Demonstrations in Iran – once again
We’ve seen this before, over and over: the people of Iran against the mullahs, the stirrings of hope and defiance, and the suppression of the movement.
Is there any reason to believe the cycle won’t simply repeat itself this time? Turning points in these sorts of revolts tend to occur when the police or military turn on the regime and refuse to enforce order. I haven’t read any sign of that happening in Iran right now, but when it occurs it can be sudden.
Meanwhile:
Independent analysts warned the unrest reflects deeper structural strains. The OSINT research group SpecialEurasia said in an assessment on Tuesday that Iran’s internal stability has reached a “critical threshold,” citing the convergence of currency collapse, renewed international sanctions and chronic water and energy shortages. The group noted that the participation of bazaar merchants, traditionally a pillar of regime support, signals declining confidence in the state’s economic management and raises the risk of prolonged unrest.
There’s also this news:
Reports from across the country indicate that shop owners in other cities, including the western city of Hamedan and the southern island of Qeshm, have also joined the protests by closing their stores. Slogans such as “death to the dictator” and “Seyyed Ali (Khamenei) will be toppled this year,” referring to Iran’s supreme leader, were heard in Qeshm and Zanjan, according to reports. …
Video and pictures coming from different cities in Iran show a heavy police and security force presence at the ongoing protests, with some video showing the police using tear gas against protestors.
That last paragraph – not a good sign.
“Turning points in these sorts of revolts tend to occur when the police or military turn on the regime and refuse to enforce order.”
Hmm…isn’t this what the Democrats and their fellow travelers are trying to do with police in blue cities and states?
This raises a serious question which is “so when do these sorts of uprising result in regime change?” You’ve provided one answer which is when the police or military say “we’re not doing this any more”.
I wonder if another condition is when the uprising is so large and so widespread that those charged with enforcing order can no longer do so. A crude analogy is when there’s a small leak in the ship, you can bail water. But if so much water is gushing in you can’t keep up and the ship sinks.
Why do some popular uprisings work and others don’t?
That’s part of the risk faced by citizens who have had enough of the current regime. If two hundred people protest today, three hundred tomorrow, the police and the army can just arrest and suppress us. But what if we have one hundred thousand protest today in this city, another two hundred thousand protest in another city, and so on? Then the police and military run out of options. What are they going to do? Gun down millions across the country? Withdraw and just drop bombs?
I was given a mini-sabbatical in 2010 and spent four weeks traveling through China visiting people we knew from when they were studying or doing research here in Louisiana. I will neither confirm nor deny that some of my Chinese friends briefly talked about Tienanmen Square. They have friends who just vanished. And to this day even people who live in the People’s Republic don’t know exactly what happened.
Some regimes are extremely effective at suppressing dissent.
I am curious why Israel does not destroy the Iranian oil fields. They showed during the 12 day war that their warplanes can bomb Iran without any interference by the Iran air defenses.
Here is what Grok says:
Israel has historically refrained from directly bombing Iran’s oil fields or broader energy infrastructure as a deliberate strategic choice, though this shifted somewhat during escalations in mid-2025. Below, I’ll outline the key reasons based on recent analyses, while noting the exceptions where strikes did occur.
Historical and Strategic Restraint
For decades, despite ongoing tensions—including Iran’s support for proxy groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, and mutual covert operations—Israel avoided targeting Iran’s oil sector. This restraint stems from several interconnected factors:
• Risk of Catastrophic Escalation: Striking oil fields could provoke a full-scale regional war. Iran might respond by closing the Strait of Hormuz (through which ~20% of global oil flows), launching missile barrages, or intensifying attacks via proxies. Both sides recognize that prolonged conflict would be mutually destructive, with Israel facing high economic and military costs (e.g., daily war expenses in the hundreds of millions of dollars and potential munitions shortages). Experts note this as a form of calculated deterrence: Israel’s air superiority could cripple Iran’s oil exports, but Iran could retaliate asymmetrically, threatening regime stability in Tehran and broader chaos.
• Global Economic Fallout: Iran’s oil production (around 3.4 million barrels per day in 2025) is a critical revenue source for the regime, funding its military and proxies. Bombing it would spike global oil prices, disrupt supplies, and cause economic turmoil worldwide—including for Israel’s allies. For instance, even limited strikes in 2025 led to a 9% rise in oil prices initially. This could invite international backlash, including from the UN or via sanctions mechanisms, and strain Israel’s economy amid recovery from prior conflicts.
• Pressure from Allies, Especially the US: The US has repeatedly urged Israel to avoid energy targets to prevent oil market volatility and wider conflict. This influence was evident in earlier 2024-2025 exchanges, where Israel focused on military, nuclear, or proxy sites instead. Restraint here serves as a “threat in reserve,” signaling capability without immediate use, while preserving diplomatic support.
• Military and Operational Priorities: Israel prioritizes threats like Iran’s nuclear program or direct military assets over economic targets. Strikes on oil would require significant resources (e.g., long-range missions with refueling), and Israel’s capabilities, while advanced (including nuclear submarines), are better suited for precision hits rather than widespread infrastructure destruction. In past operations, such as October 2024 airstrikes, Israel deliberately spared oil and nuclear sites to send a message of dominance without full escalation.
Exceptions: Strikes in June 2025
Despite this pattern, Israel did target some Iranian oil and gas infrastructure during a major escalation in June 2025, marking a first in decades of rivalry. These occurred after Israel hit Iranian military and nuclear sites on June 13, prompting Iranian retaliation:
• South Pars Gas Field (offshore, Bushehr province): Struck on June 14, halting a production platform (12 million cubic meters/day) and causing fires. This field accounts for two-thirds of Iran’s gas output and ~20% of global reserves; disruptions risked domestic blackouts costing $250 million daily.
