We still know next to nothing about the current state of the remaining Israeli hostages Hamas and other Gazans took on October 7. That’s about five and a half months ago. It’s pretty much a certainty that many are dead, but how many? I believe many are alive, being kept that way because of their great value. Hamas doesn’t value them as human beings but rather as pawns of great price, to be exchanged for prisoners – including many murderers – held in Israel.
Hamas is well aware of the precedent of prisoner releases by Israel in order to get hostages back. The most notorious one involved a single hostage, Galid Shalit, who was returned in an exceedingly lopsided deal:
[The Shalit deal was] a 2011 agreement between Israel and Hamas to release Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in exchange for 1,027 prisoners — almost all Palestinians and Arab-Israelis … Two hundred and eighty of these had been sentenced to life in prison for planning and perpetrating various attacks against Israeli targets.
Hamas military leader Ahmed Jabari was quoted in the pan-Arab newspaper Al-Hayat as confirming that the prisoners released under the deal were collectively responsible for the killing of 569 Israelis. The agreement came five years and four months after Palestinian militants captured Shalit in southern Israel along the Gaza Strip border.
It was a costly deal then, and turned out to be even more costly in terms of the future, because many of those released – including Sinwar – were involved in the planning and execution of the October 7 massacre. How could it have been otherwise? What were the Israeli authorities thinking when they negotiated that deal? Part of the reason they did it was intense political and emotional pressure from many Israelis. And note how long the negotiations took – over five years between Shalit’s capture and his release.
More:
While in captivity, Hamas refused to allow the International Red Cross access to Shalit, and the only indications that he was still alive were an audio tape, a video recording, and three letters.
The International Red Cross has had no access to the current hostages, nor is the organization even asking for it, as far as I know. And Shalit’s family got more evidence of life than the current hostage families are receiving. Hamas thinks it is holding a very very strong hand, and that strength also involves the neutrality or even the approval of much of the international community. The only pressure Hamas faces is military pressure from Israel, and the UN and most countries on earth – including the US under the Biden administration – are determined to get Israel to relax that pressure.
Yesterday’s UN Security Council resolution – from which the Biden administration abstained – demanded a ceasefire and hostage release, but did not make the first demand contingent on the second and was therefore worse than useless. Hamas believes it can get its ceasefire and continue to hold the hostages.
So why negotiate? And predictably, yesterday Hamas rejected a hostage deal that seems to me to have been unconscionably favorable to the terror group:
Hamas informed the mediators on the hostage deal that it would maintain its original position regarding a ceasefire, Reuters reported on Monday. This includes the withdrawal of IDF troops from the Gaza Strip, returning Palestinians to their homes, and exchanging prisoners.
Hamas’s response comes after Israel agreed on Saturday to a compromise proposed by the US regarding the number of Palestinian prisoners to be released and was waiting for the terror group’s response.
According to Israeli media on Sunday, citing Israeli officials, Israel reportedly agreed to release some 700-800 Palestinian prisoners in return for 40 hostages.
The Palestinian prisoners in the recent exchange proposal are reported to have included many murderers, just as with the Shalit exchange. And of course, 40 hostages are only about a third of those Hamas holds (dead or alive). The hostages are money in the back for Hamas, and their worth increases over time, with interest. Why should they acquiesce before all their demands are met?
Netanyahu responded today [emphasis mine]:
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in a statement released on Tuesday, “Hamas’s position clearly proves that Hamas is not interested in continuing negotiations for a deal and is an unfortunate testimony to the damage created by the Security Council’s decision.
“Hamas once again rejected any American compromise proposal and repeated its extreme demands: an immediate end to the war, a complete withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip, and the remaining in power so that it could repeat the massacre of October 7 again and again, as it had promised to do,” the statement continued.
I have to say it is also “unfortunate testimony to the damage created by” the Shalit exchange and other such prisoner exchanges. Netanyahu was Prime Minister of Israel when the negotiations were concluded, although he didn’t hold that position when they began. Ehud Olmert did.:
Unofficial talks between Israel and Hamas [on Shalit] began on 1 July 2006, six days after the abduction of Shalit, mediated by Gershon Baskin, an Israeli peace activist, co-director of the Israeli-Palestinian think tank IPCRI—the Israel Palestine Center for Research and Information. On that day, Baskin arranged a telephone conversation between Hamas Government spokesman Ghazi Hamad and Noam Shalit, the father of the soldier. …
On 9 September 2006, Baskin arranged for a hand written letter from Shalit to be delivered to the Representative Office of Egypt in Gaza, the first sign of life from Shalit and the proof of an actual channel of communication had been established. … In the end of December 2006 the Egyptians presented the agreed formula for a prisoner exchange in which Israel would release 1,000 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Shalit in two phases. This was the same agreement reached five years later.
