What did NATO promise Russia?
Ever since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, I’ve noticed certain assertions made by some commenters here and around the blogosphere. They are often stated as though they are self-evident truths, unnecessary to document.
Most people in the US – and that includes me – have not previously obsessively followed the history of Ukraine or of NATO and Russia. So it’s easy to just accept as fact that which is repetitively and authoritatively stated as such. But are such things actually true?
I’m going to try to deal with just one of them today. There are others I hope to tackle at another time.
Russia keeps saying – and many US commenters keep repeating – that NATO promised not to expand eastward – but was there ever such a promise? Let’s look at this article from 2014:
The West’s supposed violation of a pledge not to enlarge NATO has long figured as a key element in Putin’s narrative about (and against) the Alliance. In his bombastic February 2007 speech to the Munich Security Conference, he said:
“And we have the right to ask: against whom is this [NATO] expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our Western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? … I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr. Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time that: ‘the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee.’ Where are these guarantees?”
The Russian president returned to the subject in his March 18, 2014, Kremlin speech justifying Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea: “… they [Western leaders] have lied to us many times, made decisions behind our backs, placed before us an accomplished fact. This happened with NATO’s expansion to the east, as well as the deployment of military infrastructure at our borders.” Although it has been clear for several years that the Alliance has no appetite for putting Ukraine on a membership track, Putin went on to express horror at the prospect of NATO forces in Crimea: Russian inaction “would have meant that NATO’s navy would be right there in this city of Russia’s military glory [Sevastopol], and this would create not an illusory but a perfectly real threat to the whole of southern Russia.”
[But] Western leaders never pledged not to enlarge NATO, a point that several analysts have demonstrated. Mark Kramer explored the question in detail in a 2009 article in The Washington Quarterly. He drew on declassified American, German and Soviet records to make his case and noted that, in discussions on German reunification in the two-plus-four format (the two Germanys plus the United States, Soviet Union, Britain and France), the Soviets never raised the question of NATO enlargement other than how it might apply in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR)…
We now have a very authoritative voice from Moscow confirming this understanding. Russia behind the Headlines has published an interview with Gorbachev, who was Soviet president during the discussions and treaty negotiations concerning German reunification. The interviewer asked why Gorbachev did not “insist that the promises made to you [Gorbachev]—particularly U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s promise that NATO would not expand into the East—be legally encoded?” Gorbachev replied: “The topic of ‘NATO expansion’ was not discussed at all, and it wasn’t brought up in those years. … Another issue we brought up was discussed: making sure that NATO’s military structures would not advance and that additional armed forces would not be deployed on the territory of the then-GDR after German reunification. Baker’s statement was made in that context… Everything that could have been and needed to be done to solidify that political obligation was done. And fulfilled.”…
To be sure, the former Soviet president criticized NATO enlargement and called it a violation of the spirit of the assurances given Moscow in 1990, but he made clear there was no promise regarding broader enlargement.
Make of that what you will. I know what I make of it is that there was no such promise.
What’s more [emphasis mine]:
Several years after German reunification, in 1997, NATO said that in the “current and foreseeable security environment” there would be no permanent stationing of substantial combat forces on the territory of new NATO members. Up until the Russian military occupation of Crimea in March [2014], there was virtually no stationing of any NATO combat forces on the territory of new members. Since March, NATO has increased the presence of its military forces in the Baltic region and Central Europe.
So it appears that Russian soldiers in Crimea constituted the writing on the wall for NATO. It was Russian military action in Crimea that signaled a change in the previous “security environment,” and that in turn triggered changes in NATO.
The article ends like this. Remember, it was written in 2014 [emphasis mine]:
Putin is not stupid, and his aides surely have access to the former Soviet records from the time and understand the history of the commitments made by Western leaders and NATO. But the West’s alleged promise not to enlarge the Alliance will undoubtedly remain a standard element of his anti-NATO spin. That is because it fits so well with the picture that the Russian leader seeks to paint of an aggrieved Russia, taken advantage of by others and increasingly isolated—not due to its own actions, but because of the machinations of a deceitful West.
It also fits in very well with various narratives from the US left and sections of the US right on how the US double crosses everyone (which it sometimes does do, particularly during the Obama and Biden administrations). The line is picked up by many politicians, pundits, bloggers, and commenters all around the blogosphere and the media as well as social media.
It’s interesting that Putin’s claim of such a promise, and such a promise violated, is taken at face value by so many Americans. I’m certainly not one to automatically trust what the US says, but I’m even less likely to trust Putin and in this case I believe the facts run mostly against the tale Putin tells.
It is very nebulous as I learned listening to this MartyrMade podcast yesterday. He goes through the various meetings on the subject since the fall of the Soviet Union. Regardless of promise or not (some made them and some specifically didn’t care if one was made or not made), one thing seems to be clear to the speaker: Russia considers putting NATO weaponry and troops on its border to be provocation.
Some may say “but that’s already happened”. Sure, but that doesn’t mean it wasn’t seen as a provocation, just that Russia may not have been able to respond to the provocation. In the case of Ukraine, the point being made is that the talk of accepting Ukraine into NATO is provocation. Understanding this is important for negotiating an end to war. Those, such as some Republican leaders, suggesting we should just make Ukraine part of NATO in response to Russia’s invasion (or worse, just create a no-fly zone) are, in my view, escalating tensions between the US and Russia. I don’t even accept that doing so to gain a position of strength in negotiations is worth that escalation. We have strength economically, so let us not bring in military options. That was Putin’s mistake, so let us not make our mistake as well.
Finally, for clarity to neo’s last paragraph; I don’t think a clear promise was made to Putin nor should he have believed it unless approved by the Senate. As neo says, don’t automatically trust what the US says, particularly what any administration says, as our politics are too volatile for that, hence the difference between an agreement and a treaty. I’m not even sure you can trust treaties. Do you trust our government with our own Constitution?
IF the threat of NATO expansion in Ukraine was really the reason for Putin’s invasion, then Zelensky’s very clear statements in recent days that Ukraine will NOT be joining Nato will cause Russian withdrawal, right? Right?
I am hopeful that Zelensky agreeing to neutrality for Ukraine will break the impasse and allow Russia to back away with the two small Russian speaking enclaves (although they might not be as enthusiastic since being shelled) as the only conquest. The chickenhawks in the US Senate, like Romney, seem to be determined on further provocation (no fly zones) but I hope sanity will prevail.
I think that some of the measures taken against Putin will cause serious harm to us. Meanwhile, Biden’s regime asks Russia to help with the surrender to Iran. And Biden is probably shocked that the Saudis won’t take his phone call.
“Two Paintings by Aivazovsky Banned in Russia Since 1892”
https://allinnet.info/history/two-paintings-by-aivazovsky-banned-in-russia-since-1892/
Nothing has changed in Russia since then..
Not being willing to trust Putin is sensible, but why should anyone trust the MSM (wrong about every single story, large and small, since 2016, and, of course, even before that), when the clear intent is to induce a hysterical frenzy in the citizenry (as was done with Trump and impeachment, the Wuhan-virus, BLM thuggery, the “insurrection” of J6, and now a convenient new “moral panic” over Ukraine) in order to distract from far more important domestic concerns? John Nolte (at Breitbart) has warned that this is all about the midterms and that foolish and gullible members of GOPe seem, sadly, more than willing to fall for such an obvious strategy of deception, Mount Rushmore, 9/11 and Pearl Harbor having all been scripted into Zelensky’s manipulative performance today.
Kate:
How true.
Vlad should be rolling back to Russia already because he can now sleep easy.
But of course the statement will be viewed as of no value by Vlad’s apologists because, corruption, or Dravos, or Schwab, or whatever. All sorts of allowances and rationalizations extended to Vlad. To the west? Self loathing at best.
Understanding this is important for negotiating an end to war.
No it isn’t. This was never about NATO. If Putin needs a face-saving provision in any agreement, some blather about NATO may be useful. That presupposes his actual aims are set on the back burner again.
Thanks for the link, Zara A. For Russians outside the elites, not much difference between the Tsars, the Soviets, and the current oligarchy/fascism.
As I’ve said before here, I don’t agree with the concept that it was NATO expansion or the mere threat of NATO expansion that was a big reason that Putin decided to invade Ukraine. I believe he has wanted to bring Ukraine back into the Russian sphere since the fall of the Soviet Union, regardless of NATO expansion. He was just waiting for the right time to do so, when he felt he could do it with the least amount of fuss and minimum danger of any kind of retribution from the West. NATO was never a existential threat to a sedentary Russia. There was never any chance of NATO actually invading Russia (although ironically there might be now).
All that said, I also don’t believe that anyone who disagrees with my thinking is necessarily a “TRAITOR!1!!” either (Tucker Carlson for example).
If “blather” about NATO gives Putin a face-saving way to bail out of a disaster, so much the better. We’ll see. Concerns about the scope of Russian military casualties and about the toll on the countryside are not hallmarks of Russian military history.
• Pretty sure most of the public does not know NATO’s: a) “Open Door” policy, b) process for adding new members, or c) what the MAPS categories are – but it is unlikely Russia and the Ukraine do not.
• Which means both Russia and Ukraine are both aware that Ukraine cannot meet the requirements for NATO membership (e.g., territorial disputes, rule of law/ corruption, fully support).
Note: the Ukrainian government’s support for NATO membership has changed dramatically several times since their independence.
• Over the years NATO has chosen diplomacy by avoiding public statements of denial; while letting their actions communicate the reality (i.e., not offering Ukraine a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), or participation in NATO Accession talks).
• The public may not understand this, but Russia does and they know that NATO made no promises.
• But until NATO and the Ukraine admit the true reality, Russia has a valuable “public perception card” to play.
***
NATO’s “open door policy” is based upon Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, which states that membership is open to any “European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area”.
The Membership Action Plan, which is a practical manifestation of the Open Door, is divided into five chapters. These chapters are:
Political and Economic issues
Defence/Military issues
Resource issues
Security issues
Legal issues
I know Neo totally discounts anything this guy says, but I think he has given a very balanced update on the combat situation. Be sure to watch the entire thing to get to complete balance of what he is saying.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Igq2fqa7RY4
I don’t feel like it required any “promise”.
This about sums up the position of anyone who is not particularly in favor of going to war with Russia over Ukraine:
https://amgreatness.com/2022/03/14/the-architects-of-our-present-disaster/
And just because no average person in the west believes NATO would ever invade Russia (you can totes believe us).
Nobody would ever have believed Canada would put people in jail, confiscate their property, or lock their bank accounts for protesting the government, either.
And yet, here we are.
deadrody:
I disagree on several counts.
The first is that Trudeau’s actions in Canada were unsurprising and could have easily been predicted, for anyone paying attention the last couple of years to events in that country as well as events even in this country especially after Jan 6, 2021.
The second is that even were that not the case, two “mostly unbelievable” things would not be equally unbelievable.
Kate: Well, Putin may be believing Zelensky, as Putin seems ready to negotiate an end to war based on Ukraine neutrality. Seems like your reasoning is sound.
physicsguy:
I don’t focus on any reports from either side about the actual military progress or lack thereof of Russia in taking over Ukraine. I also don’t trust analysts about it because of the difficulty of getting reliable information. Someone is probably doing a good job evaluating what’s going on, but who that someone is I don’t know.
I do know that of all the sources I don’t trust – in other words, pretty much all the sources – I don’t trust the Russians the most, followed by random internet military “experts.”
Don’t forget Russia’s violation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). Through that treaty the Reagan administration defused the USSR deployment of SS-20 nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe to intimidate our NATO allies. INF banned the possession or development of such missiles by both the US and USSR (and later Russia, as successor to the latter). Putin violated the INF by developing new missiles. The Obama administration tried to negotiate the Russians back into compliance but failed; Russia then deployed SSC-8 missiles in violation of the Treaty, in an apparent effort to intimidate European NATO members. Trump withdrew from the INF in 2019.
that guy: Well put. And it doesn’t help when our VP makes gaffes that suggests Ukraine is already part of NATO. It shows she doesn’t understand MAP or reality, and she is there “to help”.
Art: My response to you would essentially be what Kate wrote at 3:49pm. I said at the beginning of this, and still believe, that Putin wants control over Ukraine’s oil fields. The same arguments vis-a-vis NATO were made in regards to Georgia (Georgia had undergone a coup, the new leadership said they would seek NATO membership, which wouldn’t happen as “that guy” notes due to membership requirements, yet Russia rolled the tanks in), and Russia left with a new border that conveniently included a major oil pipeline value now residing inside Russian territory, just in case they decided to walk over and close said valve at a future date. I’m sure Putin has alternative reasons, but he convinced many people, particularly the troops fighting the war, that this is about NATO.
deadrody:
You write “this about sums up the position of anyone who is not particularly in favor of going to war with Russia over Ukraine,” and give this link.
I read that article already earlier today, and I disagree. I am not in favor of going to war with Russia over Ukraine, nor are most of the commenters here, and yet I disagree vehemently with that article. It’s basically the right’s version of the sort of “everything is America’s fault” reasoning the left usually specializes in.
By the way, for what it’s worth, the author’s moniker “Benjamin Braddock” is the name of the main character in the movie “The Graduate.”
