Don’t mean to beat a dead ISG horse, but…

The New Neo Posted on by

The ISG report seems to be dead in the water. And that’s a good thing. The idea behind the report was to get us all to come together, and we did. The only problem is we came together in condemning it.

Krauthammer sees the ISG report as having given Bush “one last chance to alter course on Iraq.” In James Baker and his clueless cronies, Bush has been lucky in his opponents–as he so often is. Their suggestions were so inept that the report has temporarily revived the seemingly moribund Bush and given him at least a chance to regroup. And whatever new plan for Iraq he may come up with can hardly help but seem better than the utterly astounding ISG suggestion of begging Iran and Syria for assistance.

Dean Barnett is, likewise, happy that the ISG report took only a mere eight days to find–as he puts it–“history’s ashbin.” He calls for a new Churchill to define the path back to “greatness,” something for which the American people yearn.

Unfortunately, as a Churchill fan, I have to say I don’t expect one to be waiting in the wings.

Churchill was sui generis, as well as being very much a man of his times–which was acknowledged to be an earlier time even than World War II. His sort of rhetoric was not only unique, it was grounded in an age long past, and especially British (Tony Blair, for example, comes closer to it than any American ever could. Although not close enough.)

Nor do I think Dean himself really expects a Churchill to emerge. But he is looking for someone who can inspire and clearly articulate what we are fighting for. Someone who doesn’t shirk from asking for sacrifice, and who does not gloss over hardship, but who understands why he/she is requesting it, and what is so important about this fight.

“Leadership” is an old-fashioned word, and a concept towards which many are suspicious. But without it, and without clear vision of success, we flounder.

Parties. Holidays. Home.

The New Neo Posted on by

Those of you who’ve followed my mother’s journey to a new assisted living facility located in the NY community where she lived for most of her life might be interested in learning there’s good news and bad.

First, the bad. She absolutely detests the place. Every time we talk–which is almost every day–she complains: the food stinks, the people likewise. Some of it may be hyperbole, but it may just very well all be true.

Her apartment itself isn’t the problem. It’s a studio, yes. But even though it’s only got one room, the ceilings are high, and huge multiple windows on two sides give it an air of great spaciousness and openness. Likewise, the staff is pleasant and fairly responsive.

When you’re in a place like that, though, and almost ninety-three, the food and–for want of a better word, your fellow inmates–are really the thing. And she’s unequivocally negative about both.

So, what’s the good news? She sounds very happy nonetheless. Happier than she’s sounded in many years. Her voice–always an instant giveaway to her mood, as far back as I can remember–is light and energetic, and her mind seems very sharp.

I think the reason for her good spirits is clear. As I wrote here, she’s home.

In the eighty-eight years she lived in that community, she probably knew thousands of people, many of them well, many of them from childhood. Even though that huge group of friends has now been sharply culled by death and time, it was originally so extraordinarily large that the survivors still constitute a fairly large number.

That means she gets a couple of phone calls on a daily basis from old friends she hasn’t seen in the five years since she moved to New England to be near me when her significant other (boyfriend, that is) died in 2001 at the age of ninety-four. A couple of times a week they’ve taken her out–to lunch, to dinner. To the golf/tennis club she was a member of for forty years, to our old home (sold in the early 90s), to the hamburger joint that opened in the 50s to great fanfare, even to the museum where she used to volunteer and where she still might be able to.

Don’t ever underestimate the power of that sort of community to lift the spirits. It grounds her in a particular space and a particular history, rather than the far northern city where she lived near me, a random place with random people with no significance for her, however lovely or however friendly it or they may have been.

I’ve been thinking a lot lately about the concept of “home.” One reason, of course, is my mother. Another, as I mentioned in my piece about her move, is that I’ve been contemplating a move myself. I haven’t gotten too far with the process yet, but stay tuned.

This particular weekend I’m back in the New England town where I landed in the late 70s and lived for the next twenty years. I came here because of a job of my then-husband’s; we stayed far past the time he held that job. Once you get set in a place and start raising kids, it becomes home, even if it isn’t the home you would have chosen (too rural, too isolated, for me). And when you’re cooped up with a bunch of screaming toddlers and going stir-crazy yourself–dedicated to the important task of child-rearing though you might be–the friendships you make are deep and lasting.

This weekend it’s holiday party weekend; that’s why I’m here. Last night I went to a celebration that’s been held every year for the last twenty-five. I don’t know most of the people there well anymore; never did, actually. The vast majority I only see once every year, at that very party. But there’s something about knowing people over time that has a power all its own.

The food is always fabulous and copious; the hostess makes everything herself. Every couple of years she moves to a new house and seems to have a new guy–this is the first year for this home and the third for the guy (I approve, by the way, especially of the latter). But when I look at her I don’t just see the present; I see the past.

The young mother with two little babies so close in age I wonder how she managed. The businesswoman who’s started many successful ventures. The different hair colors. The first husband, a charmer, still a friend despite a messy divorce that broke her heart and estranged them for years (she became so startlingly thin at that time that everyone was alarmed for her health).

And that’s the way it was for me and almost everyone there. If they show photos of their tall, grownup children, or give news of offsprings’ marriages and even a few grandkids (something new in the mix), in my mind’s eye rise images of the adorable little babies and toddlers I originally knew years ago. Some of my friends still look pretty good, themselves, but some of them wear the years harder, and they seem–well, some of them seem pretty old. And don’t get me started on the topic of weight gain.

