The definition of “success” in war: Part I

The New Neo Posted on by

The ISG report has branded our efforts in Iraq “grave,” “deteriorating,” and “not working.”

The American people aren’t too happy with the situation, either. Results of recent polls indicate:

Just 9 per cent expect the war to end in clear-cut victory, compared with 87 per cent who expect some sort of compromise settlement…

But what would “clear-cut victory” actually look like in the case of Iraq (or Iran, or Syria, or any number of other places, for that matter)? Do we know? To achieve “victory,” is it necessary to have a country completely at peace, with guarantees of civil rights for all and a smoothly functioning democratic process?

Well, that would be victory, all right. But is anything short of that failure? Probably not. But, if not, where do we draw the line between the two? After all, a nation running as smoothly as that was always a highly unrealistic short-term goal for Iraq–and by “short-term” I mean anything less than a few decades, or even longer.

So, how should we define a realistic and relatively short-term (a couple of years) victory in Iraq? Although it’s difficult to do so, it seems necessary in order to know whether we ever achieve it, or even come close to it.

Our early definition of victory in Iraq was simple, but very incomplete: deposing Saddam. That was done with relative ease, but had we left at that point the country would have devolved into chaos. Leaving prematurely is a big problem; in fact, the current Iraq War can be seen as an attempt to deal with the situation left by the very unfinished business of the first Gulf War, in which “success” was too narrowly defined.

Commenter Ymarsakar had this to say recently on the subject of success in this war versus previous, more traditional, ones:

The thing you have to remember about WWII…is that people could know whether victory or defeat was close by, by casualty lists and whether a battle was won or lost, territory gained or won. In a guerrila war as with Iraq, that doesn’t seem very clear. I mean, the US won all the battles so far, and yet we have violence every day, but we control all the territory, but and but and but. The human mind is not wired for this kind of fight and flight, fight then flight then fight then flight then fight schism. Because it pulls you from one way to the other, and eventually you will shred.

One part of your mind says you are winning. No attacks, US soldiers winning battles, etc. Other side of your brain sees you are losing, loss of support, violence, more violence, American deaths, demoralizing stories, etc.

I’ve mentioned this before of course, but the agony of defeat in WWII or even the threat of it, actually galvanized morale and support. You don’t have that now, because America itself is not being attacked and the world doesn’t “look” like the terroists are gaining ground…

I think you know that the loss of the Pacific Fleet left the entire Western seaboard of America open to Japanese invasion. It was a palpable sense of dread and DEFEAT, the idea that you could lose. You NEED that for resolve. In Iraq, the idea that we will lose, is not there, but the idea that we “aren’t winning” is there. So it creates friction.

One of President Bush’s major communication failures was on the subject of what success would look like in this particular war. Some say it should have been limited to toppling Saddam, although that would have left the country in chaos. The traditional realpolitik solution would have been to have backed another strong man as replacement–a dictator, but “our” dictator–and hope for the best (the Shah of Iran was an example of this approach in the past).

Our venture in Iraq had a more lofty ultimate, long-term goal (although the amount of time and effort necessary to achieve that goal was poorly defined): to help the Iraqis towards a functioning democracy rather than a dictatorship, somewhat resembling the occupation of Japan and West Germany and the establishment of democracies there after WWII (and yes, the differences between Iraq and the those countries, as well as the perception of defeat by the populations involved, are profound) . Whether or not that goal could have been achieved with a more forceful and committed occupation in Iraq (see this for a discussion), or could still be achieved, there’s no doubt that it has not been achieved at this point in time.

But Victor Davis Hanson points to the fact that the jihadis don’t seem to think they’ve achieved success yet, either:

We forget that the jihadist websites are still worried about Iraq, both the losses suffered there, and the emergence of a democratic government. We think we are not winning, but so do they think they aren’t either.

Recently President Bush was careful to refer to the “pace of success” in Iraq as being too slow, rather than mentioning the “F” word, failure. He said:

You want frankness? I thought we would succeed quicker than we did. And I am disappointed by the pace of success.

Semantics, right? Not entirely. How something is framed does indeed affect our view of it.

