Charles Krauthammer lambasts Obama’s recent declaration of a new nuclear posture, repeating some of the main points from this already-discussed video. But in print Krauthammer adds the following illustration of how the policy of no-nukes for signers of the Non-Proliferation Treaty even if they attack us biologically or chemically is an absurdity:
This is quite insane. It’s like saying that if a terrorist deliberately uses his car to mow down a hundred people waiting at a bus stop, the decision as to whether he gets (a) hanged or (b) 100 hours of community service hinges entirely on whether his car had passed emissions inspections.
My first thought on reading this was: don’t give the administration any ideas. They’ll do that next.
But my second, and more serious thought was that it’s an odd way to try to discourage nuclear proliferation—by reducing the penalty for other types of insidious and illegal warfare, therefore probably making them more likely to occur. What a bizarre tradeoff!
The actual wording of the Obama document gives us a better idea of what is being attempted here [emphasis mine]:
Since the end of the Cold War, the strategic situation has changed in fundamental ways. With the advent of U.S. conventional military preeminence and continued improvements in U.S. missile defenses and capabilities to counter and mitigate the effects of CBW [chemical and biological warfare], the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks ”“”“ conventional, biological, or chemical ”“”“ has declined significantly. The United States will continue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks.
To that end, the United States is now prepared to strengthen its long-standing “negative security assurance” by declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.
This revised assurance is intended to underscore the security benefits of adhering to and fully complying with the NPT and persuade non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty to work with the United States and other interested parties to adopt effective measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.
It’s hard to envision what sort of reasoning is behind this. The peacetime value that nearly everyone can agree that nuclear weapons have had throughout the sixty-five years of their existence has been as deterrence, both to nuclear and other types of attacks (as Obama knows, since his document clearly states this by saying that until now the United States has “reserved the right to employ nuclear weapons to deter CBW attack on the United States and its allies and partners”).
So, what would be the point of giving up that deterrent power? The implicit quid pro quo seems to be to get more countries in comply with the NPT. But even were that to happen, would the policy not at the same time encourage these other sorts of attacks, either on the US or its allies (if it has any left after Obama is through)?
Conventional weapons are fine and dandy, I suppose. But they hardly represent the sort of deterrence afforded by at least the threat of using a nuclear weapon. Of course, as is his tendency, Obama hedges even this new policy of non-nuclear-deterrence by saying (read the small print):
Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of bio-technology development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat.
So basically Obama is saying “I didn’t really mean it. I’ll use those nuclear weapons if I feel like it, whenever I feel like it.” And although that’s somewhat reassuring (if you believe it) in placing back a certain uncertainty about the use of nuclear weapons, and therefore a small amount of the deterrent power previously provided by such a threat, it leaves one scratching one’s head. If there’s an escape clause like that, what’s the whole thing about, anyway? “Posturing” is really the best word for it; Obama puts forth a promise and reneges on it, within the very same document.
It’s really not known how believable the US’s nuclear threat has been in recent years. Were other nations really convinced that this country would retaliate so powerfully and aggressively? As the only country that has ever actually used nuclear weapons in combat, we did have some credibility on that score. But the point was that, although no one knew for sure, we presented a credible enough threat to at least give other nations pause.
However, this recent document of Obama’s is so confusing that I’m not sure what other nations will make of it. But it seems to me that it removes some of that previous deterrent threat while at the same time providing little that would convince a nation that joining the NPT would be in its best interests—which, after all, appears to be the main goal of the paper in the first place.
And it doesn’t even begin to address the fact that rogue states such as North Korea and Iran, which laugh at the NPT and its signatories, will go their merry way and are very likely to continue on their present nuclear paths. Obama’s new posture is less likely to reassure other, non-nuclear nations that he will keep his word to protect them, not more.
The document also contains a mind-boggling passage addressed to North Korea and Iran, although not by name [emphasis mine]:
In the case of countries not covered by this assurance ”“”“ states that possess nuclear weapons and states not in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations ”“”“ there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the United States or its allies and partners…
Yet that does not mean that our willingness to use nuclear weapons against countries not covered by the new assurance has in any way increased. Indeed, the United States wishes to stress that it would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.
What could be the purpose of adding this restrained language? Remember, it is addressed to rogue enemy states such as North Korea and Iran that are out of compliance with non-proliferation and clearly pursuing nuclear weaponry ends, and who might even use such weapons in first strikes against either the US or its allies. It projects conciliatory weakness at the same time it claims to offer a threat of strength.
Why not instead use language that goes something like this: “Our commitment to use every means available to defend ourselves and our allies against attack by countries not covered by the new assurance has remained as firm as ever”? As written, the document seems to be saying instead: “Don’t worry; you can get away with quite a bit before we’ll even consider striking.”