• Fajr Jam Gas Plant (Bushehr): Hit around the same time, processing South Pars gas and vital for national fuel.
• Shahran Fuel Depot (Tehran): Targeted on June 14, a major storage hub with 260 million liters capacity, critical for fuel distribution.
• Shahr Rey Oil Refinery (south of Tehran): A fuel tank fire reported on June 14 (Iran disputed the cause), with a capacity of 225,000 barrels/day.
These attacks were limited and aimed at pressuring Iran without fully crippling exports, amid warnings from Israel’s defense minister. However, they did not lead to a broader oil crisis—global prices stabilized lower than pre-attack levels by late June, partly because Iran avoided retaliating against oil supplies. Post-June, no further major oil strikes have been reported as of December 2025, with both sides de-escalating to avoid economic collapse (e.g., Iran’s oil revenues reportedly fell to 15% of expectations by November).
In summary, Israel’s general avoidance of Iran’s oil fields is driven by a desire to prevent uncontrollable escalation and economic harm, while maintaining leverage. The 2025 strikes were an outlier in a tit-for-tat phase, but even then, they were selective rather than comprehensive. Geopolitical dynamics could shift this in the future, depending on Iranian actions or US policy.
Tehran, Iran’s capital, is facing severe water shortages due to decades of water mismanagement and recent droughts. So much so that:
______________________________________
On November 20, 2025, President Masoud Pezeshkian said in a speech in Qazvin that Iran’s capital must be moved because the country “no longer has a choice”. He said that there are parts of the capital that sink up to 30 centimeters [~12″] per year and that Tehran is facing a catastrophe. A potential site for relocation could be Makran, something that Iranian government has been considering since January 2025.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tehran_water_shortage
–“Tehran residents film their daily lives as Iran faces devastating drought”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CsD8WhhUCIk
______________________________________
This is extremely serious. It’s a pity Iran spent so much money on its nuclear weapons program, making war on Israel and hating the West, particularly America, instead of taking care of its own country and people.
It’s a good thing Israel and the US took out its nuclear program. I’d hate to think how Iran would have used those weapons to blackmail the world or start a nuclear war.
The key is the regular armed forces, they at the least must be intensely jealous of the IRGC. The protesters need them to take on the IRGC. If the IRGC wins they rule not the mullahs.
I’m trying to be optimistic about Iran. 1) Remember Nicolae Ceau?escu was firmly in power when lo and behold on Christmas Day 1989 he was overthrown and quickly executed. As you alluded to Neo, the military turned against him. Too late for a Christmas Miracle but we haven’t had Orthodox Christmas yet. (yes, facetious) I’m reminded of this because (I think it was you, Neo) of an article I read about the phenomenon of Preference Cascade. 2) Obama was president when Iran experienced significant turmoil some years back. He did nothing. Although Trump may not be able to do anything to facilitate an overthrow, I’ve learned over the years to not underestimate him. (See: election day, 2016 etc, etc)
Ironically the spark that started the Romanian uprising was a perceived injustice done to a Roman Catholic priest. Romania is overwhelmingly Romanian Orthodox. The Preference Cascade was ready and waiting.
The regime of the mullahs in Iran began before my children’s births. May it end. The same to the Communist regime in China, which began the year of my own birth. I’d like to see the end of that before my own.
Many dictatorships, at least since the beginning of the twentieth century, have had two armed forces. One is the regular army (and navy and air force) in the conventional sense, oriented outward. The other belongs to the Party. The MVD/NKVD/MGB/FSB in Russia have all maintained at least a cadre for light infantry forces to offset any issues there may be with the regulars and to maintain internal security.
The Germans had the Wehrmacht and the, among others, SS. It was later that the SS was showing up wiht conventionally organized combat units. Once the war(s) get started, the internal guys are running around shooting deserters or setting up machine guns behind regular units to make sure they attack as ordered.
The IRGC is the internal force and is probably well-enough armed on a small unit level. But they are unlikely to be able to take on the regulars all at once. They have to nip in the bud any irregularities they might see.
So the regulars overthrowing the regime would be both unlikely–coordinating would be difficult withhout the IRGC hearing it getting started. Then local enforcement prior to aid from other regular formations.
But we aren’t doing landlines and FM radio any longer. Or not entirely. If every squad leader in the regular army was on his cell phone at the same time…what’s to do. And they might be because….something happening in a given place can be spread faster than the origin can be shut down.
And maybe not all of the IRGC guys will show up as ordered. Everybody has relatives who may be getting the shorter and shorter end of the stick. And Iran’s basic culture is not Arab.
Bill Wilson asked why the oil fields haven’t been attacked.
If/when the mullahs are overthrown, the new regime will need a source of funds. Oil is the most readily available. If the oil fields are destroyed, a new regime may fail if it can’t keep the lights on. Then, you have a destitute failed state.
Thus, keeping the oil fields intact is an investment in the future.
Jimmy was a real dumbass.
RELATED, from JNS TV “It’s Happening! Iranians Take To Streets, Call For End of Khamenei” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0tWX3Jf1gzM
Middle East analyst Harold Rhode joins IDF Spokesman (Res.) Doron Spielman to unpack why today’s protests may be different, why Iranians are shouting “Death to Khamenei” in the streets and how secret coordination between President Trump, Prime Minister Netanyahu and the Mossad may be fanning the flames.
The protesters have won, what they’ve won is to be seen. This changed everything.
I saw reports this morning that police or troops have been firing on protesters. If the military doesn’t support the uprising, it will fail.
Kate
Somebody was firiing. If it was regular army troops, that’s one thing. If it’s IRGC oir similar internal security forces as military-like formations, it’s another.