The causes of the DC air collision
The horrific air collision between a military helicopter and passenger jet in the busy DC air corridor last January 29 caused shock and outrage because it seemed evident right from the start that this was the result of error, probably multiple errors. To me, first and foremost, military training flights should not be crossing paths with the approach to a busy airport at all, and especially with allowance for such a low vertical separation. And yet this was allowed, and left no room for error.
Well, there was plenty of error, and we’re learning more about that:
Moments before the deadly Jan. 29 crash near Reagan International Airport, Capt. Rebecca Lobach missed an order from co-pilot Andrew Eaves, who was overseeing her training mission, to change course and avoid the descending American Airlines jet, the New York Times reported.
Along with the error, officials found that the pilots “stepped on” some of the air traffic controller’s instructions, meaning they accidentally cut him off when pressing the button to talk over the radio and likely missed important information. …
During that moment, investigators believe Eaves and Lobach failed to hear that the American Airlines plane was “circling” because one of them was pressing the microphone key to speak to air traffic control when the word came through. …
Technology on the Black Hawk that would have allowed air traffic control to better track the helicopter was also found to be turned off that day, common protocol if the training mission had been for real.
But it was a practice mission …
Aviation experts have long bemoaned the practice of allowing pilots to navigate on their own [which was the case here] …
There was also an apparent discrepancy between two of the three Army pilots aboard the doomed chopper about what altitude they were flying at, according to investigators — and they were well above the 200-foot limit for that location.
I also think the helicopter pilots may have been thinking they saw the plane in question but they were focused on a different plane – something I’ve read speculated about in other articles. The comments to this one focused, however – and understandably, I think – on the revelation that the flight instructor told the pilot to turn about 15 seconds before the crash occurred. The wording here is that she “missed” his order, but what does that mean? She certainly didn’t follow it; that we know. But did she hear it? Did she disregard it on hearing it? Was her failure to respond the result of panic, confidence, or distraction? I don’t see that we’ll ever know.
Because Rebecca Lobach was female, there is a great deal of talk online about her having been a DEI hire. We don’t know that’s true, although it’s certainly possible. I’ve also read criticism saying that her previous 500 hours in a Blackhawk was a surprisingly low total, although that’s a subject on which I have no expertise whatsoever.
More from the article:
“The Black Hawk was 15 seconds away from crossing paths with the jet. Warrant Officer Eaves then turned his attention to Captain Lobach. He told her he believed that air traffic control wanted them to turn left, toward the east river bank,” the Times wrote.
“He believed”? I have yet to find an exact quote, which would be helpful (if you see one, please put it and the link in the comments). Did he order her? Was he tentative? Could he have taken charge and done it himself if he thought disaster was imminent? I have no answers to those questions, but that’s what I’d like to know. I’ve also seen speculation that she didn’t obey because she outranked him, but I’ve seen answers from people who claim to have been in the military that indicates in a situation where he’s the examiner, rank wouldn’t matter.
RIP to all who lost their lives in this terrible tragedy of errors.
NOTE: I’ve also seen speculation that she did this purposely in a murder/suicide. I think that’s preposterous, because even without knowing anything about her emotional state, it would be an extremely difficult thing to do in terms of the trajectories. It’s not like hitting a large stationary target such as the World Trade Center, nor is it like crashing into a mountain or the ground.
Here is how I see it:
1. Complacency may have played a role. The last midair collision in the USA involving a civilian airliner was the crash of Aeromexico 498 while on approach to LAX. That’s almost 40 years, and I am sure a lot of people simply figured that couldn’t happen anymore.
2. The flight instructor was a NCO, the pilot was a commissioned officer. It may be that the instructor was hesitant for a moment too long in in asserting control of the situation. Had he acted sooner, everyone might be alive but he’d likely face some touch scrutiny and maybe even have his career ruined. We’ll never know.
