Disagreements on how to deal with suspected or actual terrorists who are in our custody rest on some basic assumptions, legal and otherwise. The first of these is whether or not we are at war or the equivalent of war, or whether we are at peace. The second is how to treat actual or suspected enemy operatives (combatants, agents, terrorists, or otherwise) in times of war or its equivalent.
So, are we at war? The Constitution is mum on the definition of war, but it was rarely an issue until recently. Everyone knew what war was; despite rhetoric such as the “war on poverty,” wars were by their very nature armed conflicts between nation-states (usually but not always declared), because only nation-states had the means to organize the armies required to do any sort of meaningful damage, and only nation-states had the motivation to go to war. Insurrections and rebellions likewise were ordinarily open armed conflicts between groups that were readily identifiable and treated under the laws of war rather than civilian law, for similar reasons.
It is only recently, with the combination of modern technology and modern communications, that a group such as al Qaeda—never envisioned by the framers—could have been formed. Its hallmarks are the following: (a) international and broad in scope and numbers (b) political in aim (c) military and quasi-military in training (d) secret and clandestine, with no military uniforms or designations, or need to engage forces on a traditional battlefield (e) exceptionally brutal, abiding by no conventional law of war (f) access to modern weaponry and technology (g) access to modern communications, internet and other (h) access to modern transportation and immigration laws, which allow foreign nationals relatively easy entry to this country (i) religious and otherworldly in belief and motive, and therefore without the usual deterrents, including that of self-preservation (i) targets are universal: military, civilian, economy, and infrastructure (j) sworn to our destruction.
All of these characteristics combine to make a group such as al Qaeda, and its many offshoots and allies, especially dangerous and seemingly unique. But law can evolve to deal with something new; that’s its very nature. All one has to do is to take precedent and see how it fits the new situation.
And that’s where definitions of words such as “war” and “combatant” come in. Judges who interpret statutes and case law do this sort of thing all the time; the way these things are ordinarily decided is by looking at the purpose behind the original legal definition of the term, and seeing whether that purpose is served by an expansion to the new situation.
That process is often a difficult one, in which judges can differ greatly. Each time a law is expanded to meet a new situation we are in terra incognita, and yet there’s no choice but to try to do it or the law will be inadequate to meet our needs and the needs of our society.
So, are we at war, and are al Qaeda members such as al-Marri unlawful enemy combatants? I believe the answer is yes and yes. The characteristics of al Qaeda listed above make its members and sympathizers the equivalent of an enemy in war, and an especially pernicious one because it abides by no rules of war and always operates clandestinely, making all of its members not only enemy combatants, but illegal enemy combatants.
How are such people usually handled? The situation is nothing if not complex (see this). They cannot claim POW status, but should nevertheless be treated with basic human decency (that is, not expressly tortured).
Congress has passed laws regulating these very situations, and like all statutes these Acts are open to judicial interpretation. The Military Commissions Act of 2006, for example, sets up military entities that would govern cases of illegal enemy combatants, and would follow amended rules of evidence based on those for general court-martial but excluding certain protections such as the right to a speedy trial (if you’re interested in a very detailed description of the rules of evidence for the commissions, see this, pages 9 through 19).
Al-Marri has never faced such a commission; he has been held indefinitely in military custody in this country without a trial, as have many of the Guantanamo prisoners. This is in line with the common procedure of holding prisoners of war “for the duration” in a conventional war, but of course this war is not conventional. Although the duration of any war is never known at the outset, this particular war is almost universally expected to have a much longer duration than a conventional war, and many people (myself among them) consider this indefinite holding of alleged enemy combatants to be especially problematic for that reason.
When Congress passed the Military Commissions Act it provided for a procedure by which detainees could be designated as “unlawful enemy combatants” (see page 5 here). A Combatant Status Review Tribunal was envisioned, but (at least, as far as I can see in the relevant documents) specific rules for this body, and guidelines for a timeline by which those accused must be thus designated, are absent. Although these failings represents serious flaws, the problem could (and, in my opinion, should) be corrected without throwing out recourse to the military tribunal system as a whole.
The civilian courts have always been recognized as inadequate to deal with war conditions, but this doesn’t mean that courts and trials of some sort are innappropriate, or that people should be indiscriminately deprived of their most basic rights by whatever courts are deemed appropriate. A person’s entry point into the military commission system, with lesser rights than are guaranteed in the civilian courts, is an especially delicate moment when those accused as terrorists could be vulnerable to governmental abuses of power.
That is why the courts are correct in emphasizing the importance of establishing a proper procedure for the determination of unlawful enemy combatant status. But in establishing this procedure, the full and complete panoply of rights (including generous discovery) that we afford under the civilian justice system no longer seems appropriate (especially in the case of foreign nationals) under the strange circumstances in which we find ourselves: an exceedingly dangerous war against a vicious enemy that does not play by any of the rules and is trained in covering its tracks and using the guarantees of our civilian system against us.
