The Gazans are adept at three things: propaganda, killing, and digging elaborate and extensive tunnels. In fact, their tunnel system is almost certainly the most elaborate in the world. But in that, they are helped along by geography/geology.
Here’s an in-depth (pun intended, I guess) look at the tunnels and why they are so easy to build and difficult to eradicate:
The unique conditions of the Gaza Strip in this context are also well known: its soft sandstone allows for relatively easy subterranean digging, in contrast to the hard limestone terrain in Lebanon and the West Bank. As a result, the IDF’s operations in these areas have had a very different character.
In Lebanon, Hezbollah’s use of subterranean infrastructure was substantially more limited. … [M]ost of Hezbollah’s “strategic” subterranean systems were limited in location and scope, and were largely known to Israeli intelligence. As a result, when the offensive phase of the campaign against Hezbollah began in September 2024, the Israeli Air Force destroyed most of these systems within hours, days, and a few weeks. … Thus, in the Lebanese arena, a decisive victory was achieved relatively quickly, primarily through the combination of air power and intelligence, against an adversary widely regarded as stronger and more dangerous than Hamas.
Indeed, the prolonged campaign in the Gaza Strip, now approaching two years, stems decisively from the challenge of the underground domain. Beyond the issue of the hostages, which significantly restricts IDF operations, the vast underground space in the Gaza Strip enables Hamas to shelter, hide, and disappear. From there, small guerrilla units of the organization emerge from concealed shafts embedded within the built or ruined urban landscape, set up ambushes, launch RPG rockets, and deploy or attach explosive devices. Despite all the experience and skills the IDF has acquired on the subject, there is currently no simple, practical way to neutralize this mode of warfare. Moreover, not only the prolonged nature of the fighting in the Gaza Strip reflects the challenge but also the difficulty in achieving a decisive outcome and the massive scale of forces required—including both regular and reserve brigades and divisions. These stem directly from the limited ability to contend with the subterranean threat. Lacking an effective solution, the IDF is left with little choice but to flood the area with a large number of forces and advance slowly and methodically as the default course of action.
Thus, the long duration of the campaign in the Gaza Strip, the difficulty in achieving a decisive outcome, and the immense scale of forces involved all stem directly from the underground challenge. …
The Viet Cong were the first to use subterranean networks extensively against the United States, which struggled to find an effective response. However, the Viet Cong’s tunnel system was likely only half the length of Gaza’s and ran mainly through uninhabited jungle terrain and not dense urban areas. In this sense, Gaza’s network is unique in both scale and implications—not only compared to Lebanon and the West Bank, but also globally.
Much more at the link.
Since the post-10/7 war began, the nature and extent of the Gazan tunnel system has been discussed a great deal. But I think many people are nevertheless unaware of how exceptionally extensive it is, and how it continues to be used by Hamas as above-ground Gaza becomes rubble. It remains a huge problem in Gaza and an enormous factor in the duration and difficulty of this war, and the author believes that it would probably be a threat to any group that would take over postwar.