There are many, of course, who would consider that comment of Bush’s ludicrous: to them, it’s obvious that our venture in Iraq is a failure already, and to speak of a slowed “pace of success” is merely Orwellian gobbledygook meant to keep us in a losing endeavor, spilling more blood and treasure just to protect Bush’s pride.

There are others (and I am among them) who consider that failure (and premature withdrawal) in Iraq would not only be a tragedy for the Iraqi people and for the world, but would not even accomplish the goals its proponents think it will. This enemy and this fight cannot be avoided, and failure in Iraq (however it’s defined) will only set up the next, and greater conflict.

The question of “will” in this war is one I’ve tackled before (here, for example). Part of will is to consider that failure is not an option, and to do whatever needs to be done to make sure it does not occur. But without defining either, we are at sea, especially in the sort of murky situation presented by asymmetrical wars.

In World War II the goals were so obvious there was no real need to define victory: unconditional surrender of the enemy, nothing less. In Vietnam things became more foggy, and part of the shock of the Pentagon Papers was that the goals the American people had assumed were those of our war effort there were revealed to have not been taken all that seriously by the Pentagon. Post-Vietnam, goals have not only been poorly articulated, but in the current conflict they are inherently difficult to define–this enemy will never formally surrender.

[Part II, planned for tomorrow, will be an attempt to explain why victory has been especially difficult to define and to pursue in this particular war.]

[ADDENDUM: Shrinkwrapped on a related theme.]

[ADDENDuM II: Here’s another example of the use of semantics in war.]

The ISG and the USIP: who are these people and why are they saying all these things?

The New Neo Posted on by

In her latest vlog, the inimitable Pamela of Atlas Shrugs asks the following pertinent question about ISG head James Baker, “Who died and made him king?”

Well, I think I can offer a stab at an answer. Who died? The Republican Party in the 2006 election (I know, I know, they didn’t die. But they did receive a blow). Who made Baker king? The MSM.

My guess is that had the Republicans won the 2006 elections, we wouldn’t have heard much about the ISG recommendations, which have been hyped to the nth degree by the media only since those elections.

The ISG was appointed back in March. Here is its history. It was formed at the suggestion of Congressman Frank Wolf as a bipartisan panel to look at the situation in Iraq with fresh eyes. The panel was affiliated with an entity called the United States Institute of Peace:

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, national institution established and funded by Congress. Its mission is to help:

* Prevent and resolve violent international conflicts
* Promote post-conflict stability and democratic transformations
* Increase peacebuilding capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide

In other words, from the start, the ISG was under the aegis of a group dedicated to finding diplomatic solutions rather than to make military suggestions (except, perhaps, in the area of using armed forces as peacekeepers). The USIP was a “facilitating organization” to the Group, meaning:

As facilitator, USIP maintains an in-house Iraq expert committee that supports the ISG principals in their work. USIP has assisted the group and its members by convening expert working groups, writing briefing papers, providing analysis and coordinating meetings of the ISG.

The two heads of the ISG, Baker and Hamilton, were chosen by:

mutual agreement among the Congressional organizers, USIP, and the other supporting organizations. After being named co-chairs, Baker and Hamilton selected the remaining group members in consultation with USIP and the other supporting organizations.

So it was Congress and the USIP who appointed the heads of the ISG, who then appointed everyone else, with the USIP heavily involved. And once you read the goals of the USIP, it becomes crystal clear why the rather deranged suggestion to talk to Iran and Syria, and to resolve the Palestinian/Israeli situation through revival of the DOA “peace process” there, are part and parcel of the ISG recommendations.

