Negotiations and that big stick

The New Neo Posted on by

The commenter known as “unknown blogger” wrote in the previous thread:

“Impotent.” “Weak.” “They must have cut a deal.” [quoting those who criticize the Blair government’s public handling of the affair].

Tsk, tsk. Such a tremendous amount of disappointment around here that this thing was resolved without the typical neo-con diplomatic skill set, namely tough posturing and threats of attack.

Unknown blogger or UB—generally a worthy opponent, by the way, and often the impetus for provocative and informative discussions—is making some fundamental errors here, I believe.

Perhaps UB is correct about a small subset of people; I wouldn’t doubt it. But I think he (unknown? are you a “he?”) demonstrates a misunderstanding of much of the criticism of Blair and the British Navy, as well as a mischaracterization of the neocon mindset and the process of diplomatic negotiations itself.

Much of the anger on the right wasn’t just about the negotiations, but rather the fact that the sailors were left unprotected and vulnerable to this sort of abduction in the first place. After all, it’s not as though the possibility hadn’t been rehearsed through a similar (although somewhat less serious) incident in 2004. It’s not as though there weren’t recent warnings that more of the same might be forthcoming. The “impotence” and “weakness” refers at least in part to the fact that these sailors were left defenseless, showing a lack of preparedness on the part of the British government and the Navy.

For sailors to avoid being sitting ducks it’s not actually necessary for them to fire a shot. It’s just necessary that the Iranians—or whomever the potential enemy might be—need to know that they are able to, and that the rules of engagement allow them to. It’s somewhat analogous to having an effective burglar alarm or bodyguard—it’s not that it makes an attack impossible, but it does make it less likely, because of the perpetrator’s knowledge of the strong possibility of serious and immediate consequences.

So, part of the outrage—and one I share, by the way—is that the hands of the Navy had been tied so tightly by restrictive rules of engagement that they were easily able to be exploited for whatever purpose the Iranians had in mind.

That brings us to the next point. What purpose did the Iranians have in mind? I’m no mind reader, but it’s clear that this incident played out on several levels at once. First, there was the sailors and their fate, and the already-mentioned way they were allowed to be vulnerable to seizure. Next, there was the public posturing, both for the Western public and leaders, and for the locals and the rest of the Arab and Muslm world. And third, there were the hidden goings-on about which we can only speculate, and which may represent a great deal more of the tale than we know.

The first level is the one on which we can pretty much all agree: it is a wonderful thing to see the hostages return. But my position is that, unless the rules of engagement are changed significantly and those changes are communicated in some way to the Iranians (either publicly or privately), then the Brits run the risk of future incidents of this type or of related ones, in which the sensitivity with which troops are forced to operate is used against them for propaganda value.

Which leads us to the second level, that of propaganda. As I’ve written before, this is a winning situation for the Iranians, both for internal consumption and external. They are made to look first strong and then magnanimous, and the Brits are made to look weak and impotent (yes, UB, just as the others have said). In the end, the incident itself is made to look as though talk has triumphed and won the day. See, folks? All we have to do is be nice to one another and it’ll all work out; no need to listen to anyone who says otherwise.

Which brings us to the third level: what may have gone on behind the scenes. I don’t pretend to be privy to that one, either, but one thing of which I’m virtually sure is that there was a behind-the-scenes. And in this case I’d wager it was where the real back-and-forth that led to the release lay.

It is a valid question—actually, a vital one, although unanswerable at this point—to ask whether the backstory involved a deal, a threat, or both. Because if it was a deal rather than a threat, than the Iranians have learned something else about the West, and that is that kidnapping and blackmail and other such techniques work, at least with the Blair government. This is information they will store away for the future, of that you can be sure.

There’s another way in which behind-the-scenes maneuvering may play out to the Iranians’ advantage, and that is on the propaganda level. If, for example, a threat was involved, but it was not heard by the world, then the Iranians still get to look brave and the West craven.

Make no mistake about it, such a perception would be worth a great deal to the Iranians, even if it’s a mistaken one on the part of the world.

Another related perception that comes from the hidden nature of whatever negotiations and/or threats went on is the perception that, as UB himself has stated:

…this thing was resolved without the typical neo-con diplomatic skill set [sic], namely tough posturing and threats of attack.

Whether or not this is actually the case, the perception is that it was. If UB had revised his sentence to take out the phrase “neocon diplomatic skill set” (I’ll get to that point in a minute), and added the word “public” before the phrase “tough posturing and threats of attack,” then I would agree with his description of how it was indeed resolved.

