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Meanwhile, in Iran — 9 Comments

1. In WWll, we did not let German and Japanese civilian deaths deter us. That is because Americans still understood what William Tecumseh Sherman so unflinchingly declared; “War is the remedy that our enemies have chosen, and I say let us give them all they want. You might as well appeal against a thunderstorm, as against these terrible hardships of war. War is cruelty, there is no use trying to reform it; the crueler it is, the sooner it will be over.”

   Bomb baby, bomb.

2. @Geoffrey Britain

   Heck, we did not even allow allied or neutral civilian deaths to deter us. We killed thousands of French civilians during the Normandy campaign from sheer collateral damage. We bombed Switzerland by accident multiple times. That doesn’t make it good but at some point we need to steel ourselves and accept that there are few clean struggles of this importance.

3. it looks like a wilderness of mirrors to me, the bbc is the arbiter of what is happening, not the greek government, is this like the whopper lloyds list, put forward that Chris Murphy bit on, like a file o fish sandwich,

   one notes the greeks are the most intrepid of the tanker crews, going back as far as onassis and niarchos if not earlier

4. I agree with GB and Turtler. However the culture today is vastly different than WWII and the CW. The public, including independents and a good portion of conservatives, will not tolerate such. Probably because the threat from Iran is still abstract. There’s been no Bull Run, Pearl Harbor, or bombs on London to make the threat truly concrete. Tel Aviv nuked would focus a lot of minds.

   A lot of people are just Alfred E Neumanns.

5. Over on another thread Bill posed the idea that “Congress is supposed to be a necessary check to executive power. Checks and Balances. That’s the beauty of our system. I didn’t know this was controversial. But I guess it is.” regarding the executive branch’s use of the military without Congress authorizing it.

   But is that the norm? Apparently not.

   Total Foreign Conflicts / Military Actions Since the Barbary Pirates (~1801)
   The definitive, nonpartisan tally comes from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) report Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad (updated through 2023):

   469 documented instances of U.S. armed forces used abroad in situations of military conflict or potential conflict since 1798 (the data starts just before the First Barbary War and is the standard reference used by Congress).

   This includes everything from full-scale wars to smaller interventions, shows of force, evacuations under fire, retaliatory strikes, and peacekeeping/support missions. The Barbary Wars (First 1801–1805 and Second 1815) themselves are in this list — and they were not formally declared wars by Congress (Jefferson and Madison acted first under executive authority; Congress passed authorizing statutes but never issued a declaration).
   Bottom line on the split:

   With Congress declaring war: 5 conflicts (11 declarations).
   Without a declaration (executive action or limited congressional authorization): ~464 instances.

   In other words, more than 98% of all U.S. foreign military engagements since the Barbary era have not involved a formal congressional declaration of war.
   Why So Few Declarations?

   The Constitution gives Congress the power “to declare War” (Article I, Section 8) but makes the president Commander in Chief (Article II, Section 2).
   Presidents have long interpreted their authority broadly for limited or defensive actions, especially after the Quasi-War with France (1798–1800) and Barbary Wars set early precedents.
   Since World War II, Congress has often passed Authorizations for Use of Military Force (AUMFs) instead of declarations (e.g., 1991 Gulf War, 2001 post-9/11, 2002 Iraq). These are not formal declarations of war — they’re statutory approvals that still leave initiation largely with the executive.
   Many smaller actions (Grenada 1983, Libya 1986/2011, Syria strikes, etc.) have been purely executive, with only War Powers Resolution notifications to Congress afterward.

   This pattern has been consistent for over 200 years: formal declarations are extremely rare and reserved for the biggest wars. Everything else has relied primarily on presidential initiative as Commander in Chief, often with Congress later providing funding or political cover but rarely forcing a formal declaration. The CRS data makes the imbalance crystal clear.