Leland:
And he has also convinced many people on the right that this war is about NATO.
It’s basically the right’s version of the sort of “everything is America’s fault” reasoning the left usually specializes in.
The entire palaeo / unz approach to the discussion of foreign affairs replicates that of the red haze left. They’re seldom academicians, so they’re less loquacious and manipulative. The palaeo / unz types also attribute much to Joo wirepullers operating domestically, whereas the red haze types stop with loathing Israel.
For Russians outside the elites, not much difference between the Tsars, the Soviets, and the current oligarchy/fascism.
Rubbish.
I said at the beginning of this, and still believe, that Putin wants control over Ukraine’s oil fields.
You should believe something else. Fuel exports from the Ukraine bounce around a set point of $1 bn a year. The discounted present value of that is what? You couldn’t make a business case for an invasion for that prize even if they weren’t putting Kiev under siege.
Russia left with a new border that conveniently included a major oil pipeline value now residing inside Russian territory, just in case they decided to walk over and close said valve at a future date.
Russia seized South Ossetia, which has a population of about 55,000. The Abkhaz militias co-operating with Russia ran a successful ethnic cleansing extravaganza on a much larger scale than the occupation of South Ossetia. There were a number of violent disputes in the Caucasus in 1991-94, to which you might add the Transnistria dispute. These are of a different character than Putin’s operations in the Ukraine.
Don’t forget Russia’s violation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF).
Good point.
I’m sure Putin has complicated reasons for what he has done. A desire to build up Mother Russia is one. The opportunity provided by the stolen US election is another. It shows we are just as corrupt as Russia or Ukraine. Talk about NATO expansion is probably another, no matter what the treaty says. Even a large proportion of Democrats agree that Putin would not have done this if Trump was in office. Oil prices and self sufficiency are two reasons. The weakness shown by Obama retreads who ask Russian help with Iran while calling Putin a “war criminal.”
Who said what to whom is irrelevant. The fact, the only fact that really matters to the Russians, is that the Soviet Union suffered 24 million deaths in WWII.
https://www.nationalww2museum.org/students-teachers/student-resources/research-starters/research-starters-worldwide-deaths-world-war
They will not allow foreign armies on their borders. Would you?
Roy Lofquist:
Unless Russia takes over all of Europe and parts of Asia, there will always be foreign armies on Russia’s borders. So I guess Russia will have to invade and subdue much of the world.
And NATO’s supposedly broken promise is a major Putin talking point, so its truth or falsehood is relevant to what’s going on now.
Europe also suffered quite a few deaths in that same war, I hear tell. But no one is invading Russia. Russia is doing the invading here.
They will not allow foreign armies on their borders. Would you?
Every country has foreign armies on its borders unless it’s an island. So, what’s Russia’s next move, try to conquer China?
Too me, being a Old Guy and not a military expert, Putin wants as much of the Ukraine as he can get. NATO is only a pretext for his actions.
We do have foreign armies, being the Armies of their own country, on our borders. I know your point about the number of deaths suffered by Russian, but NATO is not an aggressor organization.
We will see if Ukrainian offer to be neutral, no NATO, will placate Putin. But since one of his stated aims was to destroy the NAZIS in Ukraine will he forget about this.
I’m sure Putin has complicated reasons for what he has done.
I’m not.
neo states, “Russia keeps saying – and many US commenters keep repeating – that NATO promised not to expand eastward – but was there ever such a promise?”
Given our current circumstances, any answering evidence, whether negative or positive is subject to cautious skepticism in accepting it as true.
That said, there is this: “NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard”
“Declassified documents show security assurances against NATO expansion to Soviet leaders from Baker, Bush, Genscher, Kohl, Gates, Mitterrand, Thatcher, Hurd, Major, and Woerner”
(http://nsarchive.gwu.edu).
https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early
Nor did those assurances stop with Gorbachev.
“Russia is actually challenging core values for security, and demanding that NATO should withdraw all forces and infrastructure from almost half of our members. And they have stated that if we don’t meet their demands, there will be “military-technical consequences.” So, we have to take this seriously. And that’s exactly why we are now deploying the NATO Response Force, for the first time in a collective defence context.” (NATO’s Virtual Summit, Feb 25, 2022)” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg
“Stoltenberg is right. Russia is challenging NATO’s core values on security, and demanding that Alliance roll back its forces and infrastructure from Russia’s doorstep. What Stoltenberg fails to mention is that NATO expansion poses an existential threat to Russia by placing missile sites, military bases and combat troops on its border. He also fails to mention that NATO expansion violates agreements (to which all of the NATO members are signatories) stipulating that all parties to the agreement will refrain from any action that could affect the security interests of the other members.
In Istanbul (1999) and in Astana (2010), the US and the other 56 countries in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) signed documents “that contained interrelated principles to ensure the indivisibility of security.”
What that means in practical terms, is that nations cannot put military bases and missile sites in locations that pose a threat to other members. It means that parties must refrain from using their respective territories to carry out or assist armed aggression against other members. It means that parties are prohibited from acting in a manner that runs counter to the principles laid out in the treaty. It means that Ukraine cannot become a member of NATO if its membership poses a threat to Russian security.”
https://www.unz.com/mwhitney/did-nato-just-declare-war-on-russia/
Here are the key words highlighted in the above: “all parties to the agreement will refrain from any action that could affect the security interests of the other members”
The word “could” reflects a required provision for the legitimacy of a contemplated move by either party, one that if achieved, would provide the capability of affecting the security interests of the other party to the agreement, if that party choose to do so at any point after achieving its contemplated move. SPAIN joining NATO easily met that provision. NATO planting itself at the closest point to Russia’s border clearly from a strategic military perspective violates that provision.
Again, Geoffrey, the text itself.
Roy
The numbers dead in WW I and the western-supported Russian Civil War, and Napoleon’s invasion have not, to my knowledge, been counted even inaccurately. Unlikely anything can be found out prior to WW I, if that.
But huge would be the starting point and, as I’ve said before, baked into Russia’s DNA.
Yeah. Paranoid about foreign armies and borders would be expected.
However, the next question is whether we could expect them to agree to something like the demilitarized Rhineland of Versailles’ infamy. Maybe a hundred miles from the border.
Having their armies on the border and the potential victims’ not strikes me as a potential problem.
I read that article already earlier today, and I disagree. I am not in favor of going to war with Russia over Ukraine, nor are most of the commenters here, and yet I disagree vehemently with that article. It’s basically the right’s version of the sort of “everything is America’s fault” reasoning the left usually specializes in.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
I’d sure be curious which parts you would factually disagree with. Summarizing it “the right’s version of everything is the US’ fault” doesn’t qualify. Why anyone would trust the US based on our disastrous foreign policy of the last 20 years, I have no idea. Not to mention that we promised Ukraine we’d protect them if they gave up their nukes and we’ve also hung them out to dry as well.
We’ve done literally nothing to bring Russia into the fold of first world nations other than treat them like they were still the USSR, but with a big checkbook we can get a cut of.
@Neo & Richard,
OK. You win the debate. I award you the prize. It remains that the shooting will stop when the Russians are certain that Ukraine won’t join NATO.
@Roy Lofquist
I get a bit sick about the endless banging on about the however many dead “Russia” suffered in WWII, particularly when being used to try and explain away the Kremlin’s motives
The fact is, such staggering deaths should move us, but they should not blind us. In particular, it is worth noting the staggering death tolls caused before the first Nazi boot stepped on Soviet soil caused by the Soviet Kremlin’s determination to force its control over its people in things like forced collectivization, and over others such as wars of aggression and skirmishes going back to the Russian Civil War, of which the Molotov-Ribbentrop aggressions were only the cherry on top of the bloody sundae.
There is also the fact that the reason most of those Soviets died or were murdered was because of the Soviet Union’s two track policy of supporting illegal German rearmament on a truly massive scale (which only Slowed with Hitler’s ascension of power but did not stop) in the hopes of destroying the Versailles Peace Settlement, and simultaneously scapegoating the Germans in the hopes of acquiring concessions from the West and its neighbors. This ultimately helped forge a war machine that would conquer most of Western Europe and- after a brief interlude in which Hitler sought to bring the Soviets fully into the Axis (which Molotov agreed to but demanded terms that are pretty modest by totalitarian standards yet Hitler viewed as unacceptable)- turned on his partner in crime with Barbarossa.
It still astounds me the amount of mental jumping jacks that some Soviet apologists or believers in the Russian cult of victimology (not saying you are one of either Roy but I have run into those who are) will do to try and gloss the nightmare that is Molotov-Ribbentrop, down to claiming it was to “buy time” for an “inevitable confrontation” or to gain “buffer territory”.
Which does not fit with what we know of a Soviet strategic planning at the time and also involved destroying the sovereign nations and the militaries lying between Germany and the Soviet Union in exchange for modest gains across the frontier that turned out to be spread out and indefensible, made worse by Stalin’s rather idiotic attempt to make a forward defense of all of it.
Also, while under normal circumstances we might chalk this up to a fluke caused by the peculiarities of Soviet ideology and the world revolution, coupled with Soviets not recognizing how successful the Nazis would be (which is true) and not appreciating the consequences…. You have to realize that this actually happened AFTER WWI. In which the Germans and their Allies not only defeated Russia (helping to sponsor a putsch by a little known terrorist party led by some guy nicknamed Lenin), but also responded to Lenin’s attempts to delay a formal end to the war in the hopes of causing exhaustion and collapse by hitting him again, in the little known but remarkable Operation Faustschlag that basically helped create the outlines of the map we still see today and which came close to Moscow, threatening the existence of the Bolshevik government.
https://cumbria.gov.uk/elibrary/Content/Internet/542/795/4313116190.PDF
So the Bolsheviks knew this. And yet they continued to feed the beast.
Nor is this some kind of fluke. The partitions of Poland destroyed what had been a corrupt, rather weak, and mostly Russian-vassalized realm into territory controlled by Russia, Austria, and Prussia. This would prove to be a surprisingly durable settlement lasting for more than a century of decentish cooperation between the partitioners, but it still brought the armies of Austria and what would become Germany ip to the Russian border and helped set the stage for WWI.
And if I wished I could go back more, such as to a similar de facto partition of Ukraine and Belarus by Tsarist Russian and the at the time much stronger Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the mid 17th century, leading to the creatively named “The Ruin” era of the Wild Fields. And so on.
So this is actually a fairly common foreign policy for Russian regimes down the centuries.
So let us dispense with the idea that “They will not allow foreign armies on their borders. Would you?”
“They” as in the Russian people have little to no say about foreign policy or even domestic policy in their own country, as OMON have kindly been reminding they and us. Which brings us to the Kremlin, which in its various forms has been disturbingly willing to make deals to allow foreign armies on its borders so long as it can make gains in the short to medium term.
The problem it faces with NATO is less fear of direct invasion (though I am sure that Putin and much of the Russian leadership does fear that) but a crippling of its strategic operations for maneuver in Eastern Europe, from an Alliance that has proven frustratingly difficult to divide and that thus far has refused to outright break. One where the Kremlin cannot reach a hand out to the likes of Berlin, Paris, or DC for a carve up or partition of what lies between them, and whose critical mass threatens to defeat them in a conventional (or unconventional) war. And worse, one tbst seems to still have room for growth by attracting new nations (or if you are really cynical, at least their political leadership).
There is also how this handicaps Putin etc.’s ability to threaten “their near abroad.” A close look at the nations in the former Soviet Union and WP that expedited NATO membership and those that tried to choose a path of neutrality and nonalignment is telling, especially when we see which nations have wound up at war thanks to Russian troops marching around in them or meddling with “separatists”.
I agree with physicsguy’s source that if the Baltic Three or Poland had not joined NATO, we would probably be seeing this kind of nonsense or worse with them.
Another thing that tends to get left out of discussions is the degree to which I would say the assorted “Muscovite” regimes have cultivated what I’d call a cult or Russian victim hood in order to justify well… whatever it is they need to do at a given moment. It also is hard to understate the influence this has not just on the Russians but also on foreign commenters (even those we might regard as “Russophobic” or “Cold Warriors” like Kennan, who made this one remark in his Article X/ Long Telegram about Russians being a nation of peaceful farmers in close proximity to warlike steppe nomads, which sounds convincing if you start Russian history with the Mongols or have never heard of people like Sviatoslav “The Brave” (and to be fair most people have not, especially outside of Russia).
I imagine most people who have never read Russian sources could probably guess a lot of the major beats of this narrative. Mongols, The Yoke, Time of Troubles, Poles in Moscow,
Swedes, Ottoman raiders, WWI, WWII, etc.
Like most great narratives there is a lot of truth to this- since most Russians really are more or less peaceful farmers who have routinely gotten screwed over by invaders, particularly nightmares like the Mongols and Nazis- but it’s also the equivalent of autotuning music so it sounds “right”
And uniform but with historiography, airbrushing out the inconvenient parts of the picture that do not fit so well with the constant narrative of Russians as perennial victims or God’s Nation endlessly attacked by the Other.
And in particular it erases the need to account for anybody else’s legitimate interests or defenses in the picture such as say the Estonians.
As well as inconvenient facts like how the Kremlin throughout history will gladly add new foreign armies on its border (sometimes obsessively) if it can expand said borders.
