Alternate universe: Obama against D-Day
This is pretty funny:
In a speech today presidential candidate Barack Obama maintained his steadfast disapproval of the D-Day landings of June 6th, 1944, despite the historical evidence of it as a smashing Allied victory over Nazi Germany.
“Even knowing what we know today, I would never commit to Operation Overlord,” the Senator explained…
I’d add the following to the remarks, to make the analogy a bit more apt:
I think that, I did not anticipate, and I think that this is a fair characterization, the convergence of not only the D-Day invasion but the German awakening in which a whole host of German military officers decided that they had had enough with Hitler, standing down to some degrees. So what you had is a combination of political factors inside of Germany in which the Germans would have become unwilling to fight, that then came right at the same time as terrific work by our troops. Had those political factors not occurred, I think that my assessment would have been correct.
[NOTE: Lest you think my Germany analogy far-fetched, let me remind you that German officers were plotting against Hitler since the late 30s, and that attempts reached their crescendo beginning in 1943—before D-Day—and culminated with the assassination attempt of July, 1944, shortly after D-Day, only the latest of several in the planning stages that had pre-dated D-Day but had not come to fruition.
It’s a fascinating story, if you’re not familiar with it. The summary is here.]
No doubt Obama, if elected, will call Gen. Petraeus back to DC, then threaten to kill his wife and son if he doesn’t commit suicide…
If the British government had paid attention to the small but very courageous band of anti-Hitler Germans back in the late 1930s, an ocean of suffering might have been avoided. See appeasement, then and now.
In that case, I pray that Petraeus brings the 101st Airborne to the meeting.
If Obonga relieves Gen. Petraeus and then proceeds to destroy his career and his work, expect an open rebellion in the country, with most of the military on our side. Obonga’s date with destiny: The Gallows, along with his cohort of Leftist traitors.
Keep scrolling down and you’ll find Roberto Gonzales’ account of how Jewish concentration camp victims were not protected by the Geneva Convention. And don’t miss Cheney’s explanation of how the Nazi’s really had to kill the Jews in Poland–otherwise they’d have had to kill them in Germany.
“sd”… GROW UP. That is quite possibly one of the most idiotic missives which take comments out of context. Most of the camps were in the East, because most of the Jews were there. The Nazis economized and tried to be efficient about it. And, yes, the Geneva Convention did not protect concentration camp victims BECAUSE THE GENEVA CONVENTION COULD NEVER ANTICIPATE SUCH AN EVENTUALITY.
BDS rots the brain.
“BDS rots the brain.”
…presupposing that one possesses such a thing in the first place…
Next Obama will explain how Jesus could have avoided the Cross with tough negotiations.
neo,
I’m sure the story is quite fascinating & I plan to follow it up after finishing your post, but your complete ability to capture Obama’s speaking mannerisms (without pre-written speech and teleprompter a.k.a. speaking extemporaneously) had me giggling so hard my laptop fell…on the floor. Oh, poor laptop. (It survived long enough for me to make out the rest of your posting…but I fear not much longer)
Anyway, great characterization.
(but I don’t think I can take 4 1/2 years of listening to the man’s circular drivel)
Reminds me of the mid-70’s National Lampoon headline, “Victory through Humiliating Defeat”.
FredHjr:
“If Obonga relieves Gen. Petraeus and then proceeds to destroy his career and his work, expect an open rebellion in the country, with most of the military on our side. “
I wouldnt expect anything of the sort. In fact I think that unless Petaeus runs for office, the media will simply do its best to ease him into quiet obscurity and those of us protesting his dismissal as mere bitter clinging hacks.
That’s the state of out nation politically as I see it.
Thank God we had men like Eisenhower who could think, and not men like Obama who has no sense of history or military strategy!
Does McCain know the difference between “surge and “counterinsurgency” : McCain asserted he knew that and didn’t commit a gaffe. “A surge is really a counterinsurgency made up of a number of components. … I’m not sure people understand that `surge’ is part of a counterinsurgency.” (says McCain)
Is it?
From a defense link 2005
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080723/ap_on_el_pr/mccain
I don’t think “counterinsurgency” is the subset of “surge”, it’s the other way around.
Surge differs today from in the past, the official noted. Surge during the Cold War meant a massive mobilization of active duty stateside forces, the National Guard and other reserve components, and shipping them quickly to Europe.
In the global war on terrorism it means being able to get trained forces – from whatever component or service – from the United States to a trouble spot quickly.
