A lot of Democrats, led by Obama, are carping that Netanyahu’s speech didn’t offer a “viable alternative” to the disastrous, suicidal course Obama has chosen (no they didn’t use those adjectives). But Netanyahu certainly did provide one; it’s just not one that they like. And his assertion was that it’s Obama’s alternative that’s not viable.
Before I describe Netanyahu’s alternative, let me say add you don’t have to offer a detailed alternative to state that something is a dreadful idea. Saying Netanyahu offered no alternative and that therefore Obama’s deal should go ahead is like saying that you shouldn’t desist from jumping off a cliff unless the person trying to talk you out of it has offered you a good job.
But Netanyahu’s alternative (or rather, alternatives) was actually fairly clear. The first part went like this:
Israel’s neighbors — Iran’s neighbors know that Iran will become even more aggressive and sponsor even more terrorism when its economy is unshackled and it’s been given a clear path to the bomb.
And many of these neighbors say they’ll respond by racing to get nuclear weapons of their own. So this deal won’t change Iran for the better; it will only change the Middle East for the worse. A deal that’s supposed to prevent nuclear proliferation would instead spark a nuclear arms race in the most dangerous part of the planet.
In other words, doing nothing—keeping the status quo—is a better alternative. Obama’s deal instead gives Iran concessions that will increase the danger to the world, not just to Israel.
Here’s the second part, and it involves setting conditions for easing restrictions on Iran. These conditions are of course nothing that Iran would agree to, but they are conditions that would be necessary before Obama’s concessions would begin to make any sense:
I’ve come here today to tell you we don’t have to bet the security of the world on the hope that Iran will change for the better. We don’t have to gamble with our future and with our children’s future.
We can insist that restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program not be lifted for as long as Iran continues its aggression in the region and in the world.
Before lifting those restrictions, the world should demand that Iran do three things. First, stop its aggression against its neighbors in the Middle East. Second…Second, stop supporting terrorism around the world. And third, stop threatening to annihilate my country, Israel, the one and only Jewish state.
The third part is a slight modification of the second part, and it has to do with the ten-year period after which all bets are off:
If the world powers are not prepared to insist that Iran change its behavior before a deal is signed, at the very least they should insist that Iran change its behavior before a deal expires. If Iran changes its behavior, the restrictions would be lifted. If Iran doesn’t change its behavior, the restrictions should not be lifted. If Iran wants to be treated like a normal country, let it act like a normal country.
The fourth part is an explanation of the practical reasons that Netanyahu’s proposal is likely to work better than Obama’s proposal—which boils down to the fact that Iran is hurting economically, and so this is a good time to continue the pressure rather than to lift it:
My friends, what about the argument that there’s no alternative to this deal, that Iran’s nuclear know-how cannot be erased, that its nuclear program is so advanced that the best we can do is delay the inevitable, which is essentially what the proposed deal seeks to do?
Well, nuclear know-how without nuclear infrastructure doesn’t get you very much. A racecar driver without a car can’t drive. A pilot without a plan can’t fly. Without thousands of centrifuges, tons of enriched uranium or heavy water facilities, Iran can’t make nuclear weapons. Iran’s nuclear program can be rolled back well-beyond the current proposal by insisting on a better deal and keeping up the pressure on a very vulnerable regime, especially given the recent collapse in the price of oil.
Now, if Iran threatens to walk away from the table — and this often happens in a Persian bazaar — call their bluff. They’ll be back, because they need the deal a lot more than you do.
The fifth part is a reiteration of how important keeping the pressure on Iran over time would be:
And by maintaining the pressure on Iran and on those who do business with Iran, you have the power to make them need it even more.
Most of the rest of Netanyahu’s speech is devoted to saying that choosing this path would lead to a better deal than Obama’s bad deal. There is really nothing obscure or difficult-to-understand about what Netanyahu is proposing, and it certainly seems a lot more viable than anything Obama has planned.
Paul Mirengoff of Powerline summarizes the alternatives very well:
The answer to Obama’s point is that the absence of a deal doesn’t mean the absence of a strategy for preventing Iran from obtaining nukes. In fact, the absence of a deal would facilitate two approaches that hold more promise of thwarting Iran than even a decent deal.
In theory, there are three scenarios under which Iran won’t get the bomb. First, military action might prevent it. Second, the right kind of regime change might prevent it. Third, a deal might prevent it.
The first and second scenarios are the most effective because the third depends on some level of cooperation and compliance by a notoriously hostile and unreliable regime.
The way—the only way—to ever get Iran to agree to any deal would be a remarkable amount of pressure. Even then, the agreement would probably be bogus. Obama has no appreciation of the nature of the Iranian regime (or he is actively colluding with it), and is pretending he has a “partner for peace,” just as the left has pretended the same about the Palestinians (for example, Arafat) vis a vis Israel.
[NOTE: I forgive Netanyahu for referring to Robert Frost’s “The Road Not Taken” in his speech and getting the meaning of the poem somewhat wrong—as most people do. Netanyahu wasn’t there as a poetry critic (fortunately) when he summarized it as “the difficult path is usually the one less traveled, but it will make all the difference.” Look here for why that’s a common misunderstanding of the poem’s more complex message.]