Via Dr. Sanity, I found this data, which show that military recruits in recent years do not in fact appear to be drawn disproportionately from among the poor, thus negating a favorite liberal/left talking point.
Not that this will stop anyone from making the claim. And even if it does, and if the “poverty-striken victims” notion of the military is excluded, that would still leave its useful alternate: “bloodthirsty monsters” (see this for a discussion of both attitudes).
Christopher Hitchens, in a fine article in Slate entitled “Why Ask Why?”, tries once again to tell the left that it’s futile to imagine that terrorists such as the Bali bombers are rational actors responding to policies of the West:
The return of murderous nihilism to Bali is highly instructive. It shows, first, that the fanatics of Islamism don’t know how to stop. And it also shows that they never learn. How can Jemaah Islamiyah, which almost ruined Indonesia’s economy by its filthy attack three years ago, possibly have tried to repeat the same crime in the same place?
Hitchens goes on to demolish the left’s policy-based explanations/excuses for terrorism, and explains the motive for JI’s attacks instead as Islamicist fundamentalist anger. Anger at the relatively freer form of Islam practiced in Indonesia, hatred of the mostly Hindu population of Bali, and anger at the Australians for trying to help the Christian population of East Timor (originally a leftist cause, by the way). In other words, their “rational” motive is that this is an Islamicist religious fundamentalist war.
Hitchens uses the word “nihilism,” (one I’ve used before, too) in connection with the terrorists. But I discovered when I looked it up that we are both using it somewhat incorrectly, at least in the historic sense of the word. Nihilism:
…rejected all religious and political authority, social traditions, and traditional morality as standing in opposition to freedom, the ultimate ideal. In this sense, it can be seen as an extreme form of anarchism. The state thus became the enemy, and the enemy was ferociously attacked. After gaining much momentum in Russia, the movement degenerated into what were essentially terrorist cells, barren of any real unifying philosophy beyond the call for destruction.
One can easily see that the first part of the definition doesn’t fit Islamicist terrorists such as Jemaah Islamiyah; au contraire! Islamicist terrorists are for instituting more authority and less freedom–in fact, they’d like to maximize the former and abolish the latter. It is, however, the last part of the definition of nihilism that fits them like a glove: a love affair with destructiveness. And it is in this sense that both Hitchens and I use the term.
Hitchens is correct in locating the JI’s policy motivations as being the establishment of a rigid theocracy, but one could have that goal and nevertheless shy away from blowing people up in restaurants and bars. To be a terrorist, these political and theocratic goals must be combined with a drive that is in the realm of the psychological rather than the political, and is actually more connected to the motives of the serial killer and mass murderer than the politician or even the true “insurgent.”
Serial killers and mass murderers are not rational actors. They feel compelled to do what they do. Here is a description of their makeup and motives. Read it with terrorists in mind and see how well much of it seems to fit:
Mass Murderers are typically quite ordinary. They’re reclusive, have few if any friends, and have no criminal record. However, they do not let go of past grievances and they tend to build and fester, with minor incidents being perceived as major offenses, and impersonal ones as personal. Some stress, such as a broken relationship, a loss, or unemployment, may be the trigger that sets everything in motion. They blame others for their failures and their motive is generally to strike back, to punish, and to exact as much damage as they can manage. The higher the death toll, the better they have succeeded. People who have been dismissing or ignoring them are not going to forget them now. Their choice of targets is typically irrational, and often does not even include the one against whom they wanted vengeance. Some…have shown signs of psychosis, but most have been judged sane at the time of the incident.
Every society on earth has a number of such individuals. Whether a person will actually act out as a mass murderer depends on a number of factors, many of them unknown. But if a society fosters and nurtures characteristics such as blaming others and holding grudges; if that society as a whole feels it’s been slighted, ignored, and/or cheated; if violence in the cause of vengeance is glorified by that society; if there is a pervasive sense of failure, isolation, and frustration in that society; if people sharing these traits have the capacity, through modern communication, to get together, make plans, have easy access to powerful explosives, and are whipped into a frothing rage by inflammatory media and clerics exhorting them to murder in the name of holiness–well then, whatever number of people inclined to mass murder that society may have, such behavior is likely to be fully expressed.