I don’t think I’d ever want to move back here. It’s still too rural and isolated; I’m a city girl, after all. But don’t think I’m not tempted. No, it’s not “home” in the sense that my mother’s community is to her. But, since most of my good friends are scattered all over the country and I have very few relatives, this is probably the closest thing I have to home.

Perhaps it’s the closest thing I’ll ever have, although I hope not. I hope to make a new home, or even a series of successive new homes.

So, anybody got a formula for “instant home?” Or, as I suspect, is that an oxymoron?

Taking my rightful place among bloggers on the left

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I hereby join two other bloggers, Michelle Malkin and Tammy Bruce, in officially declaring myself to be a woman of the Left.

Of the dominant left hand, that is. I’m not only a lefty, I’m very strongly left-handed, from an unusually left-handed family. Of the four of us—mother, father, brother, and myself—only my father was right-handed.

Although my politics have shifted my handedness has not. I was brought up in a left-handed culture, one in which the minority was right. Not only that, but several of my best friends growing up were also left-handed. So I somehow got the idea that left was best, and that it correlated with all sorts of good things such as creativity and intelligence.

And in fact, left-handedness does appear to correlate at least somewhat with those things, as well as mental slowness and certain types of brain damage. It appears the left-handed population is more likely to harbor outliers of both types—I’ll leave it to my readers to determine which category I might fall into.

I’ve never felt left-handedness itself to be a handicap, however. Little things like having to learn to use a scissors with my right hand were a bit difficult at the outset, but now I wield one as well as anyone.

My mother, raised in the early part of the century, had a far more arduous time of it. Back then it was common practice to switch lefties, and she was forced to write and eat with her right hand. Perhaps for that reason, she’s had a problem all her life in distinguishing right from left (not in the political sense, however); her spatial differentiation is somewhat poorly developed. It used to amuse me when I was little (children are so cruel!) to watch her taking a surrepticious glance at her wedding ring when asked for directions, in order to cue herself as to which was left and which was right.

I have a theory–unsubstantiated–that there’s a higher-than-average number of lefties in the blogger population. I’d love to do a survey. In fact, I’d like to propose that Pajamas Media, often accused of being too heavily skewed to the right, try to redress that imbalance by trumpeting how many of its bloggers are actually lefties.

The following theory, discussed in Wiki’s article on lefthandedness, conforms to my own experience, and could help explain any preponderance of lefties that might be found among bloggers, at Pajamas or otherwise:

Left-handed persons are thought to process information using a “visual simultaneous” method in which several threads can be processed simultaneously. Another way to view this is such: Suppose there were a thousand pieces of popcorn and one of them was colored pink. The right-handed person ”” using the linear sequential processing style ”” would look at the popcorn one at a time until they encountered the pink one. The left-handed person would spread out the pieces of popcorn and visually look at all of them to find the one that was pink. A side effect of these differing styles of processing is that right handed persons need to complete one task before they can start the next. Left-handed people, by contrast, are capable and comfortable switching between tasks. This makes them appear (to the right-handed majority) as if they do not finish anything. Alternately, left-handed people have an excellent ability to multi-task. Perhaps the anecdotal evidence that suggests they are more creative stems from this ability to multi-task.

This is exactly the way I seem to work.

And Wikipedia has thoughtfully compiled this list of famous lefties. Take a look. I’m not sure how valid it is, but it’s fun.

The list of sports figures is exceedingly lengthy, as would be expected. The advantages of left-handedness in most sports is well-known. Musicians, likewise, seem to be legion.

But to me the most fascinating are the politicians and world figures. Sure, you’d expect Castro and Hugo Chavez to be lefties. But both Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan (switched, like my mother was, and like his own politics were–he started out to the left and ended up on the right)? And how about the three Presidential candidates in 1992–Clinton, Bush I, and Perot, lefties all. What were the odds?

New Secretary-General Ban: I like the reform rhetoric, at least (and then there’s the French…)

The New Neo Posted on by

If you listened to my most recent podcast, you’ve probably noted that I’m neither a Kofi Annan fan nor a UN fan. Whether I’ll be a Secretary-General Ban fan (couldn’t resist the rhyme) remains to be seen, but at least in his initial UN address he paid rhetorical lip service to the fact that corruption is rampant there and reform is sorely needed. We’ll see whether there’s any way for that to actually happen.

But Ban apparently has flunked his first French test, which was–a French test. Yes, you heard me right; apparently France requires all Secretaries-General to speak French. Although Ban has been burning the midnight oil and brushing up his skills in honor of the big day. he flubbed some questions at a recent French news conference.

Chirac might hold it against him. But I promise I won’t.

Sherman and total war

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I’ve been reading a book by Robert Kagan entitled Dangerous Nation, about the history of America’s international relations. Kagan’s thesis is that, from the start, the US was more involved and interventionist, and less isolationist, than conventional wisdom would indicate.

But that’s not the portion of the book I’m writing about today. I’ve been reading the part about the Civil War. In the earliest days of that conflict, people thought it would be possible to wage the war in a relatively “civilized” and circumscribed manner. Instead, it was transformed into one of the bloodiest and most “total” of modern wars fought up till that time.