Because the truth is—and UB himself, as an intelligent person, must know this—we only get to see what goes on in public. None of us has any idea what sort of threats may have gone on in private, but from my experience of negotiations and bargaining, it seems only logical that there were some.

That brings us to my last point, UB’s characterization of the “typical neocon skill set.” I’ve written many times before on this blog about similar mischaracterizations of neocon thought; if interested, just go to the right sidebar and read some of my posts under the “neocons” category. And that’s just a sample.

So for now I’ll just say that neocons aren’t interested in threats per se. They are interested in furthering the spread of liberal democracy (funny word that “liberal,” isn’t it?) around the world, and in doing so by peaceful means if possible. There is no neocon rulebook on hostage negotiations, except that they be done with an eye to the messages they convey to the world at large, and that communicating weakness is not a good thing.

Perhaps UB is confusing neocons with Jacksonians, definitely not the same animal, although there can be some overlap. Jacksonians want action rather than words. They probably would have handled the hostage crisis by making sure the sailors weren’t left in such a vulnerable position by extraordinarily restrictive rules of engagement. Once the crisis had begun, however, Jacksonians would probably have advocated less talk (including threats) and more action—for example, a rescue attempt, or even a bombing raid.

Understand that diplomacy has many levels, and only one of them—the blandest, blankest, and most incomplete—is its public face. Threats are definitely a necessary part of diplomacy (except among friendly countries); in the famous words of Teddy Roosevelt: walk softly and carry a big stick.

Part of the size and heft of that stick is the perception that one might just use it if pressed, and that it’s in the enemy’s best interests to make sure it doesn’t come to that.

The British hostages: catch and release

The New Neo Posted on by

[NOTE: I’ve got an exceptionally busy day today, and so this will be briefer than usual, despite the importance of the news.]

The British hostages have been freed (or are in the process of being freed) by Iran.

This is excellent news in human terms. In political terms, it depends on what cost—if any—was paid for their freedom. In other words, was it the result of a deal or a threat?

Or, alternatively, was it the result of Ahmadinejad simply pardoning them out of “humanitarian considerations,” as he’s quoted as saying in the above article [/sarcasm].

In propaganda terms, the Iranians may have gotten everything they wanted—the humiliation of Britain, the British Navy, and the sailors—and have no reason to continue to hold them further if there’s any chance the ante will be upped.

In strategic terms, they may have learned what they wanted to find out: that they could get away with this and more, without real consequences.

Or perhaps they learned nothing of the sort. I’ve been hoping that all sorts of things were going on beneath the radar of which we knew nothing, and that the public face we were shown was only the tip of a much more formidable iceberg on the part of Britain and the West. Perhaps the iceberg also included a bit of “persuasion” from Iran’s Arab “friends” Syria and Qatar. Iran may be a little bit too much of a loose cannon, and getting a bit too big for its britches (pardon the mixed metaphor), for their liking,

I have a deep respect for the mullahs’ knowledge of how propaganda works, and to my way of thinking they won this particular PR skirmish, big time. I hope they lose the war.

Sanity Squad podcast: the theater of negotiations

The New Neo Posted on by

The Sanity Squad has another podcast up at Pajamas, this time on the topic of negotiating from strength. Join Siggy, Shrink, Dr. Sanity, and me for a discussion of the perplexing decline of the Western spine.

[Lyricist extraordinaire Dr. Sanity, by the way, has kindly taken me up on a parody based on an earworm that was squirming around my brain—or wherever it is that earworms squirm.]

How to talk to the enemy: first, understand it’s an enemy

The New Neo Posted on by

I’ve been perplexed by the weak reaction of so many officials in Britain to the ongoing hostage crisis.

Whoops! I used the “h” word. Apparently that’s a no-no; this Time article reports that President Bush was criticized roundly by John Williams, former Director of News for the British Foreign Service, for using the word “hostage” to refer to the—uh, hostages—during a press conference.

Williams prefers that the captured sailors be called “victims of a misunderstanding that could be resolved.” How nice. This was the way a far more minor incident occurring under his watch in 2004 was treated, and the hostages were released within days.

Williams shows a fundamental lack of comprehension of some basic differences between the two incidents. For starters, in the earlier one, the sailors actually had wandered accidentally into Iranian waters, and they were seized through what appears to have been the overreaction of a local Iranian commander. In the current crisis, however, there’s every reason to believe the incident was planned at the top. In addition, the situation between Iran and the world was quite different in 2004; the general conflict has escalated significantly since then, with sanctions looming for Iran’s nuclear program. Therefore the context for the seizure has changed, and one can assume the Iranians’ motivations and game plan have changed accordingly.