Surge also means different things to the different services, the official said. For the Army, it still has connotations of a massive lift of reserve forces to a distant battlefield. Having the training areas and facilities to make that happen are part of the surge requirement.
In the Air Force, surge capacity is broken into local, regional and strategic capabilities. The DoD official raised several points: Does one base have the ramp space to accommodate an evacuation from another base? Can bases in a region handle the number of planes and personnel needed to handle a contingency? Finally, can the service handle an all-out operation in a remote area of the globe with all that entails from fighting and logistics standpoints?
The Navy and Marine Corps have still another definition of surge. That deals with pier space, the official pointed out. Does the Navy have the space and logistics in place if they need to send ships from the Atlantic to the Pacific or vice versa?
Sorry, here’s the defense link
From a denfense link article from 2005 about the term “surge”
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=31686
He told reporters during an unscheduled stop in a super market that, what the Bush administration calls “the surge” was actually “made up of a number of components,” some of which began before the president’s order for more troops.
What I read in the linked DoD article confirms McCain’s quote. The article dated May, 2005, outlines surge capability by the military dating from before the article’s publication and well before President Bush ordered the surge in Iraq in 2007. Does the commentator have a point somewhere in all this innuendo?
The rethinking that led to the surge happened nearly a year before the surge plan was even announced
These are some excerpts from a great article which details how Bush came to the surge decision.. a decision that McCain had a role in jumpstarting.
That’s good judgement. Not Obama’s (paraphrase) “I oppose the surge because of political factors and dont care what hte consequences of our leaving would be”
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/658dwgrn.asp
On February 22, 2006, the golden dome of the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, one of the holiest Shia mosques in Iraq, was bombed. That single act of violence would change everything. For several weeks, Iraqi Shia and their militias didn’t react, and Bush and his advisers thought they’d dodged a bullet.
Then in April, violence exploded with a fury unseen in Iraq in the nearly three years since American troops had deposed Saddam Hussein. Shia militias hadn’t responded to earlier al Qaeda and Sunni provocations. But now they erupted in a killing spree. Shia death squads slaughtered thousands of Sunnis. Baghdad became a free fire zone. Iraq was on the verge of an all-out civil war.
At the White House, officials began to question the military strategy in Iraq and the assumptions behind it. American forces had been pursuing a “small footprint.” Its rationale was that Americans were an occupying force whose presence stoked the Iraqi insurgency. So the strategy was to keep U.S. troops out of Iraqi neighborhoods as much as practicable. They were camped instead in large installations, mostly outside Baghdad, and deployed on missions to destroy al Qaeda terrorists and insurgents.
There was another crucial assumption shared by American military leaders: Iraqis had to step up first. Violence wouldn’t subside until the new Iraqi government took tangible steps toward reconciliation between Sunnis and Shia. Reconciliation was a precondition for security. And while the American military could train and equip an Iraqi army, it couldn’t win the war. If Bush was skeptical of the small footprint, he never expressed it. He accepted the assurance of his commanders that the strategy was working—until Samarra.
After the bombing, NSC officials were increasingly dubious. They weren’t alone. General Keane kept in contact with retired and active Army officers, including Petraeus, who believed the war could be won with more troops and a population protection, or counterinsurgency, strategy—but not with a small footprint. At the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) in Washington, a former West Point professor (and a current WEEKLY STANDARD contributing editor), Frederick Kagan, was putting together a detailed plan to secure Baghdad. But the loudest voice for a change in Iraq was Senator John McCain of Arizona. He and his sidekick, Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, traveled repeatedly to Iraq. McCain badgered Bush and Hadley with phone calls urging more troops and a different strategy. Together, McCain, Keane, Petraeus, the network of Army officers, and Kagan provided a supportive backdrop for adopting a new strategy.
…
To stimulate fresh consideration of Iraq strategy, the NSC staff organized a panel of experts to address the president and his war cabinet at Camp David in mid-June. The two-day meeting at the presidential retreat loomed as a potential turning point in the Bush administration’s approach to Iraq.
The four-man panel wasn’t stacked. Kagan spoke in favor of additional troops and outlined his plan for pacifying Baghdad with a “clear, hold, and build” strategy. American soldiers, along with Iraqi troops, would do the holding, living in Baghdad and guarding its citizens, Sunni and Shia alike. Robert Kaplan, the foreign correspondent and military writer now teaching at the Naval Academy, talked about successful counterinsurgency campaigns in the past. (Kaplan’s books are among Bush’s favorites.) Kaplan neither advocated a troop buildup nor opposed it.