McClellan, Lincoln’s first Union commander, preferred to wage a “gentleman’s war.” Ulysses S. Grant later described McClellan as one who “did not believe in this war…[letting his] ambivalent attitude toward the conflict influence [his] military performance.” Thus do perceptions of a war’s justness and necessity color the decisions made in the course of it, even by commanders.

McClellan, who was relieved of his military duties in March of 1862, famously ran for President against Lincoln on an antiwar platform in 1864. He lost, partly due to the impressive battle victories of one of his successors, Sherman, who was his very antithesis.

Kagan writes about the ever-controversial General Sherman [emphasis mine]:

The northern generals who prosecuted the war most effectively , and most ruthlessly, had more understanding of its ideological purposes…”We are not only fighting hostile armies,” William Tecumseh Sherman declared, “but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war“….Therefore the North must “make the war so terrible…[and] make them so sick of war that generations would pass away before they would again appeal to it “…The Union’s conduct of the Civil War would remain, for American commanders in both world wars of the twentieth century, the very model of a great war…a war of ‘power unrestrained’ unleashed for ‘complete conquest.’

Sherman famously said “War is hell,” a stark statement that encapsulates the horror of war. He’s been accused of committing war crimes during the Civil War, but the evidence is that his campaign against the civilians of the South was mainly limited to destroying property, although it certainly caused a great deal of suffering–as intended.

Sherman also had a way with words. He’s the author of many famous quotes about war which show a fascinating combination of the compassionate and the implacable. Sherman felt the two were closely linked in war–in order to ultimately be compassionate, one had to be ruthless, because half-measures kept the population in an undefeated state, ready to wage war again:

Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and defeat.

War is cruelty. There is no use trying to reform it. The crueler it is, the sooner it will be over.

The scenes on this field would cure anyone of war.

War as a remedy for war–it seems paradoxical. And yet, it worked for Sherman. And it seems that the dreadful wars of the twentieth century–World Wars I and II–bore out the principle that if a war is bad enough that a people actually feels defeated (not just humiliated or tricked, but defeated and war weary), they are unlikely to start another.

The First World War, bloody and vicious though it was, was not really a total war in the sense Sherman meant, although it came close. Fought mainly by armies (although those armies were decimated; an entire generation of Europeans lost its “best and brightest” men) it was stalemated for an exceptionally long time, and ended through an armistice–and then a treaty, Versailles–that was so unsatisfactory in resolving it that World War II was not long in coming.

The reasons the Germans were able to come back so quickly to start another war, despite their defeat in WWI, are complex. But one of them was probably the fact that although they felt humiliated by the terms of the Treaty, they somehow managed to feel that they had not really been conquered. In fact, in his rise to power, Hitler played on that perception: German defeat was not a “real” defeat, but the result of a betrayal by domestic forces of a varied nature (including, of course, the Jews)–the “stab in the back” theory.

World War II was, by all definitions, a total war. It involved civilian populations far more heavily; in WWI, most of the civilian deaths had been from influenza and famine, but World War II featured heavy civilian bombardment as a common tactic of the war. In fact, it seems that the experience of the total war of WWII decisively ended even the idea of warfare for Western Europe. It made its inhabitants, harking back to Sherman’s words about the South, “so sick of war that generations would pass away before they would again appeal to it.”

Revulsion for what they suffered during World Wars I and II–compared to the relative lack of suffering on American soil–is part of what has led to European pacifism and belief in the talking cure, as well as their contempt for what they see as America’s tendency to resort far too easily to war. Europe feels itself to have been “cured” of war. The only problem, of course, is that the cure hasn’t spread to the world of Islamic totalitarianism. Au contraire.

The first Gulf War was very different than the American Civil War, World War I, or World War II. The Gulf War was waged in a comparatively “easy and safe”–and limited–manner. However, contradicting Sherman’s statement that such wars end in defeat, it was won by the US and its allies.

On reflection, though, Sherman appears to have been correct, after all. The Gulf War was “won,” but the win was so limited that it led almost inevitably to the present Iraq War. Saddam’s defiance at the end of the Gulf War; his massacre of those who, counting on our help, rose up against him; and his flouting of sanctions and inspections; clearly indicated that neither he nor the Iraqi people (except for his victims) had felt the sting of true defeat.

The present Iraq War illustrates the same dilemma of the “easy and safe” war leading to defeat–or, in this case, the perception of defeat, one that seems to have overwhelmed much of our electorate and our MSM.

“Easy and safe” (relatively speaking, of course; no war is either) is a good description of the initial military campaign of the Iraq War. The degree to which that first stage was “easy and safe” was the degree to which the forces now wreaking havoc there felt undefeated. At the time, it was “easy” for them to pretend to roll over during the initial war, which lasted only a few weeks, and then to regroup for the asymmetrical war they’ve been fighting ever since (a war which, like all modern wars, appeals to our own media–which certainly doesn’t seem to need a total war to feel defeated).

I am most decidedly not advocating using the civilian bombardment techniques of World War II in Iraq. But I am suggesting that we acknowledge that we need to be willing to do what is necessary to win, and to make the actual enemy feel conquered (a la, take out al Sadr and his minions, for starters), and not to just go for “easy and safe.” If we do the latter, we are doing no one a favor–including most of the Iraqi people.

[General Sherman on the topic of the MSM:

I hate newspapermen. They come into camp and pick up their camp rumors and print them as facts. I regard them as spies, which, in truth, they are.

If I had my choice I would kill every reporter in the world, but I am sure we would be getting reports from Hell before breakfast.]

