It very well could be, if (and it’s a big “if”) Michael Ledeen is correct in his assessment of the situation there [emphasis mine]:
When a tyrannical regime dies, you can see the symptoms in the little things. Late Friday afternoon, after millions (yes, millions”“this according to Le Monde, France 2, and L’Express, with the BBC saying that the demonstrations were bigger than those at the time of the Revolution) of Greens mobbed the streets and squares of more than thirty towns and cities to call for the end of the regime, there was a soccer game in Azadi Stadium in Tehran. It holds about a hundred thousand fans, and it was full of men wearing green and carrying green balloons. When state-run tv saw what was happening, the color was drained from the broadcast, and viewers saw the game in black and white. And when the fans began to chant “Death to the Dictator,” “Death to Russia,” and “Death to Putin, Chavez and Nasrallah, enemies of Iran,” the sound was shut off. So the game turned into a silent movie.
But the censors forgot about the radio, and the microphones stayed open, so that millions of listeners could hear the sounds of the revolution. And in Azadi Stadium, as in most parts of the country, the security officers either walked away or joined the party…
Look at what didn’t happen in the streets last Friday. Not a shot was fired at the millions of demonstrators in Tehran. There are YouTubes of police fraternizing with the Greens. There are stories of Revolutionary Guardsmen helping the demonstrators, and even the Basij didn’t dare to attack or arrest, with a handful of exceptions (one of which is notable: in Tabriz, if I remember correctly, they started to round up some people, and the crowd turned on them, freed the would-be victims, and beat the Basijis to death).
One cannot overestimate the importance of the occurrences I’ve highlighted in bold, because they represent an absolute necessity if the Iranian people are ever to cause a change in government in their country. Last June, when the anti-regime demonstrations got going and were then suppressed, I wrote the following, and I see no reason to change my mind:
However, the real questions are (1) how far the demonstrators are willing to go, and how much violence against them are they willing to absorb; (2) how far the mullahs are willing to go, and how much violence they are willing to perpetrate; and (3) will the police, the Guards, and other forces called in by the mullahs to quell the crowds be willing to fire on them, or will they stay their hands?
That last question may be the most important of all. Like all tyrants, the mullahs can do little without the help of the vast numbers of henchmen they employ, and without the exercise of fear. Sometimes there is a great deal of opposition and unrest under the radar screen even within the groups assisting tyrants, and once dissatisfaction as a whole reaches a critical mass and events transpire to release it, there can be a sudden change and a refusal to defend the regime.
And then there’s this, from a post I wrote three years ago:
When hatred of a ruler or rulers is so widespread that it has become rampant among those who would protect those rulers or enforce their edicts, then those rulers may be in big trouble, no matter how repressive and brutal they are willing to be to suppress dissent. Because they cannot do it alone; they must have a cooperative armed apparatus in place to enforce their will.
Michael Ledeen has been focusing a great deal of his considerable energy on Iran for many years. He is the originator of the phrase “Faster, please!,” a sort of modern-day “Carthago delenda est” which Ledeen has featured in many of his articles on the subject, although he is also on record as having been against a US invasion or airstrikes against the country.
Instead, his approach to Iranian regime change has been to encourage the Iranian people to dissent against its own government, forcing more and more pressure until it collapses for want of popular support. The situation Ledeen describes in Iran right now would, if true, be the vindication of his campaign and the fulfillment of his long-held desires for that country. For these reasons, it’s possible Ledeen is just a victim of his own wishful thinking. I don’t pretend to know whether this is true or not.
But Ledeen has shown prescience and insight before on the topic of Iran; for example, in 1979, when most people failed to see what was brewing, he correctly predicted the direction the Khomeini revolution would take:
In 1979, Ledeen was one of the first Western writers to argue that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was a “clerical fascist”, and that while it was legitimate to criticize the Shah’s regime, if Khomeini seized power in Iran the Iranian people would suffer an even greater loss of freedom and women would be deprived of political and social rights.
Ledeen is virtually the only person reporting right now on the current Iranian demonstrations. That doesn’t make him wrong, but it certainly makes it hard to know much about what’s really happening and whether he’s right. The lack of coverage is partly because the Iranian regime has made it very difficult if not impossible for journalists to visit that country to report on events there. Ledeen seems to have Iranian informants, but are they telling him the truth, or are they telling him what they think he wants to hear?
If Ledeen is right, however, it could be one of the best pieces of news to come along in a long while. And if the regime does fall (and something better replaces it; be careful what you wish for), will President Obama put himself on the wrong side of history again?