I’m sure the USIP is composed of a bunch of nice people dedicated to the pursuit of peace, a laudable cause. And I would imagine that somewhere, somehow, in the right circumstances, they do some fine work–perhaps, for example, in rebuilding places where the fighting parties are exhausted and wanting reconciliation (some of the nations of Africa, for example). Here are more of the USIP’s activities:

* Providing on-the-ground operational support in zones of conflict, most recently in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Colombia, Indonesia, Iraq, the Palestinian Territories, Liberia, Nigeria, Philippines, Rwanda, and Sudan. Specific work performed by Institute staff and grantees includes:
o Building leadership capacity through training and workshops
o Facilitating dialogue among parties in conflict
o Identifying and disseminating best practices in conflict management
o Sponsoring leadership summits and strategic conferences
o Promoting the rule of law
o Developing educational and teacher training materials
o Helping build civil society institutions
o Sponsoring a wide range of countrywide working groups (e.g., Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq, Korea, Sudan)
o Educating the public through informative events, documentary films, radio programs, and an array of other outreach activities

Despite the heavy hand of the USIP and their bias for the talking cure (and I’m not referring to psychotherapy), the ISG still might have been a more worthwhile and balanced endeavor had its members consisted of people with a great deal of expertise on the subject of Iraq, foreign affairs, and military matters.

Who are the members of the ISG? Most articles focus on Baker and Hamilton, the heads, but there are ten members. There are five Democrats and five Republicans, no surprise, since the panel was meant to be bipartisan. Let’s take a brief look:

(1) James A. Baker, age 76, Republican, Secretary of State under the first Bush

(2) Lee Hamilton, age 75, Democrat, vice-chair of 9/11 Commission, ex-Representative from Indiana with experience on foreign affairs and intelligence committees

(3) Lawrence Eagleburger, age 76, Republican, Secretary of State under the first Bush

(4) Vernon Jordan, age 71, Democrat, businessman, civil rights lawyer and advisor/buddy to Clinton

(5) Edwin Meese III, age 75, Republican, Attorney General under Reagan (controversial involvement in Iran-Contra)

(6) Sandra Day O’Connor, age 76, Republican, lawyer and Supreme Court Justice

(7) Leon Panetta, age 68, Democrat, Congressman (budget, civil rights, health, and environmental issues), Clinton’s Chief of Staff

(8) William Perry, age 79, Democrat, Secretary of Defense under Clinton

(9) Chuck Robb, age 67, Democrat, former Marine, ex-governor of Virginia, Senator, Chair of Iraq Intelligence Commission (only member of ISG to venture outside “green zone” in trip to Iraq)

(10) Allen K. Simpson, age 75, Republican, Senator, chair of Veterans’ Affairs Committee

One thing that leaps out–and which others have commented on–is that as a whole it’s a rather geriatric bunch. This certainly doesn’t invalidate the opinions of the members, but it leads us to a presumption that they’re not exactly cutting edge. Foreign affairs are represented, in the sense of the State Department (to be extremely specific, the State Department under the first President Bush): Baker and Eagleburger were both Secretary of State under Bush I. Hamilton has relevant Congressional experience; Perry is the only person with a Defense background (under Clinton, under whom he oversaw the post-Cold War reduction of the armed forces), and Robb has both military and intelligence experience.

But fully five of the Group’s members (that’s half) have little or in most cases no experience at all–not just of Iraq or military matters, but of foreign affairs in general. To me, this is astounding.

Baker and Hamilton picked the members of the group. I don’t know whether these were their first picks or not, or how much oversight there was, and if so, by whom. At the time the selection was made, I doubt they realized what scrutiny the results would come under, due to the election.

But these picks are beyond my understanding. If you follow the links and read the biographies, you’ll see that Jordan, O’Connor, Meese, Panetta, and probably Simpson (who seems to have a bit of experience with veteran affairs, which is probably not all that relevant to policy in Iraq) have no experience whatsoever in the relevant fields. None. Period.

This is truly hard to fathom. I understand bipartisanship. I understand that these aren’t stupid people; they are all intelligent and accomplished, in their own ways. But so are many of us, and we’re not on the ISG.

Surely these are not the most qualified people for this particular task. Surely they are not even close. Surely many of them are not qualified at all. And surely the influence of the USIP skewed the results, especially when dealing with minds that may have been somewhat of a tabula rasa on the topic.

[ADDENDUM: Shrinkwrapped diagnoses the ISG.]

Who said Senators aren’t diplomats? More talking about talking with Iran

The New Neo Posted on by

On the topic of James Baker and Lee Hamilton’s suggestion that we talk to Iran and Syria about helping us out in Iraq, I’d say a person would have to be either abysmally stupid, mindbogglingly ignorant, or stark raving mad (or perhaps some combination of all three) to think it might be a good idea. And that’s the polite version of what I think.

