There has been so much SCOTUS news in the past two days that it’s easy to ignore cases that ordinarily would be of enormous importance but have been overshadowed by others. One is the disparate impact case, otherwise known by the unwieldy moniker Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. In it, the Court ruled (with Kennedy once again casting the deciding vote) that:
…the FHA [Fair Housing Act] reaches otherwise lawful activities which, while free of discriminatory intent, are nonetheless found to have a “disparate impact” on minority groups. In so holding, the Court agreed with decades of unanimous federal appeals-court precedents that arrived at the same conclusion.
Three things stand out here. The first is that Justice Kennedy, an unelected official, has become one of the most powerful people in the US. The second is that disparate impact, of extremely dubious scientific value, has now become enshrined. The third is that the Court has no trouble ruling that statutes don’t mean what they say, both in the Obamacare case and now in the case of the Fair Housing Act, and that with Obamacare we can look at generalized legislative intent and go with that instead of the wording of the law, and that in the disparate impact case we must ignore the intent of the Fair Housing Act in order to get the progressive result we want.
There is a tiny sliver of a caveat in the case, but I doubt it will matter, because it’s hard not to notice that these things tend to get expanded and expanded and expanded rather than contracted:
At the same time, the high court cabined disparate impact liability to those policies that pose “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.” That important qualifier may ultimately determine the outcome of this case on remand. And the Court further reminded the government and lower federal courts that important constitutional considerations limit the remedies available for disparate impact liability under the FHA.
The Fair Housing Act had an intent to ban intentional discrimination:
…[T]he [Texas] case hinged on the meaning of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, commonly known as the Fair Housing Act. The FHA makes it unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). The FHA further prohibits discrimination “against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith,” on account of those same protected characteristics. Id. § 3604(b). While the FHA clearly prohibits intentional discrimination, whether or not the statute encompasses disparate-impact liability had never been squarely considered by the Court…
Undoubtedly the weakest part of the majority’s rationale is its reliance on Congress’s 1988 amendments to the FHA as a basis to conclude that Congress somehow “ratified” disparate impact liability. Because Congress knew at the time that nine courts of appeals had held the FHA encompasses disparate-impact liability, the Court reasons, three exemptions from liability included in the 1988 amendments would have been “superfluous” had Congress assumed that disparate impact liability was unavailable. But Justice Alito gets the better part of the argument in his dissent, pointing out that the official view of the United States in 1988, manifest by its formal position in the Supreme Court and many lower courts, was that the FHA prohibits only intentional discrimination. As Justice Alito concludes: “It is implausible that the 1988 Congress was aware of certain lower court decisions [allowing for disparate impact] but oblivious to the United States’ considered and public view that those decisions were wrong.” And the Court has consistently rejected identical arguments about “implicit ratification” in other cases. It is a testament to the force of Justice Alito’s argument on this point that the majority offers nothing in response but silence.
Silence is adequate, though, at least in practical terms. When you have the numbers and therefore the power, you don’t need the arguments.
