If anyone wants to talk about the Superbowl, you can do so here.
I certainly don’t plan to. But see how open-minded I am, and how dedicated to serving your needs?
If anyone wants to talk about the Superbowl, you can do so here.
I certainly don’t plan to. But see how open-minded I am, and how dedicated to serving your needs?
Does this sound like the statement of a group with little clout and few followers? [emphasis mine]:
Egypt’s largest opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood, said it would begin talks Sunday with the government to try to end the country’s political crisis but made clear it would insist on the immediate ouster of longtime authoritarian President Hosni Mubarak…
The Brotherhood said in a statement that its representatives would meet with Vice President Omar Suleiman to press its “legitimate and just demands.” Suleiman has accused the Brotherhood, businessmen and foreigners he did not identify as being behind a wave of looting and arson that swept much of the country last weekend after security forces inexplicably pulled out from the streets…
Mubarak, Egypt’s iron-fisted ruler of nearly 30 years, is known to have little or no tolerance for Islamist groups and the decision to open talks with the Brotherhood is a tacit recognition by his regime of their key role in the ongoing protests as well as their wide popular base…
And do you trust these promises of the MB?:
The Brotherhood aims to create an Islamic state in Egypt, but insists that it would not force women to cover up in public in line with Islam’s teachings and would not rescind Egypt’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel.
Ah, but:
A political leader of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Thursday called on any government that replaces Hosni Mubarak’s regime to withdraw from the 32-year-old peace treaty with Israel.
Here’s background about the MB and its activities in Europe.
And here’s some MB and Egyptian history:
In November 1948 police seized an automobile containing the documents and plans of what is thought to be the Brotherhood’s `secret apparatus` with names of its members. The seizure was preceded by an assortment of bombings and assassination attempts by the apparatus. Subsequently 32 of its leaders were arrested and its offices raided. The next month the Egyptian Prime Minister of Egypt, Mahmud Fahmi Nokrashi, ordered the dissolution of the Brotherhood.
On December 28, 1948 Egypt’s prime minister was assassinated by Brotherhood member and veterinary student Abdel Meguid Ahmed Hassan, in what is thought to have been retaliation for the government crackdown…
In 1952 members of the Muslim Brotherhood are accused of taking part in arson that destroyed some “750 buildings” in downtown Cairo ”” mainly night clubs, theatres, hotels, and restaurants frequented by British and other foreigners ”” “that marked the end of the liberal, progressive, cosmopolitan” Egypt…
After the attempted assassination of Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser, in 1954, a member of the secret apparatus was accused by the authorities of being the perpetrator of the attempt. Nasser then abolished the Brotherhood and imprisoned and punished thousands of its members…
Despite mass arrests, police harassment and an essentially closed political system, Brotherhood candidates have made strong showings in several parliamentary elections. In the past decade, the Brotherhood has made repeated calls for a more democratic political system, and in 2005 it participated in pro-democracy demonstrations with the Kifaya movement.
The MB is now the largest opposition bloc in Egypt. It is sometimes stated that they assassinated Sadat, but as best I can tell, he was killed by Egyptian Islamic Jihad, an offshoot descendant group that is more upfront about advocating violence and is now joined as part of worldwide al Qaeda. EIJ is headed by a familiar name, al Sawahiri, Osama’s Egyptian buddy and co-mastermind of 9/11.
What does EIJ think of today’s democracy movement in Egypt? Loves it:
Ayman al Zawahiri’s top deputy, Thirwat Salah Shehata, has released a statement praising the Egyptian people and calling for President Hosni Mubarak’s ouster.
Shehata is a longtime member of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), a core part of al Qaeda, and has served Zawahiri since the 1980s. In the statement, which was released on jihadist message boards known to carry al Qaeda propaganda, Shehata calls on the Egyptian people to “remain steadfast” and refuse to settle for economic concessions from Mubarak’s regime.
“Indeed, the Pharaoh and his rotten party must depart,” Shehata says.
There is no evidence that the EIJ has played any role in Egypt’s turmoil. In fact, Shehata laments his organization’s inability to be “on the front lines sharing this honor.” The EIJ was “forced to leave the country after the regime’s war against us,” Shehata says, “and we ended up participating with the mujahedin on other fronts.”
According to Asharq Al-Awsat, a Saudi publication, an anonymous source close to the EIJ said that Shehata’s “statement was issued from Tehran where Shehata is currently residing.” Shehata and other top EIJ operatives received shelter in Iran after the Sept. 11 attacks.
There’s more, much more, in the article. But the part I’m quoting makes it clear how closely related all the world jihadist movements are, and what a golden opportunity they see in the Egyptian pro-democracy movement.