Carter’s “imprisonment wall”

The New Neo Posted on by

Jimmy Carter, peacemaker extraordinaire, has called the wall Israel has built an “imprisonment wall.”

A strange notion of imprisonment, indeed. How can a wall designed to keep murderers out of a single small country (Israel), and yet allowing them freedom of movement elsewhere, be considered a prison?

I wonder if Jimmy locks his doors. Because if he does, isn’t he imprisoning someone? Locking out those who might want to steal from him, or murder him? Isn’t that the main reason we all lock our doors (although I have to say, in New England, I know quite a few people who don’t)?

Did Carter even notice the number of suicide bombers blowing Israelis to bits before the wall was erected, and has he compared it to the number of such bombings since?

But no. Carter is almost as demented as Gandhi was when he counseled the Jews to allow Hitler to murder them so that they might claim the moral high ground and set an example of peace/love. Ah, these wonderful peace advocates, always wanting the Jews to sacrifice themselves for the cause! Jimmy, likewise, would like Jews to die in order to give Palestinians freedom of movement within Israel–the freedom to come there and slaughter Jews with impunity.

I haven’t read Carter’s book, but according to this review in the Washington Post, he managed to write the entire thing–which focuses on the topic of the wall–without once conceding that it was built to prevent the murder of Jews.

Astounding. But not surprising.

[NOTE: on the topic of the inflammatory title of Carter’s book, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid, read Michael Kinsley in Slate.]

New podcast: Iran + Annan

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The Sanity Squad is back opining at Pajamas Media. The topics? Iran’s “scientific” [sic] Holocaust Denial Conference, and the legacy of Kofi Annan, whose term as UN Secretary-General is up at the end of the month.

So go to PJ and listen to me, Dr. Sanity, Shrinkwrapped, and Siggy. Those with sharp ears will notice the lingering effects of my rather nasty cold; my voice sounds pretty nasal. I stoically kept myself from coughing up a storm during the podcast: the show must go on!

The definition of “success” in war: Part II (colonialism and occupation)

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[Part I can be found here.]

Shelby Steele, a supporter of the war in Iraq, discusses the semantic and conceptual problem we face when we have no clear definition of victory:

Without a description of victory, a war has no goal.

Historically victory in foreign war has always meant hegemony: You win, you take over. We not only occupied Germany and Japan militarily after World War II, we also–and without a whit of self doubt–imposed our democratic way of life on them. We took our victory as a moral mandate as well as a military achievement, and felt commanded to morally transform these defeated societies by the terms of our democracy. In this effort we brooked no resistance whatsoever and we achieved great success.

But today, as Nancy Pelosi recently put it, “You can define victory any way you want.” And war, she said, was only “a situation to be resolved.” If this sort of glibness makes the current war seem a directionless postmodern adventure, it is only because those who call us to war have themselves left the definition of victory wide open.

Steele thinks–and I agree–that it’s not just the Iraq War that’s lacked a definition of victory. As Richard Fernandez writes at his blog Belmont Club, we seem to have a problem with the general concept of a war–except for limited, targeted “operations” such as the first Gulf War.

Any proposed solution to the current conflict with Islamic totalitarianism that fails to take into account its worldwide scope, relentless nature, and willingness to fight very dirty, is going to be a half-baked effort. In order to mount a “successful” campaign with an effective plan, we not only need creativity and intelligence, we need commitment, focus, and an understanding that this will be a long hard fight.

In the beginning of the so-called “War on Terror,” Bush’s rhetoric did indicate a long, hard fight. But I don’t think he prepared the American people for what the Iraq War would entail. Whether this was because he was afraid they wouldn’t go along if he described it, or whether he himself (and his advisors) were unaware of how very long and difficult it would be, I don’t know. Probably it was some combination of the two; not a good thing.

But at this point we know it will be very long and very hard. I’m pretty sure Bush and all his advisors know that by now, as well. An asymmetrical war against those who will use terror not only with relative impunity but with joy, who believe themselves divinely inspired, and who number in the millions and are spread throughout the world, and who have an interest in foiling us in Iraq–by definition, that’s going to be a long hard slog.

But besides the inherent difficulties in defining “success” against a shadowy, non-state entity, Steele thinks Americans have other difficulties in understanding–or, perhaps, accepting would be a better word–what victory in Iraq would look like. Steele thinks the problem stems from our modern-day ambivalence over our superpower status, which makes us want (in this postmodern, anticolonial world) to deny the responsibilities that go with it–duties that hark back to that dread word, imperialism.

Steele thinks that reluctance to accept responsibility is the reason we lack the will to impose the sort of occupation I discussed here. At the end of WWII, America had virtually no such guilt about the occupation of Japan and Germany. This ambivalence/guilt is mainly a post-WWII (and, specifically, post-60s and post-Vietnam) phenomenon.

Steele doesn’t mention any psychological reasons for this rejection of responsibility (although, for the boomer generation, I would posit them), but rather, philosophical ones:

Today our antiwar movement is essentially an argument with this fate, a rejection of superpower responsibility.

And this fear of responsibility is what makes us ambivalent toward the idea of victory. Because victory is hegemonic, it mimics colonialism. A complete American victory in Iraq would put that nation–at least for a time–entirely under American power and sovereignty. We would in fact “own” the society as a colony.

