Remember (ah, it seems like eons ago) the first few months of Obama’s presidency?
The focus was on the economy and attempts to foster its recovery. There were a gazillion articles about what had gone wrong: blame the Democrats, blame the Republicans, blame both, blame the 2007 repeal of the uptick rule, blame the 1999 end of Glass-Steagall.
The uptick rule. Back in June, I wondered about the delay in reinstating it. Well, it’s the end of October now, and I haven’t heard a thing about the topic since late spring. Wiki, which often tends to have the most current information about things, reports a flurry of discussion and activity about it in the first few months after the inauguration, but nothing since then.
I admit that, until the financial crisis hit about a year ago, I’d never even heard of the uptick rule. But a crash course (pun intended) in what had happened to the markets introduced me to the uptick rule and more. And I was shocked when I learned on what basis it had been repealed in the first place:
…[T]he “uptick” rule…helped limit downward spirals by allowing a stock to be sold short only after a rise (an “uptick”) from its immediately prior price. Adopted in 1938, the uptick rule was repealed by the SEC on July 3, 2007, primarily on the basis of a pilot program conducted in 2005. In the pilot program the agency compared 943 randomly selected stocks from the Russell 3000 not subject to the uptick rule to the remaining stocks in the Russell 3000 (a broad-based index of U.S. stocks of all sizes) still subject to this rule.
The comparison was only for six months — far too brief a time to draw conclusions about a rule that had been in effect for 70 years. The comparison also did not take place when repeal of the uptick rule could be stress-tested: 2005 was a year of rising stock prices with low volatility.
I’m not a financial wizard. But I do know something about research design. So, long before I read that last paragraph, I realized that a 6-month pilot study, performed under relatively stable market conditions, concerning a rule that had worked for approximately seventy years and is most vital under volatile market conditions, does not a proper pilot study make.
But we can’t expect the SEC to know that, can we? After all—as we’ve learned to our dismay in recent months—the SEC couldn’t even recognize a Ponzi scheme when it was handed one on a platinum platter.
While we’re on the subject, what about Glass-Steagall? That was another long-standing post-Depression rule that had stood the test of time, and whose repeal paved the way for the current crisis, at least in the view of many experts. I wrote about it in some depth back in March, and noted then that Paul Volcker had suggested that Glass-Steagall be reinstated.
If you Google “reinstate Glass-Steagall,” you’ll come up with a list of articles pro and con (mostly pro its re-establishment, however). Here, for example, is an eye-witness report of the pernicious influence of Glass-Steagall’s repeal on the insurance industry. And, although this author thinks believes that Glass-Steagall’s repeal was not instrumental in the financial breakdown of a year ago (look at the comments for a counter-argument), he finds that there is nevertheless a case to be made for its reinstatement (here’s another piece that unequivocally calls for reinstatement).
But where does the administration stand on this issue? Isn’t Volcker a top adviser, appointed Chairman of Obama’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board back in February?
Is this inaction another case of Obama as Hamlet? Or is it just the usual situation involving the influence of monied interest groups determined to prevent needed reforms? Or has there actually been an in-depth review, and a rejection of the case for repeal of the uptick rule and reinstatement of Glass-Steagall on the merits? If so, I can’t find anything about it.
The most relevant article I could locate on the subject appeared recently in the business section of the NY Times. In it, Volcker was described as firmly behind the reinstatement of Glass-Steagall, but he’s been given the cold shoulder by this administration because of its belief that this action would make the US less competitive in the world market. Instead, Obama would prefer to more closely regulate the institutions in question—but hasn’t yet done so (Hamlet again?):
The Obama team, in contrast, would let the giants survive, but would regulate them extensively, so they could not get themselves and the nation into trouble again. While the administration’s proposal languishes, giants like Goldman Sachs have re-engaged in old trading practices, once again earning big profits and planning big bonuses.
Unlike Volcker, Alan Greenspan thinks Glass-Steagall should remain repealed. But I have to say that at this point Greenspan has lost almost all the credibility he once had. But Volcker has lost something too: his influence on Obama—that is, if he ever had any in the first place. Let’s hear what he has to say:
[Volcker’s] disagreement with the Obama people on whether to restore some version of Glass-Steagall appears to have contributed to published reports that his influence in the administration is fading and that he is rarely if ever in the small Washington office assigned to him.
He operates from his own offices in New York, communicating with administration officials and other members of the advisory board mainly by telephone. (He does not use e-mail, although his support staff does.) He travels infrequently to Washington, he says, and when he does, the visits are too short to bother with the office. The advisory board has been asked to study, amid other issues, the tax law on corporate profits earned overseas, hardly a headline concern.
So Mr. Volcker scoffs at the reports that he is losing clout. “I did not have influence to start with,” he said.
Who does, I wonder?