Victor Davis Hanson calls such a suggestion “surreal.” I’m with him, as well.

But Senators–ah, Senators!–are much more refined in questioning whether the ISG’s suggestion to turn to Iran for help in Iraq is really the wisest possible course. For example, ISG head James Baker and member Lee Hamilton were quizzed Thursday by Joe Lieberman thusly:

I’m skeptical that it’s realistic to think that Iran wants to help the United States succeed in Iraq. They are, after all, supporting (the Islamist militant group) Hezbollah, which gathers people in the square in Beirut to shout “Death to America.”

Not to mention that’s this is not a recent occurrence: for thirty-five years Iran has been actively working and praying (loudly) for our destruction. Color me “skeptical” about whether the proposal is “realistic,” as well.

John McCain’s statement on the topic was a bit more to my liking:

I don’t believe that a peace conference with people who are dedicated to your extinction has much short-term gain.

Or long term gain, I might add.

But here’s Baker on the subject:

What do we lose by saying, “we’re getting all of Iraq’s neighbors together, we want you to come, and if they say no, we show the world what they’re all about?”

That actually is an interesting question that seems reasonable on the face of it. I’ll take a stab at an answer: the world already knows exactly what Iran’s about, and the world doesn’t much care, as long as Iran’s not directly affecting them at this moment in any dramatic way. The world is relying on the US to do something about Iran, when/if it should ever become necessary, because “the world” never will. And then, when/if the US ever does act against Iran, “the world” can criticize whatever that action might be. If “the world” doesn’t have enough information about Iran’s goals and nature by now, then “the world” is willfully ignoring the truth, and has motivations to continue to do so.

What’s more, making obeisance to Iran by asking them for “help” (the way such talks have been framed) makes us look both foolish and weak. It’s not a winning combination to convey. If I were one of the mullahs, I’d be flabbergasted at the amount of foolish naivete such an act indicated–flabbergasted and pleased.

I’ve always thought it’s usually not good to communicate desperation to one’s enemies. But maybe that’s just me.

One more thing: many of Iran’s people would like to overthrow their government. They look to the US for a sign that we would support them in such an endeavor. I would wager, from what they’re seeing of our current behavior re Iraq, they’re not getting a lot of assurance that we’d be there for them when the chips are down. But talking with Iran would be just as bad as the message of our possibly abandoning Iraq; it would tell the people who would like to topple the mullahs that we are dangerously out of touch with reality, and willing to bargain with our enemies and sell out our principles in order to do so.

[CORRECTION: Iran, of course, has been working for our destruction since 1979: twenty-seven years, not thirty-five.]

What’s a blog for if not to garner sympathy?

The New Neo Posted on by

I’m going to complain. I promise it will be short.

It’s freezing, abominably windy, snow on the ground, night will fall in what seems like just a few minutes. And I have a cold.

But at least the power isn’t out. Yet. That happens here whenever the wind blows. Something about the number, size, and location of the trees.

Besides being a naked plea for sympathy, this thread is an occasion for you all to either complain about your similar situation (in which case, my condolences), or crow about your wonderful weather.

Iraqis aren’t pleased with the ISG either

The New Neo Posted on by

Iraqis don’t seem to be happy with the ISG report, either (see this).

I have a question: if the Republicans had won the election, would we even be hearing much about this report? After all, it’s been brewing since last March, and I don’t recall it being all that newsworthy before. But after the election it became the most breathlessly awaited media event since the world wondered who shot JR (for those too old to recall the latter, see this for a glimpse of simpler, kindler, gentler times).

Remembering Pearl Harbor

The New Neo Posted on by

[Please see this post on forgetting Pearl Harbor.]

We’ve all learned about Pearl Harbor, but here are some details that I found especially interesting in light of 9/11. Despite having a lot of information that a Japanese attack was coming somewhere, some time soon, the military and the government really couldn’t pin down the specifics. This made preparedness very difficult. Sound familiar? It seems to be the nature of the beast.

