A vicious terrorist attack occurred in Spain about a year ago. That one has merged in memory along with so many others that it resembles. It featured vehicles purposely targeting pedestrians in a crowded spot, an explosion in a house, and various known wolves and mystery men.
But this new article tells us much more about what happened—and what didn’t happen. And the information is even more chilling than what was known before.
The attack’s mastermind was killed in the house explosion, which from the start was suspected to have been what is ironically called a “work accident.” His name was Es Satty, and he was born in Morocco but came to Spain about twenty years ago:
He worked for just over a year as an imam in a small mosque in Vilanova, called Al Furkan.
For years, Es Satty also worked on both sides of the Moroccan-Spanish border, moving goods between the countries in a van. According to court documents, Es Satty was arrested in 2002 while trying to smuggle a person with a fake passport from the port in Ceuta, one of two Spanish enclave cities in Africa, to the Spanish mainland. He was sentenced to six months, but, in the end, served no time.
Es Satty later came under investigation for more serious crimes. His name appears throughout court documents related to a major terrorism case known as Operation Chacal…
Spanish police tapped his phone in 2005 on the suspicion that he had ties to the 2003 Casablanca bombings and other extremist groups operating in Spain. In Vilanova, he at one point shared a residence with Mrabet Fahsi and Belgacem [terrorists].
He seems to have probably become a police informant in the investigation of those earlier terrorist incidents, and was later arrested on smuggling charges and imprisoned. There is evidence that he was surveilled while in prison and/or an informant, and after he got out he was ordered deported. However:
…[A] judge in Castellón ruled in Es Satty’s favor, stating that he was integrated into life in Spain and didn’t represent “a real threat” that was “sufficiently grave for the public order and security.”
The accusation that the court dropped Es Satty’s deportation order in return for his collaboration in prison circulated widely throughout the Spanish and Catalan press after the attack. A spokesperson for the courts in Castellón said that the decision was not due to police involvement, but rather the lack thereof: Because Es Satty was never charged with a crime in Operation Chacal, the spokesperson said, the court had no idea of his past.
Seems to me he should have been deported just on the strength of his smuggling conviction, but the court thought otherwise. At any rate, there was additional information that he was simpatico to terrorists and terrorism, but that news never got to the proper authorities, and he continued on his merry way.
Much of the rest of the article is devoted to the lack of communication between various sections of the Spanish police and investigative units:
Ramón Cossío, a spokesperson for the union of the Policía Nacional, described the collaboration between Spanish and Catalan police as “not great.” He listed instances of information-sharing agreements that aren’t acted on, collaborations that never happen, and turf battles.
“It doesn’t make sense to have an antiterrorism unit in the Guardia Civil, another in the Policía Nacional, and another in the Mossos d’Esquadra,” Cossío said. “It’s backwards.”
This story is hardly unique. Over and over we see known terrorists or terrorist-friendly people who have been under surveillance off and on, and yet manage to pull off terrorist attacks and radicalize others, all without the knowledge of police. Our systems of government and law protect their rights and give them second and third chances to remain in countries despite their criminal behavior, suspicious ties, and lack of citizenship. They know this and exploit it.