Mass murderers tend to go back to the scene of the crime, or to target the same type of victim over and over again. In this, as in so many other things, terrorists resemble the compulsivity of the mass murderer. So we have another Bali bombing, and the World Trade Center was struck until it was finally destroyed.
Terrorists want power, and are frustrated that they don’t have it. If you think about it, what weapons or power do they really have other than the power to blow innocent people–so-called “soft” targets–up? They can’t win over an army; if they try to battle a conventional military or police force they are usually decimated. They also lack the power of argument and persuasion; only a small percentage of people on the face of the earth are going to convert to a rigid sect such as Wahabism or its ilk, since most people lack a natural temperament for and interest in fanaticism. Modern explosives have allowed a relatively small but determined group of power-hungry, frustrated, and otherwise impotent terrorists to make a relatively big bang, if they so desire–and terrorists do so desire, quite ardently.
Roger Simon paid a nice tribute to Shrinkwrapped and some of us other psychobloggers (no, not “psycho bloggers”), even though it turned out to be based on somewhat of a case of mistaken identity re Shrinkwrapped’s semi-outing. I’m very happy to be included in their company, and in Roger’s praise.
I have a question, though: why is it that all those bloggers who are therapists, or who were therapists, or who are about to become therapists (or psychologists or psychiatrists or–well, I think you get the picture) seem to be either centrists, or to the right of center?
I can’t find any studies on this, but it’s pretty clear that the vast majority of people in these professions are of the liberal or left persuasion, Wouldn’t one therefore expect that among the crowd of psychobloggers many–if not most–would be writing from a liberal/left perspective? Or, if not “many” or “most,” then at least some?
I did a fairly comprehensive search for psychobloggers towards the beginning of my blogging experience, but I found none to the left of center. If I’m correct in my assumption that there are none (and please, if you find any, let me know!), can anyone explain this rather odd fact?
In the absense of knowledge, though, I’m almost never without a theory. So I’ll offer one now, for what it’s worth. I think we are the ones with the motive to blog. We are faced with a sense of dislocation and puzzlement, and a need to explain how we (and others) have ended up over here instead of over there, when one might have expected the opposite.
I don’t think that most of the other psychobloggers are “changers” like myself (I recall, for example, that Dr. Sanity is not). But I, for one, am continually surprised at the odd trajectory my life has taken–and, when surprised, my instinct is to try to learn and to explain.
The first time I ever saw a photo of Lenin’s embalmed corpse on display in its mausoleum in Moscow, the sight gave me the creeps. There was something dreadful about making a body into an icon–a sort of zombie-esque quality to the whole enterprise. The Soviets may have abolished (or sought mightily to abolish) religion, but they seemed to have replaced it with ghoulish hero-worship.
Little did I know the lengths to which the Soviets actually went to keep the remains intact all these long years. And it’s not just the Soviets who were big on these body-as-holy-relic displays; it turns out it’s a Communist thing. Uncle Ho is on view in Hanoi, having been secretly super-embalmed by a special Soviet team sent to the North Vietnamese jungle especially for that purpose in 1970 (the Wikipedia article mentions that this seems to have gone against Ho’s express wishes, which were to be cremated; it also mentions that other bodies on similar display are Mao Zedong and Kim Il-Sung).
Stalin used to lie under glass in Red Square alongside his illustrious predecessor; I recall seeing photos in my youth of the two of them, looking like bizarro twin Snow Whites waiting for princes who never came. But when Stalin was discredited during the Khrushchev era, he was removed from Lenin’s side and buried under the Kremlin wall.
Now a similar fate might await Lenin. The NY Times reports that talk of his burial has been revived, and Putin is in favor of it, although the idea has its detractors.
But to me the most interesting part of the article was the following quote at the end:
No matter what Mr. Putin decides, there already are indications that time may ultimately do what no politician has yet achieved. The youngest Russian adults barely recall the Communist times, and some show little interest in looking back. “Lenin,” mused Natasha Zakharova, 23, as she walked off Red Square on Tuesday, admitting that she was not quite sure whose body she had just seen. “Was he a Communist?”
