Yes, Obama’s president—and you’re not

The New Neo Posted on by

Obama won, as he keeps reminding us.

Today in his press conference, he said:

“I think John McCain has genuine passion about many of these international issues,” Obama said, adding that they share a desire to see free speech respected. “But only I’m the president of the United States.

I cannot in my lifetime recall a previous president feeling the need to remind the opposition and the public that “I won,” and “Only I’m the president of the United States.” The latter in particular has a “nah nah nah na nah” teasy juvenile quality, especially since Obama is comparing himself to John McCain, the man who ran against him in 2008 and would have liked to have been president instead.

It reminds me of this:

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Neda: martyrs, mourning, and propaganda

The New Neo Posted on by

By now you’ve heard the story of Neda Agha-Soltan, killed last weekend in a demonstration in Iran, and seen her photos—alive, dying, and dead. Her fiance and witnesses report that she was purposely targeted by Baseji paramilitaries who shot her in the chest.

When I heard of Neda’s death from a friend several days ago, my first thought (after “how horrible”) was that her image would almost surely be used to rally others under the banner of her martyrdom. This has come to pass, and not just in Iran. Even President Obama referred to her death in his press conference today

As Stalin famously said: The death of one man is a tragedy. The death of millions is a statistic. There is no question that Stalin was correct.

The way our minds and hearts seem to work is that it’s difficult to encompass and appreciate the scope of large tragedies involving vast numbers. Perhaps it’s best that way; otherwise we’d have a lot more trouble sleeping soundly at night. But in this respect we’re somewhat like those tribes whose counting ability is somewhat limited: one, two, three…many.

That’s why a story such as Neda’s captures the imagination: she’s a person we can identify with rather than a mere statistic. Why Neda and not the others who’ve died? Perhaps because her demise was so very well-documented, and also because she was young and beautiful and female. This makes her a particularly apt symbol of the opportunities lost by the multitudes of young people in Iran who’ve been under the thumb of the mullahs for their entire lives.

The mullahs are cognizant of the power of the martyr in their culture and religion. That’s why they’ve banned funeral celebrations for Neda. The NY Times explains that the mullahs themselves have made excellent use of such things in the past:

Funerals have long served as a political rallying point in Iran, since it is customary to have a week of mourning and a large memorial service 40 days after a death. In the 1979 revolution, that cycle generated a constant supply of new protests and deaths.

But the narrative of death has also been important in the lore surrounding the existence of the Islamic republic.

The government portrayed itself in the role of Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad killed by a far larger army during the seventh-century struggle within Islam, which gave birth to the Shiite sect that predominates in Iran.

Days for prophets and saints believed killed in the service of the faith dot the holiday calendar, taking up 22 days of the year.

So the very public adulation of Ms. Agha-Soltan could create a religious symbol for the opposition and sap support for the government among the faithful who believe Islam abhors killing innocent civilians.

I’ve written before about the power of iconic news photos to change (or at the very least to rally) public opinion (see this, this, and this). Photos and/or videos have the power of graphic simplicity; they get us in the gut. It’s an emotional place that the words in news stories, however dramatic, can rarely touch.

Photos seem to never lie, but of course they can. In the case of Neda, however, it appears fairly clear—from the context, the preponderance of the photographic evidence, and the large number of witnesses—that what is reported to have happened is exactly what did happen.

In the past this has not always been true. For example, in some of my posts I linked to above, the photos were of very real events but the news stories about them distorted what was actually happening at the time. And then in recent years we’ve seen the growth of two other variations: faked Photoshopped photos, and real photos and/or videos of faked events.

For example, I’ve written at great length about the al Durah case, where the video was real but drastically edited, and the preponderance of evidence (including the more complete footage, as well as forensics) pointed strongly to the fact that the event had been staged for a compliant news cameraman in order to create a martyr (or more likely the illusion of a martyr) and to frame Israeli soldiers as murderers (see also this).