Countering Kagan, Michael Vickers, a former Green Beret and CIA operations officer, explained how Iraq could actually be won with fewer troops, not more. Vickers is now an assistant secretary of defense. The fourth panelist was Eliot Cohen, now a State Department adviser. Bush had read his book on wartime leadership, Supreme Command. Cohen reemphasized its theme: Leaders should hold their generals accountable if a war is being lost or won.
Bush’s reaction to the panel offered no hint of his thinking. After the first day’s session, he secretly flew to Iraq to attend the inauguration of Maliki’s government. Bush’s advisers, still at Camp David and expecting to see him in person, were surprised when he spoke to them by teleconference from Baghdad.
…
In the NSC’s inner circle, Bush’s partiality was clear. He liked option two, what later became known as the “surge.” He got plenty of reinforcement for that position. Hadley and Crouch traveled to Iraq in late October and early November: Hadley to talk to political leaders, Crouch to spend time with military units. On his return, Hadley sent a memo to Bush and his war cabinet that criticized Maliki, but also pointedly hinted at a surge of additional troops in Iraq. The memo was leaked to the New York Times.
…
Crouch visited Anbar and found what O’Sullivan and others had also discovered in Iraq: American soldiers were now welcomed. Anbar, once controlled by Sunni insurgents and Al Qaeda in Iraq, had turned. The Sunnis had revolted against their al Qaeda allies and joined forces with Americans. With more troops, U.S. officers said they could gain control of the entire Anbar region.
On November 30, the day after Hadley’s memo became public, Bush met with Maliki in Amman, Jordan. He had “a couple of important factors” to work out before committing to a surge. “One was, would I have a partner to deal with in the prime minister of Iraq,” Bush said. “I went out to the region to have a little sit-down with him, to get a sense of his intensity in dealing with killers, whether they be Sunni or Shia. In other words, there had to be Iraqi buy-in to any new strategy in order for it to be effective.”
The second issue was whether the Iraqi troops would participate in a surge and perform better than they had in Together Forward I and II. Maliki claimed the Iraqi army could handle the job of securing Baghdad alone. His attitude, the president said, was, “We need you there for a while, we can do this, we’ll take care of it.” But “after the meeting, General Casey said they can’t.” Bush believed Casey.
It was weeks before Bush got satisfaction from Maliki on the two points, weeks that included numerous phone conversations and talks by teleconference. Finally, in a speech four days before Bush announced the surge, Maliki gave public assurances that Iraqi troops would be fully engaged in pacifying Baghdad and would act in a nonsectarian manner.
In Washington, the president got little satisfaction from the interagency review of Iraq policy. Instead of a surge, the State Department favored a strategy of pulling troops out of Baghdad and allowing the Sunnis and Shia to finish their bloody struggle. When Bush heard about this idea, he rejected it out of hand. “I don’t believe you can have political reconciliation if your capital city is burning,” he said.
…
On December 11, Bush had five military experts to the Oval Office to talk about the Iraq war. Keane, a friend of Cheney but almost unknown to Bush, made the strongest impression, arguing that “train and leave” wasn’t a strategy for winning. He laid out a case for the surge, reinforcing Bush’s strong inclination. Retired generals Wayne Downing and Barry McCaffrey opposed the surge. (McCaffrey later changed his mind.) Stephen Biddle of the Council on Foreign Relations, a Democrat, criticized the gradual retreat urged by the Baker-Hamilton Commission. And Eliot Cohen talked about civil-military aspects of the Iraq war and said Bush should talk to younger officers, not just the generals.
…
Bush was originally scheduled to deliver a nationally televised speech on Iraq the second week in December, a day or so after the Tank session. But the president wasn’t ready. He wanted to give Gates time to visit Iraq. And a key decision—about sending troops to Anbar, home of the Sunni Awakening—was still to be made. The speech was put off until after New Year’s.
When Gates returned from Iraq just before Christmas, he brought Casey’s recommendation for a surge of one or two brigades—a mini-surge. Bush felt that wouldn’t work. He had agreed with Hadley and Crouch that Anbar was an opportunity worth seizing. He didn’t want to “piecemeal the operation” by tackling the province later. Once he’d “made the decision to cleanse Anbar and settle down Baghdad at the same time,” Bush said, it had to be five brigades.