I met a traveler from an antique land
Who said: Two vast and trunkless legs of stone
Stand in the desert. Near them, on the sand,
Half sunk, a shattered visage lies, whose frown,
And wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command,
Tell that its sculptor well those passions read,
Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things,
The hand that mocked them, and the heart that fed,
And on the pedestal these words appear:
“My name is Ozymandias, King of Kings:
Look upon my works, ye Mighty, and despair!”
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare
The lone and level sands stretch far away.
Let’s see now, we’ve got the Freedom Trifecta of Howard, Bush, and Blair (in chronological order), all somehow re-elected and returned to power despite the incessant carping of the left. Then of course there’s Afghanistan, in its second largely peaceful postwar election. Also, purple, green, and orange revolutions in Iraq, Lebanon, and Ukraine.
Now there’s Poland, and Japan seems to be on board, as well. Practically a clean sweep for the coalition, the neocons, and the hawks.
The results of the German elections are as yet unclear. But recently there was new evidence that the end result could be the unseating of Schroder:
Chancellor Gerhard Schré¶der seemed Monday to soften his resistance to giving up his post, hinting for the first time that he would not oppose a decision by his party to share power with the opposition conservatives even if it meant accepting somebody else as chancellor.
“I will not stand in the way of anything that would lead to a continuation of the reform processes that I started and a stable government in Germany,” Mr. Schré¶der said…This is not about my prerogatives and absolutely not about me as a person,” he said.
True, although it’s surprising that Schroder himself is actually admitting it.
And then, of course, there’s Spain–whose voters, with the timely assistance of al Qaeda, managed to turn a lead for the party of pro-coalition Aznar into an election for the appeaser Zapatero. But that’s about it, so far, for the anti-coalition forces in elections during the past year and a half.
Perhaps I’m missing something, but I sense a trend here, and it’s one the left won’t like.
Oh, and by the way–I know it’s been said before, but I was just struck once again by how much Zapatero resembles Mr. Bean. Separated at birth?
A while back, commenter Richard Aubrey wrote here:
The neat thing about our current situation is that we don’t have to make stuff up about what our enemies want. They tell us. The problem is in believing them.
But you can’t say they don’t make their intentions crystal clear. As if we needed another example, LGF today provided evidence, in the form of an interview six weeks ago with the very spiritual Bashir, in which he is quoted as stating:
ABB: Osama believes in total war. This concept I don’t agree with. If this occurs in an Islamic country, the fitnah [discord] will be felt by Muslims. But to attack them in their country [America] is fine.
SA: So this fight will never end?
ABB: Never. This fight is compulsory. Muslims who don’t hate America sin…As long as there is no intention to fight us and Islam continues to grow there can be peace. This is the doctrine of Islam. Islam can’t be ruled by others. Allah’s law must stand above human law. There is no [example] of Islam and infidels, the right and the wrong, living together in peace.
Who knew that Bashir was a disciple of Samuel Huntington? Islam has bloody borders, indeed–you heard it straight from the horse’s mouth.
[NOTE: To try to stave off the inevitable commenters who write that not all Moslems feel this way, let me just say: I agree with you. Not all Moslems feel this way. The trouble is that way too many of their leaders, “spiritual” or otherwise (and the powerful, vocal ones at that), do. And there is too much in Moslem scripture and history that backs them up. I’d love the so-called “moderate Moslems”–whom I believe exist–to gain a great deal more power over their religion and be successful in reforming and modernizing it. But I wouldn’t suggest sitting on a hot stove till that happens.]
Oh-oh.
Danger, and from an unexpected source. Men, you may want to leave the room now, especially if you are the sensitive sort.
Today’s NY Times has an article on the hazards of bike-riding–yes, you heard me, bike riding, specifically the bicycle seat. And don’t think you’ll avoid the problem by using one of those new-fangled ergonomically blah-blah-blah seats, either. No; they appear to be, if anything, worse.