In this regard, the order establishing the military commission that tried the Lincoln conspirators (citizens all) is instructional:
The civil courts have no more right to prevent the military, in time of war, from trying an offender against the laws of war than they have a right to interfere with and prevent a battle. A battle may be lawfully fought in the very view and presence of a court; so a spy, or bandit or other offender against the law of war, may be tried, and tried lawfully, when and where the civil courts are open and transacting the usual business.
….One enemy in the power of another, whether he be an open or a secret one, should not be punished or executed without trial….The law of nations, which is the result of the experience and wisdom of ages, has decided that jayhawkers, banditti, etc., are offenders against the laws of nature and of war, and as such amenable to the military. Our Constitution has made those laws a part of the law of the land.
Whatever partisans of either stripe may argue, the law on illegal enemy combatants is far from clear, and at any rate it was developed prior to the fact situation that exists with modern-day international terror organizations. Congress’ Military Commissions Act of 2006 was passed to address this gap, but it needs some fine-tuning to function in a way that preserves the maximum rights possible commensurate with preserving the public and national safety.
Here are my recommendations—which undoubtedly will need some fine-tuning themselves:
Establish specific rules of evidence and timelines for the Combatant Status Review Tribunals that were envisioned under the Act and for detainees such as al-Marri who were held prior to that Act. Those who were clearly illegal combatants fighting us in foreign lands (al Qaeda members under arms but without uniforms in Afghanistan, for example) fit a simpler and more easily provable set of facts than al-Marri, and their designation with this status might at times be fairly straightforward. For people such as al-Marri, however, an alien who appreared to be peacefully residing in this country but who was alleged to have been an al Qaeda member and to have had al Qaeda contacts, and against whom evidence of planned terrorist activities has been amassed, the standards for declaring him an illegal enemy combatant must be stricter because the potential for error and abuse is greater.
But since the danger an al Qaeda member freely residing in this country represents is greater than that afforded by any ordinary criminal and the dangers of his being privy to our generous discovery procedures during a civil trial is likewise very great, the standards of protection afforded to such a person should not reach the levels of our civilian criminal justice system, especially if he is not a citizen nor a long-term legal resident (al-Marri is neither). In deciding whether a person thus accused is an illegal enemy combatant there might be a sort of middle-of-the-road procedure, perhaps something resembling traditional military courtmartial rules to determine this question only, and there should also be some time limit during which the accused must be granted this hearing.
What about citizens? The truth is that presently there are very few citizens held in this manner. Jose Padilla was one, but he is no longer in military custody (his case has had so many twistings and turnings that its Byzantine course would take a book to describe). Hamdi is another, but he is no longer being held at all, but was released to go back to Saudi Arabia and renounce his citizenship (where he grew up, by the way; he was a citizen because his Saudi parents were here when he was born, but they returned there when he was a child). Hamdi was picked up on an Afghan battlefield, and was only later determined to be an American citizen by accident of birth, and was never alleged to be plotting terrorism in this country.
The paucity of citizens in custody under the post-9/11 powers indicates that no Reign of Terror has been perpetrated on citizens by the Bush administration. But that does not mean that better safeguards should not be built into the operative laws; they should. These safeguards would best be served by making the government prove any accused US citizens to have been members of organizations such as al Qaeda, or prove their extreme dangerousness as terrorists plotting largescale attacks, under rules of evidence that are even stricter than those afforded aliens such as al-Marri, before being turned over to any military tribunal or detained indefinitely.
Whether these rules for determination of illegal enemy status for citizens ought to be subject to the full panoply of protections under our civilian law or whether they should come under military control at the outset is a knotty question, and one which I must admit I have not settled in my own mind. But I believe it is the only situation that might best be served by the civilian criminal system. At any rate, although cases involving the apprehension of citizens for terrorist activities or membership—and thus for illegal enemy combatant status—have been rare so far, it is still advisable to make the rules for such determinations much clearer and somewhat more protective than they are now.
The case for treating citizens who are aligned with groups such as al Qaeda as terrorists subject to military rather than civilian law rests on the idea of their being enemies of the state in a situation that is a war equivalent. The order establishing the military commission that tried the Lincoln conspirators addressed the issue of public vs. private enemies:
….That Booth and his associates were secret active public enemies [emphasis mine], no mind that contemplates the facts can doubt….[Booth] was not an assassin from private malice, but that he acted as a public foe….My conclusion, therefore, is, that if the persons who are charged with the assassination of the President committed the deed as public enemies, as I believe they did, and whether they did or not is a question to be decided by the tribunal before which they are tried, they not only can, but ought to be tried before a military tribunal.
These issues are not easy ones to solve. But the answers lie in a creative balancing of the two competing needs: to protect national security and to to protect the rights of the accused. Neither will be done perfectly, and both are extremely important. But without the first the second will be moot, because if we lose the war against Islamic totalitarians, human rights will be undermined in ways that will make Guantanamo seem like a country club and this whole debate as relevant as discussions of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.