Many have questioned whether the Slaughter solution, if used, would stand the test of constitutionality. Although no one knows, here’s a post at Volokh about a possibly relevant case, Public Citizen v United States District Court for the District of Columbia, that occurred back in May of 2007.
This was the situation in Public Citizen [emphasis mine]:
Yesterday the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. circuit turned away Public Citizen’s challenge to the validity of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) in Public Citizen v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia. According to Public Citizen, the DRA was invalid because the House and Senate did not both approve the same version of the DRA. Rather, due to an alleged clerical error (that nonetheless altered substantive provisions of the bill), the two versions were different. This means the DRA never became a law, according to Public Citizen, because the bill signed by the President did not first pass both the House and Senate in accordance with Article I, section 7 of the Constitution.
The D.C. Circuit, in an opinion by Senior Circuit Judge Harry Edwards, upheld the district court’s holding that the claim was foreclosed by Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, an 1892 case in which the Supreme court held that “the judiciary must treat the attestations of ‘the two houses, through their presiding officers’ as ‘conclusive evidence that a bill was passed by Congress.'” Once a bill is signed by the leaders of the House and Senate, it is an attested “enrolled bill” that “should be deemed complete and unimpeachable” for purposes of the Constitution’s bicameralism requirement. This “enrolled bill” rule precludes the sort of challenge Public Citizen sought to advance. Public Citizen sought to distinguish its case from Marshall Field in various ways, or suggest that the decision had been tacitly overruled, but the D.C. Circuit rejected these arguments…
The Court rejected the idea that the judiciary should challenge the validity of laws that the two political branches attest were passed in accordance with the relevant constitutional requirements. Such a “spectacle” would subordinate” the legislature to the judiciary and “disregard” its coequal position in the government. Moreover, it could lead to unnecessary uncertainty in the law.
In the case of Public Citizen, the discrepancy between the two bills involved a minor clerical error. The passage of HCR by the application of the Slaughter solution would involve a very different set of facts, but if it came to a constitutional test the Court might still consider that it shouldn’t declare Slaughter unconstitutional for similar reasons as in Public Citizen—separation of powers and the need for certainty in statute laws of the land, once a bill had been declared (or in the case of Slaughter, “deemed”) passed by both houses and then signed by the president.
But here’s a fascinating comment to the Volokh post—and remember, it was written in May of 2007 [emphasis mine]:
…I think it’s always an open question how much bad faith would really be tolerated.
Consider what happened here: the House and Senate passed two different bills, different because they contained two different dollar amounts in one spot. The Republican leadership knew that that one specific dollar figure hadn’t made any real difference in getting the bill passed, but that it had been a tough vote nonetheless and they really didn’t want to hold a new vote and face the possibility of defections. So instead, they just signed a false attestation that the House and Senate had passed the same bill, and the President, either not knowing or not caring, signed it into law…
But you could easily imagine a scenario with far worse bad faith than that. Let’s say Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid sign an attestation falsely claiming that the House and Senate have passed a bill to nationalize health care, even though the bill was never even considered by Congress, and President Hillary Clinton signs it into law. Would the courts really stay out of the issue, even if it was this bad?
If they wanted to, I’m sure the courts could manufacture some distinction that would distinguish the previous cases where the bad faith wasn’t so blatant. On the other hand, maybe their thinking is that if the bad faith is this clear, there’s going to be a political remedy (like impeachment), and thus maybe they should just steer clear rather than issue a decision that might just be ignored.
And then there’s this comment on a recent thread at Volokh about the Slaughter solution. The commenter offers the following quote from the Appeals Court’s 2007 ruling in Public Citizen (otherwise known as the “enrolled law” case). Here is what the US Court of Appeals wrote back in those naively trusting days, before the team of Obama, Pelosi, and Reid got together and cooked up certain schemes [emphasis mine]:
It is said that…it becomes possible for the speaker of the house of representatives and the president of the senate to impose upon the people as a law a bill that was never passed by congress. But this possibility is too remote to be seriously considered in the present inquiry. It suggests a deliberate conspiracy to which the presiding officers, the committees on enrolled bills, and the clerks of the two houses must necessarily be parties, all acting with a common purpose to defeat an expression of the popular will in the mode prescribed by the constitution.
The US Court of Appeals judges didn’t seem to be very prescient there, did they?
[ADDENDUM: I’ve been informed by a commenter that apparently that last quote was from Marshall Field (Justice Harlan) rather than Public Citizen. Since Marshall Field was decided in 1892, I guess Harlan couldn’t be expected to have seen that far ahead.]