Art,
I presume you missed my reply on the other thread to that objection. Scroll down far enough and you’ll see the pdf links to those documents.
If Putin is lying, presenting the potential or likely move east into Ukraine of NATO as his motivation for this war, why has no one called his bluff by asserting, unequivocally, and offering to put it in writing that Ukraine will be the new Switzerland and NATO will never move east from where it currently exists?
Maybe Kamala Harris can read the Gorbachev interview to Putin and then say “Exact words!” in a Jan Brady voice.
I’ve seen rumblings about negotiations, with the Russians allegedly calling for Ukrainian neutrality and a reduced military. Neutrality, okay, but Ukraine clearly needs a strong defensive military since it just got invaded.
Another historical perspective: “Russia’s belief in Nato ‘betrayal’ – and why it matters today”
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/12/russias-belief-in-nato-betrayal-and-why-it-matters-today
Kate,
All things considered, if a treaty proscribes offensive weapon systems, I support it.
Steve Walsh,
I myself have asked that question. Perhaps I missed a response or perhaps, my fading memory is at fault.
If I may be so bold. I think much of the confusion is based upon different interpretations of similar facts.
Assurances may have been given informally that NATO would not expand eastward. And in fact it appears that Ukraine would be unable to meet NATO requirements in any event.
And still in the Trilateral accords and the Budapest Memorandum security assurances were granted. In exchange for security and border agreements.
I have no love of Biden and think he is an imbecile regardless of his current situation. But generations of conflicting messaging and agreements only confuse the manner further.
The problem as I see it is that we are damned if we do and damned if we dont.
Openly defend the Ukraine and risk a full scale confrontation. Which our idiotic security apparatus undermines regularly. For instance if Putin is the crazed as they have implied. Then the confrontation they apparently want would be suicidal against him. If he is a rational actor then you could logically assist in defending without risking nuclear war.
And yet if we ultimately choose to sit on the sidelines. Good luck convincing other nations to give up nuclear weapons when their government collapses.
I frankly have no idea which way we should go on this. But I think Obama was right in that we should not underestimate Biden’s ability to fuck things up
I presume you missed my reply on the other thread to that objection. Scroll down far enough and you’ll see the pdf links to those documents.
I’ve already replied to you and skimmed all 30 documents. Again, they do not support the position you have taken.
steve walsh:
Perhaps because the Ukrainians don’t want to be Switzerland and are not Switzerland and are fighting a war to preserve their right to be left alone, and because NATO doesn’t want to reward Russia’s naked aggression? And because they don’t think Russia has any intention of stopping there, because it has been nibbling pieces of its former territories for many years?
Turtler:
That’s an impressive history summary.
Geoffrey:
Who gets to decide what the words “neutral,” “defensive,” “offensive,” “weapons,” or even “nation” mean? Who is the neutral impartial arbiter of Vlad’s fears and his aggressive behavior? Vlad?
Why would any country submit to such?
Do you own any firearms to defend yourself or your property or even pets from a paranoid aggressive neighbor? One who has already moved your fence and moved his relatives onto your remaining property. Give up your weapons, agree to his terms and hope he allows you to exist. Sucks to be you and his neighbor.
Simple enough for you? It never was NATO.
Point is, Ukraine is not safe from Russia. NATO will help defend them but Putin doesn’t want that obstacle in his moves now or future.
It’s not a good idea to require Ukraine to forego NATO membership or sufficient military forces.
All of which being true doesn’t mean Russia isn’t historically defensive due to repeated invasions.
It’s a complication which needs to be understood, but not yielded to.
To require Russia’s neighbors to disarm or keep their militaries back from the border…while most certainly not requiring the same of the Russians, makes things extraordinarily dangerous.
Monroe Doctrine, Missiles in Cuba.
Monroe Doctrine, Missiles in Cuba.
Has Cuba been conquered?
Because the USA is much the same as Roosia?
Pathetically weak and unoriginal.
Oh well.
Roy Lofquist:
I wrote this recent post in which I mentioned the Cuban Missile Crisis in this manner:
@Neo,
At the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis the US had deployed Jupiter IRBMs in Italy and Turkey, 10 minutes from the Soviet bomber bases, effectively pinning 90% of their nuclear capabilities. The Cuban situation was resolved diplomatically by the US removing those missiles.
Roy:
Focus, did the US invade Cuba? It’s not a hard question. You could use the interweb to find out.
@om,
Yes. JFK renegged on air support and the Bay of Pigs operation came a cockup.
Roy Lofquist:
The Cuban missile crisis was precipitated by the Soviet missiles in Cuba, not the ones in Turkey (which already had been present). It was JFK who initiated the blockade and gave the ultimatum that constituted the crisis, on discovering the Cuban missile situation.
The issue was resolved diplomatically:
The withdrawal of missiles from Turkey and Italy was kept secret at the time, and it’s still not clear whether their removal from Italy was part of the secret agreement or not.
I fail to see the similarity with now except a somewhat superficial one. In 1962, the Soviets installed missiles in a USSR satellite country that was very close to the US and very far from the USSR. This was something new for the US, and the US objected. In the present Ukraine situation, Europe is already loaded with missiles that can reach Russia very quickly and Russia is already loaded with missiles that can reach Europe very quickly. In addition, Russia has the nuclear capacity to obliterate the US and vice versa. Meanwhile, Russia has already invaded the non-nuclear-armed Ukraine and is currently engaged in a very hot and widespread war of aggression there. It has also already appropriated Ukraine territory such as Crimea through a 2014 campaign that involved a military presence there.
The US has been on Soviet and later Russian border for all of NATO’s existence.
@neo,
Yup, that’s the press release. I am somewhat constrained as to what I can say here. In October of 1962 I was at a US military base near Peshawar, Pakistan – the base Francis Gary Powers departed on his ill-fated U2 flight over the Soviet Union. We were monitoring emissions from Russian missile and nuclear tests, including their EMP program. On October 22 JFK announced the presence of missiles in Cuba. Earlier that day the Russians detonated a 130 kiloton EMP device over Kazahkstan, K-3 Test 164. That is in the public domain.
There were aspects of that test that distinguished it from others in the series and were perhaps germane to the Cuban situation. This, in itself, proves nothing. I only relate these bits of tid to perhaps nudge you towards considering that maybe the official history involved a bit of apple polishing.
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‘ Several years after German reunification, in 1997, NATO said that in the “current and foreseeable security environment” there would be no permanent stationing of substantial combat forces on the territory of new NATO members. Up until the Russian military occupation of Crimea in March [2014], there was virtually no stationing of any NATO combat forces on the territory of new members. Since March, NATO has increased the presence of its military forces in the Baltic region and Central Europe.
So it appears that Russian soldiers in Crimea constituted the writing on the wall for NATO. It was Russian military action in Crimea that signaled a change in the previous “security environment,” and that in turn triggered changes in NATO.”
What “New members to NATO”? How could there be new member in NATO w/o nato expanding? And the idea that it was placing of weapons into those states as opposed to the expansion itself tharwould trigger Russia is utter poppycock. Because An attack on one NATO state would be an attack on all of them..
Therefore they don’t need to have arms in any NATO state for it to be considered a provocation.
This is a much better overview of what promises were actually made to Russia than self serving observations made long after the fact.
https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early
‘ The first concrete assurances by Western leaders on NATO began on January 31, 1990, when West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher opened the bidding with a major public speech at Tutzing, in Bavaria, on German unification. The U.S. Embassy in Bonn (see Document 1) informed Washington that Genscher made clear “that the changes in Eastern Europe and the German unification process must not lead to an ‘impairment of Soviet security interests.’ Therefore, NATO should rule out an ‘expansion of its territory towards the east, i.e. moving it closer to the Soviet borders.’” The Bonn cable also noted Genscher’s proposal to leave the East German territory out of NATO military structures even in a unified Germany in NATO.’
NATO expansion eastward was an issue for Russia as early as 1990. And the west was making assurances it wouldn’t expand when they were still talking about Germany reunification.
sorry Sarah, but you’re wrong.
‘ Having met with Genscher on his way into discussions with the Soviets, Baker repeated exactly the Genscher formulation in his meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on February 9, 1990, (see Document 4); and even more importantly, face to face with Gorbachev.
Not once, but three times, Baker tried out the “not one inch eastward” formula with Gorbachev in the February 9, 1990, meeting. He agreed with Gorbachev’s statement in response to the assurances that “NATO expansion is unacceptable.” Baker assured Gorbachev that “neither the President nor I intend to extract any unilateral advantages from the processes that are taking place,” and that the Americans understood that “not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.” (See Document 6)
Afterwards, Baker wrote to Helmut Kohl who would meet with the Soviet leader on the next day, with much of the very same language. Baker reported: “And then I put the following question to him [Gorbachev]. Would you prefer to see a united Germany outside of NATO, independent and with no U.S. forces or would you prefer a unified Germany to be tied to NATO, with assurances that NATO’s jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from its present position? He answered that the Soviet leadership was giving real thought to all such options [….] He then added, ‘Certainly any extension of the zone of NATO would be unacceptable.’” Baker added in parentheses, for Kohl’s benefit, “By implication, NATO in its current zone might be acceptable.”
So, “ not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.”
Again, considering NATO is a United front and an attack on one NATO state is an attack on all of them then nato’s “present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastward direction means NATO,will not expand eastward and make more states that were previously part of Russia into NATO a states. Otherwise ir would be an expansion of nato’s military jrusisdicrion.
Unless we are now arguing that NATO wouldn’t defend states in NATO, which is preposterous, then any expansion of nato eastward also expands natos military jurisdiction eastward.
‘ But inside the U.S. government, a different discussion continued, a debate about relations between NATO and Eastern Europe. Opinions differed, but the suggestion from the Defense Department as of October 25, 1990 was to leave “the door ajar” for East European membership in NATO. (See Document 27) The view of the State Department was that NATO expansion was not on the agenda, because it was not in the interest of the U.S. to organize “an anti-Soviet coalition” that extended to the Soviet borders, not least because it might reverse the positive trends in the Soviet Union. (See Document 26) The Bush administration took the latter view. And that’s what the Soviets heard.
As late as March 1991, according to the diary of the British ambassador to Moscow, British Prime Minister John Major personally assured Gorbachev, “We are not talking about the strengthening of NATO.” Subsequently, when Soviet defense minister Marshal Dmitri Yazov asked Major about East European leaders’ interest in NATO membership, the British leader responded, “Nothing of the sort will happen.” (See Document 28)
When Russian Supreme Soviet deputies came to Brussels to see NATO and meet with NATO secretary-general Manfred Woerner in July 1991, Woerner told the Russians that “We should not allow […] the isolation of the USSR from the European community.” According to the Russian memorandum of conversation, “Woerner stressed that the NATO Council and he are against the expansion of NATO (13 of 16 NATO members support this point of view).“
‘ But inside the U.S. government, a different discussion continued, a debate about relations between NATO and Eastern Europe. Opinions differed, but the suggestion from the Defense Department as of October 25, 1990 was to leave “the door ajar” for East European membership in NATO. (See Document 27) The view of the State Department was that NATO expansion was not on the agenda, because it was not in the interest of the U.S. to organize “an anti-Soviet coalition” that extended to the Soviet borders, not least because it might reverse the positive trends in the Soviet Union. (See Document 26) The Bush administration took the latter view. And that’s what the Soviets heard.
As late as March 1991, according to the diary of the British ambassador to Moscow, British Prime Minister John Major personally assured Gorbachev, “We are not talking about the strengthening of NATO.” Subsequently, when Soviet defense minister Marshal Dmitri Yazov asked Major about East European leaders’ interest in NATO membership, the British leader responded, “Nothing of the sort will happen.” (See Document 28)
When Russian Supreme Soviet deputies came to Brussels to see NATO and meet with NATO secretary-general Manfred Woerner in July 1991, Woerner told the Russians that “We should not allow […] the isolation of the USSR from the European community.” According to the Russian memorandum of conversation, “Woerner stressed that the NATO Council and he are against the expansion of NATO (13 of 16 NATO members support this point of view).“
Again, the discussion was about not expanding NATO.
Roy:
Just to be clear which elements of the US Military, that is of the US Department of Defense were on the beach in Cuba during the Bay of Pigs Invasion?
The CIA doesn’t count, it ain’t DOD. That is common knowledge in this group IMO?
And what does the Cold War of 1960/61 have to do with Vlad and the Ukraine? Nothing has changed in The world since then? Have you changed or learned anything in those years?
Because diplomatic chit chat from 1990 and 1991 gives Vlad the justification to invade Ukraine and Georgia and … Message received.
Something about poppycock ….
Neo
Your answer is what I believe to be the case: that Ukraine does not want to be neutral, a la Switzerland, and that the US, and some other nations of the West, wants Ukraine to join NATO as a way to stop any expansion by Russia further into the West.
My guess is this situation is exactly what Biden wants. Why is the question. Some argue it is a Wag the Dog move to distract us from his foreign policy, political, and economic disaster of a first year. It could be that this is an unintended consequence of Biden’s desire and push to implement Green New Deal policies. Or it may be, as you say, that Biden and his fellow Democrats are foreign policy hawks and war mongers and think the US has the power to push Putin and Russia to do what we want, i.e.; stay within their current borders.