3. The airlines are constantly pushing for rules that allow for more planes in the sky and less separation between them. I don’t know if this was a factor here or not, but Reagan is a busy airport.
4. And finally, planes don’t crash because one thing goes wrong. They crash because multiple things go wrong at the same time.
As I was one who broached the “preposterous” thought — which I don’t believe is “speculation” as such, but merely one of many potentialities the air accident investigators will necessarily have to consider as they proceed and either eliminate, confirm or fail to find sufficient evidence to support one way or another, seemed to me appropriate to quote that thought in the context in which it was provoked to begin with. I hadn’t thought such a thing before in this case and certainly haven’t concluded with it now. As to the objection neo raises, a fine objection on its own, I’m not so sure even now. When, for instance, is it possible for a decision to intentionally die by suicide necessary to be made to “count” as an intention to die by suicide? Milliseconds don’t count? Two seconds? Ten? Thirty? On the other hand, as to the difficulty of causing a collision . . . seems as though an actual collision would be sufficient proof of concept as flown with targeting precision.
The more we learn about the mishap the more it’s clear the Blackhawk was focused on avoiding the straight-in traffic on final and not on the traffic that was circling into their flightpath. No flight examiner is going to let a pilot on a checkride drive into another aircraft.The fact that they were on a collision course with no evasive maneuver by either aircraft until a second or two before impact shows neither saw the other. The traffic they saw was moving across the windscreen. The traffic they hit blended into the lights of the city and unmoving in the windscreen making it more difficult to pick up. However, if the Blackhawk was flying at or below the max route altitude of 200 AGL they would have passed below the airliner and lived to tell the tale. Inexperience, complacency, bad airmanship there are any number of lessons to be learned from this terrible accident.
How in the hell does a pilot ‘miss’ an order from a co-pilot sitting right next to her, tasked with overseeing her training mission?
An order undoubtedly repeated when she didn’t follow it. Something stinks and it smells like a possible cover-up.
I’m not a helicopter pilot but my son is and is in the process of becoming a certified flight instructor so we talk a lot about the training. The latest reports seem to confirm my original thoughts of what caused the crash. The pilot was relatively inexperienced and had trouble staying on course at night under fairly windy conditions. Her instructor should have taken over the controls when he knew there was potential danger and the pilot was struggling to stay on course.
I don’t know why the instructor failed to take the controls. He could have felt pressure not to fail the pilot on her check ride because this would negatively affect her career and possibly his. But safety should have obviously been the first priority especially given the airspace in which they were flying.
I do think this was a tragic accident and was not a purposeful act. The video taken from far away gives an unrealistic impression of the speed at which the helicopter and plane were flying. Things looked a lot different from the helicopter pilot’s point of view and I don’t think she ever saw the plane until it was too late.
The instructor/copilot told the pilot flying that “he believed that air traffic control wanted them to turn left”, according to the last published NTSB report on the accident. This is not exactly either an order or a clear instruction. If he believed collision was imminent, why did he not say ‘I have the aircraft” and simultaneously take control?
Very insightful by Sgt Joe Friday:
“ They crash because multiple things go wrong at the same time.”
Contributing Items I read about:
1. Dangerous corridor being used for a check flight.
2. Overwhelmed/ under staffed air flight controllers with Dei hiring in that time period.
3. Possible issues with Blackhawk altimeter.
4. Outdated air traffic control system that still uses floppy disks. Some systems are 50 years old.
https://fedscoop.com/air-traffic-safety-faa-aging-software-technology/
Probably many more will come out.
What Sgt. Joe Friday speculates above sounds like a good analysis to me: an NCO reluctant to take the controls away from a Commissioned Officer and correct her flying.
