Here’s a summary. An excerpt:

The investigations found that the State of Israel, including both political and defense echelons, believed or carried out the following, due to their perception of Gaza:

Over the past decades, Israel considered the threats from Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon to be the priority, while the Gaza Strip was secondary. …

Israel chose to “manage the conflict” with Hamas, to create long periods of quiet, under the false presumption that the terror group was uninterested in a large-scale war. There were no plans to conquer the Gaza Strip in a war, and there were no plans to reach a full diplomatic agreement with the terror group either, but rather return to normalcy after periodic escalation. Israel believed that leveraging improved civil conditions in Gaza would make Hamas less likely to launch a war. …

The threat of a surprise and wide-scale attack from Gaza was not perceived as realistic by the IDF, due to a major gap in Israel’s understanding of Hamas. The IDF believed Hamas to be a limited threat, in the event of it responding to incidents, rather than taking initiative. …

The most significant threat from the Gaza Strip, as seen by the IDF at the time, was rocket fire. At the same time, Hamas’s invasion capability was seen by the military as very limited, due to Israel’s advanced border fence and the false belief that the IDF had successfully destroyed significant elements of the terror group’s tunnel networks in the 2021 Gaza War. …

Israel’s fence on the border with the Gaza Strip was not intended to prevent a large-scale invasion, but to handle rioting on the border, and delay or disrupt limited infiltration attacks. …

Israel’s perceptions of Gaza were “rooted and deep.” Over the years there were no meaningful attempts to question the perceptions, and no proper investigation was held to think “Where are we [doing] wrong?”

I think a big part of the problem was also that Hamas was dissembling, and Israel was taken in due to wishful thinking.