And the same is true for negotiations in the Middle East. With the launching of the Second Intifada, the mask of diplomacy was torn off, and the face of the conflict–in particular, the depth of the violence and hatred on the Palestinian side, and the futility of negotiations–was made clear.

With the election of Ahmadinejad in Iran, the same is true of Iran. No more masks; we know where we stand–although there are always going to be those who don’t believe that Ahmadinejad believes what he so clearly says.

I still profoundly hope there’s a way out of this without total war, if the regimes in Damascus and Tehran can be weakened by one of the more limited scenarios already discussed, or by some other sequence of events short of a major conflagration. But there’s no way out if it without force. And there’s no way out of it if we don’t see clearly that Iran and Syria are not seeking peace through negotiation, and if we don’t recognize their aims in the region.

And now I read (via Israellycool) that a Hezbollah missile fired at Haifa on Thursday evening was of Iranian manufacture. Israellycool asks the question, “Are we [Israel] going to go after Iran?”

I wonder what the answer to Israelly’s question will be, how much time will elapse before we find out, and what form such a “going after” might ultimately take.

Neo-neocon at war

The New Neo Posted on by

It’s confession time.

My name is neo-neocon, and I’m a warmonger. Not only have I declared war, but I’m deriving some pleasure from killing.

But don’t get me wrong. It’s not total war; I’m saving the big guns for when I might really need them. After all, in all-out, total war, everybody loses.

This is a war with that transcends issues of race (although some might argue it has aspects of class); this battle has inter-species connotations. The enemy: the Japanese beetle.

I know it’s really summer when they arrive. Their numbers are legion; the proverbial hordes. I know that spraying (otherwise known as total war) would be most effective, but I’m liberal enough and ecology-minded enough to not want to foul my own nest with pesticides unless absolutely necessary.

So, over the years, I’ve tried other methods.

Those pheromone-based lures are attractive–and not just to the beetles, but to me. Using their own sexual drives to entice them into traps seems a bit diabolical, but has the advantage of being harmless to the environment. And the technique works, in a way–as soon as I would set out a bag, I’d invariably catch about a pound of the critters (and believe me, a pound is a lot of beetle for the money).

But the lures seemed to attract as many as they killed. The beetles just kept coming and coming (and I know, I know; those who criticize the entire neocon endeavor would say that the same thing is happening in Iraq).

In the last couple of years I’ve fastened on my present approach.

I fill a jar with alcohol,


and stealthily approach the favored, already slightly decimated, feeding grounds:


or the alternative, but still somewhat popular, rest and recreation area:


The beetles are lazily, happily feeding (or procreating?), blissfully unaware of the fate that awaits them. They are slow in the midday sun, heavy and lethargic, and all it takes is a little bit of pressure on the plant with my free hand as the other holds the jar into which the happy beetles plop.

Death, I’m glad to say, is instantaneous. I’ve experimented with different concentrations of alcohol/water, and I’ve found that only the pure stuff keeps them from writhing and squirming for many long seconds. I have no wish to make them suffer; I just want them gone.

Wish me well. Wish them ill.

Bombs away: why India?

The New Neo Posted on by

By now you’ve probably read about the train bombings in India (and here’s an excellent roundup on the subject from Pajamas Media, by the way).

Over a hundred people dead and counting, and this is just one incident in a long line of recent similar ones in India–as well as a more ancient history, including a bloody eighth-century conquest and an exceptionally violent partition.

Why India? Well, why not? There’s the long history already mentioned, and the still-unresolved question of Kashmir. But perhaps there are other reasons.

Mitch at Shot in the Dark speculates:

Indian Moslems live in a relatively (and relatively new) liberal democracy; they have the rule of law, democratic elections, a constitution descended from that of the UK, and perhaps most importantly of all, economic freedom and the prospects that an open economic playing field bring to people….India’s moslems, in short, have a stake in the modern world.

And I’d bet that there’s at least a small stake on Al Quaeda’s part in stirring that up, if only by provoking a reaction against India’s moslems, something that’ll devalue that interest in the liberalism (small-l) that has helped quell so many of India’s problems.

Stirring up Hindu-Moslem violence in India could certainly be a motive. But, was this attack perpetrated by global jihadists such as Al Qaeda, as Mitch seems to think, or more local Kashmiri separatists? And, as Allahpundit wonders at Hot Air, “is there a distinction any more?”

I submit that there’s a distinction. And yet there’s a link, and the link is a vital one.

Before 9/11, I saw the terrorist violence around the world as piecemeal. Each event was disconnected from the others. Even though I knew a disproportionate number were indeed perpetrated by Arabs or other Moslems, that fact seemed to be somewhat irrelevant. The causes were the usual ancient hatreds, border disputes, impoverishment, and unknown factors as well.