I’m an FAA-certificated Flight Instructor and have been a Check Pilot and Check Pilot Examiner for the Civil Air Patrol. I know from experience there is a fine line between allowing a pilot to whom you’re giving a check ride to catch their own error, and intervening. From my reading of various reports, including the NYTimes’ long article, it appears to me that Air Traffic Control instructed the helicopter to take corrective action, and the Check Pilot was starting to tell the pilot to turn away from the course of the passenger jet and maybe even to descend. The last line of the NYTimes article said, IIRC, that she did not take corrective action.
We don’t know what transpired before on this same flight. Had the Check Pilot had to intervene previously? Was she close to washing out or to failing her check ride? All of this would have influenced the check ride in addition to their relative inequality.
I have had to fail pilots on check rides. It is not an easy thing to do, especially if there is a relative disparity between the two as there was in this helicopter case. Of if the pilot is a “protected class”. I had to fail an older pilot who was a long-time member of the squadron and a very senior pilot. But it was clear to me he was not up the mark. And when I busted him he thanked me — he knew it was time to stop flying.
I am inferring in this case that the pilot being checked might have been a member of a “protected class” and I am also inferring the check pilot might have been under pressure NOT to bust the pilot, and that’s a tough call. That’s two inferences, so perhaps way off the mark, but I put it out there as a possibility. I’ve been there, and I know it’s a tough spot to be in.
Stone Age air traffic control system is a major contributor. Imagine if the pilot was wearing VR goggles that displayed the conflicting traffic flight path as a flashing colored ribbon instead of having ATC yapping at them and getting stepped on by keying the microphone. Presumably the PIC would take action on their own upon seeing they are about to intersect the ribbon.
I think looking at the what was going on in the cockpit is a waste of effort. The root cause of the accident is having military training flights at or below 200 ft with a barometric altimeter that can have a 50 ft error flying cross to airliners on a final approach. Too bad so many people died in order for the FAA to stop such insanity.
Chases Eagles…”Imagine if the pilot was wearing VR goggles that displayed the conflicting traffic flight path as a flashing colored ribbon instead of having ATC yapping at them and getting stepped on by keying the microphone.”
Doesn’t require any changes to the ATC system to do that, signals from the ADS-B IN system could feed the VR display, as could signals from TCAS. Personally, I’d rather skip the VR goggles and display traffic on the windshield with the heads-up display.
Sounds as if the instructor pilot was a senior warrant. This bunch are not shrinking violets .
Aubrey is correct. WOs are tough guys.
I’m going off memory of other reporting that the pilot in question was not only low on hours but also had just completed a non-flying assignment in some advisory capacity in the Biden White House. I think AofSHQ noted that it’s interesting she managed to land in yet another assignment bringing her in close contact with DC movers and shakers.
IIRC, she had a p/t ceremonial post at the White House that did not take up many hours. He main assignment was elsewhere.
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I’m seeing contentions that she had failed four previous examinations. Does anyone know if this is actually true and what the implications of failing four examinations would ordinarily be?
Given the events of the last several years, I’m afraid that automatic suspicion–that things are not as we are being told they are–is my default position, when trying to understand any particular issue or event.
Apparently, the helicopter had been in the air for nearly two hours (105 minutes) when WO Eaves turned the controls over to Capt. Lobach. The collision occurred 17 minutes later.
Concur with other commenters regarding toughness and aptitude of Warrant Officers. No aviation warrant I’ve worked with would ever allow deference to rank or position to hazard an aircraft, mission, or Soldiers.
Secondly, most lower-ranking Army aviation officers, like this Captain, have a low amount of flight hours. A typical pilot gets 100 or so hours a year, and simulation time counts towards that. With our Middle East sojourns wound down and other resource constraints, most pilots are allotted the minimum hours prescribed by regulation and very little more.
Thirdly, the assignment to the White House doesn’t mean much. Aviation officers are double and triple hatted, if she wasn’t at the White House she would have been in another non-flying assignment concurrent with her rated pilot assignment.
This mishap should be generating some hard-ball questions directed at Army leadership regarding flight crew training and readiness standards. I would hate to see reflexive cries of “DEI!” allow senior leaders off the hook.