It is almost a certainty that, were the Islamicists to gain control of the Muslim world as they wish, they would jockey for position and fight among themselves. Some would adhere to Sunni and some Shi’ite Islam. Some would be more violent and some less.
But anyone who thinks they’re not all violent, and not all bent on Islamicist control of each country in the region, is misunderstanding their philosophy, motivations, and goals. These are not democrats, neither with a small “d” nor a large one. The mullahs of Iran are well aware of that, and have not been offering them shelter just out of the goodness of their hearts.
It’s not that the Egyptian demonstrators are supporters, either, although some of them undoubtedly are. It’s that pro-democracy movements are easy to co-opt in a country with no real tradition of liberal democracy, no cultural characteristics that would allow it to flourish, and where secular opposition parties have been thwarted and persecuted for decades. As in Iran before it, the Islamicists might just be the strongest game in town right now.
…the MSM scoured every Tea Party vigilantly for posters that exhibited any trace of racism and were disappointed to find almost none, and yet they seem to be mostly ignoring these seemingly commonplace anti-Semitic posters among the anti-Mubarak Egyptian demonstrators.
I think that was a rhetorical question.
[NOTE: See also this.]
While doing research on political assassins of the past for this PJ piece of mine, I looked up the case of Herschel Grynszpan, a Polish-German Jew who had shot and killed the German diplomat Ernst vom Rath on November 7, 1938 in Paris. This was the event the Nazis seized on as an excuse for Kristallnacht.
I had had only a vague recollection of the facts. But when I read Grynszpan’s Wiki entry, I found a fascinating story—far sadder, and far more complex, than I had expected. You might want to take a look and read about the strange twistings and turnings of the case.
My first troll-bot ever:
The next time I read a weblog, I hope that it doesnt disappoint me as much as this one. I imply, I do know it was my choice to read, however I actually thought youd have one thing interesting to say. All I hear is a bunch of whining about one thing that you possibly can fix for those who werent too busy searching for attention.
How do I know this was a bot and not a real commenter, you ask? Well, it advertised a Swedish website, and it came in on a short humorous post about literal videos, with nary a word of whining in sight.
Again with the throwing Britain under the bus.
It strikes me that I have a very different attitude towards what is going on in Egypt right now than I would have if I were younger and hadn’t witnessed the media coverage of the 1979 revolution in Iran.
I’m no expert on either situation, nor do I claim to be. I am merely writing from the perspective of a relatively aware and well-informed citizen of the United States, watching and reading news of events as they unfold. Granted, this is a highly incomplete and flawed picture; maybe that’s part of my point.
Iran got my attention back in 1979, even though, as a rule, I spent a lot less time then than now monitoring such things. It was a huge story, filled with drama: the Shah (who, along with his family, had been a telegenic media personality); the demonstrating youths; the creepy Khomeini, who looked like the Sorcerer in “Fantasia” (see photos here); and most of all the then-puzzling support of the left and the militant, modern-seeming women marching in the street and embracing the chador.
It was that last contradiction that floored me, although it would not make me blink an eye today. I have long grown used to the merging of those once-seemingly contradictory strains of human thought: leftists and feminists (somewhat redundant, I know) supporting an Islamic religious fundamentalism that would war against both movements the moment it got the chance.
To most of us, it didn’t seem possible that a modern country such as Iran would embrace the restrictive and despotic religious fanaticism of Khomeini and company. But it did, if only for a moment, just as Iranian women embraced the chador—at first. That was a fateful moment for Iran and the world, because the ayatollahs’ power, rapidly solidified and entrenched, has allowed no turning back (or you might say forward) for the over thirty years since. It turns out that those women and leftists were the ayatollahs’ useful idiots.
About the role of the chador in 1979:
During the 1979 Islamic Revolution many women deliberately chose to observe the Hejab, either in the form of wearing the veil or a scarf, as a sign of solidarity with Ayatollah Khomeini and a symbol of opposition to the Shah’s regime…For many women making the decision to wear the chador was not based on religious grounds, but it was a conscious effort to make a statement against the Pahlavi regime. It was against this backdrop that the Islamic Revolution of 1979 took place; a revolution, which one could argue, could not have taken place without the active involvement of women.
Ironically, Khomeini’s decree, requiring women to wear the chador, came on March 7th, 1979, a month after his return to Iran and one day before International Women’s Day. Energized and excited that they had achieved what they had fought so hard for, various women’s organizations in Tehran and all across Iran, had planned celebrations for marking International Women’s Day.