The al Durah incident was wildly successful in doing just that. And, in a terrible irony, the boy’s photo was used to inspire the murder of innocent Israelis by suicide bombers in supposed retaliation, as well as being shown as part of the introduction to the video of the beheading of Daniel Pearl. The people who arranged the al Durah incident knew how incredibly powerful the al Durah photos were.

As human beings, we are all susceptible to the pull of propaganda, both for good and evil, and we know that photos are among the most effective propaganda tools of all. Just because we are in sympathy with a cause does not mean everything that is said in that cause is the truth. We have to retain a healthy skepticism—accent on the word “healthy”—and to use our judgment to evaluate each case on its merits.

That Neda was in fact killed by the repressive forces of the mullahs is not in serious doubt, although that doesn’t stop some people from spreading the idea that this is another lie (I’m not going to dignify them with links, but just Google “Neda hoax” to see some). But the mullahs themselves are no strangers to lies—in fact, their election results were an example of a Big Lie that they thought they could pull off successfully.

And maybe, in the end, they will pull it off in the sense of their guy, Ahmadinejad, retaining power. That wily old Stalin knew a thing or two about such games, as well:

It is enough that the people know there was an election. The people who cast the votes decide nothing. The people who count the votes decide everything.

Perhaps. We’ll see.

[NOTE: This article points out the the Financial Times has compared Neda to al-Durah without seeming to have any idea of the debunking of the al Durah story. No surprise there.]

Obama hazy on smoking

The New Neo Posted on by

President Obama has signed a bill designed to give government more sweeping powers to regulate cigarettes, especially the way they’re marketed to attract teens, citing his own experience as a young smoker.

But on the question of whether he’s still puffing away now that he’s reached a more mature state, he’s about as forthcoming as he is about so many other aspects of his life and history—which is to say, hardly at all:

But he didn’t say how his own struggle was coming since he moved into the White House. And aides were no more forthcoming.

As senator, candidate and now president, Obama has veered between frank and cagey about his personal battle with smoking.

He promised his wife, Michelle, more than two years ago that he would quit if she let him seek the White House.

He has often acknowledged since that he has “fallen off the wagon.” But he hardly ever provides specifics. And though White House aides pack nicotine gum in their jackets to help him resist, they also refuse to give a clear answer to the question of whether the president still sneaks a smoke now and again…

“I don’t, honestly, see the need to get a whole lot more specific than the fact that it’s a continuing struggle,” Gibbs said. “He struggles with it every day.”

Honestly, Mr. Gibbs, I bet you don’t see the need. I wouldn’t either, to tell you the truth (I assume the White House is amply equipped with smoke alarms), except that it is typical of Obama’s cageyness (love that word!) or downright secretiveness on other aspects of his life that are far more relevant.

As far as cigarettes go, however, methinks Obama is following the example of St. Augustine, who said (albeit about a very different subject): “Make me chaste—but not yet.”

Iran: why now?

The New Neo Posted on by

What’s going on in Iran right now is the result of many forces coming together. But I have little doubt that the most powerful of them are specific to Iran and its people rather than being international in scope.

The Iranian people (especially the huge percentage of the population that is young) are fed up with many things about Ahmadinejad and the mullahs, most prominent being the former’s flagrant mishandling of the Iranian economy, and the social repressions that have been going on for decades since the 1979 revolution at the hands of the latter.

The government’s transparent lies about the recent election results have merely acted as a tipping point, making it crystal clear to the people that they have no voice at all in the selection of their government, and destroying the pretense that Iran’s leaders (at least, the figureheads; not the mullahs themselves who pull their strings) were democratically elected.

That said, what of the influence of other countries? It’s commonplace to put down neocons these days, but if you look at the map you will see that Iran is situated between Iraq and Afghanistan, two nations that have achieved enhanced freedom (although differing in degree, both are freer than they were before) as a result of our interventions there. Those who think that Obama’s Cairo speech had more of an effect on Iran’s elections are dreaming; it’s much more likely that, just as the neocons said, freedom is contagious (even a little bit of it).