…
Though he was replacing Casey and jettisoning his strategy, the president didn’t want to embarrass him. Bush admires Casey and rejects the Lincoln analogy: that like President Lincoln he fired generals until he found one who would win the war. When I raised the analogy, Bush interrupted. “McClellan and Casey,” he said. “That’s not accurate.” Lincoln fired General George McClellan and ultimately made Ulysses Grant his top commander. According to the analogy, Petraeus is Bush’s Grant. “I wouldn’t go there,” Bush told me. He promoted Casey to Army chief of staff.
The Petraeus factor strengthened Hadley’s hand in working on Bush’s speech. Words matter in presidential addresses, even a single word. The Pentagon wanted Bush to announce a surge of “up to” five brigades. Hadley urged the president to be more specific and forceful. Bush agreed and said he was “committed” to sending five brigades.
And if a question lingered about his intentions on Anbar, Bush answered it in his speech. “I have given orders to increase American forces in Anbar Province by 4,000 troops,” he declared
Well, simply put, John McCain said the Anbar awakening begin with the surge. From the same link posted earlier.
e.g. “Because of the surge, we were able to go out and protect that sheik and others. And it began the Anbar awakening.”
The Anbar awakening begin 4 months earlier without anything resembling a surge. And I listed the previous possible descriptions of surge.
Direct from a military defense link 4 months before the Surge.
This is a different phenomena that’s going on right now. I think that it’s not so much the insurgent groups that are fighting al Qaeda, it’s the — well, it used to be the fence-sitters, the tribal leaders, are stepping forward and cooperating with the Iraqi security forces against al Qaeda, and it’s had a very different result.
But now that the population and the tribal leaders are beginning to make common cause against al Qaeda, the tide is — the table is turned completely against al Qaeda, and now it’s the al Qaeda forces that need to be worried about living in those neighborhoods. They stick out like a sore thumb. Everybody knows who the terrorists are.
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3738
Vince’s above post should provide a very strong hint about our abilities to adapt, learn, and change in the middle of a war. Our military – its officers and nco’s – from the top to bottom are quite gifted at learning from mistakes and even innovative with tactics and strategy. He does not address this directly in his post, but from the President on down we had men who rolled up their sleeves and looked hard at the situation in order to assess the enemy’s tactics and goals.
I weep at the thought of these men being under a CIC like Obonga and his advisers. Obonga and his advisers ARE NOT WORTHY of these men.
We must not give over such a truly great tool, weapon, and human endeavor that has such a rich history as the United States military to fools like the Leftists who want to take power in this country.
From the American Revolution onward – and tonight I am reading a thread about Nathaniel Greene on another weblog – in every war we adapt superbly. It does not mean we have not lost battles and even had some costly victories. But this great organization we have has some of our best. The people who are the naysayers know almost nothing about military history and how to win.
I do not want a defeatist and appeaser like Obonga to do the things I’m sure his advisers want to do to this treasure of the nation.
The truth is that the Iraqi politicians and our politicians can prattle all they want about how they facilitated the currently emerging victory in Iraq, but none of this was possible without the pluck, tenacity, adaptability, and aggressiveness of our military.
Please God, do not put them in the hands of Obonga.
Fred: The article is about twice as long as the parts that I pasted, Everyone should go to the link and read the whole think.
I could cry thinking that Obama might be hte head of our military. I was never in the military, but I could actualyl weep thinking that the men and women who signed up to fight for this country would palced on the command of a degenerate Marxist.. there is no justice in the world
Well, simply put, John McCain said the Anbar awakening begin with the surge. From the same link posted earlier.
e.g. “Because of the surge, we were able to go out and protect that sheik and others. And it began the Anbar awakening.”
I hate to be a nit-picker but I would like a source and a link for the above quote.
You can only claim success for the surge by lowering the goalposts.
There is still no mid- or long-term political settlement in Iraq.
The ethnic cleansing of neighborhoods has not reversed and, in fact, the surge helped cement those divisions, which ensure long-term conflict in the country.
Sure, violence is down to near levels in the year or so after the invasion. But at what cost?
Obama was certainly wrong in his prediction that the surge would worsen violence. Clearly, it hasn’t. Yet the surge’s supporters were wrong as well in their predictions that it would create an opening for a political settlement. It hasn’t.
The analysis of the situation in Iraq can be so much more intelligent if you just step away from insane, paranoiac ideological rigidity.