@steve walsh
The fact is, Ukraine was neutral in 2014, when this war had started with the Russian invasions of Crimea and the Donbas. It had been neutral for about 20 years. And look at how that had worked out.
The truth is, neutrality has really not worked out well for the emergent nations in former Soviet space, especially in the sort of No Man’s Lands between Russia on one hand and Poland and Greece on the other that Snyder (NeverTrump hack that he is) called “The Bloodlands.”
Let’s also talk about some of the practical differences. The fact is, Ukraine has terrain that is far more exposed and generally much less defensible than Switzerland, land of mountain tops and passes. Switzerland has also been recognized as independent and neutral for centuries, going back to at least 1648. Ukraine has been independent for about 40.
And even then, let us not mince words about how the Swiss had to fight for their independence. Indeed, the assorted Burghers, Smallholders, and Farmers had to fight an incredibly bitter series of wars for their independence against the Habsburgs of Austria who claimed their land as part of their patrimony, extending pretty much the length of the 15th century. And of course even after that they had to maintain significant military readiness in order to ward off would-be predators (or engage in some military aggression of their own, as the Italians can attest).
And even then they were invaded and conquered by the Napoleonic French, and Hitler was fervently intent on partitioning the country between himself and Mussolini and had drawn up plans to invade. He just couldn’t quite get around to it due to always needing resources and troops elsewhere.
Simply put, Ukraine lacks the ability to make Putin respect its neutrality, as it learned in 2014. Which is why relations between Russia and Ukraine are like those between Austria and Switzerland in the 1450s, not 1950s.
This isn’t reassuring to people who hope for an easy way out of this by trying to force Ukraine into a form of “neutrality” that would be amenable to Putin, but I think it is closer to the truth.
@Velouria226
“And the idea that it was placing of weapons into those states as opposed to the expansion itself tharwould trigger Russia is utter poppycock. Because An attack on one NATO state would be an attack on all of them..
Therefore they don’t need to have arms in any NATO state for it to be considered a provocation.”
As I have mentioned before, I am more than slightly sick with obsessing about what “triggers” or “provokes” the Russian government in light of prior history, ESPECIALLY when you realize that a large part of the reason for things like the NATO membership stampede by states East of the Berlin Wall came as a result of historical inability to trust Russian governments (in many case going back centuries) and traumatic recent history, particularly their subjugation after signing supposedly successful peace settlements and bilateral diplomatic relations with the Moscow Kremlin during the interwar period. Suffice it to say, Russia was only ever one of the many stakeholders involved, and while Realist or “Realist” thought might wish to give it more of a controlling stake in determining matters, the fact remains that the other nations had to have a say.
And indeed, what your source(s) pointedly do not emphasize (though they do tacitly admit by reproductions of their sources) is that from the start NATO was concerned about this and did seek their opinions.
“This is a much better overview of what promises were actually made to Russia than self serving observations made long after the fact.”
The problem is that while the documents provided are indeed a very valuable source, the bulk of the source comes from a summary of them. Which not only misses other documentary information but also ignores some of the content of the documents, like whether a given promisor would have the authority to make such reassurances on behalf all of NATO or just his nation, whether this was to Gorbachev and his government specifically or to any Soviet government (including one that came to power by violent coup against Gorbachev and which proceeded to violate or repudiate many of the diplomatic agreements), or to any Russian government to take power whatsoever.
In addition, all of the documents your source cites occurred before the Soviet Union suffered its August Coup in 1991, which is KIND OF a notable event that colored and shaped everything that came after, considering it led to the armed takeover of the Soviet government by a clique of hardliners (who proceeded to fight a bitter conflict against their own people and assorted SR leadership) while also repudiating or downplaying many Soviet obligations under the Helsinki Accord.
Which of course also led to the collapse of the Soviet leadership.
Your “mother-source” the essay downplays this to the point of being frankly a bit dishonest, stating
“Instead, the dissolution of the USSR was brought about by Russians (Boris Yeltsin and his leading advisory Gennady Burbulis) in concert with the former party bosses of the Soviet republics, especially Ukraine, in December 1991.
Of course, what this “conveniently omits” is the degree to which the Soviet Union had begun to collapse well before December and not “by Russians” like Yeltsin and Burbulis but by groups like the Baltic and Ukrainian separatists justifiably terrified by remaining in a union led by the likes of Yazov, resulting in things like their declarations of independence (as well as the knock-on effects these had of anti-coup SRs declaring independence, followed shortly by pro-coup SRs upon realizing the coup was beaten).
In any case, a narrow focus on NATO-Soviet relations and particularly on the assurances given in 1990 and early 1991 is illustrative but undercuts the greater point the source tries to argue for precisely because of how dramatically the situation had changed even within August 1991, let alone others. It also thoroughly omits the agency of factions in the Soviet government not answering to Gorbachev or of the regional SRs seeking independence.
This does not make for good policy analysis about NATO expansion as a whole, especially when you remember that so many of the promises made were in the context of a reforming USSR or with the assurances/cooperation of former Pact states. Which obviously could no longer be entirely taken for granted with hardliner Putschists in the Kremlin for a few precious days in 1991 and Gorbachev incommunicado and possibly dead while the Soviet Union began to fracture.
And this is if I’m being incredibly generous, because frankly there’s a lot else in this essay that reeks of calculated dishonesty and pointedly ignoring context.
For instance, take a gander at the introduction of the first document, with minor emphasis by myself:
“The first concrete assurances by Western leaderS on NATO began on January 31, 1990, when West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher opened the bidding with a major public speech at Tutzing, in Bavaria, on German unification.”
The problems start to emerge if you bother actually reading through the document in question.
https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/16113-document-02-mr-hurd-sir-c-mallaby-bonn
“4, Genscher said a number of issues…..could all be handled below what he called the threshold of the Alliance and the Four Powers. The uestion was how all this was going to take place in relation to unification which was not a decision for the FRG alone but also for the GDR. He did not know how the democratic leadership of the GDR would define their decisions after the election. He thought they would want unity in the near future to help solve their difficult internal problems. IN THE MEANTIME, THE FRG COULD SPEAK ONLY FOR ITSELF. The German government wanted neither to extend nor to leave NATO. They wanted the two alliances to become integral parts of all-European structures. His own conversation the previous day with the Polish Foreign MInister had been revealing. THE POLE HAD AGREED WITH GENSCHER THAT THE NEUTRALIZATION OF GERMANY WOULD BE WRONG. If that had been the message coming from the British, French, or some other NATO Foreign Minister that would have been understandable. Coming from the Poles it had special importance. THE FEDERAL GERMAN GOVERNMENT OFTEN SAID IT DID NOT WANT TO ISOLATE ITSELF AND IT STOOD BY THAT. They would promote the integration of the European Community and, in parallel, the development of the CSCE process. We would all live to see of what enormous importance the CSCE process was both substantially and to help save the face of the Soviet Union. The CSCE summit, devoted to the future of Europe, would be an important vehicle for helping the Soviet Union to come to terms with the erosion of the Warsaw Pact. Genscher added that when he talked about not wanting to extend NATO that applied to other states beside the GDR. The Russians must have some assurance that if, for example, the Polish government left the Warsaw Pact one day, they would not join NATO the next.”
A few takeaways:
Firstly: far from representing a concrete assurance from “Western LeaderS” as the essay wants to make it out, this represents a bilateral assurance from Genscher and the FRG specifically, NOT NATO as a whole. Indeed, the FRG makes it painfully clear that it does not feel confident speaking on behalf of the soon-to-be-elected probably-pro-FRG DRG government, let alone all of NATO.
Secondly: While even at this early stage the FRG made it clear it did not wish to expand NATO, it also made it clear that it did not wish to leave it or the GDR out. Which would prove to be an odd parallel to future NATO member entries such as Slovakia and Hungary wanting to get in the door but afterwards being skeptical about letting others in.
Thirdly: The repeatedly-spoken assumption behind all these agreements is a more or less law abiding, democratizing Soviet Union. Which as I outlined before was no longer a reality following the August Coup.
Which is again why over-reliance on this set of documents ALONE as well as the essay is at least as self-serving and blinkered as any apologia saying “Oh No, NATO totally did not give any assurances to Russia about expansioN!”
@Neo Thank you kindly Neo.
turtler:
Another great comment on the older context of Europe!
Followed by a dialing and debunking of diplomatic BS speak. You are on a roll!
@om Thank you kindly.
@Roy Lofquist
I suggest you study more about the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Monroe Doctrine, because it seems like you are SERIOUSLY misunderstanding and downplaying the “Red” side of the equation and how its internal dynamics demanded Khruschev first place the missiles, and then remove them.
“At the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis the US had deployed Jupiter IRBMs in Italy and Turkey, 10 minutes from the Soviet bomber bases, effectively pinning 90% of their nuclear capabilities. The Cuban situation was resolved diplomatically by the US removing those missiles.”
No, the Cuban Situation was resolved diplomatically by the agreement that (among other things) saw the Soviets remove their LAND BASED missiles from Cuba (they never stopped sending nuclear-armed submarines there) while the US removed the missiles from Turkey and partially Italy.
People (particularly JFK Cultists and Democrats) like to give this credit to JFK, but this seriously understates one of the key reasons why Khruschev felt he needed to remove the missiles: Castro. Who had created the crisis by demanding the placement of missiles to prevent another Bay of Pigs/Playa Giron, and then went nuts. Starting with agitating the Soviets for a First Strike upon the US, then trying to fabricate intelligence that the US was about to strike, and finally maneuvering Cuban military troops in vicinity of the nuclear missiles, which the Soviet crews of these reported. Which led to a scare from Khruschev that Castro would try to forcibly “secure” the nukes and then fire them at the US.
In any case, the temperature got too high and Khruschev realized he needed to get the missiles out of the Cuba at almost any price, hence why the terms of the climbdown were so one-sided and in favor of the US.
To a great extent, this question depends on how you define “promise”.
For an authoritarian, any statement made by a gov’t figure is either coming direct from the leader or the spokesperson gets “relieved”. And those promises don’t change just because someone new is in charge – I think many foreign leaders view America’s leadership as always being the same, except in minor details, no matter who is in charge. (And there was a time when that was substantially true.)
For an American (a knowledgeable one, anyway), there’s no promise unless it’s in writing, passed by the Senate. For a less knowledgeable one, it has to at least be in writing and signed by an authority of some kind (an ambassador, appointed envoy, a cabinet official, an ‘expert’, etc.).
Putin’s expectations were different than ours (and most of the West). And our Foggy Bottom folks (particularly the prog-ier variety) didn’t think that was important. Some of them saw the opportunity to expand their hegemon to encompass an entire continent, on the way to global governance, and they jumped at it. And Putin took offense.
I don’t think we should have expanded NATO, for pragmatic foreign policy reasons. (This situation is one of them.) I think we should have encouraged Europe to band together and accomplish their own defense. Barring that, I would have helped create a new entity composed of Eastern Europe. (And to leave a direct corridor to Western Europe unguarded, so they couldn’t simply rely on someone else’s defense for another 70 years.)
“in Astana (2010), the US and the other 56 countries in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) signed documents “that contained interrelated principles to ensure the indivisibility of security.”
[my emphasis]
https://www.ieee.es/en/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/AstanaConmemorativeDeclaration2010.pdf
Here is a map of the OSCE, which is “the world’s largest regional security organization.” (scroll down just a bit for large map)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organization_for_Security_and_Co-operation_in_Europe#Participating_states
Art Deco,
“Again, Geoffrey, the text itself.”
“I’ve already replied to you and skimmed all 30 documents. Again, they do not support the position you have taken.”
Apparently your skimming missed this:
“Document 04
Memorandum of Conversation between James Baker and Eduard Shevardnadze in Moscow.
Feb 9, 1990
“There would, of course, have to be iron-clad guarantees that NATO’s jurisdiction or forces would not move eastward.” US Secretary of State James Baker in writing assuring the Soviet Union’s Eduard Shevardnadze, the final Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs that there would be “iron-clad guarantees that NATO’s jurisdiction or forces would not move eastward…”
Geoffrey latches on to a 1990 document and hangs his hat on talks with the USSR.
Sorry Geoffrey, but that entity is dead, “pushing up daiseys,” “pining for the fijords,” “singing in the celestial choir.” Even McCoy can’t revive it. Though Vlad is trying.
Much like that horse of yours.
@Geoffrey Britain I have to agree with om on this. This is putting an awful lot of heft (frankly far more than I think can be defended) on a document that in any case was rendered hopelessly obsolete by the Soviet Hardliner coup in August 1991 and the ensuing collapse of the Soviet Union during and after it.
However, what else Document 4 notes is also telling, particularly what you left out of the excerpt that even the Essay/Webpage’s summary of it does not.
“However, a Germany that is firmly anchored in a changed NATO, by that I mean a NATO that is far less of (SIC) military organization, much more of a political one, would have no need for independent capability. There would, of course, have to be iron-clad guarantees that NATO’s jurisdiction or forces would not move eastward. AND THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE IN A MANNER THAT WOULD SATISFY GERMANY’S NEIGHBORS TO THE EAST.”