From Wiki:

U.S. signals intelligence, through the Army’s Signal Intelligence Service and the Office of Naval Intelligence’s OP-20-G unit, had intercepted and decrypted considerable Japanese diplomatic and naval [citation needed] cipher traffic, though none of those decrypted carried significant tactical military information. Decryption and distribution of this intelligence was capricious and sporadic, and has been blamed on lack of manpower. At best, the information was fragmentary, contradictory, or insufficiently distributed. It was also incompletely understood by decision makers, and poorly unanalyzed. Nothing pointed directly to an attack at Pearl Harbor, and lack of awareness of the Imperial Navy’s capabilities led to an underlying belief Pearl Harbor was safely out of harm’s way. Only one Hawaiian message (6 December 1941), in a consular cipher, included mention of an attack on Pearl, and it was not decrypted until 8 December 1941.

I hadn’t realized–although it stands to reason–that a good many casualties were from friendly fire. This is one of the sad and inevitable ironies of war:

Ninety minutes after it began, the attack was over. 2,403 Americans died (68 were civilians, many killed by American anti-aircraft shrapnel and shells landing in civilian areas, including Honolulu)…

My elderly mother was an adult at the time of Pearl Harbor. She’d always been interested in history (her major in college). Later, she often reminisced with me about historical events she’d lived through. In fact, her earliest memory was of booming guns going off in New York Harbor to celebrate the end of WWI–they frightened her, but the adults chuckled and told her not to fear, the war was over.

In fact, all war was over–it was “the war to end all wars.” My mother recalled being taught in her early teens that her generation was the luckiest on earth. Why? because the Kellogg-Briand Pact had just outlawed war.

Well, that’ll teach you to listen to your teachers. Because, of course, her generation faced World War II not all that many years later. And, because my mother lived to see 9/11, she was able to tell me that this would be worse than Pearl Harbor and World War II.

It remains to be seen whether she was correct. Both of us would like to think she wasn’t.

Forgetting Pearl Harbor: the giant rolls over and goes back to sleep

The New Neo Posted on by

Sixty-five years ago today Pearl Harbor was attacked.

That’s long enough ago that only the elderly remember the day and its aftermath with any clarity. Several generations–including my own tiresome one, the baby boomers–have come up since then, and the world has indeed changed.

Prior to 9/11, the Pearl Harbor attack of December 7, 1941 was the closest thing America had to 9/11. The differences between the two were profound, however: at Pearl Harbor we knew the culprit. It was clearly and unequivocally an act of war by the nation of Japan, which was already at war in the Pacific. But it was, like 9/11, a sneak attack that killed roughly the same number of Americans–in the case of Pearl Harbor mostly (although not exclusively) those in the armed forces. And the Pearl Harbor attack, in the reported (but disputed) words of Japanese Admiral Yamamoto, awakened the “sleeping giant” of the US and filled it with a “terrible resolve.” This was also true of 9/11–for a little while.

In the case of Pearl Harbor, that resolve lasted the duration of the war, an all-out conflagration that required far more sacrifice of the US (and the world) in money, comfort, and the all-important cost of human lives. The scale of such a loss is not even remotely comparable to that of our present conflict–at least, so far.

In addition, the first years of World War II featured many losses and much peril. It was a different world, however, and failure was not an option.

This Manchester Union Leader editorial in honor of Pearl Harbor makes the point that:

one does not win a war by fighting it with timidness and half-measures. We are on the verge of proving our attackers of five years ago right — if they kill enough of us, we will lose our will to win.

The important part of that quote is “timidness and half-measures.” Yes, our casualties in this war have been light compared to those of WWII. And yes, mistakes were made in both wars–and always will be. But it is impossible to remain politically correct and successfully wage an asymmetrical war against an enemy that uses terrorist tactics. If you’re going to try to do that, you may as well not try, because every single life sacrificed to that cause will have been as though it were wasted.

The tactics of World War II don’t fit today’s war. I’m not suggesting heavy bombardment of civilian populations, for example. I’ve already made it clear what I would have preferred–an occupation with more teeth and more direction, and a firmer and less-PC hand to control the chaos at the outset.

But tactics aren’t the issue. The issue is will. And, in that respect as in many others, current generations don’t compare to the one known as “The Greatest Generation.”