He is correct; an occupation does mimic colonialism. But, although related, it isn’t quite the same. We did not “own” post-WWII Japan or West Germany as traditional colonies, for example, although we did exercise a great deal of control over them and took responsibility for them.

Traditionally, colonies existed not only as spoils of war, nor as objects of occupation for reforming their governments into functioning democracies protective of human rights and therefore unlikely to aggressively threaten us again (the motives for our occupations of Japan and Germany), nor even as ways to expand a certain culture and way of life (although they were often that, too). Colonies were also ordinarily taken over in order to exploit their natural resources to the good of the imperialist power: in other words, to plunder.

This accusation of motivations of plunder–of an “unjust” motive for the Iraq War–has been at the heart of the belief system (or at least the rhetoric, sincere or not) of the antiwar movement. It’s at the base of the “no blood for oil” cries, for example.

To those making the charges, there’s no real need to prove we actually are exploiting or appropriating the oil; the accusation stands as symbolic of what colonial powers always do. If the accuser accepts that the US is an imperialist colonialist power, then ipso facto our motivation must be this sort of economic exploitation, which would be both morally wrong and a throwback to the age of colonialism and subjugation of the third world for our (historically, more often Europe’s) own purposes.

The causes of the Iraq War have been disputed, and for many they are a confusing and troubling aspect of the war itself. In contrast to Afghanistan, which was known to harbor al Qaeda and therefore was directly implicated in the 9/11 attack on the US, the stated rationales for going to war with Iraq were legalistic, defensive, and moral.

The legalistic and defensive reasons for the war were Iraq’s multiple violations of the terms that ended the Gulf War, including Saddam’s spotty “cooperation” with weapons inspections. And these reasons were, in turn, part a defense of–of all things–the power of the UN to put teeth into its resolutions.

As such, the current war was actually a continuation of the 1991 Gulf War after a more than decades-long pause. The UN resolutions that were violated included ones concerning WMDs, part of the armistice for that Gulf War, as well. Saddam’s noncompliance had been winked at many times, but in light of 9/11 it was considered far more important than before to make sure Saddam did not have nuclear weapons that he could put into the hands of terrorists or use on his neighbors. This was the directly self-defensive part of the rationale for the war (and, by the way, Bush’s speech on the subject said that we did not have to wait till this threat was “imminent” in order to act).

Then, of course, there were the stated humanitarian goals of the war. We wanted to liberate the people of Iraq from an oppressor, Saddam. This was not the only reason to go to war, of course, but it was definitely part of it. And even this part got us into trouble–paradoxically, because it’s the most morally “pure” part of our motivation. One way it got us into trouble was that–to those who think the US is an evil imperialist power–it was considered just a screen for the “real,” selfish motivation for the war: colonialism. Another reason is that with the toppling of Saddam went the responsibility for establishing a functioning government in a country that had been ruled by tyranny and terror for many decades. It was predictable that there would be a jockeying for power among factions, and that it wouldn’t be pretty, and that the occupation would require a firm hand and would take a long time, although I don’t recall this ever being explicitly stated prior to the war. I believe it should have been emphasized.

To have been emphasized, of course, it would have to have been acknowledged and known. I’m not sure that was the case; if it was not, that would have been a huge failing on the part of the planners of this war.

Transforming Iraq into a nonchaotic state has proven very difficult. But in my opinion, one of the reasons it’s been so very hard is that we were ambivalent in our dedication to that goal from the start. We tried to implement it with half-measures that smacked of PC correctness–the best example being the hands-off policy towards al Sadr when his support was still relatively small.

Without an acceptance of the fact that we are an occupation force in Iraq, and all that entails, there’s no way the country can be prevented from sliding into chaos, or from falling under the domination of neighbors who are up to no good. That knowledge, I believe, is what’s behind the current calls to increase the number of our forces there, if only temporarily. Because, make no mistake about it: if we’re reluctant to “occupy” because of the resemblance of occupation to colonialism, our enemies entertain no such moral quandaries.

As with the USSR during the Cold War, Iran would like expand its power and influence in the region. But Iran is only one of the faces of our enemy. There are others (al Qaeda, or Syria, for example). They resemble each other in ignoring the niceties we pay so much attention to. For the most part, they couldn’t care less about human rights–or human life, for that matter. And of course, being third-world countries, they are somehow exempt from those nefarious charges of colonialism and imperialism–even though they nakedly and boldly lust for those things (and in some cases, already practice them) themselves.

So, what would victory in the “War on Terror” (better phrase: the war against Islamic totalitarianism) look like? Would we at least know it if we saw it? Would it be a decrease in the number of terrorist attacks, or just in our perception of their likelihood? That would certainly be part of such a victory.

Would it have to include a relatively well-functioning and prosperous Middle East? Try as I might, it’s hard to see how the first goal (decrease in the risk of terrorist attacks on us) could be effected without the second, because the hatred and jihadism in that part of the world is fueled by its dysfunctional governments and societies, which are legion. In the modern world, we cannot effectively wall ourselves off from this threat; we must do something about its wellsprings.

That was the real basis for the “moral” argument for starting the Iraq War. Those who were against that war and who argued that, since there were so many other tyrants in the world, why not depose them as well if we were going to go after Saddam, were trying to make the point that there was some self-interest behind our altruistic words about tyrants. And indeed, there was.

But that doesn’t invalidate them. Sometimes things are both morally right and in our best interests. And both things are true of reforming the Middle East.