In other words, the exact same neighbors that were already making limited overtures towards NATO and within two years would be banging on the doors to join it themselves.
Moreover, immediately after this, Baker continues by stating:
“Two final points. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY EAST AND WEST EUROPEANS ALIKE, THAT — AND THIS IS SOMETHING BY THE WAY THAT GORBACHEV ALLUDED TO — THAT THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF US FORCES IN EUROPE IS A FORCE FOR STABILITY. We do not necessarily desire to keep troops in Europe. And it is clear to us that more pressures will build within the United States to bring our troops home unless the Allies continue to want them there. So if there is any indication that the Allies don’t want them we will in no way keep our troops there. I’ve said that we should maintain our presence as long as our Allies desire it. They don’t want it, our country is simply not going to be able to sustain a presence in Europe and we will immediately bring our troops home. The NATO alliance is a mechanism by which we maintain a presence in Germany and elsewhere. In my Berlin speech I made the point that NATO must evolve into much more of a political alliance. These are the principle ideas that I have on unification.”
Now, a couple things with this.
Firstly: This is the main substantial point from Document 4 talking about NATO expansion or lack thereof, and even in this Baker notes that NATO policy- particularly regarding Eastern German reunification- must happen “in a manner that would satisfy Germany’s neighbors to the East.” Which though Baker could not know it would soon become even more disenchanted with Moscow and would seek the reassurances of NATO for themselves.
Secondly: While Baker is quite the swamp creature himself and is primarily trying to reassure the Soviets, he does note the rationale for US deployment being the belief that US forces in Europe are a force of stability by both Western and Eastern Europeans. He also notes the downright proto-Trumpian discontent with keeping troops overseas if they are not wanted or supported
Now, why would the “Slavic Studies Panel” not want to emphasize these points in concert in the document?
Hmmmmmm… gets the noggin jogging, doesn’t it?
The fact is, the “Slavic Studies Panel” seems to be trying to manipulate its paraphrasing of the documents in a rather insidious fashion, by downplaying NATO/Western acknowledgement of other nations other than Russia having stakes and interests that needed to be respected (in no small part because acknowledging their wishes thoroughly undercuts the narrative that NATO expansion consisted of many hardcore guarantees that HAD to be respected regardless of either the evolving situation like that caused by the Soviet Coup or domestic pressure from said nations), and also helps paint the documents as portraying much more in the way of ironclad guarantees than they probably were meant to be.
Geoffrey, the first 25 documents are either memorializing intramural discussions or recording inconclusive discussions between Soviet officials, American officials, German officials. Every last one of them concerns the posited alignment of a unified Germany. All but the last few concern discussions undertaken with the assumption that NATO and the Warsaw Pact would continue to be going concerns. The questions considered would be the military doctrine animating NATO, properties of how NATO and the Warsaw Pact would interact, whether a united Germany would be a member of one, the other, neither or both, and whether or not any NATO troops would be stationed in the former east Germany. There were some fuzzy discussions on countries on both sides having a choice between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It’s all about Germany.
It is only in the five documents that discussions concern other eastern European countries and discussions occur in the context of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. You find in Document 26 intramural discussions on the question and you find in Document 30 a communication to Soviet officials that most members of the NATO council opposed adding more members. That’s what you’re trying to use to justify all the carnage we’re seeing.
It’s all kind of a distraction though isn’t it? It may not exactly be fair of me but I’m seeing this whole what did NATO say when and does Russia have any right to resent it as essentially an exercise in trying to assign a percentage of the blame for the invasion of Ukraine to or away from the West and the United States.
But assigning a percentage of blame doesn’t do anything.
Does anyone here think the US should go to war with Russia over Ukraine? NATO is a collective security alliance, if Ukraine is attacked all NATO nations are to go to war.
If your answer is “no”, the US should not go to war with Russia over Ukraine–and I think almost all of us here say “no”–then either
a) you oppose Ukraine being in NATO anyway, and are aligned with Putin to that extent (lol)
or
b) you want Ukraine in NATO to make war less likely, but then abandon them if war actually happens and expose NATO as fictitious.
And I have to wonder if all this argument is so passionately engaged in so we can distract ourselves from the logic of our position.
@turtler,
You’re talking through your hat. If you are relying on information in the public domain you are probably being misled. The real story is out there if you know where to look and what to ignore.
On NATO-
I’m just mentioning this item, just because I think it is unusual-
I remember, after the USSR ended, maybe between 1991 + George Bush Jr.’s Presidency,…( or before 2010), that Russia once [ASKED TO JOIN NATO].
I think Russia’s govt., aka Russia, asked to join NATO, giving a reason that sounded like-
[your organization wants to prevent wars, + stop threats to other nations, in The North Atlantic area…we hear, well- WE are against those problems, too. How about letting us JOIN nato?]
As I remember- NATO didn’t accept that idea, since…I believe…NATO was formed to protect the N.A. area, + [mostly made] to protect Europe from possible- invasions, or [bullying actions], from- Russia + The USSR.
I think that story was reported on TV, or [in a news magazine, or in a newspaper, between 1991-2009].
Does anyone else remember a news story, where Russia had asked to Join NATO?
@Roy Lofquist “You’re talking through your hat.”
Really?
Considering we have access to at least some of Khruschev’s documents regarding the Cuban Missiles Crisis and the antics the Cuban government got into?
Complete with Che’s own unhinged ranting in 1967 (much to the ire of Castro and others)?
https://www.marxists.org/archive/guevara/1967/04/16.htm
https://www.miamiherald.com/latest-news/article1943643.html
” If you are relying on information in the public domain you are probably being misled.”
Sure, but I can say the same about you.
” The real story is out there if you know where to look and what to ignore.”
I’m sorry, can you be more vague and non-descript? Because I hear you’re in the running for the 2022 Olympics for Most Vague statement, but you just need to be that little bit less clear to really lock it in.
And would you be willing to guide me in showing what the “real story” is, if you believe me incapable of researching or parsing the fruits of said research myself?
Sure, the “Real Story” is out there, as are a lot of “Fake Stories.” I don’t pretend to claim a perfect grasp of the history involved, but I DO KNOW that any “Real Story” that does not account for the actions of the Cuban Communist government and its war hawks towards their Soviet patron is simply not the Real, Full Story.
It also makes the other parts of the story make so much more sense, particularly why Khrushchev was willing to accept such an unfavorable agreement to de-escalate tensions (one that ultimately crippled his rule and helped lead to Brezhnev’s “Soft Coup” later), making such sacrifices as not getting a guarantee from Kennedy to advertise the withdrawal of missiles from Turkey to the public.
Simply put, the US was prepared to tolerate intermediate basing of Soviet missiles around Cuba so long as it was limited to their submarine-borne weapons on intermediate visits rather than land based ones on indefinite deployment, and the USSR was unable and unwilling to trust its own Cuban vassals would not try and pull a fast one that might spark a nuclear world war.
@Frederick Nice strawman.
While I agree with your part that assigning blame is relatively pointless, your phrasing is dubious to say the least.
“If your answer is “no”, the US should not go to war with Russia over Ukraine–and I think almost all of us here say “no”–then either
a) you oppose Ukraine being in NATO anyway, and are aligned with Putin to that extent (lol)
or
b) you want Ukraine in NATO to make war less likely, but then abandon them if war actually happens and expose NATO as fictitious.”
Or
c) You advocate for NATO as written, that it is a mutual defensive pact meant to either deter war from starting against its members or to win said war when initiated. Which means that its membership and the obligations towards them must be marked and clearly Delineated.
Were Ukraine a member of NATO, I would be one of the harsher war hawks present precisely because I recognize what an open invasion of a NATO member state is. But the fact remains that Ukraine is NOT a member state of NATO, and thus NATO’s obligations to Ukraine and vice versa are of a much, MUCH lesser extent than swearing to declare war if attacked.
Moreover, it’s clear that Putin and other Russian Kremlin leadership understand this. If you graph the major Post-Soviet conflicts with those nations that entered NATO or remained neutral, you’ll see that essentially all Russian “military adventurism” has happened in the latter, with the POSSIBLE exception of bloodless or nearly bloodless border harassment on places like the Russo-Latvian Border.
The reason is very clear. Putin believes he can overcome and subjugate any of the neutral, independent states in Ex-Soviet Space by Force of Arms and not receive TOO crippling a matchup or repercussions. After all, he’s done it countless times before in places like Transnistria and Georgia. He does NOT, however, wish to risk a provocation with NATO like attacking a member state would.
Which is why I believe NATO expansion has been beneficial for peace and would argue for fighting the Kremlin in a war if it ever was rash enough to attack a NATO member.
But that is hypothetical *in part because* the Kremlin has painstakingly worked to pre-empt the ability of certain nations to join NATO.
It also raises the issue of what “going to war with Russia over Ukraine” means not just today, but also in plenty of other hypothetical situations like if-say- Ukraine somehow entered NATO back with the first Tranche of new NATO members after the Cold War. I imagine we would be looking at a recognizably similar but still quite different Ukraine in that case.
In any event, I believe in going to war with our clearly outlined allies, not willy-nilly or for sympathetic neutrals. Especially under Biden and his puppetmasters after Kabul.
That MIGHT change if Putin’s atrocities or conduct (or ties to even worse actors) change, but that is how I look at things NOW.
And it clearly does not fit in to either the “a” or “b” options you outline.
@Turtle: I’m not strawmanning. Let me try to restate and see if you agree:
What you’re saying is that you think Ukraine IS worth going to war with Russia over IF Ukraine is in NATO but not otherwise, nuclear war if need be. You think that would make the possibility of war with Russia over Ukraine less likely, and yes you’d be willing to risk New York in addition to Kiev, because if you aren’t NATO is a sham and doesn’t deter and you think NATO should be real.
Have I got that right? If so, it’s a perfectly respectable position, but I think hardly anyone commenting here holds that position.
I think most people commenting here are not willing to risk New York as well as Kiev, and so are in the position of having to endorse a) or b).
@Frederick ” I’m not strawmanning. ”
Fair, it was not your intent. Though the Either/Or was quite that.
“What you’re saying is that you think Ukraine IS worth going to war with Russia over IF Ukraine is in NATO but not otherwise, nuclear war if need be. You think that would make the possibility of war with Russia over Ukraine less likely, and yes you’d be willing to risk New York in addition to Kiev, because if you aren’t NATO is a sham and doesn’t deter and you think NATO should be real.
Have I got that right?”
That you do.
” If so, it’s a perfectly respectable position, but I think hardly anyone commenting here holds that position.”
Fair enough, then I guess it was a problem of the assumption or possible outcomes.
“I think most people commenting here are not willing to risk New York as well as Kiev, and so are in the position of having to endorse a) or b).”
Fair enough, and that is also a reasonable assumption that many (even if not most or all) would, since they are entirely reasonable and defensible standards.
Apologies for any confusion, and regards.
I posted the Astana 2010 agreement first, as it shows that the assurances made in 1990 were still valid. I only referenced Baker’s assurances to demonstrate that the Russians are correct in stating that the West has continually reassured the Russians of the West’s peaceful intent, while simultaneously acting militarily in a passive/aggressive manner. Continually blaming the Russians with a “they made us do it’ meme.
Baker proposed to Shevardnadze that NATO was going to shift away from a military focus to a political focus designed to sustain Europe’s stability. Then, when Russia under Yeltsin put forward the proposal that Russia join a now politically focused NATO, Russia was refused entry upon the basis that if Russia was accepted into NATO membership, it would remove NATO’s very reason for existing, which can only be ascribed to a military focus.
No wonder some Russians began to perceive the West as being duplicitous.
Russia has consistently repeated its view that NATO in the Ukraine is a red line for them, by any strategic military calculus, NATO upon Russia’s closest border is a legitimate national security concern.
Thus, as referenced above in the 2010 Astana agreement , the other 56 nations party to that agreement lack any legal basis for ignoring its relevant provisions.
The West is basically saying our security concerns in NATO expanding eastward are valid. But Russia has no valid security concerns because they’re a bunch of paranoid bad guys and we’re the good guys.
Talk about a simplistic narrative and one that conveniently ignores inconvenient facts that call into question the veracity of that narrative.
@Turtler: Reasoned, civil disagreement is a delight! Thank you.
I agree as you do that NATO needs to be real. So for what cities not in my own country, am I willing to see my own country’s cities at risk for? There’s a few no-brainers, but I do believe that increased NATO expansion eventually results in one of two things:
a) Bad apples get into NATO and NATO can’t agree on who’s the enemy and what to do, so becomes ineffective. We have that already, it’s called the UN.
b) Some country is brought into NATO that it is not worth risking New York for, probably because a big bad really really wants it way more than we want to get killed over it.
I have to think it through for every country, see.
Geoffrey plays armchair psychologist on whole foreign policy establishments and alliances; “passive/aggressive…” NATO.
LOL
I guessing the answer Frederick’s questions are None and None.
By the short hairs.
When Iran gets nukes it won’t be a happy time for Frederick and his delimas.
It can be important how you formulate a question especially if you want a certain answer.
@om: Should the US go to war with Russia over Ukraine? Interested to hear what you think and why.