I can’t find a biography of Williams online, but my guess is that, as Director of News, he may have a background in journalism, and believes mightily in the power of words. Now, as a writer myself, I try to use my words carefully. But in a situation such as this it is laughable to think that it would make any positive difference to the fate of the hostages if we call them “unfortunate victims.”

Williams is not alone, however; his attitude has become more and more prevalent. And it is very dangerous when dealing with tyrants such as the ones who run Iran, who don’t respect it and consider it a softness to be exploited, symptomatic of the decline of the backbone of the West. Among other things, this hostage crisis is a form of theater staged to demonstrate Iran’s strength and Britain’s weaknesses to a Muslim culture that operates from an honor/shame perspective.

In my training as a marriage and family therapist, one technique I learned is what is known as the “reframe.” This is a way of using words to soften the harsh judgments family members might make about each other or themselves. Reframes can sometimes help lead to solutions by damping down the antagonisms among family members and help them see things in a different and more hopeful light.

But this presupposes some sort of basic goodwill and rapport that quite simply does not exist in the current situation. And members of families who come to therapy are actually coming to get help, and are usually predisposed to listen to the therapist’s suggestions with at least a modicum of respect and cooperation.

Iran and Britain are engaged in a power struggle, not a family squabble, and they are each operating from extremely different premises about human nature. “Come, let us reason together,” is not the mullahs’ motto, I’m afraid, although much of the Western world wishes it were so.

I wish it were so, also—it would make the prospects for humanity so much rosier. But wishes are not reality, and confusing the two is not a good thing either for individuals such as Williams or for nations such as Britain.

[COMING SOON: rules for negotiating from strength.]

Hillary needs to brush up on her Constitution

The New Neo Posted on by

Candidate Clinton seems to think a President ought not to exercise the veto power given the holder of the office by the Constitution. Today she criticized Bush for suggesting he would veto a troop withdrawal bill. That, said Hillary, would be “vetoing the will of the American people.”

A little civics lesson here for Hillary. This country is not and never has been a pure democracy, but rather a republic. That’s actually what our representatives in Congress (of which she is one) are all about. And the Constitution expressly gives the President the power to override the will of up to two-thirds of Congress, those representatives of the American people.

But of course Hillary knows that; I doubt she counseled Bill similarly when he threatened to veto legislation. Let’s see: President Clinton vetoed seventeen bills in his first term and twenty in his second, not to mention a fairly liberal (pardon the word) use of the line item veto, which he exercised freely during its short venue as a constitutionally allowed course of action.

Were Hillary to be elected to the Presidency in 2008 I somehow doubt she’d be so very respectful of the will of the people, were it to differ with the will of Hillary.

Scientists and the long and winding road of research: Star Wars and Arrow

The New Neo Posted on by

An article entitled “”Arrow can now fully protect against Iran” describes how Israel seems to have developed a promising anti-missile defense system.

Sounds good to me—if in fact it’s true. It may just be psych-ops bluster, of course, a way to say to Iran, “Don’t even think about developing nuclear weapons, because your efforts will be an expensive waste.”

The Arrow system may not be quite as good as the article indicates. Or, it may be exactly that good.

It takes me back to the time when Ronald Reagan was laughed at for proposing what critics referred to as “Star Wars,” a sort pie-in-the-sky (almost literally) dream of intercepting Russia’s missile system and ending the MADness of Mutually Assured Destruction. Reagan’s SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) was the much-mocked prototype of a system that, with many changes, is showing much promise for the US.

Why was it treated with such derision by most when first proposed? Part of that reaction was a subset of the mockery that greeted Reagan in general from liberals and the Left: he was stupid, ignorant, and simplistic, as opposed to their sophistication. They knew better; such a thing would never work.

But it also is probably true that many didn’t want it to work. And by making that statement I’m not accusing them of wanting America to be destroyed or Russia to win the Cold War (at least, not most of them). No, I think one reason they didn’t welcome the development of an effective way of defending against incoming missiles was fear that, if the technique were ever to be perfected, it might give our military license to launch an attack with impunity.

MAD made it difficult to even conceive of actually going ahead with the launch of an atomic weapon. The fear was that Star Wars would make the inconceivable doable—and even, perhaps, tempting. And, if the intercept system wasn’t as effective as it was claimed to be, the sense of protection it would have engendered would be a false one.

No; much better to let each nation believe there was no remedy, and that the first such launch would be the end of both nations.