Anyone who was paying attention and reading, for example, the Small Wars Journal prior to the Surge knew that the Surge was less about troops and more about a more engaged, COIN strategy.
We could have added 100K troops and used the old strategy and still have an ongoing civil war. We could have kept the troops levels the same, changed strategies, and cleared more slowly. For example, the belts around Baghdad may have been cleared by now, But AQI would still hold several cities.
The added troops, change in strategy, and improvement in Iraqi leadership and military capabilities have caused some in the media to declare that Iraq cannot be lost at this point-when a year and a half ago, Sen Reid said it could not be won.
the 1st link in my 6:41 post, grackle has that quote. It is originaly from Couric’s interview with McCain yesterday, if you want to hunt down the whole transcript.
~
Perhaps Iraq will turn out to be as helpful as Pakistan once we leave.
And before you go writing that the opening for political settlement is, well, open-ended, in that it could come 1 month, 1 year or 5 years down the road, keep in mind the same goes for violence.
It could easily flare back up in 1 month, 1 year or five years.
The analysis of the situation in Iraq can be so much more intelligent if you just step away from insane, paranoiac ideological rigidity.
Like the ideology that says Obama was wrong about the surge, but he is now right about the surge not obtaining political success?
And a year from now, Obama’s going to be wrong twice and where then will that leave you?
Stuck in a hole with your head in the sand?
It could easily flare back up in 1 month, 1 year or five years.
The same goes for inflation, the debt, and gas prices. Yet I don’t see you people helping save people’s lives from those things. Isn’t it natural to sacrifice the Iraqis for your ideology simply because their life is going better than the socialist conditions created here in AMerica?
The frightening thing is this is plausible. It really is.
“Obama was certainly wrong in his prediction that the surge would worsen violence. Clearly, it hasn’t.”
Well, it hasn’t YET. But of course we are still there in force.
“Yet the surge’s supporters were wrong as well in their predictions that it would create an opening for a political settlement. It hasn’t.”
What you’ll eventually see is a kind of pseudo-settlement that will be solid enough to get us out of Iraq (if we’re lucky). Then, once the coast is clear, the ancient adversaries in Iraq will get busy meting out retribution.
On Iraq:
You can’t call Iraq stable until and unless you find a way to bring the five million Iraqis in exile home. As long as a fifth of the population remains exiles and impoverished, Iraq has a reckoning coming, regardless of the surge.
Debt
Republican governments piled up the greatest parts of the debt.
Maybe it will all blow up, kill lots of Americans, and damage America’s interests.
Keep a good thought, eh, sd?
“Maybe it will all blow up, kill lots of Americans, and damage America’s interests.”
Perhaps it will. The idea certainly seems to leave you with a boner.
Ah, the profound analysis of the leftists, whose erudition is matched only by their patriotism and judgment.
Guilty as charged, Beard. And can you speak a little louder, please? It’s hard to hear your patiotic chest-thumping over my air conditioner.
Ask the proprietor of your bathhouse to turn it down. Global warming and all that, right?
Global warming? No, no. I dare say you’re the only source of hot air here.
I believe Occam’s Beard adequately complimented “sd” in an above post. Far more eloquent a riposte than what issued forth from the recipient’s wooden tongue.
FredHjr, that, no doubt, is why he needs small minions like you to come to his aid.
Face it, your side has lost – again.
You lost when the Berlin Wall fell.
You lost when the Soviet Union fell.
You lost when Poland became free.
You lost when Ceausceau was stood against a wall.
You lost when we toppled Saddam Hussein.
You lost in 2000.
You lost in 2004.
You’re about to lose in November, as the air is going out of Obama’s balloon like a whoopee cushion, and he joins Ricky Martin, the Spice Girls, and 8-track tapes in pop culture. No number of 20-somethings showing up, hung over, on Wednesday to vote for him are going to save him.
And you’ll lose again when Iraq is free, prosperous, and democratic.
No wonder you guys are bitter.
“sd”
Small minion I am not.
B.A. Economics, University of New Hampshire, 1982
M.A. Loyola University of Chicago, 1986
M.B.A. Finance, Boston College, 1991
Other experience:
Currently employed as an equities’ analyst at a small company in Portsmouth, NH
U.S. Army veteran (1973-76, Honorable Discharge)
Played Junior A Hockey, Richmond, VA (1975-76 – with permission of Army commander, Headquarters Company, Fort Lee, VA); NCAA University of New Hampshire (1978-82).
