[NOTE: Part I can be found here.]
In my research so far about what happened in the Paradise fire and why it went so wrong, I kept trying to get a good timeline, with distances. When exactly did the fire start? How many miles from Paradise? How fast did it travel? When did it first hit the town? When did authorities order the evacuation? It has proved very difficult to get that information, but finally I’ve gotten some of it (although I’m not 100% sure it’s correct).
What is coming out is that the method and timing of the notification of the residents was deeply flawed, despite all the preparation. In addition to the natural and perhaps-inevitable obstacles, there was some sort of disorganization in the notification of the population of Paradise:
A resident of Magalia, about 8 miles west of the fire’s starting point, confronted Butte County Sheriff Kory L. Honea and other officials Monday about why he and his neighbors could not find any information about the dangerous blaze, a full three hours after fire crews first responded to the ignition point, near Highway 70 in Plumas National Forest.
“We use the emergency broadcast system for a tornado warning. But this is a deadly fire,” said the man, who was not identified by county officials whom he addressed at the meeting in Oroville. “I don’t remember any alert coming over my radio. … People in the community are freaking out, you need to get some information up here.”…
The Butte County sheriff’s office said it did deliver notifications about the fire danger: 5,227 by email, 25,643 via phone (to both land lines and cellular devices) and 5,445 by text message.
“I wish we had the opportunity to get more alerts out, more of a warning out, but unfortunately we didn’t,” Sheriff Honea told the public meeting on Monday.
At a news conference Tuesday evening, Honea stressed that the fire’s unusually swift progress south and west into Magalia, Paradise and other mountain communities made timely notification difficult.
“You have to keep in mind that this was an extraordinarily chaotic and rapidly moving situation. The fire started in a remote area. It takes awhile for our fire resources to get there and from that point, trying to determine the path of travel and whether or not that’s going to effect populated areas, that takes time,” Honea said.
He added that it’s possible some people were warned and didn’t immediately act to get out of harm’s way. “We were trying to move tens of thousands of people out of an area very rapidly with the fire coming very rapidly. And no matter what your plan is to do that, no plan will ever work 100 percent when you are dealing with that much chaos.”
Honea, who took office four years ago, also suggested that emergency officials have to be concerned not to over-burden people with excessive or unneeded evacuation orders. He said the region had already lived through evacuations from earlier fires and last year’s threatened collapse of the Oroville Dam, which caused nearly 200,000 people to flee…
Like other counties, Butte has a system that allows residents to sign up for “reverse 911” telephone alerts in times of emergency.
Savannah Rauscher told The Sacramento Bee that by the time she got the 911 alert at 8:30 a.m., embers and dust were already flying around her family’s Edgewood Lane home….
But even signing up for the warnings was no guarantee they came through. Johnson said her aunt, Peg, applied for the 911 alerts, but received no notice at her Paradise home of the Camp Fire. “She said she didn’t get anything,” Johnson said. “It was friends and family calling, or neighbors coming by. That’s how many people found out.”
Taft said she argued fiercely with her mother for more than an hour, trying to convince her to flee. But there were no sheriff’s deputies demanding the neighborhood evacuate. Fire crews, busy on the front lines of the blaze, did not stop by. No one she talked to in her neighborhood was ordered out…
Even a system designed to push warnings to all cellphones, tested recently by the Trump administration, did not reach everyone.
Lewin said he had two cellphones side by side during that test, both serviced by the same phone company, and only one received the emergency alert. “And we don’t know the reason why,” he said.
An exacerbating factor in Butte County may have been the advanced age of many residents. Paradise and its environs are popular with retirees, some of whom are reluctant to leave home because of mobility problems…
Cell phone service is apparently very bad there, and many people don’t even have cell phones. To call landlines and leave voicemails—even with an automated system—is much slower, and my guess is that the majority of those evacuation messages needed to be left on landlines.
The fire started in the early morning, and got to town pretty early in the morning, too. If a person was a late sleeper, or even a moderately late sleeper, and habitually turned the cellphone ringer off at night (or slept in a room without a landline), none of these messages would have been received. Also, of course, disabled people or elderly people who don’t drive would have had to rely on neighbors, friends, or relatives to come and get them out.
The evidence so far is that the vast majority of deaths occurred at home. Were the people asleep, in bed? Or were they somewhere else in the house? Because of the nature of the fire—its extreme heat causing what amounted to cremation—we may never know the full story. But I believe that some sort of more comprehensive warning system, and perhaps a buddy system for the disabled (paired with someone able-bodied), would have helped.