Whatever the merits or lack thereof of that line of thinking, at any rate it is now officially obsolete. Although Russia is far from our friend, it’s not the relatively rational Russians or their vast arsenal of conventional nuclear weaponry with whom we are now dealing. It is the much less deterrable mullahs of Iran, or the rogue state North Korea, or a host of terrorist cells around the globe, eager to get their hands on the nuclear goods and cause a commotion.

One thing seems clear if one looks at the history of the objections to Star Wars, and that is that scientists are far from apolitical beasts. The well-known physicists Edward Teller and Hans Bethe squared off at the time on this issue as they had on so many others, in an old rivalry between the two. Bethe’s strange history was of doubting and/or opposing every single advance in atomic weaponry, even as he worked on many of them:

Bethe had been skeptical about the possibility of making a nuclear weapon from uranium (in fact, in the late 1930s, he had written a theoretical paper that argued against fission)……After the war, Bethe argued that a crash project for the hydrogen bomb should not be attempted, though after President Truman announced the beginning of such a crash project, and the outbreak of the Korean War, Bethe signed up and played a key role in the weapon’s development. Though he would see the project through to its end, in Bethe’s account he personally hoped that it would be impossible to create the hydrogen bomb.

Bethe doubted and opposed Star Wars as well in the 1980s, on practical and philosophical grounds:

Physicist Hans Bethe, who worked with Teller on both the atom bomb and the hydrogen bomb, both at Los Alamos, claimed a laser defense shield was unfeasible. He said that a defensive system was costly and difficult to build, but simple to destroy, and claimed that the Soviets could easily use thousands of decoys to overwhelm it during a nuclear attack. He believed that the only way to stop the threat of nuclear war was through diplomacy and dismissed the idea of a technical solution to the Cold War, saying that a defense shield could be viewed as threatening because it would limit or destroy Soviet offensive capabilities while leaving the American offense intact.

Here were two extremely eminent scientists, one pro and one con, whose differing opinions seemed to depend primarily on their politics rather than the science of the matter. Twas ever thus; science for the most part is no ivory tower immune from the squabblings of politics.

Their Cold War arguments have become outdated, anyway. The nuclear situation being far different today, the defenses that have been developed—such as Arrow—are accordingly quite different from the original proposals of the 80s, as well.

No one can predict the path scientific research will take. It’s an old conundrum: almost every invention and discovery is a double-edged sword with both good and bad applications, many if not most of them unforeseen at the outset. And once the genie is out of the bottle, it cannot be put back in—nor, as recent terrorist attempts to get nuclear weaponry demonstrate, can it be kept indefinitely from the hands of the enemy.

Scientists such as Bethe and others—men (and women) of the mind, wrestling with powerful and fascinating ideas that have unforeseen practical and strategic applications—felt (and feel) a completely understandable ambivalence, and even guilt, about what their minds and efforts have wrought. These scientists deal with those emotions in different ways. Some, such as Bethe, resolve to spend their lives engaging in an ultimately futile attempt to undo what they have already done.

Following in Churchill’s footsteps: reratting

The New Neo Posted on by

[HINT: please note the date!]

If you’re a regular reader here, you probably already know that Winston Churchill is my idol—well, one of my idols, anyway, along with all the contestants on “American Idol,” Billy Idol, and idle chatter.

One of Churchill’s many famous quotes is “Anyone can rat, but it takes a certain ingenuity to rerat.” Now, for those of you who don’t speak the variant of English known as British, the term “rat” refers to a change of political affiliation. Churchill started out as a Conservative, became a Liberal a few years later, and about twenty years afterwards returned to the Conservative Party.

Well, even though Churchill is someone I look up to, I really can’t follow in his footsteps. For one thing, I’m sure his feet were a lot bigger than mine. For another, I’ve never smoked a cigar. And it’s too late to follow his political trajectory, because I didn’t start out as a Conservative (although I most certainly would have if I’d known that he had; that’s how much I admire the man).

But there’s one way I’m already like him: I’ve ratted. Big time. And today I’m announcing another way I intend to be like Churchill: I’m going to rerat.

Yes, it’s official: neo-neocon is returning to her roots and becoming a liberal Democrat once more. I’m not sure what to rename the blog: perhaps “neo-exneocon?”

But I’m not going to worry about nomenclature at this point. In fact, I’m not going to worry about anything. I’m going to stick my head in the sand and put my fingers in my ears (although that might be difficult to do simultaneously) and I’ll Whistle a Happy Tune, as long as I don’t get sand in my mouth while doing so.

Because I am tired. Bone tired. And I can see it now: the prodigal daughter will return, and I’ll be welcomed with open arms. They’ll kill a fatted calf, and we’ll have a barbecue and some brewskis. I’ll lay down my weary load. And I can finally take that silly apple away from my face before the computer company or the Beatles or Magritte’s estate ends up suing me.