After Olmert resigned from office on corruption charges and following elections in Israel which brought Netanyahu to power, Deckel was replaced by former Mossad agent Hagai Hadas who worked primarily though the good offices of a German Intelligence Officer, Gerhard Conrad. Hadas resigned in failure in April 2011 and was replaced by Mossad Officer David Meidan. Meidan took over on 18 April 2011, he was contacted by Gershon Baskin the very same day. The secret back channel run by Baskin and Hamas Deputy Foreign Minister Ghazi Hamad was authorized by Netanyahu in May 2011.
Netanyahu responded to a pilgrimage march, called by Shalit’s father for his release, by saying he was willing to release 1,000 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Shalit, but that top Hamas leaders would not be among those released. Shalit’s father had previously blamed the US for blocking talks on his son’s release.
The Baskin–Hamad secret back channel produced a document of principles for the release on 14 July 2011 which was authorized by Prime Minister Netanyahu and Ahmad Jabri. In August 2011, Egyptian-moderated negotiations on determining the list of names of the prisoners to be released began with Hamas represented by Ahmed Jabari and three other Hamas officials and Israel represented by David Meidan and two other Israeli officials. Haaretz reported that Israel proposed a prisoner swap, and threatened that if Hamas rejected the proposal, no swap would occur. Hamas responded by warning that an end to negotiations would lead to Shalit’s “disappearance”. Negotiations were hung up over disagreements between the two parties regarding Israel’s unwillingness to release all of the so-called “senior prisoners” into the West Bank—a demand Hamas rejected—and regarding the particulars of releasing prisoners who were leaders of Hamas and other organizations.
Netanyahu seems to have caved to the pressure, because in the end 280 of the prisoners released were serving life sentences for being involved in lethal terrorist attacks on Israelis. The decision was put to a vote by the Cabinet. Twenty-six members voted to approve it, while three opposed it:
[The three in opposition were] Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, Minister of Strategic Affairs Moshe Ya’alon, and Minister of National Infrastructure Uzi Landau. Ya’alon (Likud) argued that the prisoners would “go back to terrorism” and that they would destabilize the security situation in the West Bank. Landau (Yisrael Beiteinu) warned that the deal would be “a huge victory for terror” and that it would encourage more abductions of Israelis.
Well, they get to say “I told you so,” although I imagine that’s scant comfort. And if Netanyahu was going to approve the recent deal, it sounds as though little has been learned on this score since 2011 – except by Hamas.
At the time, there was a great deal of disagreement over the deal. One of the players, Dan Schueftan, whom I’ve seen and heard making statements opposing any present-day deal, called the Shalit swap deal at the time “the greatest significant victory for terrorism that Israel has made possible since its establishment.” He gets to say “I told you so” as well.
And then there’s Daniel Bar-Tal, professor of political psychology at Tel Aviv University. At the time of the Shalit deal he said this:
Here we see the basic dilemmas between the individual and the collective, and we see victim pitted against victim. Gilad Shalit is a victim who was violently kidnapped, in a way that Israelis do not consider to be a normative means of struggle. Therefore, one side says, he should be returned at any price. But the families of those killed in terrorist attacks and the people who were wounded in those attacks are victims, too, and they say that no price should be paid to the murderers. And it is truly a dilemma, because no side is right, and no side is wrong.
I beg to differ, at least somewhat. I see it as a disagreement about the “collective” itself and what the result will be of its actions, including results for individuals. It seems to me to be inevitable and inarguable that releasing so many violent terrorists to return one hostage will guarantee more hostages – individuals – of the same sort and in the same predicament. Therefore it pits one present innocent victim against future innocent victims who will be victimized as a result of the release. That hurts more individuals – although not this particular individual, Shalit – and it also harms the collective as a whole. It seems to mean that one side is right – although rational and cold-blooded – and one is wrong.
I am very glad that I’m not in charge of any such negotiations, however. And I’m extra-glad not to know anyone taken hostage, and might even be found among the “release them at any price!” contingent if I did. But governments must resist such demands if that sort of desire to free the innocent conflicts so strongly with the need to avoid rewarding the hostage-takers and emboldening them to continue in their vicious path.