The plans for Paradise called for an evacuation in stages, in order to forestall the problem of backup on the roads. Ordinarily the officials would have enough time, but this time they didn’t:
…[T]his time [because of the history of the 2008 fire, officials] decided not to immediately undergo a full-scale evacuation, hoping to get residents out of neighborhoods closest to the fires first before the roads became gridlocked.
But it soon became clear that the fire was moving too fast for that plan, and that the whole town was in jeopardy. A full-scale evacuation order was issued at 9:17 a.m., but by then the fire was already consuming the town.
The fire is reported to have begun around 6:30 AM in a remote area. I’ve read wildly differing accounts of how far away it was from the town (from 65 miles away to 25 miles away to just a few miles away). Most accounts agree on the time it was detected, and if that’s correct then this full-scale evacuation was about 2 hours and 45 minutes afterward. But it had already traversed the distance to Paradise.
The article gives a fairly close-to-Paradise origin for the fire, around Pulga at 7 miles away. But if you look on the map, Pulga is more than 7 miles from Paradise (by car it’s actually 26 or 27 miles, but of course as the crow flies it is much closer, although it’s hard to tell how close). And the article has the very first (partial) evacuation notice for Paradise being issued around 8 AM, which is about an hour and a half later):
In the chaos of the Paradise fire, many residents said, they never got warnings by phone from authorities to leave. Some said they got warnings from police driving through their streets using loudspeakers. Others got texts from neighbors. But few said they got official text alerts or phone calls from the government.
The fire was first reported near the community of Pulga — about seven miles from Paradise — about 6:30 a.m. By 7:35 a.m., it had reached the nearby hamlet of Concow.
The first evacuation order for Paradise came at 8 a.m., a minute after the first flames were spotted in town. The order was limited to the eastern side of Paradise. The hope was to get the residents closest to fire out immediately, with the rest of the town to follow if needed.
But the fire was simply moving too fast.
“The fire had already outrun us,” said John Messina,
Technical problems were inherent in the phone system used:
The evacuation orders were sent using a phone system called CodeRed, which covers all landlines as well as cellphone numbers voluntarily submitted by residents. But the system doesn’t cover all phones in the town. “In the town of Paradise, I think we’d be lucky to say 25% or 30%” of phone lines are in the system — and that’s after local officials urge residents to sign up, said Jim Broshears, who directs Paradise’s emergency operations center.
Also, the system can reach only so many phones per hour. “I can’t give you the raw numbers, but there’s a capacity per hour of calls. So CodeRed can’t [make] 12,000 calls at once. It’s really fast, but not this fast,” Broshears said.
These types of systems have been criticized because they reach so few people. Instead, some safety experts have advocated using the federal government’s Wireless Emergency Alert system, which sends Amber Alert-style warnings to cellphones within a certain geographical area…
In Paradise, Broshears said officials did not employ the Wireless Emergency Alert system because they initially wanted to stagger the evacuations by neighborhood. He also said that Amber Alert-style alerts do “not go to every phone at the same time.”
According to the Federal Communications Commission, Wireless Emergency Alerts are broadcast to coverage areas that best approximate the zone of an emergency; mobile devices in the alert zone will receive the alert. There has been criticism that the geographical targeting of the system is not terribly precise, and in late 2019, wireless carriers are supposed to improve geo-targeting of the alerts.
Again, remember that most people in Paradise may not have even had functioning cellphones.
What about the good old-fashioned siren of my youth? Do towns still have them? I hated that siren; it terrified me because it sounded like an air raid siren in World War II movies, with which I was very familiar. But boy, could you hear it.
Of course, a siren has three drawbacks in a situation such as that faced by Paradise. The first is that it’s tested a lot and people sometimes have trouble telling test from real alert. The second is that it’s non-specific and doesn’t say what the danger is or what to do about it; it’s just an alarm, unless there’s a sort of code of blasts, and then people have to remember the code. The third is the previously-mentioned problem of a mass exodus all at once. Even if the evacuation notice is given promptly and people receive it, how do you avoid a bottleneck of traffic, particularly in a town with the sort of road geography Paradise has?
[NOTE: For now, I’ve given up on calculating the speed of the fire, except to say it was very very fast. The problem with the calculations involve the differing reports of speed and of distance. Most articles say that at its fastest, the fire moved at the rate of more than one football field a second. The slowest rate I’ve read is that the average speed of this fire was a football field every three seconds. Either way, that’s tremendously fast.]