But I do think that Obama’s election may have played two small roles. First, it possibly emboldened the mullahs to become more flagrant in negating the will of the people in the election, knowing that Obama wouldn’t do much to protest. In this the mullahs may have underestimated the reaction of the Iranian people and their anger at what had transpired; time will tell whether theirs was a miscalculation or not.

But I do give Obama credit for the second thing: Bush has been a very polarizing figure around the world, and Obama is definitely a more charismatic and less strident one. His tone of conciliation and apology (which I believe also communicates weakness) does have the advantage in this situation of making it much harder for Ahmadinejad or the mullahs to successly demonize him and to blame the present uprising on the US and have it stick—although Khamenei’s been trying anyway.

This doesn’t mean that, if the present demonstrations were to succeed and Mousavi were to take control, the demonstrators would get the freedom and representation they appear to crave. Mousavi himself is still somewhat of a cipher (read his recent praise of Khomeini and the glorious early days of the 1979 revolution here, for example, if you want to get a cold chill).

All revolutions are loose cannons; their courses cannot be predicted or controlled. Revolutionaries know what they intend, but they often are part of coalitions that combine forces with very different agendas. They can’t know ahead of time what they will actually build if successful in overthrowing the current regime. And sometimes (in fact, very often) revolutionary leaders manipulate the people by saying they plan one thing, and then end up doing something quite different—something that can exceed in repression what went before.

[ADDENDUM: Will a general strike be called for tomorrow?]

A thousand calories can sure sneak up on you

The New Neo Posted on by

For anyone trying to lose weight, this is sobering.

It’s an illustration of how easy it is to eat a thousand calories. Here’s an example you might have had for lunch today—a ham and cheese sandwich, a soda, and some chips:

Bread = 200 calories
Mayo = 115 calories
Cheese = 212 calories
Ham = 183 calories
Soda = 150 calories
Chips = 155 calories

It’s one thing if you’re a lumberjack, or a 6’4″ athlete—then it’s a mere snack, a small portion of the fuel needed for a normal day. For the rest of us it’s trouble.

I don’t eat that way, of course (of course!). But it’s not at all hard to rack up the calories nevertheless.

But don’t despair. Never despair. It turns out that being skinny isn’t all it’s cracked up to be. At least, if you’re Japanese.

Listen up, Obama

The New Neo Posted on by

Despite growing opposition, President Obama hasn’t given up on his plans for sweeping reforms—including a public option—in health care and health insurance. But if Obama would slow down and work on Medicare first, and actually succeed in cutting costs there, he could actually garner some bipartisan support for his plan as well as some perception that he might really know what he’s doing.

Of course, that would mean actually showing some concrete results in tackling a very knotty problem, not Obama’s strong suit.

I first found a good statement of the idea in the comments section here:

[The] President is mixing increase in coverage with cost reduction. Controlling Medicare cost is the fiscal reform imperative for Fed and that should be done independently of coverage increase. Go there, save some solid bundles for Government, earn the ”˜chips and credibility for fiscal management’ and then commit those saved resources for coverage increase. At that time public can accept some taxes to complete the funding of increased coverage. True, these two parts (controlling costs and increasing the coverage) can be tied together and the omnibus bill can be passed for legislative efficiency purposes as well as political expediency. But what is happening is [the] President is waving the candy first before earning necessary political capital by way of controlling the daemon of Health Care Costs.

Makes sense. But not to a president who’s never had to prove he can do anything before assuming he can do everything, and do it better than anyone else who’s gone before him—and having the world nod in agreement.

Here’s the same idea about fixing Medicare, this time expressed in article form.

The problem, of course, is that Obama has no more idea how to actually “fix” Medicare than he has to fix health insurance, or health care in general. What he wants is to pass a bill that appeals to his constituents, and to do it as fast as possible, before the opposition gets too powerful and the American people too aware of what’s happening and what its ramifications are.

