Home » Trump’s message on Kharg Island and the Strait of Hormuz

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Trump’s message on Kharg Island and the Strait of Hormuz — 5 Comments

  1. Based on any earlier history, this operation has been incredibly successful. It is hard to see how it will play out, but our thinkers I am sure are constantly monitoring details and deveoping plans.

    It will succeed. It will rid the world of Twelver lunatics and result in a wonderful period of peace in that part of the world.

  2. Based on the information we have on the amount of enriched uranium that the Islamic regime has in its possession, we have two options– the regime agreeing to independent removal of all uranium from the country or the collapse of the regime with a new government allowing the removal of the uranium.

    With or without us, I don’t think Israel will stop their campaign until the regime is gone.

    The regime still projects power, and will until suddenly they don’t. Along with the bombing of Kharg Island and disruption of Iran’s ability to continue exporting oil, another major economic event took place.

    Recent reports indicate that Israel, in coordination with the US, conducted a missile strike three days ago, that targeted and destroyed the data center of Iran’s state-run Bank Sepah in Tehran. Bank Sepah is responsible for processing salary payments to Iran’s military personnel and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The strike disrupted the bank’s systems, probably preventing it from issuing payments, and given that it hit a data center, it likely involved the destruction or severe compromise of data stored there.

    The Islamic Republic could be closer to collapse or coup– possibly weeks or a month.

    Here’s Grok’s based on available data (which is based on a lot of speculation/estimates):

    Overall IRGC strength: Pre-war estimates put the IRGC at 125,000–180,000 active personnel (including ground forces). This includes a small hard-core of ~2,000–3,000 ideologically committed officers. The Basij paramilitary (under IRGC control) adds another ~90,000 active + hundreds of thousands of reservists/mobilizable volunteers.

    Tehran-specific: The capital is protected by the IRGC Ground Forces Mohammad Rasulullah Corps (also called 27th Mohammad Rasoul Ollah Operational Division), described as one of the largest provincial corps. It oversees internal security, checkpoints, and regime protection in Greater Tehran. Within days of the strikes starting, IRGC/Basij forces rapidly deployed to neighborhoods and set up checkpoints citywide. However, many have since dispersed (hiding in schools, underpasses, etc.) to avoid Israeli drone and missile strikes on Basij/IRGC positions. No troop count is given; analysts infer “several thousand” in the capital area for repression, but this has been degraded by direct strikes on Tehran IRGC sites (e.g., command centers, Imam Reza unit, Sarallah Headquarters elements).

    Provinces: The IRGC operates via 31 provincial corps (one per province, with Tehran having its dedicated/large unit). The majority of ground forces are dispersed across these decentralized commands under Iran’s “mosaic defense” doctrine — each corps has significant autonomy. Most troops and assets are outside Tehran, spread across bases in places like Khuzestan, Fars, Isfahan, and border regions. Recent reports note independent operation of provincial commands, with some units facing the same shortages and desertions.

    Cumulative losses and attrition: Israeli assessments put total Iranian security forces killed at 4,000–5,000 (many IRGC/Basij/internal security), with other sources citing at least 10,000 casualties overall. Desertions are rising (group desertions reported, failed reserve mobilization, missile crews refusing orders). Supply shortages hit even elite IRGC units. This affects both Tehran and provinces but has visibly thinned urban checkpoint forces in the capital.

    Would This Make a Coup in Tehran Easier?

    Yes, it could meaningfully ease a coup attempt in the capital in the short term, especially if coordinated with internal opposition, defecting units, or external support — but it is far from guaranteed or “easy.” Here’s why the factors you mentioned matter:

    Dispersal across provinces weakens central concentration: With forces decentralized into 31 corps and many troops/assets outside Tehran, the regime cannot quickly mass loyal IRGC units in the capital without exposing them to strikes or delays. Provincial commands are operating semi-independently (“mosaic defense”), so they might not rush to reinforce Tehran. This leaves the capital more reliant on the (already degraded) Mohammad Rasulullah Corps + local Basij — fewer reliable boots on the ground than pre-war.

    IRGC lacks meaningful air power: You are essentially correct here. The IRGC Aerospace Force controls missiles, drones, air defenses, and limited helicopters — no significant fighter jets or conventional air superiority capability.

    Fixed-wing combat aircraft belong to the regular army (Artesh), whose airbases and planes have been heavily damaged. The ongoing Artesh–IRGC rift (e.g., IRGC refusing medical aid to wounded Artesh soldiers) could mean Artesh stays neutral or even sides against the IRGC in a coup scenario. Without air power, IRGC ground units in Tehran cannot easily counter air-supported coup forces, defecting pilots, or external intervention.

    Compounding factors helping a coup: Heavy losses in Tehran security units, dispersed/hidden checkpoints, supply shortages, desertions, and low morale among non-elite Basij/IRGC rank-and-file all erode repression capacity. Strikes have explicitly targeted internal security to “degrade the regime’s repressive capabilities,” and opposition calls for security forces to defect are increasing. A small, motivated core of defectors in Tehran could tip local control quickly.

    Counterpoints (why it’s still hard)

    The IRGC’s loyal hard core remains in key Tehran positions (protecting leadership compounds, etc.), and the regime has shown resilience via decentralization. No mass defections or organized coup have materialized yet, and remaining forces could still fight street-by-street. External air support or Artesh cooperation would be decisive.

    In short: The dispersal, attrition, and lack of IRGC air power create a window where a well-timed internal coup attempt in Tehran is more feasible than it was pre-war — especially in the next weeks amid chaos. But success would still require rapid coordination, defections, and exploiting the Artesh rift. The situation remains extremely fluid; no public indicators point to an imminent successful coup.

    None of this will happen until the US/Israel gives the green light, which won’t happen until the Strait of Hormuz is secured, IMO. The fastest way for that to happen is other navies to commit to escorting tankers through the Arabian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. The continued threat of drones– both air and sea will likely continue. Ukraine proved the viability of sea drones to attack ships and the nature of drones, which can be fired from any location makes them hard to eradicate completely. Naval ships could render them ineffective.

  3. At some point, if not already, some general or colonel is going to decide that backing the current regime is a losing proposition. If a group of like minded ones get together, they could pull off a coup.

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