But what a task! How much of this could–or should–be under our control? And how best to go about it (that’s what the arguments regarding Iran are all about: talks, vs. clandestine operations to support anti-government groups, vs. military action, limited or otherwise)?

Even if reform of the area is something we could effect, at least theoretically, how much are we willing to spend in money, time, and blood, to achieve it? We’ve never answered these questions, but the answers depend in good part on how high we evaluate the risk of doing nothing.

We need a government that is not afraid to use the “s” word–success–and is willing to define it, and able to describe to the American people just what it will take to achieve it.

The definition of “success” in war: Part I

The New Neo Posted on by

The ISG report has branded our efforts in Iraq “grave,” “deteriorating,” and “not working.”

The American people aren’t too happy with the situation, either. Results of recent polls indicate:

Just 9 per cent expect the war to end in clear-cut victory, compared with 87 per cent who expect some sort of compromise settlement…

But what would “clear-cut victory” actually look like in the case of Iraq (or Iran, or Syria, or any number of other places, for that matter)? Do we know? To achieve “victory,” is it necessary to have a country completely at peace, with guarantees of civil rights for all and a smoothly functioning democratic process?

Well, that would be victory, all right. But is anything short of that failure? Probably not. But, if not, where do we draw the line between the two? After all, a nation running as smoothly as that was always a highly unrealistic short-term goal for Iraq–and by “short-term” I mean anything less than a few decades, or even longer.

So, how should we define a realistic and relatively short-term (a couple of years) victory in Iraq? Although it’s difficult to do so, it seems necessary in order to know whether we ever achieve it, or even come close to it.

Our early definition of victory in Iraq was simple, but very incomplete: deposing Saddam. That was done with relative ease, but had we left at that point the country would have devolved into chaos. Leaving prematurely is a big problem; in fact, the current Iraq War can be seen as an attempt to deal with the situation left by the very unfinished business of the first Gulf War, in which “success” was too narrowly defined.

Commenter Ymarsakar had this to say recently on the subject of success in this war versus previous, more traditional, ones:

The thing you have to remember about WWII…is that people could know whether victory or defeat was close by, by casualty lists and whether a battle was won or lost, territory gained or won. In a guerrila war as with Iraq, that doesn’t seem very clear. I mean, the US won all the battles so far, and yet we have violence every day, but we control all the territory, but and but and but. The human mind is not wired for this kind of fight and flight, fight then flight then fight then flight then fight schism. Because it pulls you from one way to the other, and eventually you will shred.

One part of your mind says you are winning. No attacks, US soldiers winning battles, etc. Other side of your brain sees you are losing, loss of support, violence, more violence, American deaths, demoralizing stories, etc.

I’ve mentioned this before of course, but the agony of defeat in WWII or even the threat of it, actually galvanized morale and support. You don’t have that now, because America itself is not being attacked and the world doesn’t “look” like the terroists are gaining ground…

I think you know that the loss of the Pacific Fleet left the entire Western seaboard of America open to Japanese invasion. It was a palpable sense of dread and DEFEAT, the idea that you could lose. You NEED that for resolve. In Iraq, the idea that we will lose, is not there, but the idea that we “aren’t winning” is there. So it creates friction.

One of President Bush’s major communication failures was on the subject of what success would look like in this particular war. Some say it should have been limited to toppling Saddam, although that would have left the country in chaos. The traditional realpolitik solution would have been to have backed another strong man as replacement–a dictator, but “our” dictator–and hope for the best (the Shah of Iran was an example of this approach in the past).

Our venture in Iraq had a more lofty ultimate, long-term goal (although the amount of time and effort necessary to achieve that goal was poorly defined): to help the Iraqis towards a functioning democracy rather than a dictatorship, somewhat resembling the occupation of Japan and West Germany and the establishment of democracies there after WWII (and yes, the differences between Iraq and the those countries, as well as the perception of defeat by the populations involved, are profound) . Whether or not that goal could have been achieved with a more forceful and committed occupation in Iraq (see this for a discussion), or could still be achieved, there’s no doubt that it has not been achieved at this point in time.

But Victor Davis Hanson points to the fact that the jihadis don’t seem to think they’ve achieved success yet, either:

We forget that the jihadist websites are still worried about Iraq, both the losses suffered there, and the emergence of a democratic government. We think we are not winning, but so do they think they aren’t either.

Recently President Bush was careful to refer to the “pace of success” in Iraq as being too slow, rather than mentioning the “F” word, failure. He said:

You want frankness? I thought we would succeed quicker than we did. And I am disappointed by the pace of success.

Semantics, right? Not entirely. How something is framed does indeed affect our view of it.

There are many, of course, who would consider that comment of Bush’s ludicrous: to them, it’s obvious that our venture in Iraq is a failure already, and to speak of a slowed “pace of success” is merely Orwellian gobbledygook meant to keep us in a losing endeavor, spilling more blood and treasure just to protect Bush’s pride.

There are others (and I am among them) who consider that failure (and premature withdrawal) in Iraq would not only be a tragedy for the Iraqi people and for the world, but would not even accomplish the goals its proponents think it will. This enemy and this fight cannot be avoided, and failure in Iraq (however it’s defined) will only set up the next, and greater conflict.

The question of “will” in this war is one I’ve tackled before (here, for example). Part of will is to consider that failure is not an option, and to do whatever needs to be done to make sure it does not occur. But without defining either, we are at sea, especially in the sort of murky situation presented by asymmetrical wars.

