The most recent protests in Iran seem to have been successfully put down. This is a sad but not surprising thing, since Iran’s government is tyrannical and willing to use its muscle to stay in power:
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei announced that the regime has squashed the uprising that took place the last few weeks. The protests left 22 people dead and 3,700 arrested.
The regime also disrupted internet communication, but more about that later.
Every time there are such demonstrations in Iran I have a glimmer of hope for the country although I remain profoundly pessimistic about the possibility for overthrowing an Iranian government that’s clamped down on the country for nearly forty years. I was also musing on how the revolution of 1979 managed to succeed where recent movements have failed, and in doing so I reread some of my much earlier posts chronicling that 1979 revolt. I urge you to read them: Part I (Khomeini), Part II (Bakhtiar), and Part III (Carter), as well as this one about Khomeini as a con man.
Here are some of the differences between then and now. It’s not meant to be an exclusive list.
Khomeini was an extremely popular and charismatic figure who attracted millions in the street on his return to the country from years of exile. That made for a huge popular movement in 1979 composed of his religious supporters. But that group was also joined by a large number of leftists and human rights democrats. Each of those latter two groups thought they would be able to use the mullahs in the revolution and then control them when it came time to form the government—but of course the bitter laugh was on the leftists and the democrats, who were ruthlessly crushed.
Khomeini was also smart—strategically and politically smart—and he knew how to say just the right thing to lull those two groups (and most of the West) into thinking he wouldn’t be much trouble for them (in that con man post, I give some examples of how he did this).
In addition to the personality of Khomeini and his particular gifts, Iran also had a Shah who’d earned the enmity of many groups by killing hundreds of protestors, and by modernizing the country. The first approach (violence and/or imprisonment of protesters, much like the current mullahs’ reaction to the recent demonstrations) alienated groups two and three (leftists and human rights democrats), while the second approach (modernization) alienated group one, the ultra-religious.
The turning point for the Shah was reached in several ways: President Carter put pressure on him to release hundreds of political prisoners in the name of human rights. Afterwards, when that softening had emboldened the anti-Shah forces, the Shah cracked down on them again, thus angering several groups once more. But the crucial turning point was when army and police turned on him and refused to treat the protestors as they had in the past. After the Shah resigned under pressure, Iran’s temporary leader Bakhtiar—an anti-Shah human-rights-advocating democrat—let Khomeini back into the country:
On Bakhtiar’s appointment as the new Prime Minister, Khomeini condemned him, of course, from his exile in France. But Khomeini continued to live his charmed life; Bakhtiar allowed him to return to Iran shortly thereafter. The reason? A combination of Bakhtiar’s own devotion to freedom of speech, and the Shah’s old conundrum: Khomeini was so popular that to try to ban him would cause such public unrest in Iran that it seemed counterproductive. In essence, Bakhtiar, although a far different ruler than the Shah, faced the same dilemma; he resolved it in favor of not suppressing the opposition.
Allowing Khomeini back into the country was like lighting a match in an oxygen-saturated room.
You can see the differences between then and now. At present there doesn’t seem to be any particular charismatic figure who commands great allegiance and respect among large numbers of people, unlike in 1979. Now the demonstrators can use the internet to organize, but the government also uses the internet quite effectively as a tool of repression:
Iranian authorities shut down social media channels and disrupted internet access as protests against the government spread across the country over the past two weeks, showing an unprecedented ability for the nation to shut down dissent online, according to a new human rights report.
The crackdown showed that the Iranian government has developed an increasingly sophisticated ability to restrict, block, and monitor internet, according to a new report released Wednesday by the Center for Human Rights in Iran (CHRI).
“As the government shut down access to the global internet, protestors desperately pleaded for a restoration of internet access,” Hadi Ghaemi, executive director of the CHRI, told Newsweek.
This is their lifeline to the outside world and to each other.” Ghaemi said the Iranian government wants to show off that “it can retain its repressive grip on society.”
Social media platforms like Instagram and the Telegram messaging app, the main methods of communication protesters used to mobilize other demonstrators to join them on the streets, were blocked during the protests. Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), and other tools Iranians frequently use to circumvent censorship and access banned platforms like YouTube and Facebook, were also blocked. On December 30, the government blocked all Iranians from the internet for at least a half an hour.
It is my distinct impression that the current anti-government movement isn’t as large, or at least not the current active movement, compared to 1979. It consists (as far as I know) of mainly three factions with a certain amount of overlap—what’s left of the left; the human rights advocates, many of them young, who want more liberty; and those who are dissatisfied with the economy (is that the largest group?). Minus the large religious faction that fed the revolution of 1979, I wonder whether these protests can ever reach critical mass. And I wonder what (if anything) would cause the police and army (especially the elite guards) to turn on the government, this time—the economy, perhaps?
Nor are the mullahs being pressured—at least, not successfully pressured—to give people more rights, a la Jimmy Carter. Economic sanctions on Iran were lifted in 2016, post-Iran-deal. Nevertheless, they are doing poorly economically, but mainly because of the leaders’ failure to throw the population enough fish to keep them happy enough:
…[T]he lifting of sanctions on Iran in January 2016 has failed to deliver an economic boom.
Instead, the non-oil part of the economy has continued to struggle, with unemployment officially put at around 12.5 percent ”“ in reality, much higher for Iran’s millions of young people ”“ and inflation running at nearly 10 percent.
“There is a crisis of expectations in Iran,” said Tamer Badawi, a research fellow at the Istanbul-based Al-Sharq Forum. “It is a deep sense of economic frustration.”
To ease that discontent, Rouhani may need to spend more government money on creating jobs, restrain inflation by supporting the rial exchange rate and do more to eradicate the widespread corruption which angers the protesters.
But all of those actions would involve policy change. Rouhani has been pursuing a conservative budget policy to bring Iran’s volatile state finances under control, part of his effort to create an attractive environment for foreign investors. Meanwhile, fighting corruption would risk a backlash from powerful interests hurt by a crackdown…
Emadi [Iranian economist based in London] blamed much of the economy’s poor performance on a deep-rooted structural issue: the influence of paramilitary bodies such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as well as religious institutions on business.
Those interests, which according to some estimates control over 60 percent of assets in Iran, generally do not pay taxes and stifle competition from small private companies, blocking job creation, he said.
More:
Indeed, Iran has not produced up to its maximum OPEC quota for some months now. The industry needs serious investment to improve, but Iran does not have the cash or the equipment it needs. The Iranian people see their country’s money wasted on military engagements and terrorism abroad instead of being put to work for their own economic wellbeing, and this has been a major complaint of the protestors.
For Iran’s oil industry, foreign investment ”“ especially from oil companies with the expertise and capital to work on Iran’s mature oil fields ”” is needed. Many foreign companies expressed interest in working in Iran after sanctions were lifted, but they have found it very difficult to sign contacts with the NIOC. The Iranian government has established rules and policies that make it difficult and unattractive for foreign businesses.
In a way, then, it may be that lifting the sanctions has had a paradoxical effect. Poor economic conditions in the country prior to that could easily be blamed by the mullahs on the sanctions and the West. Now they themselves have been exposed as the cause of the problem.
I don’t see much changing in Iran until unrest—for whatever reason—reaches such overwhelming proportions that millions upon millions of people demonstrate and risk death, and the police and army finally turn on the mullah-controlled government and refuse to cooperate in stopping the protests. But I make no predictions as to when that might happen—except that I don’t think it will be any time soon, and maybe it will be never.