I can pack an intellectual wallop, and also dish one out physically on the ice, when I could play (can’t play now, both hips replaced on account of osteoarthritis).
And I prefer to use a word you used in an above post only in a men’s locker room with other hockey players. It’s not polite to refer to the erect male phallus in mixed company where some modicum of civility is necessary. I only use cuss words when I’m very angry, and usually followed by or preceded by an apology.
Your knowledge of military history, the history of ideas, and especially of Islam and the current conflict is not exactly overwhelming.
Occam is, indeed, wittier than I am. I was merely acknowledging that he ate your lunch.
“I can pack an intellectual wallop.”
And so modest!
Poor Freddy.
If you need to cite your resume, it’s a good sign whatever “wallop” you may have isn’t finding the target.
Angus is right, Freddy. When you’re reduced to trotting out your college degrees and abject boasting, it’s all over.
“And you’ll lose again when Iraq is free, prosperous, and democratic.”
This is loss? Holy crap! What happens when you win…they throw in some kind of gift certificate or something?
“It’s not polite to refer to the erect male phallus in mixed company where some modicum of civility is necessary.”
And yet, you just referred to the erect male phallus in mixed company. We await your apology.
It’s difficult to separate those who think the worst is yet to happen and those who hope the worst is yet to happen.
But not impossible.
“sd” you were the one who made use of the word “boner” in an above post. You are nothing but an adolescent provocateur and a crude one at that. You perfectly exemplify the kind of verbal brass knuckle style of the idiots over at the DailyKos. Are you a KosKiddie, “sd” ?
There are slight differences between how we respectively insult each other. I am sure some will appreciate the subtle difference.
I actually think invasion of Iraq was more necessary, less optional, than D-Day. The D-Day alternative of “no invasion, bad weather, Sorry Stalin, here’s another multi-million in tanks to kill Nazis” probably would have kept Stalin sending under-trained Ruskies against under-clothed (and under-shod) Krauts while the US kept working to get the A-bomb, with new D-Day in 1945 much less expensive in terms of lives, nor with any Battle of the Bulge counter-attack (all such Nazis would be killing commies and dying in the East.)
And maybe surround and blockade Japan first.
If the US hadn’t invaded Iraq, nobody would have booted Saddam (until maybe both Iran & Iraq had nukes facing off?).
Funny/ illogical how those against McCain, who rightly note that the Awakening started before the Surge, fail to give Rumsfeld’s “small footprint” any credit. I’d claim 1)small footprint, 2) Awakening (Iraqis deciding to fight AQ), 3) Surge and COINS, in that order, are probably the optimal strategy for both of the most important measures:
a) minimize US troop loss, and
b) minimize time before Iraqis take over.
Notice how, with full Occupation, neither Bosnia nor Kosovo is really fully independent. While Iraq isn’t yet either, I’d bet they will be faster than the Europeans.
But it’s not BDS, it’s really anti-Rep / anti-Christian / anti-Capitalism that was driving the Leftist Hate. They just personalize it to Bush, but demonize all Bush supporters.
Much like the Nazi fascists demonized Jews in the 30s — I think Liberal Fascists is the right term for most ‘BDS’ folk who have no let up in hate for McCain and Reps as Bush exits.
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“sd” you were the one who made use of the word “boner” in an above post
He didn’t complain (only) about the use of “boner”. He complained about referring to the erect male phallus in mixed company, period.
Now turn that frown upside down
“I actually think invasion of Iraq was more necessary, less optional, than D-Day.”
I think I’m prepared to make the even stronger claim that the invasion of Iraq was more necessary, less optional, than defending ourselves against the Japanese following the attack on Pearl Harbor. Japanese food tends not to stay with one very long. Had the Japanese continued their military operations westward, their supply lines couldn’t have kept up for the demand for food. Their forces would have starved. The Chinese would probably have sought to avenge past injustices and that would have been the end of the Japanese empire, without our even engaging Japanese forces in the Pacific.
So you see, the invasion of Iraq was much, much more necessary.
Look sd, why don’t you go worship the dead body of Saddam as your new God, while Obama takes the Heavenly Throne.
Then, once the coast is clear, the ancient adversaries in Iraq will get busy meting out retribution.
That is certainly what would have happened, and what did happen in Cuba and Iran, when Leftist revolutionaries came to power.