The events of 9/11 didn’t function for me as some sort of instant illumination, but rather (as I’ve written here) as a catalyst for much reading and research on my part. And that reading indicated the existence of a coherent philosophy underpinning what previously seemed to have been disparate and unconnected events. That belief system has come to be known to me as Islamist totalitarianism.

Yes indeed, there have been other violent–and even terrorist–separatist movements. The IRA comes to mind, of course, and is often cited as an example that this sort of thing is hardly exclusive to Islam. But I’m not asserting it’s exclusive to Islam; rather, that it’s become rampant in a certain subset of Islamic thought. And, unlike localized groups such as the IRA, this movement has been widely promoted around the Islamic world, which means around most of the world itself This phenomenon has caused the vast majority of recent terrorism, violence that has escalated mightily within the past decade, increasing in both scope and magnitude.

The usual disclaimer–that most Moslems aren’t jihadis–is certainly true. But it doesn’t take “most;” it just takes “many.” And “many” there are. (‘Tis enough, ’twill serve.)

9/11 was a watershed for many reasons, but there were two overriding ones: its scope, and its location in the heart of the West in an America that hadn’t previously known a large terrorist attack on civilians on its own soil. From our initial reaction to that event, the jihadis may have learned not to awaken the sleeping giant any more; let him start snoozing again. (Maybe not, of course; a new attack here is always possible.)

But India and other third-world countries, as well as Arab countries such as Egypt, are good targets of opportunity. Easy to move around in and plan, and less fear of massive retaliation. Maybe they did it there mostly because they could.

“Tough love” in the Arab world

The New Neo Posted on by

Richard Fernandez of Belmont Club applies his thoughtful and complex mind to the question of the pace of attitude change in the Arab world.

Fernandez offers evidence that one of the side-effects of the Iraqi war–and have no doubt of this, it was an intended effect–is that many of the Iraqi people are starting to think in fresh ways, rather than to march in lockstep with the propaganda rife in their part of the world.

He bases some of his assertions on a fascinating post at Iraq the Model, which points out how Iraqi opinions on Hamas and the Palestine/Israel question differ from those of their neighbors:

The reactions I gathered were posted on an Arabic forum on the BBC Arabic website. About three dozens of comments were made by Iraqis both inside Iraq and in exile and all these comments were supportive of Israel or at least against Hamas as far as the topic is concerned except for only three comments; that’s a 10:1 ratio while as you probably have guesses, the opposite ratio is true about the comments by the rest of Arabs.

Fernandez believes that the experience of taking responsibility for one’s own political life has had the ripple effect for Iraqis of enhancing their ability to make objective judgments. I would caution that, in the particular instance of Iraqi attitudes towards Palestine and Israel, one other factor is operating: during the Saddam years Palestinians were encouraged to come to Iraq and were resented for having been given special privileges by the hated regime

But I still believe Fernandez is onto something. It’s true in family life, as well: taking responsibility for oneself, bearing the consequences of one’s decisions, is a good way to enhance learning and encourage more thoughtful future decision-making. Every parent knows that, although it can be very hard to let a child start doing this. But eventually, it’s necessary.

Ah, but what if the decisions made are wrong, wrong, wrong? When to step in? What if a child is doing drugs, for example, or prostituting him/herself? How to prevent tragedy? Can one prevent tragedy? These decisions are hard enough in the relatively simple case of the family.

But countries are not children. And tough love has even larger consequences in the international arena than it does in the more personal environment of the family. In Palestine–a country that’s never really been a country, and that for years has been treated as a sort of child by the international community–the Hamas victory is a case that might be likened to a dose of “tough love” after decades of a combination of enabling (Palestinians being on the perennial UN dole) and tyranny (the Arafat regime as harsh parent). In the last election, the Palestinian people were encouraged to take charge of their own destiny. The results, unfortunately, seem to have enhanced their tendencies for destruction, both of themselves and of others.

I wrote earlier that there was some evidence that, in that Hamas election, many Palestinian voters didn’t take their responsibility as seriously as they might have, and voted for Hamas as a sort of protest and a game, not ever thinking the group could actually win. When all the possibilities in an election seem deeply flawed (and what election isn’t like that, if you think about it?), that’s a danger, and not just in Palestine. But in Palestine the flawed options were, unfortunately, far more deeply flawed than in most other countries, due to its especially sad history and deep marination in hatred, dependence, and tyranny.

The alternative to democracy in the Arab world so far has been dictatorship, tyrannical or at times relatively benign. Every dictatorship is a sort of infantalizing of its people, whether the parent be cruel or kind.