Since the Times is registration-only, I’ll give an excerpt–a rather expurgated excerpt. Read the whole thing for the precise anatomical details–if you dare.
The studies add to earlier evidence that traditional bicycle saddles, the kind with a narrow rear and pointy nose, play a role in sexual impotence.
Some saddle designs are more damaging than others, scientists say. But even so-called ergonomic seats, to protect the sex organs, can be harmful, the research finds. The dozen or so studies, from peer-reviewed journals, are summarized in three articles in September’s Journal of Sexual Medicine…
Researchers have estimated that 5 percent of men who ride bikes intensively have developed severe to moderate erectile dysfunction as a result. But some experts believe that the numbers may be much higher because many men are too embarrassed to talk about it or fail to associate cycling with their problems in the bedroom.
The link between bicycle saddles and impotence first received public attention in 1997 when a Boston urologist, Dr. Irwin Goldstein, who had studied the problem, asserted that “there are only two kinds of male cyclists – those who are impotent and those who will be impotent.”
Although Bostonians (and even Boston neurologists, as far as I know) are not ordinarily given to hyperbole, the evidence is that Dr. Goldstein was over-the-top on this one. But 5% is nothing to sneeze at, either. So, forewarned is forearmed, all you bicycle-riding guys out there.
I am truly sick and tired of this business of calling terrorist cheerleaders “spiritual leaders.”
In some ways it’s worse than the “militant” thing; at least terrorists are militant. But how are people such as Abu Bakar Bashir, a cleric who most agree is the one who inspires and guides the murderers of Jemaah Islamiyah “spiritual” (unless, of course, the spirit of evil and hatred counts)?
Is it because he hides behind the role of cleric? Well, the mere title “cleric” does not a spiritual leader make. It’s a perversion of the word and the concept “spiritual” to use it to refer to people like Bashir–or to that other well-known spiritual leader, the late Sheikh Ahmad Yassin (see this).
And why, by the way, are these guys so often frail and elderly? Here is the wispy and oh-so-spiritual Bashir in 2002 on the subject of the first Bali bombings:
Asked if there was anything he wanted to say to families who lost relatives in the bomb blast, he said: “My message to the families is please convert to Islam as soon as possible.”
Mr Bashir offered no sympathy for those who died; just his belief that by converting to Islam, the survivors could ensure they would avoid the fate of those non-Muslims who died and went to hell.
Sitting cross-legged on the carpet in a run-down house that serves as headquarters for the Indonesia Mujahideen Council, an umbrella group for a cluster of radical Muslim groups, the gently spoken cleric also had a more ominous message he wanted conveyed to Australians.
“The second message is for Australia because you suffered the most: please advise your government not to follow the US policy because it will bring tragedy for your country”…
I think the bomb was done by foreign intelligence, especially US intelligence. The indications are Americans and Jews did it to justify the claims that have been made so far that Indonesia is a terrorist haven. What they mean by terrorists is Muslims. So to prove their theory they created the incident in Bali.
Spiritual as all get-out.
[This is the second segment of my multi-part series on pacifism. The first, which dealt with Gandhi, can be found here. This second part discusses the Quaker approach. It also will be divided into two smaller sections, of which this is the first. I think that’s quite complicated enough, don’t you think?]
During the long build-up to the Iraq war and for quite some time after, my regular driving route took me past the local Quaker church. In front was a large banner, prominently displayed, that read, “WAR IS NOT THE ANSWER”. Driving by, I often had to fight the urge to stop my car, walk inside, and ask them: What’s the question? And what’s your answer?
I wouldn’t have minded quite so much if the banner had read “We believe that war is not the answer” or even better “We hope that war is not the answer.” It was the absolute and sweeping nature of the statement that got to me: was war never a proper response to a situation? Was it not sometimes the least terrible of the “choices among crazinesses?”
It turns out that, despite the banner, at least some Quakers have always answered “yes” to the latter question. The Quaker attitude is far more nuanced (pardon the expression) than the banner would indicate.
