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Meanwhile, in Iran — 5 Comments

1. In WWll, we did not let German and Japanese civilian deaths deter us. That is because Americans still understood what William Tecumseh Sherman so unflinchingly declared; “War is the remedy that our enemies have chosen, and I say let us give them all they want. You might as well appeal against a thunderstorm, as against these terrible hardships of war. War is cruelty, there is no use trying to reform it; the crueler it is, the sooner it will be over.”

   Bomb baby, bomb.

2. @Geoffrey Britain

   Heck, we did not even allow allied or neutral civilian deaths to deter us. We killed thousands of French civilians during the Normandy campaign from sheer collateral damage. We bombed Switzerland by accident multiple times. That doesn’t make it good but at some point we need to steel ourselves and accept that there are few clean struggles of this importance.

3. it looks like a wilderness of mirrors to me, the bbc is the arbiter of what is happening, not the greek government, is this like the whopper lloyds list, put forward that Chris Murphy bit on, like a file o fish sandwich,

   one notes the greeks are the most intrepid of the tanker crews, going back as far as onassis and niarchos if not earlier

4. I agree with GB and Turtler. However the culture today is vastly different than WWII and the CW. The public, including independents and a good portion of conservatives, will not tolerate such. Probably because the threat from Iran is still abstract. There’s been no Bull Run, Pearl Harbor, or bombs on London to make the threat truly concrete. Tel Aviv nuked would focus a lot of minds.

   A lot of people are just Alfred E Neumanns.

5. Over on another thread Bill posed the idea that “Congress is supposed to be a necessary check to executive power. Checks and Balances. That’s the beauty of our system. I didn’t know this was controversial. But I guess it is.” regarding the executive branch’s use of the military without Congress authorizing it.

   But is that the norm? Apparently not.

   Total Foreign Conflicts / Military Actions Since the Barbary Pirates (~1801)
   The definitive, nonpartisan tally comes from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) report Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad (updated through 2023):

   469 documented instances of U.S. armed forces used abroad in situations of military conflict or potential conflict since 1798 (the data starts just before the First Barbary War and is the standard reference used by Congress).

   This includes everything from full-scale wars to smaller interventions, shows of force, evacuations under fire, retaliatory strikes, and peacekeeping/support missions. The Barbary Wars (First 1801–1805 and Second 1815) themselves are in this list — and they were not formally declared wars by Congress (Jefferson and Madison acted first under executive authority; Congress passed authorizing statutes but never issued a declaration).
   Bottom line on the split:

   With Congress declaring war: 5 conflicts (11 declarations).
   Without a declaration (executive action or limited congressional authorization): ~464 instances.

   In other words, more than 98% of all U.S. foreign military engagements since the Barbary era have not involved a formal congressional declaration of war.
   Why So Few Declarations?

   The Constitution gives Congress the power “to declare War” (Article I, Section 8) but makes the president Commander in Chief (Article II, Section 2).
   Presidents have long interpreted their authority broadly for limited or defensive actions, especially after the Quasi-War with France (1798–1800) and Barbary Wars set early precedents.
   Since World War II, Congress has often passed Authorizations for Use of Military Force (AUMFs) instead of declarations (e.g., 1991 Gulf War, 2001 post-9/11, 2002 Iraq). These are not formal declarations of war — they’re statutory approvals that still leave initiation largely with the executive.
   Many smaller actions (Grenada 1983, Libya 1986/2011, Syria strikes, etc.) have been purely executive, with only War Powers Resolution notifications to Congress afterward.

   This pattern has been consistent for over 200 years: formal declarations are extremely rare and reserved for the biggest wars. Everything else has relied primarily on presidential initiative as Commander in Chief, often with Congress later providing funding or political cover but rarely forcing a formal declaration. The CRS data makes the imbalance crystal clear.

   — Grok

   I think most everyone would think that as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the President would have some inherent Constitutional authority to use the military, and I suppose the AUMF tries to strike a balance. But here are some conflicts where the act first and then seek approval have been used:

   Notable Examples of Unilateral Start + Later Congressional Involvement

   Korean War (Truman, 1950): Purely unilateral at the start (no prior approval). Congress later passed emergency funding, draft extensions, and other support measures that effectively ratified it.
   Lincoln (Civil War): Acted first, then explicitly asked Congress for ratification; Congress obliged.
   Vietnam era: Escalated under executive claims; Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964) amid ongoing involvement, then funded it for years.
   Kosovo (Clinton, 1999): Bombing continued past the WPR 60-day mark; administration cited congressional funding as implicit approval.
   Libya (Obama, 2011) and many others: Started unilaterally; no new AUMF, but continued with existing appropriations.

   Bottom Line
   This “act first, get funding/ratification later” approach has been the dominant historical pattern for non-declared conflicts. Formal prior authorizations (AUMFs) are rare and usually reserved for big wars (e.g., 1991 Gulf War, 2001/2002 post-9/11 and Iraq). For the hundreds of smaller instances, presidents initiate under their commander-in-chief powers, notify Congress, and rely on the normal budget process (which Congress controls but almost never uses to defund active operations).
   Exact quantification is elusive because CRS and historians track instances and reports, not every case of “later funding = ratification.” It’s happened routinely—likely in the large majority of sustained actions—reflecting political reality more than strict constitutional process.

   — Grok

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