@turtler,
I know things that are not in the public domain. If I am not certain that something is in the public domain then I am necessarily vague about it.
I posted the Astana 2010 agreement first, as it shows that the assurances made in 1990 were still valid.
Except that the assurances were in the form of telling them that the majority of NATO members were not in favor of adding new members in 1991. That’s not a binding agreement.
Frederick:
If Ukraine was in NATO we would be obligated to go to war to defend it, or we should withdraw from NATO because NATO would have no meaning. However, Ukraine is not in NATO and really was not about to get into NATO anyway.
However, Estonia and Latvia (for example) are in NATO. The implication is that we and the other NATO nations would go to war to defend them. If not, we should disband NATO because it is useless.
The idea, however, is that Putin probably will not attack those nations because they are in NATO. Otherwise, he might indeed attack them.
Of course Ukraine would like to be a NATO member, for obvious reasons.
Fredrick:
That depends, “over Ukraine” is a very vague open ended, even simplistic question. Will Vlad attack NATO “over Ukraine?” He got pretty close to the Polish border in an attack this week.
So will Vlad go to war with NATO “over Ukraine?” Just a little incursion, eh, Brandon?
@neo: Agree totally with how you say NATO should work.
And I’m sure you agree with me that implies we need to put New York at risk for Talinn or Vilnius or Riga. IF it was right to include them in NATO, then they are worth going to war with Russia over, nuclear war if need be, even if it means the loss of New York.
And we see right away what the advantage is for the Baltic republics and the other small countries of belonging to NATO if its pledges are real.
Do we also see that the US is definitely safer by putting New York City at risk for the Baltic republics? And do we also see that for every country we want to expand NATO to, we need to soberly assess whether we’d be definitely safer by taking on the risk of losing New York for them?
I think if we all spent some time on these questions, we could quickly establish that we all have a lot more common ground with each other than it has appeared of late.
@om: Are you saying “yes, under the right circumstances, the US should go to war with Russia over Ukraine”? Don’t want to put words in your mouth, qualify it all you like. I’d like to know what you think.
Frederick:
To follow up on neo’s question. Which NATO countries can Vlad attack before you would deign to go to war “over?”
Is the going to war “over” based on size, population, GDP, cultural affinities, national security interests of the USA, or just what is in the NATO agreement.
How you ask a question matters, eh?
Not my day job, is it yours?
@om: I’m asking you to know what you think. I know what I think and already said it–I have to think it through for every country and for Ukraine it’s “no”, for the United Kingdom it’s “yes”, and if you want to go through the smaller countries one-by-one later I’d be happy to, after I understand what you think.
But if you want to keep snarking and spreading more division, rather than find common ground, that’s up to you.
Turtler had no trouble answering. Neo had no trouble. Neither had I. We’re not all on the same page except in desiring civil exchange of ideas and somehow we can do that. I think it would be good if more of us did.
Roy knows deep dark things. If he told us he would have to kill us. Need to know and classification levels, or just blowing smoke?
There have been a lot of “intelligence” folks in the media lately (years actually) blowing a lot of smoke too.
Fredrick:
You be you.
A basic concept is that you don’t permit the aggressor to set the terms or give away your options.
NATO is a redline to me, all of them. Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Turkey, all of them.
The consequences of parsing alliances are just what Vlad or Xi would want IMO. Divide and conquer, heard of that?
Common ground, with Vlad and Xi? Just a little appeasement.
Thomas Sowell, in his book of essays. “Intellectuals and Society” has one on “Intellectuals and War”.
For a large part of that, he uses the years just prior to WW II where, among other things, intellectuals discussed the justice of Hitler’s claims. The potential victims discussed how guilty they were. Apparently they didn’t think anything would come of it, ideas being the sole work product of intellectuals.
And they presumed rational actions of other parties based on what they themselves would do in that situation with those circumstances.
They didn’t have pixels in those days, which is good, because we’d still be short. Turns out they were all wrong.
One practical-world result was that the potential victims were not prepared.
It’s said that Putin has replaced his entire personal staff of 1000, down to laundresses. Not sure, laundresses, that that’s “down” but you get my point. Presumably he’s afraid of something, possibly poisoning. Why the newbies should be any less likely to slip some polonium into his next shot of vodka is not obvious.
But we really need slice, dice and parboil what was said by various parties to other parties, many of whom are no longer relevant, over the last twenty-plus years, in order to figure out what Putin’s rational next act will be.
To the extent I indulge, I feel a kind of relief. Because I can design the best outcome. Otherwise…where’s my iodine?
@om: I see you answered for NATO, but not Ukraine.
You planning to answer, or should I just give up trying to learn from you what you think?
Are you saying “yes, under the right circumstances, the US should go to war with Russia over Ukraine”? Would love to hear what those are and why if the answer is yes. If the answer is no, would be interested to hear that too.
Frederick:
I’ve got work to do. Your “over Ukraine” is not a serious question since Vlad has already threatened to attack non-Ukrainians “over Ukraine.” If he attacks Finland or Sweden “over Ukraine” and they ask for help it’s Game on Vlad. Clear enough?
Not my day job. Is it yours?
@om:Your “over Ukraine” is not a serious question
neo and turtler thought it was. It is indeed a serious question.
Vlad has already threatened to attack non-Ukrainians “over Ukraine.”
Yes, I know. But we have not been attacked yet. The question is not “should the US refuse to fight back if attacked because of Ukraine”?
Given that we have not been attacked yet, for the third time, are you saying “yes, under the right circumstances, the US should go to war with Russia over Ukraine”? Would love to hear what those are and why if the answer is yes. If the answer is no, would be interested to hear that too.
United States Army Security Agency, 1/61-12/63, RA19690917
https://www.nsa.gov/portals/75/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/army-security-agency/asa-and-subordinate-units-history-1963.pdf
TUSLOG Det 4, Sinop Turkey
https://www.armysecurityagencyveterans.net/asa-turkey/
TUSLOG Det 4-2, Incirlik AFB, Adana Turkey
Joint Army/Navy Reconnaissance
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Douglas_A-3_Skywarrior#Reconnaissance
TDY Tripoli Libya, Peshawar Pakistan, Nairobi Kenya, Tananarive Madagascar
Career in aerospace.
Art Deco,
The 2010 Astana agreement is a binding agreement. See my comment at 11:23 as to why it permanently settles the Ukraine joining NATO issue. That NATO announced in 2020 its intention to welcome the Ukraine into NATO is demonstrable proof of the West’s political leadership’s willingness to directly violate its agreements.
Confirming the Russian’s view that the West i.e. the U.S. can’t be trusted to honor its agreements and treaties. Given our history of tearing up every treaty the U.S. federal government ever signed with our Native Americans, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that that betrayal extends into the present day.
All of this reinforces Russia’s distrust that if they allow NATO to park itself upon its doorstep, they will find themselves subject to a strategic vulnerability from which they cannot defend themselves.
None of this is meant to deny Putin and Russia’s violation of its agreements. I’m simply not pretending that the violations are not a two way street.
So there’s distrust on both sides, resulting in what we have now, another cold war, at least partially the result of the West’s leadership seeking to gain an unmatchable strategic advantage over Russia.
The 2010 Astana agreement is a binding agreement. See my comment at 11:23 as to why it permanently settles the Ukraine joining NATO issue. That NATO announced in 2020 its intention to welcome the Ukraine into NATO is demonstrable proof of the West’s political leadership’s willingness to directly violate its agreements.
Since the Ukraine is not a member of NATO, that is an irrelevant point. And Russia’s foreign minister has demanded that all 10 countries admitted to NATO between 1997 and 2004 be expelled.
Fredrick:
Curious isn’t it that you define what is and isn’t the question and then demand an answer you would “love” to hear.
And why neo or turtler chose to respond to your question, or the seriousness of it, is something that you have decided. That was my opinion.
Curiouser and even more curiouser that Vlad attacking other countries, “over Ukraine,” that are not NATO, could be a reason to respond militarily. Do I have to say it again Frederick?
Any more “serious” questions?
Roy:
A resume’ is not proof of veracity. See Clapper, Vindmann, Brennan, Comey.
@Geoffrey Britain
Please, can you give me a link to a site that has the full text of The 2010 Astana agreement?
I’ve never heard of that document. I’d like to read what it entails.
Cheers, TR
All very interesting, to be sure, but I don’t believe the right question—the relevant question—is being asked… since Stoltenberg just like week stressed that there’s no way Ukraine would have or could have—or will—join NATO.
OTOH, it IS MOST interesting to compare and contrast the following (apparently Winston Smith has been slacking off…):
1: From December 2021…
“NATO membership still possible for Ukraine, alliance chief says”–
https://www.stripes.com/theaters/europe/2021-12-10/NATO-Stoltenberg-France-Ukraine-membership-3921477.html
and…
2: From March 2022…
“Ukraine’s NATO Membership Is Not ‘Relevant or On the Agenda’: Jens Stoltenberg”—
https://yournews.com/2022/03/12/2312847/ukraines-nato-membership-is-not-relevant-or-on-the-agenda/
3. …and that’s when Stoltenberg wasn’t waffling on the issue, viz. from June 2021…
“‘We need more’ before Ukraine can join NATO, says Stoltenberg”—
https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2021/06/15/we-need-more-before-ukraine-can-join-nato-says-stoltenberg/
No, the relevant, more up-to-date, question is NOT “What did NATO promise Russia?” but ‘What did “Biden” promise Putin?’.
And vice-versa….
(Um, make that, ‘What HAS “Biden” promised…?’)
Would Brandon go to war “over” Hunter and a whore?
Is that a serious question?
“@Geoffrey Britain
Please, can you give me a link to a site that has the full text of The 2010 Astana agreement?
I’ve never heard of that document. I’d like to read what it entails.
Cheers, TR”
I was unfamiliar with it as well.
https://www.ieee.es/en/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/AstanaConmemorativeDeclaration2010.pdf
Question for about 90% of the discussion here: Does anybody think Putin gives a rodent’s behind? Has Putin been following the lengthy twists and turns of undertakings and is now morally and legally convinced he’s right because of his parsing of the lengthy twists and turns?
Has a panel of legal philosophers weighed in on the issue with him being neutral until they gave their opinion?
If he considers such things, is he feeling bound or unbound by the various items, or is he picking and choosing to rationalize or justify to others what he’s wanted to do just because he wants to do it?
Or is he ignoring the whole thing with the possible exception it might cause the west to do something he finds useful?
Once we convince each other of something or other….then what? Somebody DMs Putin and all is okay?
Everything happening is happening in his brain with the rest of the entities reacting as expected with the exception of the Ukes standing firm.
Richard Aubrey:
How dare you cut to the chase; what Putin is doing now and has done to Ukraine in the past, when you can chase your tail and divert your mind with speculations of imagined (since you aren’t Russian) threats and motives? Not my game either.
Richard Aubrey:
No, Putin does not give a rat’s behind.
But some people seem to think he does, and that his idea that these agreements have been violated by others (never him!) is an enormous part of the reason for his aggression against Ukraine and other states.
Neo. This requires he think of NATO as a military threat. Otherwise, whatever violations have occurred are irrelevant.
Russia has free, sometimes Slavic, countries on its borders. The examples of what happens when one goes, in effect, west are obvious. Things are a lot better than in Russia. That danger, the example, isn’t changed by NATO membership.
I’ve spoken in the past about the history of catastrophic invasions of Russia being likely a cultural memory. You don’t need to be part of NATO for an invasion to come across your territory. So, rationally, NATO membership doesn’t change things except for the jumping-off point of an invasion.
But presuming he figures he’s the injured party. So what? Whether he should so consider or not is…irrelevant. It would be irrational to go to war to rearrange some legal issues from years ago. So he’s either irrational, or he thinks something else is the issue. As in….western armies are getting closer.
But there is the other issue: western armies always retreat from Russia broken. One German officer remarked, when things were getting rough on the eastern front, that copies of Caulincourt were being passed around. He wrote about Napoleon’s effort. Point is, the stupidity of invading Russia is baked into western thought.
We don’t know if he does or if he’s using it to cover some other motive. That might mean discussing what the Russian people think about such things and we can only speculate.
For example, sunk cost. Does he feel the sunk cost requires him to go ahead? Or does he think the sunk cost with no useful results is making the Russian people really angry and he can only protect himself through victory? Do we know which? How? For sure?
But, okay, I’ll take it that he’s annoyed about what he sees as a violation. I can say that and have breath left over for….so what and what now.
@Geoffrey Britain
“ I posted the Astana 2010 agreement first, as it shows that the assurances made in 1990 were still valid.”
That is a rather dramatic and fanciful reading of Astana on a couple levels. First and foremost because it contains terms bluntly and comprehensively repudiate the core of “No NATO expansion.”
And I will quote:
“ 3. The security of each participating State is inseparably linked to that of all others. Each participating State has an equal right to security. WE REAFFIRM THE INHERENT RIGHT OF EACH AND EVERY PARTICIPATING STATE TO BE FREE TO CHOOSE OR CHANGE ITS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING TREaTIES OF ALLIANCE, AS THEY EVOLVE. Each State also has the right to neutrality.”
There it is, in black and white, bluntly stating that any prior “promises” that NATO would not expand East of Germany were and are null and void.