Although pacifism is a basic tenet of Quaker belief—the thing that most often comes to mind when the word “Quaker” is brought up in conversation among non-Quakers—by no means do Quakers universally agree as to its dimensions and scope. In fact, the argument within the Quaker faith on this point goes back hundreds of years, to its founding in the 1600s by George Fox, and the disagreement mirrors in some interesting ways arguments in the larger world about pacifism itself.
Here’s a brief history of the dilemma within the Quaker faith, taken from this piece by Quaker Vernon Mullen:
There have been several sides to the pacifist stand from George Fox’s time. The question has always been: How far should one go in refusing to use force to try to bring about peace and justice? On one side stand the pure idealists who have renounced force or violence in any form; on the other are the pragmatists, although they may be pacifists, who are willing to use force to maintain law and order.
George Fox’s declaration of 1661 to Charles II is referred to as the Friends historic peace testimony: “We utterly deny all outward wars and strife and fightings with outward weapons, for any ends or under any pretence whatsoever. And this is our testimony to the whole world.” The rulers feared that the Quakers might lead some kind of revolution against their authority, and Fox wanted to assure them that the Quakers were peaceful.
In his biography of George Fox, First Among Friends, Larry Ingle says:
“Fox was not a pacifist in the modern sense that he utterly rejected participating in all wars and violent conflicts. He couldn’t imagine himself bearing the sword, at least under {his} present circumstances… but he also recognized that someone must wield the sword against evil-doers.”
Ingle goes on to say, “Fox would not condone violence except ‘in the cause of justice’… ‘in a war with the devil and his works’… ‘for a righteous cause’… or for ‘keeping the peace and protecting people’s estates’ (i.e. not their property but their condition), and Ingle continues that Fox would ‘never deny the right of a nation’s rulers to wield weapons in defense of a just cause. The problem was in defining such a cause.’ Thus the dilemma.
The old question keeps on appearing: “What would you do if you saw your mother being raped?” [neo-neocon note: sound familiar, Mike Dukakis?] I know my answer: I would use whatever force or weapon I had available to protect her. I would not try to kill or maim but use only enough force to stop the aggressor. Yes, I would respect “that of God” in the aggressor, but I must respect it also in the victim. I believe this principle applies as well to nations.
So here we have a Quaker tradition that runs a surprising gamut from what I call “absolute pacifism” (what Mullen refers to as the “pure idealists”) to “relative pacifism” (what Mullen refers to as the “pragmatists”). The pragmatists adhere to a doctrine that is somewhat similar to the “just war” doctrine of Catholicism (another topic for another day, perhaps) although the Quaker version seems to me to be the slightly more restrictive one.
The Civil War presented a particularly compelling case to Quakers as being both just and necessary, since Quakers had long been in the forefront of the abolitionist movement. In fact–as Ingle himself writes here–despite the “peace testimony” being the heart of Quakerism, at least some Quakers have participated in every war since the religion’s founding in the 1600s.
Ingle describes the conflict within Quakerism on this issue, and emphasizes the individual nature of the Quaker decision about pacifism vs. war (and in his description of the William Penn approach you may find, as I did, a hint at the genesis of many modern-day strains of pacifism, both Quaker or otherwise):
…Fox, at least, never betook himself to deny the right, even duty, of a ruler to wield weapons in a just cause. The problem was determining exactly what such a cause was and by whose standards it would be judged. In this sense, it fed the individualism at the heart of Quakerism, for it ultimately left to each Friend the responsibility of making that determination.
In addition, since the statement spoke only for Friends and formally represented only the signers’ personal testimony against participation in war, it never presumed to speak for those beyond the bounds of the Quaker faith. Certainly in denying carnal weapons, it was not making a universal statement. Hence its spirit was foreign to the kind of Enlightenment optimism that practically oozed from William Penn’s 1693 Essay “Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe,” only a bit more than a generation later.
This pamphlet proposed a structure for a united European parliament that would end international conflict and secure peace. The difference between the two approaches involved more than the mere passage of time: one from two ill-educated Quakers, whose despair at the Stuart Restoration gave them little hope of ever seeing “the Day of the Lord” or having to personally confront the question of wielding the sword in a just cause; the other from the pen of a thoughtful, well-off, and worldly educated imperial proprietor who oversaw his colony’s rules.
