Here are some statements, for what they’re worth:
President Donald Trump dismissed “false” media claims that the U.S. will be party to a $300 billion fund for Iran, as leaked versions of the initial agreement allege that the regime will receive billions of dollars worth of “cash sweeteners” just to sign a “Memorandum of Understanding” (MoU) on Friday.
“President Donald Trump says the agreed deal with Iran is not final,” BBC reported Wednesday. “Speaking at the G7 summit in France, he adds that the US will “go back to dropping bombs” if he does not like the final agreement.”
The president also rejected the $300 billion fund claim, calling it “false.” “People can invest if they want. I mean, what am I going to do — say nobody’s ever allowed to invest? We’re not investing. We’re not putting up ten cents,” he told reporters.
I’d say it’s about 50/50 that any agreement will be signed at all and released on Friday. Of course, that’s a pretty safe bet; you sort of win either way, because you’ve really predicted nothing except that it will be one or the other.
UPDATE 5:40 PM:
Just a few moments after I wrote and posted the above, I saw that there’s been a briefing from the White House on the deal. It says basically what I wrote yesterday, strangely enough, which was this:
At any rate, it sounds like the agreement is just an agreement to ease pressure on Iran in order to have some future negotiations. Why? Is this mainly a temporary measure about oil prices?
About today’s White House briefing:
“We’re not going to be taking their word for anything,” a senior U.S. official said when asked about “compliance” for Iran’s adherence to the deal, particularly when it comes to nuclear development, adding that the U.S. will “work very closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA].”
Some provisions: a ceasefire (already in effect anyway, I would say), some blather about “mutual respect” (absurd, I would say, but typical diplospeak), more negotiations for 60 days for a “final” deal (which can be extended, so is basically meaningless), opening Hormuz – and the rest of it is mostly just things that might happen in a final agreement. A wish list, as it were.
What will happen more immediately is this:
The United States of America undertakes, but immediately upon the signing of this MOU, and until the termination of sanctions, the U.S. Department of Treasury will issue waivers for the export of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products and derivatives and all associated services including banking, transactions, insurances, transportation, etc.
There’s also this, which is somewhat opaque as to when it would happen:
The United States of America undertakes to make fully available for use, the frozen, or restricted funds, and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran upon the implementation of the MOU, the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran will usually agree on the procedures related to the relief of these funds during the negotiation. Such funds, whether retained in the original accounts or transferred, government may be fully usable for payment to any ultimate beneficiary designated by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The opaque part is whether this happens right away or is contingent, like so much of the rest, on further agreement.
It’s about what I expected, and I still find it troubling. It also still seems to me to be a way to get oil prices down in order to help the economy and the midterms. It seems to me to signal weakness, and since it depends on Trump’s now-uncertain readiness to go back to war if things don’t work out, that signal seems like an invitation to Iran to declare it has made the US capitulate. And in this case I think Iran would be correct.
I’ve written a great deal about Iran, both in the past and recently, and I’ve always seen it as an intractable problem. The Iranian government will stop at nothing – literally nothing – to stay in power. Our resolve does not include all-out war or boots on the ground. Modern technology and targeted bombings can only do so much.
ADDENDUM:
Professor Jacobson at LI says it more bluntly than I, but I’m in agreement with him:
It’s an embarrassment and sell out of our national interests. And that’s the nicest thing I can say about it. No reason to sugarcoat it. We went from sweeping military success to capitulating because Iran threatened to destroy the world economy and drive energy prices higher.
What a shame.
One of the many reservations I had about Trump at first, and have retained right along, is Trump’s mercurial nature and his loose-cannon tendencies. This can go either way; he’s unpredictable. Sometimes he’s rock-solid and sometimes he says or does things that make a person cringe. He is never completely reliable. The explanation for what is happening now with this deal – and the cause of my own uneasiness since the negotiations and ceasefire phase began – is not clear. But I agree that it has to do with economics. I would add, however, that Trump’s narcissistic desire to make a deal is probably some part of it. I’ve expressed that fear before: that the idea of himself as dealmaker extraordinaire would cause him to make a bad one. This seems to be that bad one, unless there’s a whole lot that I’m missing.
Another thing that has made me more and more uneasy as time has gone on is that Vance has become more visible as spokesperson compared to Rubio. This did not, and does not, bode well.
At the moment, this appears to rank up there with Biden’s retreat from Afghanistan – or worse. I hope I’m overreacting.