You HAD to have read at least some of this in the process of copying the “Equal right to Security” and “At the expense of-“ text, since this occurs right before the latter. And yet you did not mention this. Why?!?
Especially since it handily underlines my case: that the 1990 reassurances, such as they are (given how they are almost always less sweeping and restrictive than the likes of the file hosted wished to claim), were handily outpaced by events as well as the wishes of the later NATO applicants.
Which brings me back to the systematic problem you and Velouria have had with citing these documents: that they were never absolut, unconditional, or binding agreements from *Insert Western actor* to Russia, but always conditional on the will and interests of other nations like the future NATO entries and neutrals, AS WELL AS on Russian Good Behavior and adherence to international agreements.
And this is IF I treat Astana 2019 as a serious accord. And to be brutally honest I am not inclined to do so. They were a multinational anniversary spectacle meant more for good will than enforceable law. And I know this because by the time they were signed- to cite just one nation’s violations- Russia had already aggrandized itself at the expense of Georgian and Moldavian security.
Trying to argue that ideas like preventing the expansion of “military jurisdiction” for NATO East of Germany was still enforceable or binding in 2010 is not only a fanciful interpretation of international law, it is BLUNTLY AND COMPLETELY REJECTED by what the Astana Agreement actually says.
“I only referenced Baker’s assurances to demonstrate that the Russians are correct in stating that the West has continually reassured the Russians of the West’s peaceful intent, while simultaneously acting militarily in a passive/aggressive manner. “
This is rich coming from a series of regimes that have exacerbated violent conflicts in Georgia and Moldavia, and Ukraine. The truth is, the West has maintained peaceful intention to Russia even in the face of truly outrageous behavior, such as the 2008 Georgian War (timed to occur while the best units of the Georgian Army were fighting in Iraq under Polish control).
And it is not like this is some recent or new development, as Transnistria 1991 shows.
“Continually blaming the Russians with a “they made us do it’ meme.”
Again, this is rich coming from a regime that has repeatedly sewed violent Balkanization or nonviolent but disruptive strongarn diplomacy (such as the trad wars with Ukraine and Belarus) and is then absolutely AMAZED when other nations and NATO rethink ideas like not wanting NATO Expansion.
Not helped by the Russian governments following their sadly historical tradition of paying short shrift to international agreements, as the Russian military happily mincing Astana in its invasion of Ukraine in 2014 shows.
So please do not DARE try and cite Astana and its terms to make a serious legal point, let alone that Astana ratified previous reassurances that NATO would not expand., because not only is that NOT what it says, the Kremlin is frankly lucky that nobody seems to take it very seriously for the reasons I outlined above.
“Baker proposed to Shevardnadze that NATO was going to shift away from a military focus to a political focus designed to sustain Europe’s stability. Then, when Russia under Yeltsin put forward the proposal that Russia join a now politically focused NATO, Russia was refused entry upon the basis that if Russia was accepted into NATO membership, it would remove NATO’s very reason for existing, which can only be ascribed to a military focus.”
Once again, you seem to be “conveniently” skipping over parts of the story. Such as the Transnistrian War, the internal Russian instability in Chechnya, and above all the start of the Yugoslavia breakdown that handily dominated NATO focus during these years.
As well as residual uncertainty about NATO enlargement, which features strongly in the documents cited by Vel and which feature Baker himself, but which you seem to be discounting to the point of exclusion. And this in spite of the fact that such residual hesitation during the early and mid 1990s being cited as a contributory reason for why the deal was stillborn by that bastion of right wing Atlanticism, “The Grauniad.”
https://amp.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/dec/31/russia-associate-membership-nato-malcolm-rifkind-chequers-boris-yeltsin
Which brings me back to how self-defeating, unhelpful, and borderline dishonest it is to look at these agreements in isolation from their context. Because otherwise that leads you to doing things like claiming that “the assurances made in 1990 (presumably largely about NATO enlargement) were still valid” when the text of Astana underlines NO, NO THEY WERE NOT.
“No wonder some Russians began to perceive the West as being duplicitous.”
But pointedly ignoring large swaths of actual international agreements expressly guaranteeing national sovereignty in choosing alliances or neutrality is not duplicitous?
I am far from the person to Rah Rah for the integrity of Foggy Bottom or the Quay d’’Orsay the most, but even grafting a timeline onto these documents puts them in so much more context and reveals they are nowhere near as “duplicitous” or inexplicable as they seemed.
“Russia has consistently repeated its view that NATO in the Ukraine is a red line for them, by any strategic military calculus, “
Then perhaps they should have thought twice before guaranteeing Ukrainian independence or integrity, including the ability to choose any alliance it chooses in treaties like Budapest 1994 and Astana 2010?
Funny how THAT is not being mentioned.
As well as the fact that the Kremlin blathering about how “Ukraine in NATO is a red line” is proof positive of what I said: that the Kremlin did not take its obligations under Budapest 1994 or Astana 2010 seriously.
“NATO upon Russia’s closest border is a legitimate national security concern.”
Of course it is. And like other legitimate national security concerns it is grounds for exercise, preparing military readiness, and planning.
But legitimate national security concerns hardly justify utterly illegitimate and perfidious crimes against the peace. Or if you want to argue they DO, they at a minimum mitigate the amount that can be excused by them.
“Thus, as referenced above in the 2010 Astana agreement , the other 56 nations party to that agreement lack any legal basis for ignoring its relevant provisions.”
Again, did you even read the freaking Astana agreement?
The Astana Agreement CLEARLY SPELLS OUT the right of ANY of its signatories to choose any alliance it chooses. Which utterly destroys the grievance narrative thrust NATO was and is obliged to have never expanded, and that Russia has legitimate cause to prevent Ukraine joining NATO, OPEC, or any other foreign alliance it chooses at the point of Russian bayonets.
“The West is basically saying our security concerns in NATO expanding eastward are valid. But Russia has no valid security concerns because they’re a bunch of paranoid bad guys and we’re the good guys.”
This is a nice little inversion of reality, and basically the Kremlin’s propagandists projecting their own egocentric, lunatic, and criminal mindset onto those they view as their enemies.
The West has repeatedly agreed that Russia has valid security concerns, at least in paying lip service to them. Astana outlines this, as do things like what I pointed out regarding Baker’s previous statements about Germany’s Eastern neighbors.
The problem is that the West’s argument for how to resolve these has always been with Russia agreeing to the rules of the road by which Russia and its neighbors would be protected by international law and interlocking security agreements (which we might laugh bitterly at now due to their “efficiency” but do as it is).
In contrast, it is the Russian Government that seems to define its “legitimate national security concerns” as only being sustainable or meeting by trampling on the legitimate sovereign rights of other nations, particularly those in its near abroad.
The fault line of this friction is clearly shown by that article of the Astana agreement, which features both grants for nations not aggrandizing their security at the expense of others and free choice of any alliance or none at all by the signatories.
The Kremlin’s argument, such as it is, is that the free ability of nations (or at least some nations) to choose whatever alliance they wish is a threat to its security and a case of those nations increasing their security at its expense.
Which points to this being a “Yoi problem@ with the Kremlin.
“Talk about a simplistic narrative and one that conveniently ignores inconvenient facts that call into question the veracity of that narrative.”
Mate, don’t you DARE peddle that after you got caught leaving our one hell of a relevant part of Astana that utterly destroys the idea that reassurances against NATO expansion in 1990 were still binding in 2010.
“ The 2010 Astana agreement is a binding agreement. “
Eh, I suppose it theoretically is (certainly moreso than the cited “reassurances”) in spite of how dysfunctional and unenforceable it is.
“See my comment at 11:23 as to why it permanently settles the Ukraine joining NATO issue. “
Actually, Astana DOES permanently settle the question if Ukraine (not “the” Ukraine) joining NATO, but NOT In THE WAY you are implying.
Again, let us bring up what the ACTUALLY RELEVANT part of the Astana Agreement SAYS.
“ “ 3. The security of each participating State is inseparably linked to that of all others. Each participating State has an equal right to security. WE REAFFIRM THE INHERENT RIGHT OF EACH AND EVERY PARTICIPATING STATE TO BE FREE TO CHOOSE OR CHANGE ITS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING TREaTIES OF ALLIANCE, AS THEY EVOLVE. Each State also has the right to neutrality.”
So what part of “We reaffirm the inherent right of each and every state to be free to choose or change its security arraignments, including treaties of alliance…” is so hard to comprehend?
This has Infinitely clearer and more direct applications to the legality of Ukraine joining NATO than vague statements about respecting each others’ national security (especially when you realize these two were recognized to be consistent, with a part of national security being the right to choose alliance policy)
“That NATO announced in 2020 its intention to welcome the Ukraine into NATO is demonstrable proof of the West’s political leadership’s willingness to directly violate its agreements.”
Except as Astana OBVIOUSLY states, this is not true. Moreover, Russia’s insistence on preventing Ukraine from joining NATO at any cost underlines that it is violating the Astana Agreement and fundamentally entered into it in even worse faith than the other signatories did (since they probably correctly realized it was a bunch of feelgood puffery that was factually unenforceablehz
“Confirming the Russian’s view that the West i.e. the U.S. can’t be trusted to honor its agreements and treaties. “
Again, you’re trying to cite the Astana Agreement- which Russia violated but the West did not- as “confirming the Russians’ view that the West can’t be trusted to honor its agreements and treaties”?
“Given our history of tearing up every treaty the U.S. federal government ever signed with our Native Americans, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that that betrayal extends into the present day.”
Dear God, that is such a stretch that 343 might Sue you for Copyright Infringement.
A few notes. Firstly: the US has hardly been noted (especially in its early history) for treaty adherence, but even it did not break every single treaty signed with Amerindians.
Secondly: Even back when the US did treat treaties with Amerindian nations as written suggestions at best, its track record with what it viewed as “peers” such as European Nations such as the European States was much better (by no means perfect but much better).
Thirdly: even a cursory look at Russian diplomacy with everyone ranging from the assorted Siberian tributaries it gained in the 17th century and other Great Powers underlines how diplomacy is a dirty game and the Kremlin does not have much claim to the high ground in regards to the US’s own track record.
And this is before I talk about how your citation of Astana shows the Russian government violated it far more fundamentally and brazenly than “the West” did.
“All of this reinforces Russia’s distrust that if they allow NATO to park itself upon its doorstep, they will find themselves subject to a strategic vulnerability from which they cannot defend themselves.”
Which brings us back to the Kremlin’s decision to treat the nations it thinks it can get away with bullying so badly and as something less than sovereign, and the ensuing disillusionment and anger that helped propel NATO expansion.
“None of this is meant to deny Putin and Russia’s violation of its agreements. I’m simply not pretending that the violations are not a two way street.”
The issue is, the violations are nowhere near comparable, nor were they equal opportunity. You want to claim the US violated Astana based on tenuous (and out of context) reading of the terms regarding improving security at the expense of other nations. I claim Russia violated Astana by pointing to the clauses in Astana underlining national determination and the ability to choose any alliance a nation wishes or none at all.
These are not alike. Nor is it tenable to claim the 1990 reassurances were still binding or enforceable 20 years and no less than three Russian regimes later.
“So there’s distrust on both sides, resulting in what we have now, another cold war, “
Agreed.
“at least partially the result of the West’s leadership seeking to gain an unmatchable strategic advantage over Russia.”
And primarily as a result of the Russian Kremlin, the CCP, and a bunch of other ne’er-do-wells fundamentally rejecting basic tenants of international law and bilateral diplomacy, and either agreeing in transparently bad faith or outright repudiating them.
@Roy Lofquist
“I know things that are not in the public domain.”
Good for you. So do I. I will not claim that I have as much knowledge about things in the non-public domain that you do, let alone the experience or credentials. However, I do do research, and know some others in something like your position.
Which is why I go back to the asymmetrical nature of the Cuban Missile Crisis Resolution, why a braggart like Khruschev would have allowed such an asymmetrical resolution, and the missing Castro component.
” If I am not certain that something is in the public domain then I am necessarily vague about it.”
Understandable enough, and I can’t fault you for that. After all while I myself have always been a civilian not all of my friends and acquaintances can say the same, and they have to deal with similar.
But this goes back to the similar issue that the Soviets never fully denuclearized Cuba, they merely withdrew the vulnerable land based systems from it while continuing to keep ports of call for their Boomers there. It also does not address the rather apocalyptic lunacy on the parts of Castro and Che.
@Turtler,
1. “I know things that are not in the public domain.” Good for you. So do I.
I am referring to information that is, as far as I know, still Top Secret+. If you looked at the declassified NSA document that I linked you saw that half of it is redacted. Aside from legal liability it is the culture that you just don’t talk about sensitive information. If you do you are very careful.
2. However, I do do research,
A major part of intelligence analysis is devoted to figuring out if the information you have is valid or purposeful disinformation. A major part of counter-intelligence is planting disinformation to mislead the other guys. Anything you read might be a red herring. I regard anything that I find plausible as merely possible, subject to verification. Michael Crichton wrote an essay about what he termed the “Gell-Mann Effect”. You read a story about something of which you have personal knowledge and see that it is mostly wrong. You read the next story and assume that it is accurate. Go figure.
