There is a lot of reportage (on the right, anyway) about some of the revelations in the Danchenko trial. I’ve been meaning to write a post about that. But one of the problems is that the legal issues in the trial are a bit difficult to understand, and not many of the explanations offer sufficient clarification of what’s going on.
The other thing that has me dragging my heels is that I strongly suspect this trial will not matter. The half of the country on the Democrat side, and most of the MSM, will ignore the shocking parts and/or emphasize the parts that can be spun in a way more favorable to the FBI and the Democrats.
And a conviction probably won’t happen. Here’s Andrew C. McCarthy on why a conviction will be difficult:
A witness cannot properly be accused of lying if he has not been asked a question that would necessarily have elicited the information the government claims has been withheld. It is objectionable for a prosecutor to ask me, “Isn’t it a fact that you never told the FBI you robbed the bank?” if there is no evidence that the FBI ever asked me whether I robbed the bank. It is not my job to volunteer information (let alone incriminating information); it is the investigators’ job to ask.
It is entirely possible — I’d be willing to bet that it’s likely — that Danchenko was disingenuous in his some of his discussions with the FBI about the sources of information that he fed to Steele. But to prove that he intentionally made false statements, the prosecution will have to establish that he was asked sharp questions and gave clear answers that were plainly untrue.
In other words, here’s my understanding of what’s going on: with Russiagate and the Steele dossier: the FBI clearly did not want to know the truth and in fact actively avoided seeking it. They instead appear to have been intent on implicating Trump and therefore did not pursue the obvious holes in the stories being told. Therefore convicting someone like Danchenko will be difficult (as it was with Sussman). Because the FBI was guilty of essentially framing the president, being lied to or misled was accomplished with the FBI’s willing participation, and prosecuting someone under a law about lying to the FBI becomes an uphill battle.
Earlier, McCarthy wrote this:
It remains to be seen whether Durham can prove these charges…
What is not in doubt, though, is that the trial is highlighting the FBI’s shocking malfeasance in the Trump-Russia “collusion” probe, which it codenamed “Crossfire Hurricane.”
The first witness in the case was FBI supervisory intelligence analyst Brian Auten, of whom Durham himself conducted the prosecution’s questioning. Auten conceded the FBI had offered Steele $1 million if he could prove his sensational allegations that Trump was in cahoots with the regime of Vladimir Putin and that the Kremlin was positioned to blackmail the then-candidate because it supposedly possessed a video recording of Trump engaging in sexual hijinks.
Ultimately, the bureau never had to pay the $1 million because neither Steele nor Danchenko could prove the dossier allegations. In fact, according to court filings, Durham’s investigation has concluded the so-called pee tape was a complete fabrication. Further, when the FBI finally got around to interviewing Danchenko, months after it first received Steele’s reporting, Danchenko debunked it as a screed of rumor and innuendo, much of it exaggerated and gussied up to look like professional intelligence analysis…
More to the point, though, that the FBI offered to pay such an exorbitant sum in hopes Steele’s anti-Trump claims could be backed up is proof positive that the bureau knew these claims were not verified.
That is key. The rules of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Justice Department mandate the FBI must verify information before submitting it to the court in applying for surveillance warrants. Even though it could not prove the Steele allegations and had every reason to know they were exaggerated if not out-and-out false, the FBI relied on the Steele claims in sworn applications.
It gets worse. The FBI obtained FISC surveillance warrants to monitor former Trump campaign adviser Carter Page in October 2016 and mid-January 2017, representing to the court that Trump appeared to be in a corrupt conspiracy with the Kremlin. Finally, in late January, the FBI interviewed Danchenko, who debunked Steele’s reporting. Nevertheless, even after speaking with Danchenko, the bureau continued relying on Steele’s allegations when — again under oath — it persuaded the court to extend the surveillance in April and June 2017…
Indeed, not only did the FBI fail to disclose to the Justice Department and the court that Danchenko had contradicted Steele’s claims. The bureau told the court it had interviewed Danchenko to “further corroborate” Steele’s reporting (which actually had not been corroborated). In so doing, the bureau elaborated, it found Danchenko to be “truthful and cooperative.”
Of course, what the FBI didn’t mention was that what Danchenko had been “truthful and cooperative” about was the fact that Steele’s claims were sheer nonsense. Thus, FISC judges were led to believe Danchenko had verified Steele’s reporting when the truth was just the opposite.
There’s also, of course, the fact that some of the agents involved in pushing lies to implicate Trump were the same people involved in pushing lies to exonerate Hunter Biden. That, more than anything else, starkly highlights the FBI’s pro-Democrat bias. They lied to hurt Trump’s chance of re-election and they lied to prop up Biden’s chances (more on that here).
You can find more details about recent testimony in the trial in this piece, which is long but well worth reading. Here’s an excerpt (in the following, Durham asks the questions, and an FBI agent named Helson is answering):
Q. All right. Well, what about looking at what [Danchenko] had said as compared to what the records showed? Did you do that going backward?
A. Not going backwards, no.
Q. Did they make a specific recommendation to you that the Bureau behavioral assessment group conduct an examination to determine what Mr. Danchenko’s actual motives, allegiances and vulnerabilities were?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you do that?
A. No…
Q. Were you — was it recommended that you do an assessment or to look at the financial nature of Mr. Danchenko’s employment because of the concern that he may be prone to shopping around his information in search of work and pre-composing reporting containing unsolicited material, which may indicate the FBI is not the primary audience for his information?
A. Yeah, I saw that in the report.
Q. Did you do that?
A. No.
Q. Was it recommended that the Washington Field Office determine whether Mr. Danchenko committed any unauthorized illegal activity for the apparent falsehoods and inaccuracies contained in his visa and immigration documents?
A. Yes, they recommended that.
Q. Did you do that?
A. No.
Then Durham asked Helson about the Washington Field Office recommendation to polygraph Danchenko, apparently concerned with Danchenko’s loyalties:
Q. Did they specifically recommend to the Washington Field Office and you that you considered administering a polygraph of Mr. Danchenko to determine if he has ever been tasked by a foreign individual, entity or government to collect information or to perform actions adverse to the U.S. interest?
A. They recommended that, yes.
Q. Did you do that?
A. No.