The recent cost estimate by the Congressional Budget Office was a nightmare for Obama. It slowed down the juggernaut and made some people—even some Democrats—reflect and pull back. The CBO has a long-held reputation for objectivity, and that’s why Nancy Pelosi is now trying her hardest to discredit their projections of the cost of her (and Obama’s) pet project. Of course, few people (even among my liberal, female friends) think much of Pelosi and her own objectivity.

This revolution will be Twittered

The New Neo Posted on by

Yes, I know—the unrest in Iran right now can hardly be called a revolution, and there’s a good chance it may never rise to that level, although one can hope.

But there is no question that the widespread protests that have gone on there were facilitated at the start by modern communications such as cell phones and especially the internet, including such ordinarily light and entertaining modes as You Tube and Twitter. They’ve taken on a new—and deadly—seriousness, and although the Iranian government has now blocked a great many of these avenues for communication, some of the protesters have found a way around such barricades, particularly through Twitter.

I doubt that the originators of these networking tools ever envisioned this particular use of their bright idea. What’s more, the internet was at least partly responsible for the ability of the younger generation of Iranians to comprehend exactly how repressed their country is compared to the outside world reaching them on their computers.

In fact, one could set up a hierarchy of countries on the basis of how completely they attempt to block communication technology in general, and it would roughly resemble the relative cruelty and harshness of the regimes involved—with North Korea being by far the most Draconian, nearly complete in its sealing-off of the populace. Tyrants well know that this is what they must do (or at least try to do; there are often ways around it) in this day and age to keep their people from what neocons like me would call the universal yearning for liberty and a say in choosing a government that fosters it.

Of course, technology is a double-edged sword; it makes the protesters in Iran vulnerable, as well. Their attempts at coordinating the protests have been hampered by the government’s blocking of the normal avenues of internet and cell phone communication, as well as press coverage. But although the mullahs have not been completely successful in doing so, you can see the fruits of their efforts today as journalists in the West maintain that the information they’re getting is spotty, fragmented, and unreliable. Twitter, however, is alive with reports and photos indicating that the demonstrating crowds are bigger than officially reported, and that the police (mostly Baseji?) have been shooting and killing as well as using tear gas and water cannons.

There is no question that today’s protesters are uncommonly brave; they went to the streets knowing there was a good chance they might be murdered. There is also no question that no one knows whether the official repression and violence against them will have its desired effect and cause the crowds to thin and finally dissipate, or whether it will inspire a widespread backlash and perhaps even a general strike.

Boris Yeltsin said, ““You can make a throne of bayonets, but you can’t sit on it for long.” But the example of Russia before him, and of Iraq for many years, as well as North Korea—belie his words. You can sit on that throne for quite a while, as the mullahs have, although it depends on what the meaning of “long” is.

Thirty years is a long time, enough to allow a new generation to grow up under this regime and to become impatient and dissatisfied with it. The bigger question is how many bayonets surround the mullahs’ throne, how willing those who hold them are to use them to intimidate the Iranian people, and for how long.

Mousavi the changer?—Part II

The New Neo Posted on by

Two days ago I wrote a post speculating on whether Mousavi was a “changer.” I didn’t know the answer, and I still don’t know. But I wrote:

…the reasons for Mousavi’s retirement from the public scene in 1989 are mysterious (at least, I haven’t found anything yet that sheds light on them), and twenty years is a long time. Was he undergoing a metamorphosis and biding his time? Or was he just biding his time?…

But if Mousavi has really reformed (as opposed to just being a “reformist candidate”), he is not alone. Many revolutionaries who are gung-ho in the first flush of a movement’s victory later become disgusted with the wretched excesses that ensue. If Mousavi goes that way, he wouldn’t be the first Iranian to do so…

In yesterday’s Guardian there is an article by Mohsen Makhmalbaf, the official spokesperson for Mousavi. Makhmalbaf writes:

People say that Mousavi won’t change anything as he is part of the establishment. That is correct to a degree because they wouldn’t let anyone who is not in their circle rise to seniority. But not all members of a family are alike, and for Mousavi it is useful to understand how he has changed over time.

