Today’s announcement:
A federal grand jury in Minnesota has voted to indict the four former Minneapolis police officers involved in the May 25, 2020, arrest of George Floyd, according to indictments unsealed Friday.
The three-count indictment names Derek Chauvin, Thomas Lane, J. Kueng and Tou Thao. Specifically, Chauvin, Thao and Kueng are charged with violating Floyd’s right to be free from unreasonable seizure and excessive force. All four officers are charged for their failure to provide Floyd with medical care. Chauvin was also charged in a second indictment, stemming from the arrest and neck restraint of a 14-year-old boy in 2017.
The fact that EMTs had been called and were on their way doesn’t seem to matter. The fact that one of the officers, Lane, had suggested early on and then again that Floyd be rolled on his side and that Chauvin overruled him – doesn’t seem to matter. Does anyone else remember this?:
Lane, 37, had only been on the force for four days when he helped to restrain Floyd, according to his lawyer.
“My client is holding his legs, Mr. Floyd is saying he can’t breathe and my client says to the 20-year veteran Chauvin should we roll him over,” Gray said.
“Lane asked, should we roll him on his side and officer Chauvin said no,” Gray said. “Now, we’ve got a 20-year officer here and a four-day officer in my client.”
“Then later, my client again says, do you want to roll him on his side? This is right before the ambulance comes and again he’s not rolled on his side.”
Gray said that Lane “did not want to see the man die” and started to perform CPR on Floyd.
“My client is holding his feet. When the ambulance comes, my client goes in the ambulance. Four days on the force … and starts his own CPR, pushing down on his chest, which he did for a lengthy period of time, until they got the machine on,” according to Gray.
Chauvin, the 20-year veteran, overruled Lane. But Lane is charged, just like the rest of them. And all also face state charges as well. Speaking of which…
In the Rodney King incident and trial of 1991, which also featured inflammatory video evidence (although King was not killed, only injured), you may or may not recall the legal niceties. I’ll summarize them by saying that four police officers were charged by the state, three acquitted, and one received no decision on a single charge because of a split jury. The results was terrible riots in Los Angeles:
The rioting lasted six days and killed 63 people, with 2,383 more injured; it ended only after the California Army National Guard, the Army, and the Marine Corps provided reinforcements to re-establish control.
Note the force with which the riots were met, quite different from today’s reaction.
After that came the federal charges, because of the failure to find the men guilty. It’s worth looking at that trial in more detail. As you read this, please compare and contrast with today [my emphasis]:
After the acquittals and the riots, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) sought indictments of the police officers for violations of King’s civil rights…[T]he grand jury returned indictments against the three officers for “willfully and intentionally using unreasonable force” and against Sergeant Koon for “willfully permitting and failing to take action to stop the unlawful assault” on King…
…The jury found Officer Laurence Powell and Sergeant Stacey Koon guilty, and they were subsequently sentenced to 30 months in prison. Timothy Wind and Theodore Briseno were acquitted of all charges.
During the three-hour sentencing hearing, US District Judge John G. Davies accepted much of the defense version of the beating. He strongly criticized King, whom he said provoked the officers’ initial actions. Davies said that only the final six or so baton blows by Powell were unlawful. The first 55 seconds of the videotaped portion of the incident, during which the vast majority of the blows were delivered, was within the law because the officers were attempting to subdue a suspect who was resisting efforts to take him into custody.
Davies found that King’s provocative behavior began with his “remarkable consumption of alcoholic beverage” and continued through a high-speed chase, refusal to submit to police orders and an aggressive charge toward Powell. Davies…concluded that Officer Powell never intentionally struck King in the head, and “Powell’s baton blow that broke King’s leg was not illegal because King was still resisting and rolling around on the ground, and breaking bones in resistant suspects is permissible under police policy.”
Mitigation cited by the judge in determining the length of the prison sentence included the suffering the officers had undergone because of the extensive publicity their case had received, high legal bills that were still unpaid, the impending loss of their careers as police officers, their higher risks of abuse while in prison, and their undergoing two trials. The judge acknowledged that the two trials did not legally constitute double jeopardy, but raised “the specter of unfairness”.
These mitigations were critical to the validity of the sentences imposed because federal sentencing guidelines called for much longer prison terms in the range of 70 to 87 months. The low sentences were controversial and were appealed by the prosecution. In a 1994 ruling, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected all the grounds cited by Judge Davies and extended the terms. The defense appealed the case to the US Supreme Court. Both Koon and Powell were released from prison while they appealed to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, having served their original 30-month sentences with time off for good behavior. On June 14, 1996, the high court partially reversed the lower court in a ruling, unanimous in its most important aspects, which gave a strong endorsement to judicial discretion, even under sentencing guidelines intended to produce uniformity.
There’s a lot there to mull over, as well as tremendous differences between then and now. I strongly suspect that, had the King incident taken place today, the riots would have occurred even before the initial trial, and that the men would have been found guilty in that trial. They would have been sentenced to the harshest possible sentence, and then they would have been tried by the feds as well.
The present situation is an obvious show trial, and it seems that very few people care, because Chauvin is a seemingly dislikeable person. The other accused officers have not had that much personal exposure compared to Chauvin, and it remains to be seen whether they will ever have a higher profile in the public’s minds or whether the taint of Chauvin will wholly become their taint. How many people care about them or their fate? I certainly do, and anyone who cares about justice should care about each individual and each case, but I believe that’s very rare in this day and age.
As Scott Johnson of Powerline writes:
I wonder if such a case has ever been brought when the perpetrators have already been convicted or have yet to be tried in pending state criminal proceedings. I may be missing something, but I am unaware of relevant precedent. Absent relevant precedent or further explanation, I can only comment that I find this aspect of the case performative and abusive.
That is my thought as well.
As with the King case, the court can say that the two trials do not legally constitute double jeopardy. The difference, of course, is – as Scott Johnson says – that Chauvin was convicted by the state in his first trial, and the others have yet to be tried but certainly have not been acquitted and the plan is for the state of Minnesota to try them. The unusual nature of this particular double prosecution may also not be double jeopardy in the technical sense – at least, that will be the prosecution’s argument – because the exact charges are different although they arise from the same set of acts. I submit that they not only raise “the specter of unfairness” but constitute actual unfairness, especially considering the highly serious nature of the crimes of which Chauvin has already been convicted. And I wonder whether an argument can be made that these federal charges, coming at this time – prior to sentencing on the state charges – have the goal of affecting the Minnesota sentencing in the first trial and making it even more harsh.
The state of justice in the US today is sickening. The DOJ is quite the Orwellian designation at this point.
[NOTE: I have already discussed that charge against Chauvin in the case of the 14-year-old.]