[NOTE: Something tells me that now might be a good time to revisit and add to some ideas I expressed in this post from two years ago.]
Remember the brouhaha that ensued when Trump called a judge who ruled against his asylum policy an “Obama judge”? It drew a rebuke from Justice Roberts: “We do not have Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges.”
It strikes me that the argument between Roberts and Trump is a typical DonQuixote/SanchoPanza dispute. Roberts is stating an ideal that does not exist in the real world, and what’s more just about everybody knows that Trump is stating something that seems very very real. But although that’s the case – as the bitterness of so many confirmation fights in recent decades has made crystal clear – presidents aren’t supposed to actually say that sort of thing, and SCOTUS chief justices certainly aren’t supposed to say it. So Roberts is defending what he sees as the integrity of the judicial system, and his own integrity as a justice who no doubt prizes his own idea of his own lack of partisanship and his devotion to objectivity.
But maybe what passes for political partisanship – and acts as partisanship – on the part of judges is also a reflection of a deeper divide between left and right, a divide based on judicial philosophy. To put it in a very simplistic (perhaps too simplistic) way, judges appointed by Democratic administrations usually operate under the idea that the Constitution is a document that must adapt to modern times, and can be stretched and reshaped to find penumbras and intents to fit whatever the left happens to think is a worthy cause. Judges appointed by Republican administrations usually (although certainly not always, since there is variation as well as “changers” among them) operate under a more restrictive idea of what judges must do: interpret cases in accord with the intent of the Founders and the words of the Constitution, plus case law. “Creative” stretching and innovation by judges is largely frowned on; the idea is that change should be the province of other branches of elected government or of amendments.
These two philosophies lead to very different results, and those results are relatively consistent and predictable in that the decisions of Democratic-appointed justices and judges tend to follow the interests of the left and the decisions of Republican-appointed justices and judges tend to follow the interest of the right – only less often. If you look at the philosophical differences, the flexibility of the liberal judicial philosophy versus the relatively rule-bound rigidity of the conservative one means that liberal justices have more “freedom” to twist things to reach decisions they desire, whereas conservative justices are more inclined to apply the letter of the law even when it sometimes leads to results they might not agree with politically.
Lastly, I believe that Roberts may also have been reacting to the pernicious influence of something called “critical legal studies,” although I doubt that motive is perceived by most people. I keep meaning to write a long post on critical legal studies, but I haven’t done it yet. Critical legal studies got going in law schools during the 70s, during the time Justice Roberts would have been in law school. Here’s a brief idea of what the movement was about in those days:
The critical legal studies movement emerged in the mid-1970s as a network of leftist law professors in the United States who developed the realist indeterminacy thesis in the service of leftist ideals…
Duncan Kennedy, a Harvard law professor who along with Unger was one of the key figures in the movement, has said that, in the early days of critical legal studies, “just about everyone in the network was a white male with some interest in 60s style radical politics or radical sentiment of one kind or another. Some came from Marxist backgrounds–some came from democratic reform.” Kennedy has emphasized the twofold nature of critical legal studies, as both a network of leftist scholar/activists and a scholarly literature…
The approach is too complex to go into here, and it has many components. Its practitioners have become extremely influential in legal education. One of its main philosophies is that the idea of the judiciary as an objective impartial interpreter of law is invalid and incorrect. And not only invalid and incorrect, but not even desirable or possible as a goal. Instead:
…there is the idea that all “law is politics”. This means that legal decisions are a form of political decision, but not that it is impossible to tell judicial and legislative acts apart. Rather, CLS have argued that while the form may differ, both are based around the construction and maintenance of a form of social space. The argument takes aim at the positivist idea that law and politics can be entirely separated from one another.
Chief Justice Roberts may have thought he was upholding the idea of the judiciary as something different from “politics by another name,” and the notion that objectivity is a good thing and something to strive for even if not always achieved.
