[NOTE: I plan for this to be a two- or three- part series, sparked by the terrible news of Hamas’ murder of six Israeli hostages who had survived almost a year in captivity.]
First, a bit of background on the early post-10/7 days.
When the enormous carnage and torment (as well as kidnappings) wrought by Hamas on ordinary Israeli citizens (plus a fair number of resident non-citizens, such as workers from Thailand) was revealed, the reaction in Israel was intense grief and rage. Some of the rage was against Hamas, of course. But a great deal was also against the government and the military that had failed to protect its people. That reaction got even more intense when it was learned that there had been multiple prior warnings about what was about to happen, and those warnings were brushed away, although they later turned out to have been spot on.
Not long after 10/7, Hamas threatened to execute hostages. This possibility was always part of the equation, as with any kidnapping by a violent (and in this case sadistic and fanatic) group. It’s easy to forget these threats – after all, so much has happened since. But I remember them, and here’s a refresher in case you’ve forgotten. The dateline of the story is October 9, 2023, two days after the attack:
On Monday, Hamas’ al-Qassam Brigades, the terrorist group’s military arm, chillingly declared it would begin killing its prisoners if the Israeli government continues bombing Palestinian lands.
“Any targeting of innocent civilians without warning will be met regretfully by executing one of the captives in our custody, and we will be forced [sic] to broadcast this execution,” said Abu Obeida, a Qassam Brigades spokesman.
“We regret [sic] this decision, but we hold the Zionist enemy and their leadership responsible for this.”
That statement brought into sobering view one of the main reasons Hamas seemed so intent on capturing innocent civilians: the leverage it could provide.
“The cruel reality is Hamas took hostages as an insurance policy against Israeli retaliatory action, particularly a massive ground attack and to trade for Palestinian prisoners,” said Aaron David Miller, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
The only reluctance Hamas has had to killing the hostages is the need to parade them as well as to use them as negotiation leverage against Israel, and for the latter purpose live hostages are better than dead ones, although dead ones will do in a pinch.
I bring all of this up to remind us all that in the early days it was reasonable to assume that we’d be seeing these televised executions, and that the abductors would be taking a leaf out of the book of Daniel Pearl’s killers. After all, inherent in kidnapping and hostage-taking is always a good possibility of murder if the abductors’ demands are not met. But in this case those public executions never happened, because Hamas is smarter than that. They are playing a public relations game, and so far they are winning. So in the post-10/7 phase of the conflict, Hamas has been careful to walk a tightrope of pretend magnanimity versus bloodthirstiness.
The pretend magnanimity came last fall during the hostage-for-prisoners exchanges, in which Hamas gave up the hostages seen as most vulnerable, the ones most likely to garner worldwide sympathy: mothers and children, and older women. In return Hamas got a great many prisoners.
But that’s not all Hamas got. It also was able to give the impression that future negotiations with Hamas (through its proxies such as Qatar) would bring Israel even greater dividends, as time went on, and that all the hostages might be released alive if only Israel gave up more and more. Hamas had every reason to believe that over time the pressure from the Israeli public and the world (including of course the present US administration) would increase to the point where Israel would be pressed to give up just about everything. And in fact, the metrics of the 2011 Shalit deal, in which Israel released 1027 prisoners for one Israeli soldier who’d been held for five years (including 280 prisoners with life sentences, who altogether were responsible for the murders of 569 Israelis) would lead them to believe that. It’s no accident that among those released prisoners was Sinwar, future mastermind of 10/7. If Israel had been willing to agree to a deal so lopsided for one Israeli – and a soldier at that – what might it give up now? It’s easy to understand why Hamas was motivated to take as many hostages as possible on October 7.
Over time – and as I write this post, it’s been about a month short of a year since 10/7 – many hostages have died. We don’t know the exact number, but Israeli intelligence has learned a lot. Even prior to the recent murder of six of the young adult hostages (I’ll be writing more about that in Part II), the dead bodies of some hostages had been found and taken back to Israel for burial. Some were known to have been murdered on October 7 in Israel and Hamas operatives had ghoulishly brought their bodies to Gaza to be used as negotiating currency. Some had died more recently, and Hamas claimed – of course – that they’d been killed by Israeli bombs, although the autopsy evidence and condition of the bodies didn’t indicate that. Then there was the terrible case of three hostages mistakenly killed by Israeli forces during a firefight. And always there was the threat of Hamas murdering more hostages.
Meanwhile, the IDF and/or Israel’s intelligence forces managed to rescue some hostages unharmed. This was cause for great celebration in Israel, and probably a great deal of anger and chagrin on the part of Hamas. There was a basic pattern to the successful rescues, however: nearly all the hostages whom Israel had managed to free previously were in above ground houses, which made it easier to surprise their captors and easier to get intelligence on the hostages’ whereabouts because neighbors might inform or unknowingly give information. The only hostage found alive in a tunnel was the recent case of Farhan al-Qadi, an Israeli Bedouin grandfather who was found alone and apparently had been abandoned by his minders as the IDF closed in – although we don’t know for sure. It doesn’t appear that the IDF knew of his exact whereabouts to begin with, and my guess is that he was guarded by less fanatical Hamas members compared to those guarding the six Israeli captives who were later murdered in the tunnels as the IDF approached.
Unlike many hostage situations, the one that began on 10/7/2023 is apparently somewhat decentralized. Some of the hostage-takers were originally what I call free-lancers, meaning that they were not Hamas regulars but rather Hamas sympathizers trying to cash in on the deal. Not only that, but the hostages have not been kept in one place, and one reason for that was that it guaranteed that at no point could Israel do something heroic to rescue them all or even most of them. All the rescues have been bit by bit by bit. And it is my belief that, at present, the vast majority or maybe all of the living hostages are in the tunnels being guarded by the most coldblooded of minders, because Hamas has learned that rescue is almost impossible under such circumstances – because not only can Hamas kill them as the IDF approaches, but the hostage guards can get out alive afterwards through the warren of tunnels that Hamas has constructed over the years.
Therefore I don’t think we’ll see any more rescues of living hostages, although I hope I’m wrong. And I think we’ll learn of more hostage murders, much like the ones we learned about over the weekend.
Hamas murdered the hostages to further psychologically torment Israelis and their sympathizers, as well because it knew that another result would be that the pressure on the Netanyahu government to surrender to Hamas and/or resign would increase to a fever pitch. That is exactly what has happened. There was a general strike (it’s over now), and the anti-Netanyahu forces have strengthened their protests and machinations. I plan to deal with that phenomenon in more depth in Part II, but till then I suggest you watch the following video by Caroline Glick (especially around minute thirty and after, although the whole thing is well worth watching):
Or if you prefer, please read this very informative article of Glick’s that covers much the same territory.