Just reminding you that Andrew Branca is reporting in-depth at Legal Insurrection on the Chauvin trial. His first two posts from yesterday are this and this.
I believe the plan is for him to write at least one post every day the trial is in session. It’s probably the most accurate and thorough reportage you’ll get on the subject.
Here’s an excerpt:
The defense narrative of innocence in this case is obviously that what killed Floyd was not Chauvin’s knee but rather the three-fold fatal dose of fentanyl found in Floyd’s body upon medical examination. The belief is that when he realized he was about to be arrested for attempting to pass a bad $20 bill, Floyd ingested meth and fentanyl drugs he had on his person in order to prevent their discovery by the arresting officers. The dose ingested, unfortunately for Floyd, for Chauvin, for all of Minneapolis, and for the United States generally, was more than sufficient to prove fatal.
Almost exactly a year prior to the day Floyd died with a fatal dose of fentanyl in his body he was also the subject of a lawful arrest and also apparently ingested illicit drugs to avoid their discovery by the arresting officers. In that case Floyd received hospital care and did not die as a result of the drug ingestion.
Naturally, with a nearly identical drug ingestion event having occurred with Floyd merely a year prior to his death, the defense would like to get evidence of that prior event in front of the jury. Their prior efforts to get that event admitted into evidence, however, had not gotten traction because the judge perceived the evidence as more prejudicial than probative.
In law, introducing evidence of a prior action in order to establish a pattern of behavior is quite limited:
The defense argued this afternoon that the evidence of the 2019 ingestion event ought to be admitted as proof of a modus operandi, or “method of operation,” in effect that “this is what Floyd does when confronted by police.”
Modus operandi is an exception allowing for the admission of prior bad act evidence when the prior bad acts appear to be a consistent pattern or practice of behavior. So, someone charged with second-story burglary might not have a prior drunk driving conviction admitted as evidence at their trial for second-story burglary, but if they have prior convictions for second-story burglary in their record those convictions might well be admissible as a pattern or practice of behavior in their trial for the newest charge of second-story burglary…
In making this argument before Judge Cashill this afternoon, however, defense counsel met a cool reception…
And if the evidence of the prior dug ingestion event had little probative value, in the context of other available evidence of Floyd’s drug toxicity, it begins to look a lot like it’s being submitted largely to show a propensity for bad conduct—which is not a proper basis for the admission of evidence.
So, there’s a general rule of evidence, termed 404(b), that generally excludes prior bad acts or character evidence that’s offered as proof of unrelated currently charged misconduct, stating:
404(b). Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. …
As those ellipses suggest, however, there are a number of exceptions to this exclusion of admissibility—like the modus operandi exception we discussed above.
… It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
If memory serves me, I believe this is because – as I learned long long ago in a great course in law school on jurisprudence – in our legal system the basic general premise is that we judge the act, not the character of the person. The latter ordinarily comes into play in the sentencing phase, however.