As Parvin Paidar notes, those celebrations quickly morphed into massive protests and demonstrations; “the protesters included young and old, rich and poor, veiled and unveiled”, just as women from all walks of life had marched in support of the revolution and Khomeini, they now were protesting against his policies on women’s rights. Thousands of women participated in spontaneous and massive protests against the Hejab.
Once again women were demanding their rights, only this time they were demanding it from the very government that they had hoped (and had promised) would ensure the protection of their rights. Despite the numerous meetings and protests that were held on Tehran University campus, the streets, and even at the Ministry of Justice, the women were unsuccessful in reversing the compulsory veiling decree.
To make matters worse, most of the political action groups, which many of the women were members of, failed to fully support the women in their opposition to the compulsory veil. Although some of these political parties condemned compulsory veiling in writing, they failed to support their words with action…
Something about the process of watching the Iranian Revolution unfold in real time, even from afar, made a deeper impression than any newspaper or history book ever could. Those of us who are old enough to remember the trajectory of events—the promises, the sanguine predictions, and the betrayals—that led to current-day Iran, are less likely to look on current events in Egypt with equanimity.
It is possible, of course, that the endgame in Egypt will not resemble that in Iran in any way. It is a different country and a different time. But those who watched the unfolding of Iran in the late 70s and early 80s cannot possibly shrug off the idea that there are ominous parallels.
Our Arab allies (yes, we have them) are miffed that President Obama has been so eager to abandon Mubarak.
It’s no surprise they feel this way. They understand that Obama’s actions mean they could be next, and they “fear the U.S. is opening the door for Islamist groups to gain influence and destabilize the region.”
Well, I fear it too, as does any thinking person who knows anything about the region.
Let’s see: Obama fails to support the demonstrators in Iran; his rhetoric is tepid at best. But he throws his weight behind the ones in Egypt and speaks actively and early for Mubarak’s removal. I can think of no benign reason why this disparity would occur, except that perhaps he’s a slow learner. But it is difficult to believe that’s what’s going on. It seems purposeful and strategic, and sends a message to our other allies in the region.
Pride and face are especially important in the Arab world:
Another Arab official from a government aligned with Washington said the Obama administration seems to be humiliating Mr. Mubarak, despite his close cooperation over the years. This could lessen the willingness of Arab states to cooperate with Washington in the future, said the official.
“[The Saudis] are at odds with the U.S. position, publicly pushing Mubarak out. And frankly so are we””this isn’t how you handle issues in region,” said the Arab official. “Egypt needs to be treated with respect.”
A great many of our allies—and not just in the Arab world—could make the same complaint.
Obama faces an extraordinarily difficult set of choices in Egypt, but he seems to be selecting some of the worst possibilities. How much damage can this administration do before it is finished?
[ADDENDUM: Walter Russell Mead provides some excellent historic perspective on the enormous difficulties of knowing which course to take when an ally undergoes a revolt.]
Keith Hennessy lays out a multi-step blueprint for repealing Obamacare in 2013:
* Keep up the pressure in 2011 and 2012:
* maintain and strengthen Republican unity toward full repeal;
* repeatedly attack the bill legislatively on all fronts, knowing that most votes will pass the House and fail in the Senate;
* continue legal pressure through the courts; and
* tee up repeal as a key partisan difference in the 2012 Presidential and Congressional elections;
* In 2012 win the White House, hold the House majority, and pick up a net 3 Republican Senate seats to retake the majority there; and
* In 2013, use reconciliation to repeal ObamaCare, requiring only a simple majority in the Senate.
It is a profoundly satisfying poetic justice that the final step of the undoing could involve the reconciliation process. And it would be even more satisfying because—unlike the passage of Obamacare—the argument for reconciliation being valid in this case is stronger.
There are problems with CBO scoring and the like (not to mention defeating Obama in 2012), but apparently they could be overcome. Read what Hennessy writes, and see what you think.
[ADDENDUM: And then there’s the war between the states—and Obamacare.]
Maria Schneider, star of “Last Tango in Paris,” has died at the age of 58. She seems to have had a difficult life subsequent to making the film.
I saw that film in a movie theater when it first came out in 1972. It was famously controversial for its time—or even for any time—and highly, highly praised. It was supposed to be some sort of masterpiece, but almost all I remember about it is that I hated it and found it surprisingly dull and stupid.
Plus, here’s another confession: I’ve never cared much for “Tango” star Marlon Brando as an actor, even in the roles that made his name like “Streetcar Named Desire,” when he was a young hottie. I found him mannered and self-indulgent, never believable.
His best role for me was in “The Godfather.” And even then I didn’t like him for much the same reasons. The voice and the mannerisms seemed too actorish, and distracted me from the character, although they did make me forget for a while that I was watching Marlon Brando.