   — Grok

   I think most everyone would think that as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the President would have some inherent Constitutional authority to use the military, and I suppose the AUMF tries to strike a balance. But here are some conflicts where the act first and then seek approval have been used:

   Notable Examples of Unilateral Start + Later Congressional Involvement

   Korean War (Truman, 1950): Purely unilateral at the start (no prior approval). Congress later passed emergency funding, draft extensions, and other support measures that effectively ratified it.
   Lincoln (Civil War): Acted first, then explicitly asked Congress for ratification; Congress obliged.
   Vietnam era: Escalated under executive claims; Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964) amid ongoing involvement, then funded it for years.
   Kosovo (Clinton, 1999): Bombing continued past the WPR 60-day mark; administration cited congressional funding as implicit approval.
   Libya (Obama, 2011) and many others: Started unilaterally; no new AUMF, but continued with existing appropriations.

   Bottom Line
   This “act first, get funding/ratification later” approach has been the dominant historical pattern for non-declared conflicts. Formal prior authorizations (AUMFs) are rare and usually reserved for big wars (e.g., 1991 Gulf War, 2001/2002 post-9/11 and Iraq). For the hundreds of smaller instances, presidents initiate under their commander-in-chief powers, notify Congress, and rely on the normal budget process (which Congress controls but almost never uses to defund active operations).
   Exact quantification is elusive because CRS and historians track instances and reports, not every case of “later funding = ratification.” It’s happened routinely—likely in the large majority of sustained actions—reflecting political reality more than strict constitutional process.

   — Grok

   I know some don’t like the use of AI, but it does save a lot of time and research. In some instances Grok does get it wrong, but looking at the big picture of this concept of Executive vs. Legislative authority, it does make the valid point that most of our use of the military has been directed solely by the Executive branch. A lot of these uses have been minor, but the principal is there.

6. President Trump is coming up on the 60 day AUMF requirement for congressional approval, and I wonder if the President’s use of the ceasefire will give him cover.

   President Obama, after committing US to the extended NATO bombing of Libya never sought authorization, though he did meet the reporting requirement.

   Obama’s administration (2011) notified Congress within 48 hours, then—once the 60-day mark hit—argued the limited U.S. role (mostly intelligence, refueling, and occasional strikes under NATO/UN auspices, no ground troops, no U.S. casualties) did not constitute “hostilities” that triggered the withdrawal requirement. They kept operations going without ever getting an AUMF.
   Trump could make an even stronger version of the same claim now:

   With the ceasefire actively extended and strikes halted, there are no ongoing combat exchanges involving U.S. forces.
   The blockade is a non-kinetic enforcement measure, not direct “hostilities.”
   Therefore, U.S. forces are not in a situation “where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated,” so the WPR’s 60-day limit doesn’t force withdrawal or congressional approval.

   According to Grok, “this is the classic executive-branch reading of the WPR that multiple presidents (Republican and Democratic) have used: the law only bites on sustained, kinetic combat. A pause/ceasefire de-escalates the situation enough to reset or sidestep the clock. The White House has already signaled they believe they’re operating “within the bounds of the war powers statute.””

7. @Brian E:Over on another thread Bill posed the idea that

   He amply demonstrated that he either doesn’t know what he’s talking about or that he’s straw-manning. No one was talking about giving Trump unlimited power to wage war or anything else. Bill appears to think that “unitary executive” and “no checks and balances on the President” are the same thing. If he thinks that, he doesn’t know what he’s talking about, and if he doesn’t think that, he’s just trying to confuse the issue.

   Anyway, before you can say the Constitution is being violated, you have to know what it actually says. Few people bother, even though it is very short.

8. Bill essentially emotes, as he did years ago regarding immigration and illegal aliens. He could be an idiot, ignorant, or both on this topic of Iran.

9. Pearl Harbor

   TBF, I’ve have wondered if more than 50% of today’s population would be upset if such were to occur, especially if a Republican were president at the time. A large percentage would probably be upset, but not think it bad enough to go to war over. A smaller percentage would blame the US and seek to use it for political advantage. I think what is missing is a sense of the place of the US in the world. We have become very insular, separated not only from the world, but from each other as well. No one has the moral authority that FDR possessed after the attack.

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