The Russians and Chinese can’t be all that happy about the performance of their defense systems in Venezuela
This was one of the things that struck me the most about the recent US operation against Venezuela’s Maduro:
… EurAsia Times, an Indian publication that is no friend of Trump, reported, “Boasting one of the strongest militaries in Latin America, Venezuela possessed a variety of advanced radars, including the [Chinese-made] JY-27, whose capabilities have now been called into question by observers.
“These radars were integrated into Venezuela’s air defense network alongside Russian systems like the S-300VM surface-to-air missiles, forming a layered defense around key sites, including Caracas.”
America stuffed both systems.
The publication said, “Designed to detect low-observable aircraft like the US F-22 and F-35 by operating at meter-wave frequencies that, in theory, exploit resonance effects on stealth designs, the JY-27 has been marketed by Beijing as an anti-stealth or stealth hunter radar.”
The only person in their showroom now is Wile E. Coyote.
I haven’t a clue how this was done. But it seems that neither Russia nor China have a clue either, which is more important.
More:
Zona Militar said, “From a military standpoint, analysts agree that the outcome cannot be explained by the failure of a single system, but rather by the inability of a Chinese-designed command-and-control framework to operate under intense interference and multidomain attacks. The U.S. operation exposed the limitations of these architectures when confronted by forces capable of integrating intelligence, electronic warfare, combat aviation, and special operations within a single operational cycle, confirming that superiority lies not solely in hardware, but in the coherence and resilience of the system as a whole.”
In other words, a lot of things must have been operating to make this occur.
It also seems that something similar happened during the Israeli and US attacks on Iran last summer.
A simple answer could be that the systems were not energized at the time of the attack. A good reason for that would be to avoid what happened in Iran a few years ago when a civilian airliner was shot down shortly after taking off. Air denial systems don’t work well in areas known for civilian traffic.
The problem with that answer is the US called for the closure of that airspace days prior to the attack. Whatever your feelings on US doing so, it at least prevented the potential of US and allied countries flying commercial traffic near Caracas. With that type of warning, why have your air defense systems turned off? The Venezuelan military should expect an attack was imminent and should want to know when such an attack was happening with as much early warning possible and, assuming they wanted to protect Maduro, they would have wanted to repel that attack.
I write this because of the sentence mentioning “limitations on these architectures” and “integrating intelligence”. A limitation is use in civilian airspace and integrating defense in civilian airspace. The US could have done less warning, and it would be likely those systems wouldn’t be on. I think the US suspected those systems were not that capable and were happy to prove so. Indeed, I almost think that was as much a message being made as the capture of Maduro.
I think it is worth considering that the U.S. had the opportunity for weeks to demonstrate for the operators of the Venezuelan radar warning system what assets they could expect we would employ, and how those assets would behave. Naturally, in the event, all assets would behave quite differently.
Sun-Tzu, white courtesy phone for Sun-Tzu.
ECM has come a long way from my days in the Navy. What we had in the 1960s was the equivalent of the stone age compared to what they have today.
No matter their frequency, all radars have to emit. Electronic jammers can detect and jam the signal. I’ve been told that modern jammers can even destroy the radars’ magnetron in some instances.
Today electronic warfare is different than it was even in 2001. The technology has grown by leaps and bounds.
With regard to Wiley B Coyote, the Russian and Chinese systems came from ACME.
I asked Grok if the electronic warfare supression systems on the Growler could defeat air defense systems like the JY-27.
I then asked to respond to reports the air defense systems were never activated.
Take it for what it’s worth. Grok doesn’t have access to classified information, but does do a good job of scouring the web for information from a variety of sources.
Some of the videos show strikes on air defense systems where missile systems appear to be cooking off (continuous rapid explosions). I think we not only jammed the systems, but targeted them. Grok agrees:
LLM, so what’s it worth? Nada. Scroll by.
We can’t rule out the idea that the U.S. military’s hardware systems are simply better than the detection systems being used in Venezuela, and that their planning and execution went astoundingly well.
It feels good to say something like this about the U.S..
Remember if you don’t defeat them, you are just training them.
Here is a former fighter pilot, Max Afterburner, adding analysis to the press conference where Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dan “Razin” Caine, described how the US performed the operation, “Operation Absolute Resolve”.
Fighter Pilot Reacts to General’s EXPLOSIVE Military Brief on Maduro Capture
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HOpnzb7ZKK0
From Operation Sindoor to Venezuela: How Chinese weapons, radars keep failing — Explained
TOI World Desk | TIMESOFINDIA.COM | Jan 8, 2026, 17:24 IST
In Venezuela, America’s EA-18 Growlers reportedly played a crucial role in the mission by deploying advanced electronic jamming and communications-disruption capabilities. The Growler is a carrier-launched electronic warfare aircraft built not for delivering ordnance, but for controlling the electromagnetic battlefield. During the Venezuela operation, it formed part of a large US aerial force that disabled China-supplied radar and communication networks, enabling special forces aircraft to move into and out of Venezuelan airspace with speed and minimal resistance.