[NOTE: In the interests of clarity, and to any readers out there who may not be aware of this fact, I am hereby stating that today, April 1st (otherwise known as April Fool’s Day) is a day on which hoaxes and practical jokes are traditional in the English-speaking world, as well as in France.

So, there’s been no reratting; all of this was merely an attempt (and probably a feeble one, at that) at a joke. Neo-neocon will remain neo-neocon for the foreseeable future.

And the reason I’m publishing this with the huge “HINT” on top and this spilling-the-beans explanation on the bottom is that this is a modification of a longer essay I published last year, and so many readers took me seriously that time that I felt constrained to add disclaimers to it and even published this rumination on the subject of hoaxes that are believed.

So no, this neocon rat has not reratted, and has no plans to do so in the future.]

Podcast and iTunes

The New Neo Posted on by

Some of you have written to say that our podcasts can’t be downloaded through iTunes anymore. My apologies. It’s apparently some sort of technical problem that Pajamas is working on fixing, rather than a new policy. So it should be righted in a couple of days. Keep checking.

Who’s the audience for the show trial?

The New Neo Posted on by

Now the Iranians are saying the British sailors might be tried:

If Britain continued its current approach to the standoff, Larijani told Iranian state radio, “this case may face a legal path. British leaders have miscalculated this issue.”

I think there’s no question the Brits have made some miscalculations, beginning with the lack of firepower at the start of it. The actual details of the situation involved in the sailors’ abduction is unclear, though; I’ve read many conflicting reports.

I hope Iran has miscalculated as well, in its opinion that it has nothing to fear by actions of this sort. They seem to believe the West is, in the old phrase, a “paper tiger— a gargantuan Gulliver bound, tied, and rendered helpless by its own busy internal Lilliputians.

Who’s the audience for the latest show trial? Certainly not the West; all but the fringiest of the fringe is aware of the bogus nature of such a trial. My guess is that they are playing to their own masses, who may or may not be buying what they’re selling.

It used to be that propaganda of this sort had more effect back in the days when it was easier to regulate the dissemination of information to a population. A country such as North Korea still does this quite effectively, but the price North Korea pays is isolation from the rest of the world and economic stagnation. Iran ‘s people have more conduits of competing information through which to judge the truth or falsehood of the antics of their own government.

But of course there’s no need for a show trial to ever happen. Threatening one has another effect—making Iran seem powerful, and Britain and the West weak as we fumble around for the proper response, and as we say things like the following, from Britain’s Foreign Office:

This doesn’t change our position, we have made it perfectly clear that our personnel were in Iraqi waters and we continue to request immediate consular access to them and their immediate release.

Note the polite language: “request.” I can only hope they are doing more than “requesting” behind the scenes. But for public consumption, what we mostly hear is a sort of exquisite politeness from the Brits. Here’s Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett:

I am concerned. [Iran’s ambassador to Moscow] is not the first person to have made sabre-rattling noises…The message I want to send is I think everyone regrets that this position has arisen. What we want is a way out of it.

I personally don’t think that’s the right message to send. There’s a sort of wistful wishful thinking here, a refusal to understand the nature of the opposition, a denial that can only be described as potentially suicidal.

Blair has been a little more energized, but not very much more, considering the circumstances:

Blair told reporters in Manchester that the “parading and manipulation” of British service personnel would “fool no one,” and would only “enhance people’s sense of disgust with Iran.”

And another Foreign Office official called the parading “outrageous.”

Outrage and disgust are fine, but they are emotions, and fairly impotent ones at that. What are needed are credible threats of a certain course of events—economic and otherwise—that will be followed by the West if the sailors are not returned immediately. A bit of “sabre-rattling” wouldn’t be out of line, either.

The truth is that the precedent for this sort of thing favors Iran, and Iran knows it. Milk it as much as possible for the propaganda value, and know that the West will probably mouth platitudes while the show goes on.

Sanity Squad: on playing poker with Iran

The New Neo Posted on by

Here‘s the Sanity Squad’s latest podcast. Join Siggy, Dr. Sanity, Shrink, and me as we tackle the topic of Iran’s most recent game of high-stakes poker with Britain, the West, the UN, and the lives of fifteen British sailors and marines.

You might also want to take a look at Dr. Sanity’s informative history lesson comparing today’s antiwar movement to the Copperheads of Civil War times, Shrink’s analysis of the antiwar group, and Siggy on the fact that not all religious fundamentalisms are alike.