What will it take to fill us with the “terrible resolve” necessary? Because I sense this giant is only too happy to go back to sleep.

Helpful, so helpful

The New Neo Posted on by

The Washington Post headline: “Experts: Syria, Iran willing to aid USA.” Article by the AP, naturally.

What alternative universe do headline writers live in, I wonder? Reporting on the fact that the Iraq Study Group believes that Syria and Iran would be willing to help the needy US, as though this is some sort of newsworthy item, ought to be risible. But unfortunately, the AP is not the Onion. They are serious.

The Arab world, of course, is taking note of our breastbeating festival. Al Jazeera, according to the article, repeatedly aired Gates’s testimony that we’re not winning in Iraq.

Oh, perhaps al Jazeera’s viewers will watch and envy us for our ability to be humble, and to speak truth to power. And then again, their being an honor/shame culture and all, perhaps they’ll just take it as a sign that we are giving up, and they are winning. But we all get to feel good about ourselves in the meantime–isn’t that the important thing?

And if you detect more than a hint of sarcasm here, you’d be correct.

Iraq Study Group report: so, what else is new?

The New Neo Posted on by

I’m a bit underwhelmed by the Iraq Study Group report “The Way Forward: A New Approach” (see this and this). It reminds me of the usual recommendations by committee; you’re familiar with the genre, I’m sure.

“New approach?” Hardly.

I haven’t had time to read the full text, but the reports on the report are in line with the leaks on the report we’d gotten prior to the its official debut. The main recommendation seems to be more or less what the Administration has been saying all along–the goal is Iraqization, without an exact timetable. This is combined with the following “new” ideas, leaked prior to the issuance of the report: a temporary upsurge in troop involvement to get over the hump of Iraqization, talks with Iran and Syria (I’ve written about that idea before, here), and a new commitment to the old failed “peace process” approach to Israel/Palestine. No magic wands, nor were any expected.

I’m a bit perplexed by all the attention paid to the report prior to its release, and even now. Something like this–a public document about future military strategy–needs to be vague and general even if it does contain new and important information. At least, it should be that way if any of its proposals have any chance of being effective. Telegraphing exactly what we plan to do in great detail, and beaming it around the world for the enemy to see, would be counterproductive, to say the least. But many in this country and the MSM, although professing to be citizens of the world, act as though the only important thing is domestic political infighting, and a short-sighted “gotcha!” game.

And, of course, in line with this, some of the MSM articles on the subject (example here) emphasize the Group’s criticisms of the current approach. Imagine if, in the middle of the gloomiest days of the Civil War for the North, or World War II for the Allies (and they were pretty much all gloomy for the first couple of years), our own media had emphasized the demoralization of our forces, or the pessimism of our own people. But I digress…

I’m glad and not at all surprised at the seemingly general and rather bland nature of the recommendations. It’s really only the details of how Iraqization and the subsequent slow withdrawal of US troops will be carried out that matter on the end; all the rest is bluster.

However, bluster can be harmful, and I’m with Robert Kagan and William Kristol (oh yes, we evil scheming neocons stick together!) on the negative results that have already ensued from all the jaw-jaw about the Iraq Study Group, to wit:

It’s not as if the Baker commission has accomplished nothing, however. Although its recommendations will have no effect on American policy going forward, they have already had a very damaging effect throughout the world, and especially in the Middle East and in Iraq. For the Iraq Study Group, aided by supportive American media, has successfully conveyed the impression to everyone at home and abroad that the United States is about to withdraw from Iraq. This has weakened American allies and strengthened American enemies. It has exacerbated the problems in Iraq, as all the various factions in that country begin to prepare for the “inevitable” American retreat. Now it will require enormous efforts by the president and his advisers to dispel the disastrous impression that the Baker commission has quite deliberately created and will continue to foster in the weeks ahead. At home and abroad, people have been led to believe that Jim Baker and not the president was going to call the shots in Iraq from now on.

As yes, outside of the echo chamber that is Congress and the MSM the news gets around, and it has consequences. But we needn’t worry too much about any of those: we can always talk with the enemy about them.

