Today’s thoroughly excellent WSJ editorial on using reconciliation to pass health care reform makes the point that Democrats’ comparisons to previous transformative bills such as Social Security, Medicare, and welfare reform are inappropriate, because all those measures enjoyed significant bipartisan support. Health care reform not only lacks bipartisan votes (it threatens to make a real Republican out of Maine’s Olympia Snowe), but it is actually being resorted to because it lacks Democratic support as well. This is simply unprecedented.
Here’s some of the history:
Social Security passed when Democrats controlled both Congress and the White House, yet 64% of Senate Republicans and 79% of the House GOP voted for it. More than half of the Senate Republican caucus voted for Medicare in 1965…Democrats often point to welfare reform in 1996 as a reconciliation precedent, yet that bill passed the Senate with 78 votes, including Joe Biden and half of the Democratic caucus. The children’s health insurance program in 1997 was steered through Congress with reconciliation, but it, too, was built on strong (if misguided) bipartisan support. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 that created Schip passed 85-15, including 43 Republicans. Even President Bush’s 2001 tax cuts, another case in reconciliation point, were endorsed by 12 Senate Democrats…
The only precedent within historical shouting distance is Ronald Reagan’s 1981 budget, which was controversial because it reshaped dozens of programs. But the Senate wasn’t the problem””it ultimately passed the budget 80 to 14. The real dogfight was in the Democratically controlled House, where majority rules have always obtained, yet Reagan convinced 29 Democrats to buck Speaker Tip O’Neill.
One sentence in the WSJ piece that struck me as especially important was this seemingly obvious one:
Historically, major social legislation has always been bipartisan, because it reflects a durable political consensus.
Ever since reconciliation has become a strong possibility for this bill, I have wondered at the Democrats’ willingness to ignore that principle. If such an unpopular measure is passed by a simple majority of both houses (and barely passed, at that), what’s to stop it from being repealed in similar fashion, once Republicans get control, as it is predicted they will? And if Obama’s veto would stop such a thing from happening in 2010, why would it not occur in 2012?
And then what’s to stop Republicans from doing something similar, using reconciliation to pass their agenda, whatever it may be? The rules that slow things down in the Senate favor both parties; it is to the advantage of a party temporarily in power to respect such brakes on their power because someday they may be the ones on the outside looking in. Otherwise, we will experience a series of wild and frequent oscillations, the passage of extreme legislation and the subsequent repeal of such legislation, as the electorate gets whiplash watching.
As this article observes [emphasis mine]:
[This sort of restriction] has been a virtue of the American republic since “The Federalist Papers” defended the Constitution’s original design as one intended to keep factions from moving too quickly to dominate politics for short times of abrupt change.
But today’s Democrats appear to have no ability to see beyond their immediate needs, and no sense that they actually will lose, and then it will be payback time.
There are no dearth of theories to explain this—the leading one being that they will cook the elections and then it will be moot. A more benign explanation is that the Democrats believe repeal will be difficult even if they lose power, because the Republicans will still lack either the votes or the courage to undo the bill. Some Democrats also appear to sincerely believe that the American people will love Obamacare once it is in place, and that the perks will outweigh the negatives. In this, the growing economic crisis and unemployment actually helps them, because it drives more people away from the protection of job-associated health insurance and into the arms of the government dole.