The Iraq war set up an experiment in something very different. Like all experiments, the outcome is as yet unknown. Democracy was initially an experiment in this country as well, although the special circumstances of its birth favored a good outcome. The birth pangs in Iraq have been bloody, but, along with Richard Fernandez, the brothers at Iraq the Model, and Michael Yon, I am encouraged by signs that the Iraqis may indeed be–as Fernandez puts it–engaged in “constructing a future for themselves, which…will eventually be rational and intelligent.”

Or, as rational and intelligent as one can hope for when we flawed specimens, human beings, are involved.

More bumper stickers

The New Neo Posted on by

My most recent post was on the subject of bumper stickers (or, rather, bumper sticker). In one of those blogosphere coincidences that aren’t really all that coincidental–after all, there’s a finite number of subjects on which mostly-political bloggers opine–the always-interesting Varifrank has a written a much longer exploration of recent examples of the genre.

Which reminds me of another one I saw here recently that caught my eye, and expresses something about how New Englanders view the rest of the country, “We don’t care how you look at it in California.”

Meditation on a bumper sticker

The New Neo Posted on by

And, speaking of friends—

Here’s a bumper sticker seen yesterday on a parked car in my very liberal town:

Someone’s idea, no doubt, of humor, based on the slogan “Friends don’t let friends drive drunk.”

But it doesn’t seem all that funny to me, not by a longshot. Although it’s ostensibly being said tongue-in-cheek, there’s a certain hardnosed sentiment behind it, one I’ve encountered way too many times. It’s a sentiment that–although espoused by a person who no doubt would identify him/herself as a liberal–embodies the opposite of traditional liberal thought.

What an interesting idea of friendship, that it must march in lockstep, belief matching belief. What an interesting idea of Republicanism; that it’s something pernicious and dangerous, something from which friends must be protected. What an interesting idea of voting; that it’s something you “let” or “don’t let” someone do.

Yes, I know: lighten up, neo, it’s just a joke. But jokes take certain forms for certain reasons; underneath, they express serious ideas that drive people. What is this particular idea? At heart, it’s one of thought control, intolerance, and demonizing of the opposition.

And now–out I go to be with some friends. And I think I’ll “let” them vote however they please.

Friends: who needs em?

The New Neo Posted on by

Recently Dr. Helen, another psychoblogger, wrote this interesting essay exploring the topic of modern-day friendship.

It’s funny; we talk and think (and sing!) a lot about love–how to get it, how to keep it, what goes wrong with it, what it means to us–but not so much about friendship.

It’s a topic I’ve thought a lot about, though, perhaps because I’ve moved quite a bit in my life and most of my old friends live far away, and I’ve had to make new ones in new communities several times over. I’m one of those people to whom friends mean a great deal. Dr. Helen mentions that perhaps extroverts are more likely to be interested in friendship:

People affect people differently–if you are energized by people and feel pleasure in being with others (a typical extrovert), then friendships can be positive, but if you tend towards introversion, then people can sometimes exhaust you and make you feel blue instead of energized—perhaps more boundaries are needed to maintain your emotional health. However, even an introvert may need other people—even one person who you can talk with and share some of yourself in ways that feel safe.

I don’t think I’m a “typical” anything; I’m definitely some strange chimera, either an extroverted introvert or an introverted extrovert. That is, I’m very contemplative and have a need for solitude, but I also love being around people and talking to them. I don’t spill my guts easily, but I have a stable of friends to whom I can confide in a pinch or a crisis; perhaps six or seven of them (friends, not crises!), carefully gleaned and cultivated over time. And I try to follow the old adage, “To have a friend you must be one.” I’m a good listener, as well, and I think my friends know that.

Perhaps that’s why it was so painful for me to come out politically and have so much friction with people, and even to lose a couple of friends (including one long-term one) over that. But, for the most part, my friendships have weathered the storm, although not without some work.

Long ago, I used to think my need for friends, and the number of them that I had, was typical of most people (perhaps that’s a subset of the common misperception that whatever we happen to feel or want is what everyone feels or wants). But as I got older I realized that wasn’t so. One thing I learned as a general rule—although, of course, as with most rules, exceptions abound—is that women tend to have more friends than men. Or, at least, they tend to do different things with them; rather than be activity-oriented (golf, baseball, hunting), women’s friendships tend to be talk-oriented (problems, relationships, feelings).

I have some friends I’ve known since I was a little girl, and some I’ve kept since college. Some of the former might be people with whom, if I met them today, I wouldn’t be especially friendly. But the long history we share is worth a lot, and gives us a commonality that almost feels as though we’re relatives at this point.

The college friends are still some of the best I have; I think there are certain times in life that are especially ripe for forming fast and firm friendships, and that’s one of them. Another, especially for young mothers, is the period when they’re at home with the babies or the toddlers, and about to lose their minds if they don’t have some adult companionship; I’ve got quite a few friends from that period of life, as well.