Grunt.
You don’t need extensive experience to follow precise directions.
Some other factor. Bright flaring in NVG from another A/C landing lights causing a startle reflex(
11B 71552
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This mishap should be generating some hard-ball questions directed at Army leadership regarding flight crew training and readiness standards. I would hate to see reflexive cries of “DEI!” allow senior leaders off the hook.
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Embrace the power of ‘and’.
My brother works for a major airline. He’s not a pilot but works with pilots and has learned a great deal about the flying side of passenger air travel. We regularly talk about air crashes in the news. Sometimes he cannot tell me what he knows.
We briefly discussed the New York Times article which was revealing. A whole bunch of mistakes were made. Yes the Black Hawk pilot appears to bear much of the responsibility. Air Traffic Control also bears some. These mistakes did not happen in a vacuum. There’s the whole “training flight along a river near a major airport with a piece of equipment turned off because we’re simulating an evacuation of members of Congress” thing.
A few years ago my brother said something that has stuck with me.
“You know why we haven’t had a major passenger jet crash in twenty-plus years? Because we learn from our mistakes. When a crash happens, we find out what went wrong, and we make sure that doesn’t happen again”. We need to be honest about what went wrong here.
Sgt Joe Friday nails it.
Several things went wrong that evening in January. Put them all together and we get the worst passenger jet crash in more than twenty years.
There are a whole lot of odd things going on here
1) The Black Hawk was above the 200′ ceiling it was supposed to be below in its corridor. There are two kinds of altimiters used, barometric, which you set the 0 for on take off. There are also Radar but would the Black Hawk have that? But the 33 runway the airplane was headed for is at 14′ MSL and other airports in the area would likely be at or slightly above Reagan National so the altimiter would (if anything) read low (unless of course you set it wrong. NTSB would have looked at that). The Check Pilot doesn’t SEEM to have called that issue out.
2) Communications with ATC were sloppy, with the Black Hawk being too eager to talk and stepping on ATC. Again, the Check Pilot didn’t call this out and not having the Aircraft he was likely the one doing the communicating
3) Communications inside the aircraft were sloppy. The CWO seems to have requested the pilot turn left, but precisely the tone and nature of the communication we do not have. This was 15 seconds before collision. If it was critical you would expect the check pilot to repeat the command in a more urgent tone or to take the aircraft away from the captain. As noted the CWO is probably not a shrinking violet, but the captain might have a chip on her shoulder OR might have been overwhelmed
4)NYT (for whats that’s worth) seems to say this was the captain’s yearly checkride. Why in all the names of hell would you do a checkride in a super busy corridor on a pathway meant for VIP extraction using Night Vision Gear? This path is notoriously hard to deal with and all of that really puts the trainee right at the edge (and perhaps beyond) task overload. Be interesting to see what other recent flight hours the captain had (simulated or otherwise).
Comments have asked how you don’t hear the person sitting next to you in the cockpit but helicopters (and military aircraft in general) are LOUD. You’d be using headsets, likely very nice noise cancelling ones to hear the crew on the internal monitor channel as well as hear radio communications.
Honestly this looks like an issue the commercial airlines have dealt with where the ranking officer discounts the input from the “junior” officer. Thing is here “Junior” officer likely likely has 3-4x the hours of the captain.
I would see this as clearly Pilot in command of the Black Hawks failure with ancillary culpability for the Check officer. That the Check officer was NOT taking the aircraft at several different points hints at a general lack of readiness and pilot skills possibly endemic in the US Army pilots.
If you want to Blame DEI I think the issue is more that training time was likely wasted on bunches of foolish training rather than keeping Aircrew efficiency where it ought to be.
Sky Dayton, an entrepreneur who among other things was the founder of Earthlink, is also a jet pilot and had some comments on this accident: especially, he thinks recurrent simulator training needs to focus a lot more on traffic avoidance.
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