In World War II the goals were so obvious there was no real need to define victory: unconditional surrender of the enemy, nothing less. In Vietnam things became more foggy, and part of the shock of the Pentagon Papers was that the goals the American people had assumed were those of our war effort there were revealed to have not been taken all that seriously by the Pentagon. Post-Vietnam, goals have not only been poorly articulated, but in the current conflict they are inherently difficult to define–this enemy will never formally surrender.

[Part II, planned for tomorrow, will be an attempt to explain why victory has been especially difficult to define and to pursue in this particular war.]

[ADDENDUM: Shrinkwrapped on a related theme.]

[ADDENDuM II: Here’s another example of the use of semantics in war.]

The ISG and the USIP: who are these people and why are they saying all these things?

The New Neo Posted on by

In her latest vlog, the inimitable Pamela of Atlas Shrugs asks the following pertinent question about ISG head James Baker, “Who died and made him king?”

Well, I think I can offer a stab at an answer. Who died? The Republican Party in the 2006 election (I know, I know, they didn’t die. But they did receive a blow). Who made Baker king? The MSM.

My guess is that had the Republicans won the 2006 elections, we wouldn’t have heard much about the ISG recommendations, which have been hyped to the nth degree by the media only since those elections.

The ISG was appointed back in March. Here is its history. It was formed at the suggestion of Congressman Frank Wolf as a bipartisan panel to look at the situation in Iraq with fresh eyes. The panel was affiliated with an entity called the United States Institute of Peace:

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, national institution established and funded by Congress. Its mission is to help:

* Prevent and resolve violent international conflicts
* Promote post-conflict stability and democratic transformations
* Increase peacebuilding capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide

In other words, from the start, the ISG was under the aegis of a group dedicated to finding diplomatic solutions rather than to make military suggestions (except, perhaps, in the area of using armed forces as peacekeepers). The USIP was a “facilitating organization” to the Group, meaning:

As facilitator, USIP maintains an in-house Iraq expert committee that supports the ISG principals in their work. USIP has assisted the group and its members by convening expert working groups, writing briefing papers, providing analysis and coordinating meetings of the ISG.

The two heads of the ISG, Baker and Hamilton, were chosen by:

mutual agreement among the Congressional organizers, USIP, and the other supporting organizations. After being named co-chairs, Baker and Hamilton selected the remaining group members in consultation with USIP and the other supporting organizations.

So it was Congress and the USIP who appointed the heads of the ISG, who then appointed everyone else, with the USIP heavily involved. And once you read the goals of the USIP, it becomes crystal clear why the rather deranged suggestion to talk to Iran and Syria, and to resolve the Palestinian/Israeli situation through revival of the DOA “peace process” there, are part and parcel of the ISG recommendations.

I’m sure the USIP is composed of a bunch of nice people dedicated to the pursuit of peace, a laudable cause. And I would imagine that somewhere, somehow, in the right circumstances, they do some fine work–perhaps, for example, in rebuilding places where the fighting parties are exhausted and wanting reconciliation (some of the nations of Africa, for example). Here are more of the USIP’s activities:

* Providing on-the-ground operational support in zones of conflict, most recently in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Colombia, Indonesia, Iraq, the Palestinian Territories, Liberia, Nigeria, Philippines, Rwanda, and Sudan. Specific work performed by Institute staff and grantees includes:
o Building leadership capacity through training and workshops
o Facilitating dialogue among parties in conflict
o Identifying and disseminating best practices in conflict management
o Sponsoring leadership summits and strategic conferences
o Promoting the rule of law
o Developing educational and teacher training materials
o Helping build civil society institutions
o Sponsoring a wide range of countrywide working groups (e.g., Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq, Korea, Sudan)
o Educating the public through informative events, documentary films, radio programs, and an array of other outreach activities

Despite the heavy hand of the USIP and their bias for the talking cure (and I’m not referring to psychotherapy), the ISG still might have been a more worthwhile and balanced endeavor had its members consisted of people with a great deal of expertise on the subject of Iraq, foreign affairs, and military matters.

Who are the members of the ISG? Most articles focus on Baker and Hamilton, the heads, but there are ten members. There are five Democrats and five Republicans, no surprise, since the panel was meant to be bipartisan. Let’s take a brief look:

(1) James A. Baker, age 76, Republican, Secretary of State under the first Bush

(2) Lee Hamilton, age 75, Democrat, vice-chair of 9/11 Commission, ex-Representative from Indiana with experience on foreign affairs and intelligence committees

(3) Lawrence Eagleburger, age 76, Republican, Secretary of State under the first Bush

(4) Vernon Jordan, age 71, Democrat, businessman, civil rights lawyer and advisor/buddy to Clinton

(5) Edwin Meese III, age 75, Republican, Attorney General under Reagan (controversial involvement in Iran-Contra)

(6) Sandra Day O’Connor, age 76, Republican, lawyer and Supreme Court Justice

(7) Leon Panetta, age 68, Democrat, Congressman (budget, civil rights, health, and environmental issues), Clinton’s Chief of Staff

(8) William Perry, age 79, Democrat, Secretary of Defense under Clinton

(9) Chuck Robb, age 67, Democrat, former Marine, ex-governor of Virginia, Senator, Chair of Iraq Intelligence Commission (only member of ISG to venture outside “green zone” in trip to Iraq)

(10) Allen K. Simpson, age 75, Republican, Senator, chair of Veterans’ Affairs Committee

One thing that leaps out–and which others have commented on–is that as a whole it’s a rather geriatric bunch. This certainly doesn’t invalidate the opinions of the members, but it leads us to a presumption that they’re not exactly cutting edge. Foreign affairs are represented, in the sense of the State Department (to be extremely specific, the State Department under the first President Bush): Baker and Eagleburger were both Secretary of State under Bush I. Hamilton has relevant Congressional experience; Perry is the only person with a Defense background (under Clinton, under whom he oversaw the post-Cold War reduction of the armed forces), and Robb has both military and intelligence experience.