The implications of the peace testimony thus stand apart from most modern Quaker peacemaking, which owes more to the aristocratic Penn than to the ruder Fox and Hubberthorne….our 1661 authors…[who gave] a sectarian call to Friends to be faithful to the word of God they had heard in the silence of their meetings; it spoke only to those who had been convinced of its truth and knew themselves called to uphold a unique standard.
So the original pacifist Quaker position was a highly individual one, more akin to that of the modern-day conscientious objector who cannot himself fight but who might support a war in other ways by being a medic or ambulance driver, for example. The second, or William Penn strain, is the “international law” variety so popular today, and often espoused by those who are not aligned with any religious movement, Quakerism or otherwise. This second type of pacifism embraces the idea that courts and the UN and treaties and disarmament will usher in the era of the lion lying down with the lamb, and among Quakers it is connected with the mission to work as social activists to hasten the arrival of that day.
The first wing of Quakerism is eloquently represented here, by one of its early founders, Penington, writing in 1661:
I speak not against any magistrates or peoples defending themselves against foreign invasions; or making use of the sword to suppress the violent and evil-doers within their borders – for this the present estate of things may and doth require…There is to be a time when ‘nation shall not lift up sword against nation; neither shall they learn war any more’…This blessed state, which shall be brought forth [in society] at large in God’s season, must begin in particulars [that is, in individuals].
So, Penington’s position is: for now, war is necessary and will not be opposed, except by individual non-participation based on individual decision. Quakers in their pacifism have a special call to be a sort of harbinger of the world to come, when war will no longer be necessary. This state will be brought about through God’s will and the efforts of individual humans such as Quakers.
The dangers of pacifism, especially of the absolute variety, were well-expressed in 1974 by the British Quaker writer and teacher Wolf Mendl (who, by the way, began life as a German Jew—an unusual journey, I would imagine):
Because of their personal experience and convictions, [early] Friends did not deny the reality of evil and of conflict. Nor did they equate conflict with evil. They were well aware of the suffering which a non-violent witness could bring in an imperfect world. This is in contrast to those who identify peace with the absence of conflict and value that above all things. It is the latter who have given modern pacifism its bad name and have led their critics to refer to them contemptuously as ‘passivists’. The failure to take evil and conflict into account as elements in our human condition and an obsession with the need for peace and harmony have led pacifists badly astray… Christian pacifists [are] not exempt from the temptation to sacrifice others for the sake of peace.
Mendl is not exactly a hawk, to be sure. But his writing shows a deep awareness on the part of at least some Quakers about what is at stake, and of the damage that can be done by “passivists” in the name of goodness.
[Go here for Part I, and here for Part IIB, the final post in the series.]
In response to my post about Gandhi’s pacifism, a number of people (Ed Driscoll publicly, others in private e-mails) have called my attention to Richard Grenier’s essay on Gandhi that appeared in a 1983 issue of Commentary.
Driscoll calls it “undoubtedly one of the most incredible film reviews ever written,” and I second the motion.
Driscoll’s reference is quite the wry understatement. The essay is far more than a film review, although its take-off point is indeed a critique of the Oscar-winning movie of 1982. Whether the movie “Gandhi” could truly be termed a film biography is doubtful; it probably is so only in the Oliver Stone-ish sense.
Grenier writes what could more rightly be called a fisking of the Gandhi movie–in the course of which he pretty effectively demolishes the Gandhi myth as well. He makes a very good case that the actual historical figure is a far more complex and flawed person than the Gandhi most of us think we know.