I realize I may be in a tiny minority in this.
We’ve seen such demonstrations before, notably in Iran. But they were brief and flickered out after the government responded harshly. The same may ultimately occur in Egypt, but nevertheless there seems to be something different about the Egyptian demonstrations.
The NY Times has an article today with some glowing reports:
The protesters have spoken for themselves to a government that, like many across the Middle East, treated them as a nuisance. For years, pundits have predicted that Islamists would be the force that toppled governments across the Arab world. But so far, they have been submerged in an outpouring of popular dissent that speaks to a unity of message, however fleeting ”” itself a sea change in the region’s political landscape…
“The street is not afraid of governments anymore,” said Shawki al-Qadi, an opposition lawmaker in Yemen, itself roiled by change. “It is the opposite. Governments and their security forces are afraid of the people now. The new generation, the generation of the Internet, is fearless. They want their full rights, and they want life, a dignified life.”
It depends, doesn’t it? The new generation can afford to be fearless as long as the government doesn’t decide to put the big fear into them by killing significantly more than one or two here and there. If a government wants to crack down, it has more than enough power to do so, and my guess is that most people would not so heroic as to risk everything for the idea of democracy.
Some of the demonstrators had this to say:
“I tell the Arab world to stand with us until we win our freedom,” said Khaled Yusuf, a cleric from Al Azhar, a once esteemed institution of religious scholarship now beholden to the government. “Once we do, we’re going to free the Arab world.”…
“I’m fighting for my freedom,” Noha al-Ustaz said as she broke bricks on the curb. “For my right to express myself. For an end to oppression. For an end to injustice.”
Brave words, words I support and hope will come to be. But if democracy comes to a country such as Egypt, what rough beast will slouch towards Cairo to be born?
I’m old enought to remember 1979 and Iran quite vividly. Some of those same brave voices, that same exhilaration. And we know how it turned out. And that’s why I worry.
That, and polls such as this, which was taken in December of 2010. It indicates that the populace of Egypt may mean something quite different from what Americans mean when we use words such as “an end to injustice.”
Some of the findings:
Egyptians who support Hamas: 49%
Egyptians who support Hezbollah: 30%
Egyptians who support al Qaeda: 20%
95% agreement with religion playing a role in politics, with 48% thinking the role should be large, and 49% thinking it should be small
Of people in Egypt who see a struggle in their country between those who would like to modernize and those who are fundamentalists, 27% identify with the modernizers and a whopping 59% with the fundamentalists.
82% of Egyptian respondents favored stoning as punishment for adultery, and 84% favored death as punishment for apostasy (leaving the Muslim religion).
54% approve of suicide bombing in some circumstances.
It’s sobering, to say the least. When the real Arab street stands up, what will it be saying?
Remember that bipartisan “date night” seating for the SOTU address? I hear it cut down on the applause, although that surely wasn’t the intent. It seems that some people became confused as to what were the applause lines. Being in a partisan pack and seeing everyone else around them clap and rise ordinarily cues them to the fact that the moment has arrived. Minus that clear sort of signal, the response was more tepid.
It occurs to me that it’s a bit like a choral group, where if members of each section—altos, sopranos, tenors, basses—are clumped with others of their ilk, it helps the weaker members keep to their parts. Sometimes the members are spread out and separated for balance, but that requires more attention and focus.
Since I know next to nothing about choral groups, I thought I’d look it up to make sure I’m correct about that. I discovered that yes, indeed, this is a burning question among choral directors—to group or not to group:?
And then there’s the whole issue of whether or not a choir stands with all the sopranos grouped together, all the altos grouped together somewhere else, etc. The alternative (usually in more advanced choirs, and always depending on the piece of music) is having the sections all mixed up…usually in quartets (one soprano, one alto, one tenor, one bass). The challenge here is that, as you’ve noted, in order to sing next to a different voice part (or three!), you really need to be a strong independent musician — be able to hold your own, even when you’re not hearing someone else sing your part. But that’s really a different situation.
Choir positioning is a tricky thing, and very few directors are able to get it set up just to their liking on the first try (that is, if they care at all…many directors place the singers with the simple instruction “basses in the back, tenors in the front, sopranos on the left, altos on the right…tall singers in the back and short in the front” which may work, if the choir is 80+). So, directors tend to move singers around during the rehearsal process…and I’ve seen more than a few singers get very upset about being moved.
I’ve never really considered the finer points of choir directing, but I’m certain that the intrigue and brouhaha of positioning can get quite intense. Maybe not as intense as in Congress, but intense enough.