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Home » Potemkin: the Odessa steps scene

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<i>Potemkin</i>: the Odessa steps scene — 27 Comments

  1. It didn’t do anything for me, no nuance or subtlety. Like being smacked in the forehead by a 2 x 4.

    I was hoping for a dance or ballet theme.

  2. IrishOtter:

    Yes, I know something about it. I also know that the early years of the 20th Century were a time when many Russian Jews came to the US.

  3. I remember the Odessa steps scene from a film class I took way back in the early 80s. We also watched DW Griffith’s Birth of a Nation and scenes from Leni Reifenstiel’s Triumph of the Will. I don’t imagine they are showing scenes from those films in film class now but maybe I’m wrong.

  4. In the mid seventies the cinemas in LIsbon used to show the Einsenstein movies frequently. What I remember about them is the magnificent music created by Prokofiev for Ivan the Terrible and Alexander Nevsky, which is very pleasant to be enjoyed independently.

  5. I have seen Battleship Potemkin, everything in the Soviet era movies is propaganda.
    I actually watch lots of Russian movies, Soviet era as well.

  6. One of the educational benefits of reading your blog for several years, Neo, is that, while I have always been aware of anti-Jewish pogroms in general, I know a lot more about them now.

  7. One of the places I lived there were tunnels behind the staircases for the Jews to hide during the pogroms of the.Middle Ages

  8. Let me guess; when the Bolsheviks took over the USSR there were no movies made – anywhere – showing them shooting dead any protesters or showing them being tortured and murdered in the Lubyanka prison.

    Anyway, just a wild guess on my part.

    Though Stalin wasn’t all bad; at least he had Trotsky murdered.

  9. On that, Stalin had lots of Bolsheviks murdered. He still is rotting in Hell.
    For all the books I have read on Russian history, a lot too, Trotsky is a dead end, literary, so never bothered with his biography. There is on at a used book store too.

  10. DW Griffith’s Birth of a Nation and scenes from Leni Reifenstiel’s Triumph of the Will.

    DW Griffith’s “Intolerance” always reminded me of Eisenstein, for good reason. It was a major influence and deeply studied in Russia. Griffiths->Eisenstein->Reifenstiel->Chiaureli. I’d say Eisenstein’s particular contribution was using montage to express abstract Marxist ideas.

  11. Interestingly enough, that magnificent almost 200 steps stone staircase leading from the city center down to the sea port has become known as Potemkin Stairs, although it had been built almost a hundred years before the movie came out. As Neo said, it had nothing to do with the events of 1905 nor with Prince Potemkin himself, who had died a few years before the city of Odessa was even built.

    Such was the power of this masterful propaganda that the name stuck for a hundred years. A physical object named after an invented movie scene…

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potemkin_Stairs

  12. Re the Kishiev Pogram: It induced the powerful and influential Jewish-American financier, Jacob Schiff, to organize the New York City banking establishment to provide Japan with the funding it needed to go to war Russia. Once it became clear to Schiff that Russia’s war effort — having started and initially progressed badly, as is so often the case with Russia in times of war — was gathering steam in Manchuria while the Japan was losing momentum, Schiff cut his funding. Which forced Japan, through the energetic efforts of Theodore Roosevelth, to negotiate a settlement with Russia which was highly unfavorable to Japan.

    Japan could not sustain its war effort absent American funding and as a result failed to achieve decisive victory; at the same time the Russian army in Manchuria was growing stronger literally every day due to supplies and reinforcements that were arriving daily in the Far Eastern theater courtesy of the Trans-Siberian railroad. The Russians were preparing and positioning themselves for a counter-offensive that very likely would have overwhelmed Japanese forces, which were steadily dwindling — Japan had not only run out money, it was running out of manpower. It had to end the war and the Japanese were desperate to do so.

    Thus, upon the treaty’s signing (in Portsmouth, NH) Russia’s chief negotiator, Sergei Witte (Count Witte), pronounced himself well satisfied with the outcome, and asserted publicly and with some glee that it was to be regarded as a victory (of sorts) for Russia. The Japanese understood what had happened and were embittered by this outcome for a war in which they had suffered enormous and disproportionate casualties for relatively little material and strategic gain, and they never forgave the United States for its role in forcing the treaty upon them.

    Of course the Japanese in their usual way could not admit to this and convinced themselves that they had won a tremendous victory. Generations of military historians have agreed with them, incorrectly.

    I have argued in published writings that the Japanese, because of their pride and racism and capacity for self delusion, learned all the wrong lessons from the war and misapplied those lessons disastrously in the upcoming war with China and in the Pacific War.*

    Jacob Schiff was the puppet master who pulled all the strings initially for and then against Japan, and the massacre of Russian Jews in Kishniev was what motivated him in either case.

    * One of those lessons improperly learned concerned the use of naval power. The Japanese started what amounted to an undeclared war with a surprise attack on the Russian fleet in Port Arthur. The seeming success of this gambit remained a pillar of Japanese naval doctrine and they repeated it at Pearl Harbor in 1941. Both attacks failed to achieve anything in the way of a decisive results. The Russian fleet in Port Arthur, although crippled, continued to fight, with intermittent success. The slaughter of the Russian fleet at Tsushima has been hailed as one of the most decisive naval victories of all time, but it was anything but — in fact the Battle of Tsushima was an irrelevancy, the outcome of the war having already been more less decided before it took place. Also interesting to note in this regard is that Count Nogi Marasuke, commander of Japanese forces that took Port Arthur, wanted to commit suicide in the aftermath of capture the city to atone for the huge casualties (c. 90,000 KIA) his army suffered in the course of the campaign. The Japanese emperor forbade from doing so, and he obeyed — but only temporarily. Upon the emperor’s death in 1912, Nogi killed himself.