[NOTE: re Iraqization vs Vietnamization, you might want to review this.]

Don’t feed the trolls

The New Neo Posted on by

Once again, I want to remind people to ignore trolls.

I plan soon to be getting enough time to redesign the blog in order to better deal with them. Till then, the best thing to do is ignore them rather than engage them. As a reminder, the following are banned trolls: loki, alphie, justaguy, and stevie. Of course, several of them do not stick to these names, so it’s only by IP and other details I’m privy to that I can identify them if they do so.

The new system should circumvent the present problems and make it far more difficult for trolls to get around the bans. Till then, I ask, once again, that people simply not respond to any troll comments, even those that seem like they invite a rational argument. It won’t stay rational or polite for long.

[ADDENDUM: Just for clarification, I want to state that once a troll has been banned, all comments by that troll will be deleted, including ones that seem reasonable and would otherwise be acceptable. Commenting here is a privilege, and once you’ve lost it, you’ve lost it.]

The many faces of democracy: Venezuela’s version

The New Neo Posted on by

I haven’t said anything much so far about Hugo Chavez, who recently won the Venezuelan election handily.

Take a look at what Fausta’s written about it for some perspective. It’s a sorry tale but not an unfamiliar one: demagoguery, Leftism, consolidation of power, shutting down of the opposition. Democracy in name only. And take a look at what Marc Cooper (definitely not a man of the Right), has to say about Chavez; apparently, Chavez is also a Leftist in name only.

But that’s the history of Leftism the world around, is it not? Ye shall always have the rich with you.

Also please read this sad elegy for a lost Venezuela by Daniel at Venezuela News and Views. An excerpt:

Today it was quite a hallucinating day. Oh, I was not surprised. My carefully documented predictions were giving Chavez a victory by 5 points. It might be by almost 20 points when all is counted. But with Chavez it does not matter, even with a single vote majority he would go ahead and try to do as he pleases. There is no brake for him. He is not a democrat. A democrat is always aware of the rights of the minority because a democrat knows that one day he might be that minority. Chavismo has made it clear long ago that all revolves around Chavez and that there is no other option for Venezuela. Elections are a necessary ritual that is extremely expensive but a necessity to justify all sorts of other different abuses. Unfortunate Rosales was not running against Chavez, he was running against a whole state whose complete resources were at the service of the autocrat who needs a regular plebiscite to boost his ego.

And thus today the amateur historian in me realizes that he has had the privilege to witness an historical day, the day that democracy completely left Venezuela. We have lost it.

I believe that democracy is in general a good thing. I’m with Churchill when he said it’s the worst form of government in the world except for all the others. However, democracy is fragile for a reason–it is susceptible to demagogues, relies on an informed citizenry, and can be undermined by tyranny if it doesn’t include strong and enforceable guarantees of civil liberties.

That’s why our form of government–which is actually a republic, not a true democracy –has been so stable and so unusual. Republicanism (and I’m not talking about the political party, I’m talking about the form of government: see this) is one of the greatest inventions of the human race. But that’s quite a bit different from simply allowing people to vote; Republicanism (or a free and well-functioning democracy) requires institutions that prevent a takeover by the forces of tyranny:

Democracies are free only if the people know what freedom is and are consistent in their application of it. If they don’t know this, or more appropriately, if a majority of the people don’t know this, then a democracy could be just as tyrannical as the worst dictator…As should be plain, there is a giant difference between the two systems of government. One of the main fears at the Constitutional Convention of the United States was that the government they created would be too democratic (causing Alexander Hamilton to suggest a restricted monarchy), because it was quite obvious, then and now, that any majority could vote itself anything it wanted, be it property or executions.

That’s why I always assumed that the Iraq War was going to have to include a fairly heavy-handed and lengthy occupation in order to set up the institutions that would foster the freedoms that go with democracy/republicanism. We did it in Japan; MacArthur and his staff wrote the Japanese Constitution, and it survives today without change; thirty-nine articles deal with basic human liberties. If that’s cultural imperialism, I’ll take it.

These guarantees are necessary, or democracy can–and most probably will–fail to be “the worst form of government except all the others;” it will merely take its place alongside all the others.