Before the revolution, Mousavi was a religious intellectual and an artist, who supported radical change but did not support the mullahs. After the revolution, when all religious intellectuals and even leftists backed Khomeini, he served as prime minister for eight years. The economy was stable, and he did not order the killings of opponents, or become corrupt.

In order to neuralise his power, the position of prime minister was eliminated from the constitution and he was pushed out of politics. So Mousavi returned to the world of artists because in a country where there are no real political parties, artists can act as a party. The artists supported Khatami and now they support Mousavi.

Previously, he was revolutionary, because everyone inside the system was a revolutionary. But now he’s a reformer. Now he knows Gandhi ”“ before he knew only Che Guevara.

Well, I still don’t know; under Mousavi as Prime Minister there was certainly a lot of killing, although I’m inclined to credit Makhmalbaf’s assertion that Mousavi didn’t order the deaths. As Prime Minister he probably didn’t have that sort of power because the mullahs were in charge back then as well (this is in agreement with me, although it’s hard to know whether the information there is correct or not).

At the very least, however, we know that Mousavi remained as Prime Minister for many years while repression was happening. But his retirement from public life afterwards indicates the strong possibility of the sort of disillusionment I referred to in my previous post.

Mousavi has now said he’s ready to be a martyr. For a man in his position, these words are not mere hyperbole. And it’s hard to believe he would be willing to die merely to gain personal power, especially since his absence from politics all these years seems to have been at least partly voluntary.

Makhmalbaf is a fascinating figure himself, and another “changer.” A few years before the 1979 revolution, he was arrested and imprisoned for activity as a seventeen-year-old revolutionary in an underground Islamic militia group. After 1979 he was released from prison. But instead of entering official political life he became one of Iran’s premier film personalities, a director, writer, and producer, and some of his films have been banned in Iran. Therefore when he talks of artists as a form of underground political power and protest he knows whereof he speaks.

Besides his characterization of Mousavi as a changer, Makhmalbaf offers other interesting observations in his Guardian piece. Speaking of the 1979 revolution, he writes:

The people of Iran have a culture that elevates martyrdom. In the period running up to the revolution, when people were killed at demonstrations, others would gather again in the days following the death. This cycle carried on for six months, and culminated in the revolution. Today they are gathering in Tehran for those who were shot on Tuesday, and if there are more killings, this will continue…

Thirty years ago we supported each other. When police used tear gas, fires would be lit to neutralise its effects. People would set their own cars on fire to save others. Since then, the government has tried to separate people from one other. What we lost was our togetherness, and in the past month we have found that again. All the armed forces in Iran are only enough to repress one city, not the whole country. The people are like drops of water coming together in a sea.

No doubt Makhmalbaf wishes very hard that that sea—like the waters that engulfed and drowned Pharaoh’s armies—would overwhelm the hated mullahs of Iran. I believe that this is what Mousavi wants, as well—not just his own election under them.

Exactly what sort of government Mousavi would attempt to form if he were to succeed against so many odds is hard to tell. In what direction did his change go? Is he a man of the Left now? Makhmalbaf speaks admiringly of Obama and disparagingly of Bush, but that is so common these days that it’s hard to know whether it has any particular meaning, especially in terms of Mousavi. Perhaps we’ll get a chance to find out.

I can’t resist this one

The New Neo Posted on by

The title of the video is “are women born this way?”

Answer: beats me. But it’s awfully cute, isn’t it? Maybe she’ll grow up to be a blogger.

[NOTE: For some reason I can’t get the video to play if I use Mozilla, but it works just fine in Explorer.]