  13. Just a little OT, but time is running out: I have heard no speculation about the impact on the stock market of a Democrat midterm wholesale or partial victory.

    Should the Dems take both the House and Senate, I would assume a market crash, given their announced antipathy toward AI and datacenters, intention to impeach Trump once again, prosecute Musk, and nationalize SpaceX.

    Does Duolingo offer a crash course in Mandarin? Beat the rush!

    Actually if I had to bet, I would bet against a loss of the Senate. But should the market crash, it will be entertaining the hear the media explain how it was Trump’s fault. “Hurrah! – we’ve killed the Golden Goose, and best of all it was the goose’s fault!!”

    More seriously, would such an outcome embolden China to attack Taiwan, assuming Trump to be crippled?

    Ps. Proposed nickname for the Dems… “The Spotless Party”. “Nothing is ever our fault!”

  14. Japan, Russia, Germany, Austria just about every strategic decision they made after 1867 was a stepping stone to disaster.

  15. Not quite. The Wars of German Unification culminating in Germany’s victory over France in the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War was a great success by any and every measure at every level.

  16. Except France wanted Alsace and Lorraine back and got them. 1871 made 1914 inevitable.

  17. Except France wanted Alsace and Lorraine back

    Bismarck knew it would be a problem and didn’t want them. Likewise, Bismarck thought alienating the Russians was a bad idea. I’ll go out on limb and posit that Bismarck didn’t have enough power and influence 🙂

  18. 1871 made 1914 inevitable.

    No it did not. The outbreak of war in August 1914 could have been and should have been prevented. There was nothing “inevitable” about it. As Christopher Clark asserted, the belligerent nations “sleepwalked” their way into the war. This view is representative of the general consensus regarding the descent into war.

    In any case I was responding to the assertion that “every strategic decision they made after 1867 was a stepping stone to disaster.” The German Wars of Unification were undertaken on the basis of sound strategic thinking and decisions by German leaders. As a result of its victories in those wars Germany became a unified nation and, in short order, a world power. They were not stepping stones to the outbreak of war in 1914 except to the extent that every event in history may be casual, i.e. have limited causality, to every event that follows. Call it the “butterfly effect” theory of historical causation. It is not a theory that any reputable historian will espouse. The outbreak of the Great War was only marginally consequent to the Germanification of Alsace-Lorraine.

  19. General consensus is wrong. Of course the war was inevitable. Everyone was planning for it. Everyone. The German army, the Russian army, the French army, the Italian army, the Austrian army all getting bigger and bigger. The German Navy, the Royal navy, the French navy, the Italian navy, the Austrian navy, all getting bigger and bigger. The new Dutch fortifications on the Scheldt estuary in 1912 despite Belgian objections. The Prussians were militaristic shitheads. I have the advantage in that it happened and speculation about how it could have been avoided is just that, speculation.

    Unification was a catastrophe for Germany, Europe and the world. No unification, no Imperial Navy, no turning Britain into a strategic enemy, no France and Germany planning for a war of revenge, no Hail Mary through Belgium, no tens of millions of dead Germans, no wasting the economic output of 70 years on stupidity.

    This is my major area of study. I have my own private strategic modeling system that have been developing for about 50 years. I don’t care if people agree. I have no axe to grind, no books to sell.

  20. You have excellent hindsight, but you are wrong.

    There are only two things in this life that are inevitable:

    Death, and the German counterattack.

  21. But if it has been evaluated or assessed by no one else it may be of little veracity or of no use even if astute.

  22. If a strategic modeling system is only shown to and read by ducks does it exist; a Schrodinger’s Model?

  23. imitation is the sincerest form of flattery

    Whenever you watch an old classic film, especially if groundbreaking effects or styles are used in it, you have to appreciate that you’ve probably seen many other more modern films that have borrowed from it. And some have probably done it better.

    Now the following scene by Brian DePalma, is an entirely different scene, except for the long flights of stairs and the baby carriage. The Untouchables (1987).

    The shorter scene within the scene:
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QJpRSf4q-hI

    Here is the full scene. Just under 9min. I always thought it was too long and drawn out, especially given all the slo-mo editing. Watching it now, I see that DePalma is trying to build an emotional arc, that begins with an almost ho hum level of boredom at the start. Plus the music box music is there to tie you to the mom and baby.
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oxc0FiwY5dY

    This version is interesting. What would it be like without the slo-mo? Here ya go!
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uzBxtNQgiZ4

    In this last one, you can see that there is a ton of rapid action and a tremendous amount of cutting in the montage. Too fast for most people to grasp in a first viewing. Maybe.

    Watching this, I’m reminded Quentin Tarantino’s comments about Hitchcock and DePalma. He didn’t like Hitchcock much, but very much enjoyed DePalma, mainly because Hitchcock was hamstrung by the MPAA morality police. If DePalma wanted graphic sex or violence, he’d put it in. Not that DePalma had complete license. He definitely had difficulties with key violent scenes in Body Double and Dressed to Kill.

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