ECM/ EW is a complex environment, not something your average unmotivated conscript will master. On top of that the high end stealth hardware is VERY hard to spot if it is approaching in the proper sense. In the Bosnia/Croatia confrontations in the late 90’s the stealth vehicles were best spotted from side or under aspects. Even if you get signals back from the side I suspect they are subtle and not long lasting as the target leaves your scan area. Likely the High stealth platforms went in first and took out the more capable radars (which had been likely being teased by FA-18G Growlers for some period). With those eliminated the Growlers make a hash of the radar signals while the slower and less stealthy MH-60 enter the scene. Meanwhile Air Defense Command and Control is racing about like a chicken with its head cut off, and sitting on the issue as they try to figure out how to report it without looking like chumps. By the time they get their stuff together Maduro and his lady are in a chopper headed out to sea.
I also suspect the Chinese and Russian hardware didn’t communicate and integrate with each other well.
It seems to me China and Russia have hardware that is having problems dealing with US hardware, and they should consider their actions carefully when dealing with a president like Trump.
With Biden (or Kamela) in office they didn’t have much to worry about.
this is not particularly new. at least for Russian hardware: see Iran, 2025, where the Israeli air force outperformed them as well. though, IIRC, these are only the latest two examples of this performance imbalance
I think the contractor in called npal, they are having an acme problem, once an accident, another coincidence,
I doubt there is a simple answer here. But the first question might be, ‘were they configured to operate as designed, and in operating condition?’
Given the state of most everything else in Venezuela, and its 25 slide to its present position, it’s easy to guess that perhaps maintenance and expertise might have been mitigating factors, and also easy to speculate whether these were things known to the Special Forces.
US tech superiority is great to see in action.
It was probably available to US forces in Afghanistan, but Biden was unwilling to fight, and kill, tens or hundreds of thousands of poorly armed Taliban.
Taiwan’s protection depends on continued US tech superiority.
There’s a new Trump directive to push Raytheon to stop buybacks and instead invest more in America. Also to reduce salaries. Which I favor, for most major defense contractors whose main customer is govt.
Trump is the man.
Any CCP plans to invade Taiwan are lengthening their timelines.
Hopefully out to ‘Forever’.
Meanwhile, buyers for their radar detection system are prolly cancelling orders left and right.
Beep Beep!
Trust ACME! (not to work)
I think it’s an issue of “Trump is bluffing. He’s never gonna invade…” **
…so they were pretty certain those systems would never be tested.
(Same with Iran this past summer.)
** …BUT if he DOES dare to actually attack us, then our allies in the DPUSA and the MEDIA and EU and the UN—together with Tucker Carlson—will take care of him, but this time for good!!!
File under: Feelin’ lucky??
Just in case this might have flown under the radar:
“…I’m Venezuelan. Here Are 7 Things Canadians Need To Know About Maduro’s Ouster”—
https://blazingcatfur.ca/2026/01/08/rodrigo-madriz-im-venezuelan-here-are-7-things-canadians-need-to-know-about-maduros-ouster/
The Growlers are from Electronic Attack Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet which is based at NAS Whidbey Island. One of many unique activities in western Washington.
Then there’s the Guyana angle:
“Guyana: The Little Caribbean Country With A Big Role To Play In Trump’s Regional Shift”—
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/guyana-little-caribbean-country-big-role-play-trumps-regional-shift
For those radars to see US aircraft, stealth or otherwise, they have to be active. And active radars can be located from much further away than they can detect anything.
And what US forces can locate, they can usually kill, one way or another.
To hearken back to tactics used in a previous war: in the Persian Gulf War, the initial hole in the Iraqi air defense network was blasted by Army AH-64 attack helicopters. Air defense radars optimized to look for fast moving stealth jets don’t do too well at seeing helicopters coming in a few feet above the trees.
@ Sennacherib > “Remember if you don’t defeat them, you are just training them.”
Yes, the downside is that now China and Russia have some clues on how to improve their hardware and performance.
It remains to be seen if they CAN.
@ bill (poor communication between systems) & Don (dealing with US arms & Trump’s objectives): Agreed, on all counts.
Two items for consideration:
What does this say to CCP planners wrt Taiwan?
Use Google Earth to look at The Three Gorges Dam; history’s largest glass jaw.
Does anyone think that perhaps the Venezuelan military is simply poorly trained and/or incompetent thus allowing the US to render their defense system ineffective??
You can bet your house that China and Russia will learn from this experience and attempt to develop better defense systems.
The lesson? Don’t sell your junk to untrained, unprofessional gangs?
But if you are going to use your systems in another country (Donbas, Ukraine) have your military (undercover) operate it (to shoot down a civilian airliner).
It’s a mistake to think our success was due, even in part to the lack of training or ability of the Russian/Chinese military hardware. This is just how good our military is. Israel demonstrated it in the 12-day Iran war.
It is a mistake to sit in eastern Washington and think training of the Maduro minions or the equipment they were using had no effect on the outcome.
It is a mistake to think anything om writes adds value to the comments here.
It is a mistake to rely on AI for original thinking. :0
“Anything” and “even in part” used to mean something in journalism.
I subscribe to Rod Dreyer’s substack and he pulled some long quotes from a recent publication that posits that the total failure of the vaunted Russian and Chinese defense systems to stop the US raid in Venezuela signals a sea change in geopolitics. We are now back to the age where nuclear deterrence is the only true power.