But fully five of the Group’s members (that’s half) have little or in most cases no experience at all–not just of Iraq or military matters, but of foreign affairs in general. To me, this is astounding.

Baker and Hamilton picked the members of the group. I don’t know whether these were their first picks or not, or how much oversight there was, and if so, by whom. At the time the selection was made, I doubt they realized what scrutiny the results would come under, due to the election.

But these picks are beyond my understanding. If you follow the links and read the biographies, you’ll see that Jordan, O’Connor, Meese, Panetta, and probably Simpson (who seems to have a bit of experience with veteran affairs, which is probably not all that relevant to policy in Iraq) have no experience whatsoever in the relevant fields. None. Period.

This is truly hard to fathom. I understand bipartisanship. I understand that these aren’t stupid people; they are all intelligent and accomplished, in their own ways. But so are many of us, and we’re not on the ISG.

Surely these are not the most qualified people for this particular task. Surely they are not even close. Surely many of them are not qualified at all. And surely the influence of the USIP skewed the results, especially when dealing with minds that may have been somewhat of a tabula rasa on the topic.

[ADDENDUM: Shrinkwrapped diagnoses the ISG.]

Who said Senators aren’t diplomats? More talking about talking with Iran

The New Neo Posted on by

On the topic of James Baker and Lee Hamilton’s suggestion that we talk to Iran and Syria about helping us out in Iraq, I’d say a person would have to be either abysmally stupid, mindbogglingly ignorant, or stark raving mad (or perhaps some combination of all three) to think it might be a good idea. And that’s the polite version of what I think.

Victor Davis Hanson calls such a suggestion “surreal.” I’m with him, as well.

But Senators–ah, Senators!–are much more refined in questioning whether the ISG’s suggestion to turn to Iran for help in Iraq is really the wisest possible course. For example, ISG head James Baker and member Lee Hamilton were quizzed Thursday by Joe Lieberman thusly:

I’m skeptical that it’s realistic to think that Iran wants to help the United States succeed in Iraq. They are, after all, supporting (the Islamist militant group) Hezbollah, which gathers people in the square in Beirut to shout “Death to America.”

Not to mention that’s this is not a recent occurrence: for thirty-five years Iran has been actively working and praying (loudly) for our destruction. Color me “skeptical” about whether the proposal is “realistic,” as well.

John McCain’s statement on the topic was a bit more to my liking:

I don’t believe that a peace conference with people who are dedicated to your extinction has much short-term gain.

Or long term gain, I might add.

But here’s Baker on the subject:

What do we lose by saying, “we’re getting all of Iraq’s neighbors together, we want you to come, and if they say no, we show the world what they’re all about?”

That actually is an interesting question that seems reasonable on the face of it. I’ll take a stab at an answer: the world already knows exactly what Iran’s about, and the world doesn’t much care, as long as Iran’s not directly affecting them at this moment in any dramatic way. The world is relying on the US to do something about Iran, when/if it should ever become necessary, because “the world” never will. And then, when/if the US ever does act against Iran, “the world” can criticize whatever that action might be. If “the world” doesn’t have enough information about Iran’s goals and nature by now, then “the world” is willfully ignoring the truth, and has motivations to continue to do so.

What’s more, making obeisance to Iran by asking them for “help” (the way such talks have been framed) makes us look both foolish and weak. It’s not a winning combination to convey. If I were one of the mullahs, I’d be flabbergasted at the amount of foolish naivete such an act indicated–flabbergasted and pleased.

I’ve always thought it’s usually not good to communicate desperation to one’s enemies. But maybe that’s just me.

One more thing: many of Iran’s people would like to overthrow their government. They look to the US for a sign that we would support them in such an endeavor. I would wager, from what they’re seeing of our current behavior re Iraq, they’re not getting a lot of assurance that we’d be there for them when the chips are down. But talking with Iran would be just as bad as the message of our possibly abandoning Iraq; it would tell the people who would like to topple the mullahs that we are dangerously out of touch with reality, and willing to bargain with our enemies and sell out our principles in order to do so.

[CORRECTION: Iran, of course, has been working for our destruction since 1979: twenty-seven years, not thirty-five.]

What’s a blog for if not to garner sympathy?

The New Neo Posted on by

I’m going to complain. I promise it will be short.

It’s freezing, abominably windy, snow on the ground, night will fall in what seems like just a few minutes. And I have a cold.

But at least the power isn’t out. Yet. That happens here whenever the wind blows. Something about the number, size, and location of the trees.

Besides being a naked plea for sympathy, this thread is an occasion for you all to either complain about your similar situation (in which case, my condolences), or crow about your wonderful weather.