The commonality is that these are times or transition and stress, and the bonds forged among those who share the experience can be very strong indeed. Even if they move away—and many of them have; as, in fact, have I—we talk on the phone, and when we meet, often the years fall away and we experience that wondrous cliché , “it’s as though we last saw each other just yesterday.”

I’ve lost some friends, too, and not just to politics: to death. That happens more and more as one grows older. Mercifully, it’s been few so far, but I know as time passes the numbers will inevitably increase. And two of my very best friends have had extremely life-threatening cancers, a very sobering and disturbing momento mori.

When I look back, I think some of my expectations about friendship were formed by my parents—no surprise, I suppose. They were both born, grew up, and lived their entire lives in a single tight-knit community (well, for my mother, not quite her whole life, since she moved from New York to New England in 2002 to be near me—but by that time, she was eighty-eight.)

Their community was an exceptionally social one, social in a way few are today. Not only did my parents grow up there, but almost everyone they knew did, as well—and they knew hundreds, if not thousands, of people. As a child, when I would walk down the street, complete strangers constantly recognized me from my powerful resemblance to my father and would come up to talk to me (another thing that wouldn’t happen today!), saying that they knew him and could tell I was his daughter. As a teenager, I wasn’t allowed to wear jeans when I went out into the community, because it would reflect badly on the family (and remember, my parents were liberals–oh, how the times they have a-changed!)

My parents, and all their friends, used to party. Not as in “get blasted,” but as in “have a lot of fun.” It was not unusual for them to get together with friends four or five times a week—card games, volunteer work, cake and coffee, and full-fledged parties. They often vacationed with from four to eight couples as a group. They took ballroom dancing lessons in their basements.

And they talked—oh, how they talked! As a child one of my strongest memories is of evenings spent up in my bedroom, trying to do my homework, while the siren song of loud and animated conversation wafted invitingly towards me.

Often, I would give in and go down there, to where the adults sat around the large dining room table, eating pastry, drinking coffee, and talking. Arguing, too, at times. Over local things and larger things, including politics and the world. Nor did they shun the opinions of a child; I was welcome at the table, and I was allowed speak up. My parents didn’t monitor my homework–perhaps because they knew I was conscientious enough and driven enough so that they didn’t have to–and so I was allowed to make my own judgments about how much time I would spend partaking of the conversation.

I always thought when I grew up I’d have friends like that. Alas, I don’t—that is, I don’t have a large group of friends who all know each other and get together regularly. They’re scattered, as my life has been scattered, as well; with different eras and varied venues, as well as different groups of friends and individual friends.

I’ve come to consider that what my parents had then was at least somewhat exceptional, even for the time, although it used to be far more common than now. Such a phenomenon seems very rare nowadays, especially in urban areas.

But I value it. And sometimes I think it set the tone for my attraction to blogging, which is a sort of virtual recreation of my parents’ coffee hours. And here I am, still speaking up.

So here, friends, have some coffee cake on me:

Told you so: the New York Times reliving its glory days

The New Neo Posted on by

About ten days ago I wrote this post, in which I speculated about the motivation of the NY Times in publishing its recent national security revelations. My answer to the question of what the Times editors were really trying to do by their actions was that they were hoping to relive the paper’s own “top of the world, Ma!” days, the heady era of their victory in the Pentagon Papers lawsuit of 1971, when the Supreme Court ruled in their favor.

And now I’m only more certain that I may have been onto something. Why? This piece by LA Times editor Baquet and NY Times editor Keller, appearing in the July 1 NY Times, appears to say as much. They refer to the Pentagon Papers case prominently and early in the article, a clear indication to me that the case represents some sort of inspiration for them.

The piece reads as though we are meant to feel sorry for the editors and the terrible anxiety they experienced when making what they refer to as “excruciating choices” in whether or not to cover these stories. Poor dears; sounds dreadful.

Their article is entitled “When Do We Publish a Secret?” and their answer (which could be paraphrased as “whenever we feel like it”), is expressed this way:

There is no magic formula, no neat metric for either the public’s interest or the dangers of publishing sensitive information. We make our best judgment…It is not a responsibility we take lightly. And it is not one we can surrender to the government.

Isn’t that reassuring? It’s awfully good to know that the unelected editors of the MSM are the final arbiters of which secrets to publish, and when, and that they don’t even seem to have guidelines about it, or feel the need to respect the wishes of the experts in national security who advise them on the matter. After all, that’s “the government,” and we all know better than to trust them right? They never have our best interests at heart and, after all, what do they know? Far better to trust Baquet and Keller, our national security gatekeepers.