Regarding yesterday’s news about Sinema and her speech to retain the filibuster, commenter “Frederick” wrote:
The rules are not the rules. The only rule is does a majority of both Houses want something. All else is distraction. Let’s learn the lesson so we can make effective changes.
I don’t think that’s something most of us didn’t already know. It seems to me that it’s acknowledged that a majority can change the rules if it so desires.
The issues right now – and perhaps always – are whether such changes will be made, when, by whom, in what manner, to what purpose, and what the result will be.
For many years the 60-vote Senate threshold rule remained intact, despite the fact that a majority could have changed it. Some of the reasons for this:
(1) each party recognized, when it was in power, that it might need to respect the 60-vote majority rule because soon it might be out of power (2) both parties wanted some sort of bipartisanship on major transformative legislation, or at least the approval of a strong majority of the public. Of course, if that party already held over 60 Senate seats and therefore was filibuster-proof as long as all its members voted to end cloture, then it was understood that a large majority of the public was already on their side.
What it really boiled down to was that both parties felt vulnerable to voters’ opinions for the next election, and therefore didn’t want to rile too many voters with extremely partisan transformative legislation and risk their seats next time. There are other factors, too – for example, the parties really used to be at least somewhat less polarized in their goals.
However, at present HR1 is the entire ball of wax for the Democrats, who have moved much further to the left than ever before in my lifetime and perhaps in American history. That’s what makes it different and that’s what makes them more even more determined than usual (and they usually are very determined indeed) to pass this legislation, because they believe it will give them permanent power. Permanent power includes the power to do more things that will solidify that power, including making new states out of DC and Puerto Rico. Then they would never have to worry about the likes of Sinema and Manchin. To be blunt, HR1 gives them a much greater opportunity to win elections through fraud, and if so then they also would never have to worry about the pesky voters’ rejection, either.
Whether anything will stop them is anyone’s guess. But they will not stop trying to pass this bill any way they can (and that includes some sort of executive action if the legislative action fails, and lawfare as well).
That’s why the latest approach to passing HR1 surprises me not in the least, and it should surprise no one:
Democrats have figured out a way to sneak their “voting reform” bill into the House and then on to the Senate. It involves hollowing out a bill that has to do with NASA, and replacing the text with the text of their voting bill…
…Politico reports:
“‘The Senate will finally debate voting rights legislation, and then every senator will be faced with a choice of whether or not to pass the legislation to protect our democracy,’ Schumer wrote in a memo, obtained by POLITICO, to Senate Democrats.
That “hollowing out a bill” approach rang a bell, and that bell was Obamacare. I’m not keen on relating all the Byzantine details of the passage of that legislation, but the main relevant points are the following:
(a) The United States Constitution requires all revenue-related bills to originate in the House. To formally comply with this requirement, the Senate repurposed H.R. 3590, a bill regarding housing tax changes for service members. It had been passed by the House as a revenue-related modification to the Internal Revenue Code. The bill became the Senate’s vehicle for its healthcare reform proposal, discarding the bill’s original content.
(b) The House passed it with only a narrow margin (220-215). Only one Republican voted for it, and 35 Democrats voted against it. Therefore, except for that one vote, support was not bipartisan but opposition was.
(c) The Senate passed its own bill with a 60-vote margin. You may remember some of the hurdles that were overcome to get to that magic number of 60:
At the start of the 111th Congress, Democrats had 58 votes. The Minnesota Senate election was ultimately won by Democrat Al Franken, making 59. Arlen Specter switched to the Democratic party in April 2009, giving them 60 seats, enough to end a filibuster.
The vote to end cloture was passed by 60 votes, as was the bill itself. No Republicans voted for it and all Democrats plus two Independents voted for it, thus making it a completely partisan affair. But at least it was a partisan affair passed by a strong majority rather than a very narrow one.
(d) The next step was to unite the House bill with the Senate bill and pass a single bill. This is where the election of Republican Scott Brown of Massachusetts (to replace the deceased Ted Kennedy) came in. That election let the Democrats know how opposed the public was to the passage of this bill – if even liberal Massachusetts seemed to want to stop it – but they didn’t care. It was thought that Brown could stop the Democrats from getting 60 votes to invoke cloture on the new bill that would unify the two previous ones, but the Democrats got around that little problem by having the House merely approve the previous Senate bill as written (with a few budgetary changes), which meant Democrats did not face a new cloture vote at all and the bill could now be passed in the Senate by a simple majority.
From that Wiki page:
Since any bill that emerged from conference that differed from the Senate bill would have to pass the Senate over another Republican filibuster, most House Democrats agreed to pass the Senate bill on condition that it be amended by a subsequent bill. They drafted the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, which could be passed by the reconciliation process.
Per the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, reconciliation cannot be subject to a filibuster. But reconciliation is limited to budget changes, which is why the procedure was not used to pass ACA in the first place; the bill had inherently non-budgetary regulations. Although the already-passed Senate bill could not have been passed by reconciliation, most of House Democrats’ demands were budgetary…
The House passed the Senate bill with a 219–212 vote on March 21, 2010, with 34 Democrats and all 178 Republicans voting against it. It passed the second bill, by 220–211, the same day (with the Senate passing this bill via reconciliation by 56-43 a few days later).
Note again the bipartisan nature of the opposition rather than of the support.
Coming back to HR1, the approach has some similarities and some differences. The hollowed-out bill is the same approach, but that wouldn’t be of concern if HR1 itself had strong bipartisan support. Not only does it not have that support, but the Democrats now don’t have the kind of majority they did back when Obamacare was passed. There is no way they could reach that 60-vote threshold that was initially reached for the Senate to pass Obamacare. That’s why there’s all this talk about ending the filibuster. It’s because the Democrats have only the slimmest of margins, and even that margin is iffy (Sinema has indicated she would vote for HR1 but not to end the filibuster, and I’m not sure what Manchin’s position is right now on the bill, but in the past he opposed it).
Obamacare was very important to the Democrats, but its importance pales in comparison to the importance of HR1. As I’ve stated many times, HR1 is the entire ballgame to them, their entree into permanent power. That’s not only the reason they are so grimly determined to pass it no matter what, but it’s also the reason it is a profoundly dangerous and pernicious bill. With its Orwellian “For the People” title, it purports to secure voting “rights.” In actuality, it provides the mechanism to subvert them.