Iran: “it wasn’t supposed to happen this way”

The New Neo Posted on by

Well worth reading, this NY Times op-ed purports to be by a young Iranian. Writer “Shane” describes the evolution of public opinion in the Iranian election and how the subsequent demonstrations got going, as well as noting the changed demographics of Iran during the thirty years since the Khomeini revolution.

Along the way, he castigates those in the US press and politics who muse that Ahmadinejad was actually the true winner of the election. He calls them ignorant of the changes that have occurred in Iran during the last thirty years, including increased urbanization and education. He also floats the curious notion that Ahmadinejad would be better for Iranian foreign (as opposed to domestic) policy because he would be able to make concessions to the West, since he is already viewed as such a hardliner, a sort of “Nixon opens up China” figure. Although I certainly don’t have my finger on the pulse of Iran, I beg to differ; Ahmadinejad could theoretically do that if Ahmadinejad showed a single indication of wanting to do that, which he most decidedly has not.

“Shane” doesn’t mention another factor about which I’ve read a great deal, one that seems to be a big part of the mix: the population of Iran is overwhelmingly young. This seems to be an example of the principle of “be careful what you wish for,” because it’s a result of campaigns by the rulers after the revolution and during the war against Iraq to increase the birth rate:

[T]he leaders of the new Islamic republic drew attention to a tenet of the Quran that encourages early marriage and large families. Population growth became part of the national agenda, with incentives to reward families for each additional child. Everything from TVs to cars to food was distributed on a per capita basis through a rationing system, making it advantageous to have many children. These incentives remained in place through the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, when population growth was viewed as a strategic advantage: more children, more future soldiers.

The government-spurred baby boom came to an abrupt end toward the end of the war. In 1988, the Ministry of Health and Medical Education held a three-day seminar in Mashad on development, which determined that the rapidly increasing population would soon exceed Iran’s infrastructure and natural resources.

The huge baby boom slowed down after 1988, but this left Iran with its current bubble of people under 30, variously estimated as being either 60% or 70% of the current population. That’s an awful lot of young people. This is most definitely a part of what’s happening in the revolt in Iran today; as “Shane” says, these people are finding strength in each other and experiencing a new sense of shared community and purpose. “It wasn’t supposed to happen this way” is a refrain of his essay, and it could also be applied to the mullahs’ encouragement of childbearing for the revolutionary generation, which created this problematic (for them) bubble of young people today.

At the moment the news appears grim for the demonstrators, however. Khameini just addressed crowds of supporters and laid down the law, as expected. Mousavi was not at his side,although he was told to be. The West, in particular Britain, was vilified (although Obama, despite all his carefully calibrated mealymouthed blather, was also panned).

Mousavi’s supporters plan to continue demonstrations tomorrow, as do a group of clerics on the same side. However, the real questions are (1) how far the demonstrators are willing to go, and how much violence against them are they willing to absorb; (2) how far the mullahs are willing to go, and how much violence they are willing to perpetrate; and (3) will the police, the Guards, and other forces called in by the mullahs to quell the crowds be willing to fire on them, or will they stay their hands?

That last question may be the most important of all. Like all tyrants, the mullahs can do little without the help of the vast numbers of henchmen they employ, and without the exercise of fear. Sometimes there is a great deal of opposition and unrest under the radar screen even within the groups assisting tyrants, and once dissatisfaction as a whole reaches a critical mass and events transpire to release it, there can be a sudden change and a refusal to defend the regime.

I am most definitely not saying this will happen in Iran right now. I am merely saying it is a possibility, although I don’t think it’s likely. The mullahs have the firepower, and if they also have the will to suppress the demonstrators, and the loyal police with which to accomplish it, they will almost undoubtedly succeed in doing so—even if “the whole world is watching.”

But no matter what happens, the seeds of unrest have been sowed, and they may bear fruit in later years. This will be scant comfort to those in Iran who want freedom now. But at least Obama will then have his much-anticipated talks with Ahmadinejad, for what that’s worth (which in my opinion is absolutely nothing).