Here’s an excerpt which is especially relevant to the pacifism discussion on the earlier thread:
“Gandhi”, then, is a large, pious, historical morality tale centered on a saintly, sanitized Mahatma Gandhi cleansed of anything too embarrassingly Hindu (the word “caste” is not mentioned from one end of the film to the other) and, indeed, of most of the rest of Gandhi’s life, much of which would drastically diminish his saintliness in Western eyes…
[I]t is not widely realized (nor will this film tell you) how much violence was associated with Gandhi’s so-called “nonviolent” movement from the very beginning. India’s Nobel Prize-winning poet, Rabindranath Tagore, had sensed a strong current of nihilism in Gandhi almost from his first days, and as early as 1920 wrote of Gandhi’s “fierce joy of annihilation,” which Tagore feared would lead India into hideous orgies of devastation–which ultimately proved to be the case. Robert Payne has said that there was unquestionably an “unhealthy atmosphere” among many of Gandhi’s fanatic followers, and that Gandhi’s habit of going to the edge of violence and then suddenly retreating was fraught with danger. “In matters of conscience I am uncompromising,” proclaimed Gandhi proudly. “Nobody can make me yield.” The judgment of Tagore was categorical. Much as he might revere Gandhi as a holy man, he quite detested him as a politician and considered that his campaigns were almost always so close to violence that it was utterly disingenuous to call them nonviolent.
For every satyagraha true believer, moreover, sworn not to harm the adversary or even to lift a finger in his own defense, there were sometimes thousands of incensed freebooters and skirmishers bound by no such vow. Gandhi, to be fair, was aware of this, and nominally deplored it–but with nothing like the consistency shown in the movie. The film leads the audience to believe that Gandhi’s first “fast unto death,” for example, was in protest against an act of barbarous violence, the slaughter by an Indian crowd of a detachment of police constables. But in actual fact Gandhi reserved this “ultimate weapon” of his to interdict a 1931 British proposal to grant Untouchables a “separate electorate” in the Indian national legislature–in effect a kind of affirmative-action program for Untouchables. For reasons I have not been able to decrypt, Gandhi was dead set against the project, but I confess it is another scene I would like to have seen in the movie: Gandhi almost starving himself to death to block affirmative action for Untouchables.
…Meanwhile, on the passionate subject of swaraj Gandhi was crying, “I would not flinch from sacrificing a million lives for India’s liberty!” The million Indian lives were indeed sacrificed, and in full. They fell, however, not to the bullets of British soldiers but to the knives and clubs of their fellow lndians in savage butcheries when the British finally withdrew.
I came across Grenier’s piece about a year ago and found it extraordinary, and extraordinarily shocking. I’ve done a fairly extensive online search to see whether anyone has effectively countered any of the facts in it, and have found nothing save ad hominem attacks on Grenier himself. Makes me think he may have gotten his facts right. (Here, by the way, is a short bio on Grenier himself.)
Read Grenier’s piece and judge for yourself.
You exhibit a very well-developed sense of Right and Wrong and believe in economic fairness.
The test didn’t pick up on the fact that it would be more accurate to describe me as an economic illiterate than an economic liberal. But at least it got the “centrist” part right.
In case you missed the story the first time round, Richard Landes of Second Draft has a post at Solomonia on the misidentification of Tuvia Grossman by the press.
Grossman, an American Jew studying in Israel, was beaten by a mob in the Arab section of Jerusalem and rescued by an Israeli policemen. When the photo of the bloodied Grossman appeared, a club-wielding and shouting policeman standing over him,
it was released by the AP and flashed all over the world–including the NY Times–with the laconic caption, “An Israeli policeman and a Palestinian on the Temple Mount.” The reader was led to the inescapable conclusion that the Israeli had beaten the defenseless Palestinian youth.
To this day, that misapprehension continues among many, despite attempts at correction. The photo was originally used as propaganda for the Palestinian intifada; it is still used for propaganda purposes by the Palestinians. After all, what are facts when there’s a larger truth to consider?
Landes makes the important point that the misidentification most likely had to do with the expectations of the press that any photo featuring “bloodied youth and Israeli policeman with club” would just have to be of a Palestinian who had been beaten by said policeman. Psychologists have long known that human beings function in the world by setting up such templates as shortcuts to ordering observations.
I became curious to know more of the details of the chain of events involved in this error. Who actually had been responsible for the mistaken caption? Who had taken the photo, for example; had he/she originally identified the people in it, and if so, how? Was the error the photographer’s, or had someone else along the way goofed–or even lied?
