Why would anyone say that? After all, McCain was already dead when the election occurred. And he’d been in the Senate anyway.
But I have had the same thought as that expressed in this WSJ piece (at least, the first few sentences of the piece and the headline; I can’t get behind the paywall to read the article).
Here’s how it went:
The Republican Party lost its House majority on July 28, 2017, when Sen. John McCain ended the party’s seven-year quest to repeal ObamaCare. House leadership had done an admirable job herding cats. On the second try, we passed the American Health Care Act in May. Then McCain’s inscrutable vote against the “skinny repeal” killed the reform effort.
I already have written on the matter, and I reproduce it here [bold indicates quotes from links; the rest of the indented and italicized paragraphs are my own commentary]:
…[O]ne of the final reasons that many on the right feel a great deal of anger at McCain, his July 2017 vote against so-called “skinny repeal” of Obamacare:
…[McCain] stunned his party when the final vote was at hand early Friday when he voted “no” and killed the legislation.
In the process, the maverick dealt what looks like the death blow to the Republican Party’s seven-year quest to get rid of President Barack Obama’s 2010 health law.
Along with McCain, GOP Sens. Susan Collins of Maine and Lisa Murkowski of Alaska joined Democrats in the dramatic 51-49 vote rejecting the bill despite intense pressure from the White House…
Before voting, McCain would not say how he would vote, but told reporters to “wait for the show” as he arrived in the Senate chamber.
Note that last paragraph. It was not just the vote itself that rankled—although that was bad enough, considering how long and hard the GOP had campaigned for the repeal (whether you think they were serious or not), and the fact that McCain himself had campaigned in 2016 on a promise to repeal Obamacare [written in September of 2017):
McCain did run [in 2016], as Trump is drumming, on a strong repeal-and-replace platform. In fact, it was the principal distinction he drew with his Democratic opponent, Ann Kirkpatrick. He would vote to repeal Obamacare. She would not.
McCain did not say that he would vote to repeal Obamacare, provided Democrats agreed. If he had, his Republican primary with Kelli Ward might have turned out differently.
McCain now says that Democrats made a mistake in passing Obamacare on a partisan basis, and that Republicans shouldn’t undo it on a similarly partisan basis. But that’s the equivalent of a Brezhnev doctrine on domestic policy. Democrats can enact legislation on a partisan basis. But Republicans can undo it only if Democrats agree.
McCain is undoubtedly correct that bipartisan policy changes are more enduring. But when one side acts unilaterally, it shouldn’t get a veto when the other side attempts to undo it.
More importantly, there is no bipartisan agreement possible to repeal and replace Obamacare, as McCain vowed to do. That’s because there is no Democrat willing to agree to the first step, repeal.
It was not just the complete impracticability of McCain’s stand, its divorce from political reality, that rankled, although that was the major thing (I wrote about it here). It was also the seeming hypocrisy of his campaign promises vs. his later actions, as well as the theatricality of failing to reveal his vote in advance and telling reporters to “wait for the show.”
These things did seem characteristic of McCain, at least some part of McCain, although somewhat exaggerated. But I have one caveat to offer when thinking about this episode, and that’s the fact that McCain had already been diagnosed with a glioblastoma and had undergone a three to four hour brain surgery about two weeks prior to the vote. Though widely reported to not be suffering from any cognitive decline, this is part of what led to his diagnosis:
He also told his doctor he had, at times, felt foggy and not as sharp as he typically is. In addition, he reported having intermittent double vision. These symptoms and doctor intuition prompted a CT scan.
A brain tumor can affect a person in global and obvious ways or in subtle ones. Perhaps McCain’s tendency towards what, for want of a better word, we’ll call maverickyness was accentuated by brain changes accompanying both his illness and his surgery. So personally, I think that all the decisions he made post-brain-tumor should have an asterisk next to them.
Note also that McCain wasn’t alone among Republicans in voting against the measure. Collins and Murkowski joined him. However, it was McCain’s vote that counted and was purposely dramatic. Had he voted “yes,” the tally would have been 50/50 and Pence could have broken the tie.
Did McCain’s “no” cause the GOP to lose the House? Maybe. If so, however, it was certainly misplaced anger on the part of any GOP voters who stayed home because of it. The fault was the Senate’s and McCain’s, not the House members’ at all.
I’m actually not at all sure it mattered in terms of the outcome in the House in the 2018 election, however. First of all, the Democrats had history on their side; there is almost always a big gain for the opposition party in the midterms. Secondly, I think voters were already very negative in polls on all the GOP’s proposed bills. Every single one (and there were many) had generally gotten terrible press from the MSM, and even many Republicans were against them.
Would the passage of this particular bill have mattered? At the time of McCain’s “no,” I wrote this about the bill and its flaws as well as its opportunities:
Here is [McCain’s] statement [on why he voted “no”]; you can read it and judge it for yourself. On the surface, this sort of thing makes sense:
The so-called ”˜skinny repeal’ amendment the Senate voted on today would not accomplish those goals. While the amendment would have repealed some of Obamacare’s most burdensome regulations, it offered no replacement to actually reform our health care system and deliver affordable, quality health care to our citizens. The Speaker’s statement that the House would be ”˜willing’ to go to conference does not ease my concern that this shell of a bill could be taken up and passed at any time.
The idea that the details of a “replace” bill should be ready to go when “repeal” is passed, and that we shouldn’t trust promises that it will be taken up in a timely fashion, seems sensible. The problem is that this was originally tried, and it couldn’t pass, either.
The “skinny repeal” bill was a compromise arrived at in order to get the negotiations to continue, including probably some changes in the House. “Skinny repeal” was a Sancho Panza bill, as it were. McCain is the Don Quixote here (that is, if you think he’s sincere—and many people would say he’s not).
Here’s an example of what he’d like to see happen, taken from his statement on the reasons for his “no” vote [emphasis mine]:
I’ve stated time and time again that one of the major failures of Obamacare was that it was rammed through Congress by Democrats on a strict-party line basis without a single Republican vote. We should not make the mistakes of the past that has led to Obamacare’s collapse, including in my home state of Arizona where premiums are skyrocketing and health care providers are fleeing the marketplace. We must now return to the correct way of legislating and send the bill back to committee, hold hearings, receive input from both sides of aisle, heed the recommendations of nation’s governors, and produce a bill that finally delivers affordable health care for the American people. We must do the hard work our citizens expect of us and deserve.
Everything except that highlighted bit is possible, but bipartisanship has gone the way of the dodo and “reach-across-the-aisle” McCain fails to realize it (although if you think he’s insincere, you’d amend that to say he realizes it and doesn’t care because this is all a pose on his part). The problem is that McCain’s own voting “no” on the skinny repeal is probably the best way to ensure that none of the things on his list will be happening.
So McCain’s “no” was very effective in blocking further action on Obamacare repeal, and although I’m not sure the GOP wouldn’t have lost the House anyway had the Senate passed “skinny repeal” (for example, could they have actually passed an effective and popular “replace” bill in time?), I am sure that the failure of the GOP in Congress to do anything about Obamacare when they controlled the legislature, after all the promises they had made, did in fact hurt them in November of 2018. Whether it struck the fatal blow for the GOP-dominated House—or rather that blow would have landed anyway—I do not know.