3. why a braggart like Khruschev would have allowed such an asymmetrical resolution
Post WWII stability was, and still is, grounded in MAD – Mutually Assured Destruction. A first strike capability negated MAD. The Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy were 10 minutes from the Soviet strategic bomber bases which comprised almost all of their retaliatory capabilities. They were a first strike threat. The missiles in Cuba posed the same threat to the US. The removal of all the IRBMs, Russian and US, was what Khruschev wanted. It was also what both sides needed as evidenced by you and I having a conversation today.
4. and the missing Castro component.
Castro was irrelevant.
5. But this goes back to the similar issue that the Soviets never fully denuclearized Cuba, they merely withdrew the vulnerable land based systems from it while continuing to keep ports of call for their Boomers there
The Cuban situation was existential but transitory. Both sides subsequently implemented their triads – bombers, land based missiles and sea based missiles – which eliminated the first strike threat.
6. It also does not address the rather apocalyptic lunacy on the parts of Castro and Che.
They’re both dead and we are not.
@Roy Lofquist
“I am referring to information that is, as far as I know, still Top Secret+.”
Which is fair enough, and why I added in the caveat that
“I will not claim that I have as much knowledge about things in the non-public domain that you do, let alone the experience or credentials. ”
Precisely because I thought it might be something like this, which has the dual problem of being unprovable without breaking legal covenants and hard to use. Also because I was merely giving vague details of my own experience and connections, not trying to engage in a measurement contest or Stealing Valor I have never earned.
” If you looked at the declassified NSA document that I linked you saw that half of it is redacted.”
Indeed, as is pretty typical.
” Aside from legal liability it is the culture that you just don’t talk about sensitive information. If you do you are very careful.”
Agreed, Loose Lips Sink Ships and all that. That is something I have noticed with my other friends, and why
To quote another friend I had:
“So if I can’t speak on specifics from inside a SCIF, why have I shared with Turtler? Because he asks questions I can usually answer referring to outside sources. I can usually safely point him in a certain direction without violating my oaths or laws. When that fails, I can give him a simple answer that requires no special knowledge. If that fails, I can tell him “”I cannot speak on that” and he understands to not pursue further.
For most people, what I share would be nearly useless…because most people don’t do the research Turtler does. Shit, man, I wouldn’t even do it.”
“A major part of intelligence analysis is devoted to figuring out if the information you have is valid or purposeful disinformation. A major part of counter-intelligence is planting disinformation to mislead the other guys. Anything you read might be a red herring. ”
Indeed, especially when dealing with the Soviets and to a lesser degree Russia as a whole, which for all of its myriad flaws and problems (as the war in Ukraine is revealing) has internalized and refined Maskirovka and other mass-deception and information warfare strategies like few others. Helped by the fact that a lot of contrary evidence has been locked in archives or “disappeared.” Which is why you have so many lingering traces of their narratives (like the idea that the Gulf of Tonkin was a “false flag” attack (it wasn’t; the First Incident saw the North Vietnamese attack a USN ship and get beaten, while the Second Incident was caused by the crew of that ship being so nervous they misinterpreted white noise on the radar and started shooting at fish) still remain.
“I regard anything that I find plausible as merely possible, subject to verification. Michael Crichton wrote an essay about what he termed the “Gell-Mann Effect”. You read a story about something of which you have personal knowledge and see that it is mostly wrong. You read the next story and assume that it is accurate. Go figure.”
Quite, which is also why I try to maintain a good deal of skepticism. And also why I have not mentioned or sourced the likes of Humberto Fontova (sort of the Right’s PoP Culture source on Che and the Castro Regime, and where a lot of the more salacious quotes and claims seem to originate from) because I cannot trace the ‘evidence’ or ‘sources’ they are presenting beyond them, even with some rudimentary knowledge of Spanish and quite a lot of patience.
“Post WWII stability was, and still is, grounded in MAD – Mutually Assured Destruction. A first strike capability negated MAD. ”
The big problem with this is that MAD was far more of a focus and ends to Western strategists than it was to the Soviets or Communist Chinese. While it can be hard to filter out the apocalyptic bluster of people like Mao talking about how he would ask the Soviets to nuke China in order to destroy American forces there, the fact is we now know that the Soviets thought far more seriously about nuclear weapons as war-winners and gradients of escalation than we previously believed, and certainly more than the Kumbayaya “Russians love their children too” school of mass media liked to admit.
The truth is, Marxist-Leninism was founded as an aggressive, messianic ideology with global pretensions of exporting the revolution worldwide. It did not believe in “Stability” in and of itself, particularly not for its own reasons. Which is why so much of Soviet and other Communist doctrine in the first half of the Soviet Union’s existence was geared towards *destroying* stability in order to help fuel the revolution.
This is easily traceable from public resources, whether it’s looking at Marxists.org’s transcripts of Lenin talking about how there would never be peace between the Bolshevik revolution and the wider world, his attempts to jump-start a World War in 1919 (which largely faltered on the stumbling blocks of Poland, the Baltics, and Romania accompanied by the sheer devastation Russia had), the interwar Soviet support of German rearmament in order to destabilize the Versailles peace settlement and create room for maneuver, subversion throughout the world (IIRC the first “Chekist” captured in Vietnam was grabbed by the British in 1945), the muted level of Soviet demobilization after WWII, or Soviet Civil Defense doctrine. Even if you discount much of this as a false positive, rendered obsolete by changing policy, or simple bluster it clearly points to the Soviets’ strategic culture being predominantly offensive in a way that NATO’s simply was not.
This was up to and including serious consideration for how nuclear weapons and other WMD would be used in a war of conquest.
http://insidethecoldwar.org/sites/default/files/documents/NI%20IIM%2077-029%20Soviet%20Civil%20Defense%20Objectives%2C%20Pace%20and%20Effectiveness%2C%20December%201977.pdf
In essence, the Soviets responded to the end of WWII and particularly the use of atomic weapons by the West by trying to launch a crash program to nuclearize in order to gain a nuclear umbrella against potential retaliation or aggression by the West (especially in an era that marked the high point of Western discussions of “Massive Retaliation” and the use of nuclear weapons in wars from Korea to Vietnam). This was meant to not only ward off attacks on the “Peoples’ State” as the Soviets liked to bring up by drumbeating about Operation Barbarossa, but also to provide a counterbalance to help launch offensive operations in the West, whether more surgical subversion or the sort of a “1919 but we’ll do it right this time!”
So the goal was less about deterring a Western or Chinese attack (which the Soviets were concerned about but also deterring Western recourse to nuclear weapons in a conventional war they were losing, in essence trying to overcome the threshold for MAD.
The issue is that the Soviets were never able to be confident they had amassed enough nuclear weapons to do so, even as the balance of power went from an anemic conventional Western military (post-WWII Empires, Pentomic era US) with immense nuclear power against a conventional Soviet juggernaut (albeit one trying to adjust to the loss of logistical support from Lend-Lease) with underpowered nuclear arms to a gradually atrophying nuclear-powered Soviet military with an increasingly out-nuked but militarily competent US military at the end of the Cold War.
It’s hard to tell exactly when the Soviet leadership more or less gave up their ambitions of a conventional aggression against the West, but it was almost certainly some time after the Cuban Missile Crisis and Khruschev’s fall.
Which is part of the reason why the two sides came to the field with different objectives. US doctrine was focused primarily on containment at all costs, with the potential to “rollback.” The Soviets, however, were determined to export the revolution by subversion or open arms. Which is ultimately what did them in: the US ultimately had to “not lose” in order to win the Cold War.
“The Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy were 10 minutes from the Soviet strategic bomber bases which comprised almost all of their retaliatory capabilities. They were a first strike threat. The missiles in Cuba posed the same threat to the US. The removal of all the IRBMs, Russian and US, was what Khruschev wanted. It was also what both sides needed as evidenced by you and I having a conversation today.”
Agreed, but there are a couple caveats.
Firstly: the fact that while this is the primary goal Khruschev wanted, it discounts the secondary goal he had and the primary goal his vassals in Habana wanted. Namely to have nuclear weapons stockpiled on their island in order to stave off another Bay of Pigs or outright invasion by the US (and in the case of Castro, to maintain the possibility of using said nuclear weapons as leverage against his patrons).
It’s not a coincidence that the Soviet positioning of weapons in Cuba came after Fidel lobbied for their placement and even offered as such.
https://www.cfr.org/blog/twe-remembers-secret-soviet-tactical-nuclear-weapons-cuba-cuban-missile-crisis-coda
Nor is it a coincidence that his feelings and conduct loomed so relatively large in 1960-2 as an unpredictable wild card, heavily aligned with the Soviets and in sympathy with them but pursuing his own agenda that did not always line up with them.
Secondly: one key reason for the interest in Soviet nuclear disarmament was because of the Kremlin’s belief up to this point that doing so would strengthen the Soviet Union’s hand in conventional war and possibly open the door towards an attack at a more convenient time.
“Castro was irrelevant.”
Unlikely, especially from what is public knowledge. He was not the main force involved, nor one of the main players, but he was the host of the nuclear weapons and quite capable of pursuing his own agenda within the limits of Great Power politics (and to a limited extent even beyond then, hence Khruschev’s growing concerns).
There is a brilliant little quote a friend gave me, which they claimed came from a Chess-themed play, though I cannot verify it.
It was: “Even pawns can make moves of their own.” Which is worth remembeirng.
“The Cuban situation was existential but transitory. Both sides subsequently implemented their triads – bombers, land based missiles and sea based missiles – which eliminated the first strike threat.”
Indeed, but that is also why I do think the Cuban Missile Crisis marked a foundational moment in Soviet policy, and particularly a growing leeriness towards an aggressive forward policy, helpfully underlined by the construction of massive fortifications across the border lines, aimed at both deterring invasion and above all stemming the tides of defection.
The fact that these fortifications were designed for strategic demolition by the Soviet Bloc in order to do things like launch an invasion of the West shows that the Soviets had not completely given up the possibility of an aggressive move West or at least heavy counterattacks, but it does show a significant part of their policy had shifted from trying to plan the export of the revolution to consolidating and protecting it on its own soil.
Even the people who made that shift probably did not realize how important or lasting it would be, but so it was.
“They’re both dead and we are not.”
Quite, but that is rather irrelevant when discussing their actions while they were alive, no?
@turtler,
First, the analysis I presented is not my own but rather the concensus of any number of people who were in the business of shooting and getting shot at. It has developed over the years influenced by my participation in the Minuteman II program and various other activities. I don’t delve into motivations or grand movements in history. I tend to put more emphasis on CEP (Circular Error Probable) and fratricide (friendly fire). Peoples’ attitudes and perceptions, there are billions of them, are fun to talk about but the real measure lies in body counts or the lack thereof.
@Roy Lofquist
“First, the analysis I presented is not my own but rather the concensus of any number of people who were in the business of shooting and getting shot at.”
Fair enough, that wasn’t as clear before.
I for myself am an amateur historian and lifelong civilian. I admit I am mostly in the peanut gallery and heavily reliant upon secondary sources and what primary ones are declassified for the obvious reasons (I imagine the thrill of being “gangsta” or an “outlaw” starts to dull after your friends start to get arrested). So I admit I largely speak for myself, though I will talk about the stances and opinions of others and where I agree or disagree with them. After all, we all have to try as we can.
This is also why I care a great deal more about motivation in my research, even if this may not be the most important aspect the agendas of institutions, factions, or even individuals can be incredibly important. Which is why I disputed it.
” It has developed over the years influenced by my participation in the Minuteman II program and various other activities. I don’t delve into motivations or grand movements in history. I tend to put more emphasis on CEP (Circular Error Probable) and fratricide (friendly fire). ”
Understandable, and that is probably the right call. I am nowhere near as versed in that and I admit it.
I also care a great deal more about motivation in my research, even if this may not be the most important aspect the agendas of institutions, factions, or even individuals can be incredibly important. Which is why I disputed it.
It also helps that motivations are generally a lot clearer and somewhat more telling by actions and declarations, even if obviously subject to misinformation and so on.
“Peoples’ attitudes and perceptions, there are billions of them, are fun to talk about but the real measure lies in body counts or the lack thereof.”
Agreed, but that is part of the question of motive. Who would be willing to crunch those numbers and what outcomes would meet their approval. Obviously it is only part of the puzzle and arguably a less important part compared to body counts, concrete policy, and so forth but that plays out against the backdrop of wills and agendas shaping how that plays out.
@Turtler,
I appreciate, and agree with, your sentiments. They are far richer and more nuanced than the ones I have expressed. My comments on this thread are me in analytical mode. It is similar to reductionism in science. You have to winnow your focus to essentials to draw conclusions in a reasonable amount of time. Yet every factor you ignore constitutes a loss of information. It is, of necessity, a parochial endeavor.
As to the motivations of prominent people please consider that there are very few, if any, lone wolves. They are the faces of institutions or power centers in a society. They are constrained. For example, all of the presidents in my life, from Truman to Biden, have been blamed or credited with actions taken by people in departments that they didn’t even know existed. Such is the curse of leadership.
In closing, thank you for one of the more enjoyable discussions I have had in many a year. —Smily Face—