It took some digging to find any answers, and at first I found only a fragment. It appeared in this recent article from the Jerusalem Post on the subject of the Grossman photo (Tuvia himself, by the way, has emigrated permanently to Israel, according to the article).
Here’s the passage relevant to the caption’s genesis and evolution:
…a freelance photographer took a shot of one of the soldiers, his club in the air, standing over a bloody Grossman. The Associated Press, in giving a caption for the photo, identified the gas station, outside the Old City, as the Temple Mount and the victim as a Palestinian.
From this we learn that a freelance photographer took the shot, and someone at the AP gave it the caption (we also learn that the policeman in question may have actually been a soldier, although the words “soldier” and “policeman” seem to be used interchangeably at times in articles about the incident, including even this one by Grossman himself. An unimportant distinction, perhaps, but it illustrates what an elusive quarry accuracy can be–as does this whole affair).
So, we still haven’t a clue as to how the AP managed to get the information so very wrong. Even CAMERA, which has a good summary of the development of the story and the differing retractions and corrections along the way (including the AP’s first correction, which again misidentifies Tuvia, this time as an Israeli medic) fails to shed light on the question.
Here is the most complete set of facts describing how the caption came to be written that I’ve been able to find. It’s not perfect, but it will have to do. The link is to a reprint of an article that originally appeared in the NY Times about a week after the story broke. Here’s the relevant quote (note that the soldier [?] has turned back into a police officer):
A picture of Tuvia Grossman, his head bloodied and sitting in front of the approaching police officer, was taken by an Israeli photographer for Zoom 77, an Israeli agency, and sent that Friday, Sept. 29, to The A.P. in Jerusalem with a garbled Hebrew caption that misidentified Mr. Grossman as an Israeli ambulance medic.
The A.P., which had received many pictures of injured Palestinians that day, did not clarify the garbled caption but sent the picture to subscribers with a caption based on the erroneous assumption that Mr. Grossman was a Palestinian. It also misidentified the site, first as the Temple Mount and later as another site in the Old City.
Many newspapers published the picture and erroneous captions based on The A.P.’s information. The New York Times misidentified Mr. Grossman in last Saturday’s issue as a Palestinian and in some copies misidentified the site as the Temple Mount. In a correction on Wednesday, The Times noted that the wounded man was Tuvia Grossman, a student from Chicago, but–using erroneous information from The A.P.–mistakenly said the site of the attack was in the Old City.
So: we’ve learned that the photographer was an Israeli who originally made an error about Grossman’s identification–a different and much smaller error than the one later made by the AP. At least the photographer got the fact that Grossman was a Jew and not a Palestinian correct–and that the policeman/soldier was protecting him rather than beating him. (At the same time we’ve learned why it was that the AP’s first correction of the caption had misidentified Grossman still again, this time as an Israeli medic–the AP was simply using the information supplied by the photographer’s original caption to make its correction. One almost begins to have some sympathy for the AP at this point–almost.)
The incident began with the fact that the photographer’s original caption had somehow become garbled (unintelligible? illegible?). But the AP, instead of asking for clarification from the photographer–as it should have if it had any interest in accuracy–seems to have filled in the blanks (just as Landes has suggested it did) with its own expectations and assumptions that the bloodied man had to have been a Palestinian victim of Israeli aggression. All the other papers followed the lead of the AP, not having any reason to suspect a mistake. The Times, when informed of the error (by Tuvia’s father, by the way), continued to err in the first of its several corrections by relying on the already-discredited AP for the location shown in the photo.
A story of astounding carelessness, expectations, assumptions, and multiple misidentifications on the part of the press, particularly the AP–although one that does not seem to include deliberate lying, except on the part of the Palestinian organizations still using the photo even today.
The whole thing would be relatively trivial if the subject matter weren’t so important, and hadn’t been so inflammatory. The photo and caption have already done their dirty work, and I doubt that many of the people who saw the original caption have ever caught the correction, or ever will.